Shulchan Aruch: Chapter 350 - The Laws that Apply When One Extends His Head and the Majority of His Body from One Domain to Another

SECTION 350 The Laws that Apply When One Extends His Head and the Majority of His Body from One Domain to Another (1-4)

1 A person may stand in a private domain, extend his hand into the public domain, and move objects [located] there, picking them up from one place [in the public domain] and putting them down in another place [in that domain].1 We do not suspect that he will forget and bring [the objects back] to his [location] in the private domain. [The person must, however, be careful] not to move [the objects more] than four cubits in the public domain. [In such an instance,] even though [the person] would be standing in one place [without moving] in a private domain, and merely moving the object with his hands four cubits from the place it had been positioned [initially in the public domain], he would be liable.2

So too, a person may stand in the public domain and move objects in a private domain.3 We do not suspect that [the person] will bring [the objects] to [the domain] where he is currently [standing].

2 To [which type of objects] does the above – that we do not suspect [that one will bring the objects to his location] – apply? To objects that [the person] does not require in the domain in which he is [currently] located; [he] only [needs these objects] in the domain where he moves them. For example, [a person] stands in one domain and extends his hand to the other, takes a key, and opens [a door there with the key].4 [The person] does not need the key in the domain in which he is located, only in the other domain where he opens [the door]. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations with regard to objects that one does not require in one domain, only in the other.

A person may not, however, stand in a private domain and extend his head into the public domain and drink there, or do the opposite.5 [Standing in one domain and reaching over to drink from another domain] is only permitted if [the person] extends his head and the majority of his body into the place where he is drinking. [The rationale for this stringency is that] there is concern that since [the person] is in need of the water, he will forget and bring [the water] to his [location in the private domain].6 The same [principle] holds true in all similar situations.

It is, however, permitted to stand in a private domain or a public domain and drink in a karmelis, or to do the opposite, [i.e., stand in a karmelis and drink in a private or public domain]. Our Sages did not decree [a restriction to safeguard the observance of] a Rabbinic decree.7

(True, [the person drinking] is performing an akirah with the water by drinking it in one domain, and when the water enters his digestive system, which is located in the other domain, he has performed a hanachah and thus transferred [the water] from one domain to another. This, [however,] is of no consequence, since the water already came to rest in [the person’s] mouth for a brief time before it entered his digestive system, and his mouth is a makom p’tur. [The person’s mouth is categorized as such] because he is standing in one domain and his mouth is in another domain. There are authorities who rule in this manner, as stated in sec. 347[:7]. A prohibition against bringing [an object] into a private domain from a karmelis even via a makom p’tur was established only as a decree lest one bring [the object] in[to the private domain] without it being placed down in the makom p’tur in the interim, as stated in sec. 346[:2-3]. In this instance, however, such a safeguard is not relevant, [for in order for the water to enter the person’s system, it must first enter his mouth, and] it is impossible that the water will not come to rest, at least briefly, in his mouth before he swallows it. [Hence, there is no basis for a prohibition.]

It is possible to say that [the person’s] mouth is not deemed a makom p’tur, but is rather considered as being in the domain into which he extended it. [Indeed,] as stated in sec. 347[:7], there are authorities who follow such a view. [According to this conception, when the person drew the water into his mouth,] the water came to rest in that domain, and when he swallowed [the water], he enabled it to enter his digestive system which was located in the other domain. Thus, [the person] will have transferred [the water] from one domain to another. Nevertheless, [this does not pose a difficulty, for] it can be argued that [there is no prohibition involved] since [the act of] swallowing the water is considered as placing [the water] down [i.e., performing a hanachah] in a complete sense. [Hence,] there is no concern about the fact that later [the water] descends into [the person’s] digestive system [which is in the other domain], because since [the water] has already been absorbed in his body, it is batel, subordinate to and considered part of, his body.)

3 A person may not stand in a private domain and urinate or spit into the public domain, or do the opposite.8 [Indeed,] if [one] urinates or spits [in this manner], he is liable.9

[There is] an unresolved question [in the Talmud] concerning one [who, while standing in the private domain], inserted his male organ [into the public domain] and urinated there. Is it considered that the urine was removed from the cavity of [the person’s] body that was in the private domain, and thus, [by inserting his male organ into the public domain and urinating there,] he will have transferred [the urine] from the private domain and hence he is liable? Or is it considered as if the urine was removed from his male organ that was located in the public domain, and hence, [the person] is exempt? [Since] the unresolved question involves a Scriptural prohibition, stringency is required. [Accordingly, it is] even [forbidden to do so] from a private domain or a public domain into a karmelis or the converse.

Similarly, [an unresolved question exists] if one extended his head [into the other domain] and spat there. [Hence, doing so] is forbidden even from a private domain or a public domain into a karmelis or the converse. True, the spittle comes to rest briefly in [the person’s] mouth before he spits it out, and there are authorities who maintain that when one’s mouth is in another domain, it is a makom p’tur. Nevertheless, in this instance, it is not considered that the spittle came to rest in a makom p’tur, since [the spittle] was not put [in his mouth] from another place after he extended [his head] into the other domain, as explained in sec. 347[:7].10

4 When spittle already became distinct in a person’s mouth and is primed to be released, there is an authority who maintains that one should not walk four cubits in a public domain – and, similarly, in a karmelis – until one spits.11 Nevertheless, those who take leniencies in a karmelis should not be admonished, for there are authorities who even permit walking [four cubits] in a public domain [with spittle that is primed to be released].