SECTION 278 Lights May Be Extinguished [on Shabbos] for the Sake of a Person Who Is Sick (1-4)

סימן רעח שיכול לכבות הנר בשביל החולה וּבוֹ ד׳ סְעִיפִים׃

1 A lamp may be extinguished in order to enable a sick person to sleep, if [his life] may be endangered1 if he does not sleep.2 Similarly, if one fears that robbers may kill him, he may extinguish a light so that they will not see him. For a threat to life – even concern for the mere possibility of [mortal] danger – supersedes the Shabbos [prohibitions], as will be explained in sec. 328[:2].

According to Rabbinic Law, however, it is forbidden to extinguish a light if there is no concern for mortal danger, merely financial loss3 – or similarly, for the sake of a person who is not dangerously ill. If one does extinguish it, he is exempt.4

[The rationale is that] according to Scriptural Law, [performing a forbidden labor is] prohibited only when it is a melachah ha­tzorichah legufah, a labor performed because one requires the object itself with which the [forbidden] labor was performed.5 For example, one extinguished burning wood because [he desires] the coals [produced], which are fit to [be used by] smiths.6 [In this instance,] the actual forbidden labor of extinguishing was performed with the coals themselves, which the person needs. In contrast, a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah refers to a forbidden labor which a person performs for a purpose that does not involve the object with which the forbidden labor was performed. For example, one extinguishes a lamp because he wishes to save the oil, so that it will not be entirely consumed at this time.7 Alternatively, he wishes to save the earthenware lamp so that it will not crack when the wick burns against it. In these instances, the actual forbidden labor of extinguishing is performed with the wick, yet the person’s intent in the performance of this task is that he requires the oil or the lamp [and it has nothing at all to do with the wick]. Similarly, when one extinguishes a fire [that threatens his property], he does so to save his property. Another parallel: one who extinguishes a coal so that people at large will not be injured by it.8

[To return to the instance at hand:] When one extinguishes a light for the sake of a sick person or because of robbers, it is a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah since he is not performing the task because he requires the coals or the wick, the objects with which the task of extinguishing is being performed.

[Moreover,] even if he extinguishes the lamp for the sake of the wick, he is exempt, unless he needs to light it again afterwards, and it was a new wick that was being lit for the first time, and it was not singed before it was kindled. [In such a situation,] extinguishing it makes it better suited for burning than it was originally.

If, however, he does not need to kindle it again – or even if he needs to kindle it again, but it is an old wick that was already kindled once, or even if it is a new wick that was never kindled before, but it was singed before it was kindled – [then,] extinguishing it does not make it better suited for burning than it was originally. [Hence, extinguishing it] is considered a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah. [The rationale is that,] true, he requires the actual object with which the forbidden labor was performed – the charred tip [of the wick] which was extinguished – so that it will be easier for him to kindle it again. Nevertheless, since [the wick,] i.e., the object with which the forbidden labor was performed, is not made in any way better suited [for its task] through the performance of this forbidden labor than it was in its original state, the forbidden labor is not necessary for that object, because it does not improve it at all. A forbidden labor is considered as a melachah hatzorichah legufah only when the performance of the forbidden labor improves the object with which it was performed beyond its original state. [Only] then is [the forbidden labor] considered as having been performed for the sake of the object. Moreover, the person must also have a need for the actual object with which the forbidden labor is performed and which is improved by it.

א מֻתָּר לְכַבּוֹת אֶת הַנֵּר בִּשְׁבִיל הַחוֹלֶה שֶׁיִּישַׁן, אִם הוּא חוֹלֶה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ חֲשַׁשׁ סַכָּנָהא,1 אִם לֹא יִישַׁן.ב,2 וְכֵן מִי שֶׁמִּתְיָרֵא מִפְּנֵי לִסְטִיםג שֶׁלֹּא יַהַרְגוּהוּד – מֻתָּר לְכַבּוֹת הַנֵּר1 שֶׁלֹּא יִרְאוּהוּ,ה שֶׁפִּקּוּחַ נֶפֶשׁ דּוֹחֶה שַׁבָּת אֲפִלּוּ בַּחֲשַׁשׁ סְפֵק סַכָּנָה, כְּמוֹ שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֵר בְּסִמָּן שכ"ח.ו

אֲבָל אִם אֵין שָׁם חֲשַׁשׁ סַכָּנַת נְפָשׁוֹת אֶלָּא סַכָּנַת מָמוֹן,ז וְכֵן בִּשְׁבִיל חוֹלֶה שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ סַכָּנָה – אָסוּר לְכַבּוֹת מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים,3 וְאִם כִּבָּה – פָּטוּר,ח,4 מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵין אִסּוּר מִן הַתּוֹרָה אֶלָּא בִּמְלָאכָה הַצְּרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ,ט כְּלוֹמַר שֶׁהַמְּלָאכָה צְרִיכָה לוֹ בִּשְׁבִיל גּוּפָהּ,י דְּהַיְנוּ שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לוֹ גּוּף הַדָּבָר שֶׁגּוּף הַמְּלָאכָה נַעֲשֵׂית בּוֹ,יא,5 כְּגוֹן שֶׁמְּכַבֶּה עֵצִים דּוֹלְקִים בִּשְׁבִיל הַפֶּחָמִים, שֶׁהֵם רְאוּיִים לְצוֹרְפִים,יב,6 שֶׁגּוּף מְלֶאכֶת הַכִּבּוּי נַעֲשֶׂה בְּגוּף הַפֶּחָמִים שֶׁהֵם צְרִיכִים לוֹ, אֲבָל מְלָאכָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ הִיא כְּשֶׁהִיא צְרִיכָה לוֹ בִּשְׁבִיל דָּבָר אַחֵר שֶׁאֵין גּוּף הַמְּלָאכָה נַעֲשֵׂית בּוֹ, כְּגוֹן שֶׁמְּכַבֶּה אֶת הַנֵּר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁחָס עַל הַשֶּׁמֶןיג שֶׁלֹּא יִדְלַק כֻּלּוֹ עַכְשָׁו,7 אוֹ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁחָס עַל חֶרֶס הַנֵּר שֶׁלֹּא יִבָּקַע כְּשֶׁהַפְּתִילָה דּוֹלֶקֶת עָלָיו,יד שֶׁגּוּף מְלֶאכֶת הַכִּבּוּי נַעֲשֶׂה בַּפְּתִילָה, וְהוּא מִתְכַּוֵּן בִּמְלַאכְתּוֹ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לַשֶּׁמֶן אוֹ לַנֵּר, וְכֵן הַמְכַבֶּה אֶת הַדְּלֵקָה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁחָס עַל מָמוֹנוֹ,טו וְכֵן הַמְכַבֶּה גַּחֶלֶת בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁלֹּא יִזּוֹקוּ בָּהּ רַבִּים,טז,8 וְכֵן זֶה שֶׁמְּכַבֶּה בִּשְׁבִיל הַחוֹלֶה אוֹ מִפְּנֵי הַלִּסְטִים – הַרֵי זֶה מְלָאכָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ, כֵּיוָן שֶׁאֵינוֹ מִתְכַּוֵּן בִּשְׁבִיל צֹרֶךְ הַפֶּחָמִים אוֹ הַפְּתִילָה שֶׁהַכִּבּוּי נַעֲשֶׂה בָּהֶן.

וַאֲפִלּוּ אִם מְכַבֶּה בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לַפְּתִילָה – אֵינוֹ חַיָּב4 אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן צָרִיךְ לַחֲזוֹר וּלְהַדְלִיקָהּ אַחַר זְמַן, וְגַם הִיא פְּתִילָה חֲדָשָׁה, שֶׁזֶּהוּ פַּעַם רִאשׁוֹן שֶׁהֻדְלְקָה, וְגַם לֹא הֻבְהֲבָה קֹדֶם שֶׁהֻדְלְקָה,יז שֶׁעַל יְדֵי כִּבּוּי זֶה הִיא מִתַּקֶּנֶת לְהַדְלָקָה יוֹתֵר מִמַּה שֶּׁהָיְתָה בַּתְּחִלָּה.יח

אֲבָל אִם אֵין צָרִיךְ לַחֲזוֹר וּלְהַדְלִיקָהּ לְאַחַר זְמַן, וַאֲפִלּוּ אִם צָרִיךְ לַחֲזוֹר וּלְהַדְלִיקָהּ אֶלָּא שֶׁהִיא פְּתִילָה יְשָׁנָה שֶׁכְּבָר הֻדְלְקָה פַּעַם אַחַת, וַאֲפִלּוּ הִיא פְּתִילָה חֲדָשָׁה שֶׁלֹּא הֻדְלְקָה מִקֹּדֶם כְּלָל אֶלָּא שֶׁהֻבְהֲבָה קֹדֶם שֶׁהֻדְלְקָה,יט שֶׁעַל יְדֵי כִּבּוּי זֶה אֵינָהּ מִתַּקֶּנֶת לְהַדְלָקָה יוֹתֵר מִמַּה שֶּׁהָיְתָה בַּתְּחִלָּה – הֲרֵי זֶה מְלָאכָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ, שֶׁאַף שֶׁהוּא צָרִיךְ לְגוּף הַדָּבָר שֶׁהַמְּלָאכָה נַעֲשֵׂית בּוֹ, דְּהַיְנוּ שֶׁהַפֶּחָם שֶׁבְּרֹאשָׁהּ שֶׁהַכִּבּוּי נַעֲשֶׂה בּוֹ הוּא צָרִיךְ לוֹ שֶׁיְּהֵא נוֹחַ לַחֲזוֹר וּלְהַדְלִיקָהּ, מִכָּל מָקוֹם כֵּיוָן שֶׁהַדָּבָר שֶׁהַמְּלָאכָה נַעֲשָׂה בּוֹ אֵינוֹ מִתְתַּקֵּן כְּלוּם עַל יְדֵי הַמְּלָאכָה יוֹתֵר מִמַּה שֶּׁהָיָה בַּתְּחִלָּה – הֲרֵי אֵין הַמְּלָאכָה צְרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ שֶׁל אוֹתוֹ דָבָר כְּלָל, כֵּיוָן שֶׁאֵין מְתַקֶּנֶת אוֹתוֹ כְּלוּם, וְאֵינָהּ נִקְרֵאת מְלָאכָה הַצְּרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן שֶׁהַמְּלָאכָה מְתַקֶּנֶת אֶת גּוּף הַדָּבָר שֶׁנַּעֲשֵׂית בּוֹ יוֹתֵר מִמַּה שֶּׁהָיָה בַּתְּחִלָּה,כ שֶׁאָז הִיא צְרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ, וְגַם שֶׁיְּהֵא צֹרֶךְ לָאָדָם בְּגוּף הַדָּבָר שֶׁהַמְּלָאכָה נַעֲשֵׂית בּוֹ וּמְתַקֶּנֶת אוֹתוֹ:

2 To which [forbidden labor] does the above [principle] apply? To extinguishing, which is a forbidden labor involving impairment: one impairs the fire. Therefore, it is not considered as having been performed for the sake of the object unless the actual substance of the object with which [the forbidden task] was performed is required by a person, and that object is improved by the performance of the forbidden labor, enhancing it beyond its original state.

Similar [concepts apply] with regard to [the forbidden labor of] demolishing a building in order to rebuild it9 and to [the forbidden labor of] tearing [a garment] in order to resew it.10 According to Scriptural Law, there is no prohibition unless one had the intent that the second building be an improvement over the first. The same applies to sewing a garment. Thus, demolishing the building or tearing the garment is [intended for] the improvement of the building or the garment, i.e., that it [ultimately] be superior to its original state. For without demolishing it or tearing it, it is impossible to improve the building or the garment and bring them to a superior state.

[Different laws, however, apply to other forbidden] labors that do not involve impairment: Even if they do not improve the actual object with which they are performed, since the object itself with which the [forbidden labor] was performed is required by the person, it is deemed a melachah hatzorichah legufah, a labor performed because one requires the object with which the [forbidden] labor was performed. For example, one transfers a hatchet from one domain to another in order to chop with it.11 Even though the hatchet is not at all improved through its transfer, the person is liable, since he needs the transferred object itself. If, however, he has no need for the transferred object itself, e.g., one who transfers a corpse for burial,12 in which instance he has no need for the corpse itself, this transfer is considered as a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah, a forbidden labor performed for a purpose that does not involve the object itself. This principle applies in all analogous situations.

There are authorities13 who maintain that even with regard to forbidden labors that involve impairment, [for an act to be considered a melachah hatzorichah legufah,] there is no need that [the object with which the forbidden labor was performed] be improved beyond its original state, except with regard to extinguishing a fire. [In that instance,] one is not liable unless he intended to singe the wick by extinguishing it so that it would be easier to rekindle it. If, however, his intent in extinguishing it is to save it and prevent it from burning out entirely at this time even though he intends to rekindle it, it is considered as a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah. [The rationale is that] the fundamental entity with which the forbidden labor was performed is the charred tip [of the wick] to which the fire takes hold. Since his intent in extinguishing [the fire] is not for the sake of this charred tip, but rather because he requires that the fire not consume the remainder of the wick, it is considered that the forbidden labor is not being performed for the sake of the object with which it is being performed, but for the sake of another object, [and is therefore considered] a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah.

ב בַּמֶה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בְּכִבּוּי, שֶׁהִיא מְלֶאכֶת קִלְקוּל, שֶׁמְּקַלְקֵל הַהַבְעָרָה, לְפִיכָךְ אֵינָהּ חֲשׁוּבָה צְרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ בְּזֶה בִּלְבָד מַה שֶּׁגּוּף הַדָּבָר שֶׁנַּעֲשֵׂית בּוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהָאָדָם, אֶלָּא עַד שֶׁגּוּף הַדָּבָר מִתְתַּקֵּן עַל יְדֵי הַמְּלָאכָה שֶׁנַּעֲשֵׂית בּוֹ יוֹתֵר מִמַּה שֶּׁהָיָה בַּתְּחִלָּה.כא

וְכֵן הַסּוֹתֵר בִּנְיָן עַל מְנָת לַחֲזוֹר וְלִבְנוֹתוֹ,כב,9 אוֹ הַקּוֹרֵעַ עַל מְנָת לַחֲזוֹר וְלִתְפּוֹרכג,10 – אֵין אָסוּר מִן הַתּוֹרָה אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן אִם דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁיְּהֵא בִּנְיָן הָאַחֲרוֹן יוֹתֵר טוֹב מִן הָרִאשׁוֹן,כד וְכֵן בִּתְפִירַת הַבֶּגֶד, שֶׁנִּמְצְאוּ הַסְּתִירָה וְהַקְּרִיעָה הֵן מְתַקְּנִים הַבִּנְיָן וְהַבֶּגֶד שֶׁיִּהְיוּ יוֹתֵר טוֹב מִבַּתְּחִלָּה, שֶׁמִּבִּלְעֲדֵי הַסְּתִירָה וְהַקְּרִיעָה אִי אֶפְשָׁר כְּלָל לְתַקֵּן הַבִּנְיָן וְהַבֶּגֶד שֶׁיִּהְיוּ יוֹתֵר טוֹבִים.כה

אֲבָל שְׁאָר מְלָאכוֹת שֶׁאֵינָן מְלָאכוֹת הַקִּלְקוּל, אַף [אִם] אֵינָן מְתַקְּנוֹת אֶת גּוּף הַדָּבָר שֶׁנַּעֲשֵׂית בּוֹ, שֶׁכֵּיוָן שֶׁגּוּף הַדָּבָר שֶׁנַּעֲשֵׂית בּוֹ הוּא צָרִיךְ לְהָאָדָם – הֲרֵי זֶה הַמְּלָאכָה הַצְּרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ,כו כְּגוֹן הַמּוֹצִיא קַרְדֹּם מֵרְשׁוּת לִרְשׁוּתכז כְּדֵי לַחְתּוֹךְ בּוֹ,,11 שֶׁאַף שֶׁאֵין הַקַּרְדֹּם מִתְתַּקֵּן כְּלָל בְּהוֹצָאָה זוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב, הוֹאִיל וְהוּא צָרִיךְ לְגוּף הַדָּבָר שֶׁהוֹצִיא.כח

אֲבָל אִם אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְגוּף הַדָּבָר שֶׁהוֹצִיא, כְּגוֹן הַמּוֹצִיא מֵת לִקְבוּרָה,כט,12 שֶׁגּוּף הַמֵּת אֵין לוֹ בּוֹ שׁוּם צֹרֶךְ כְּלָלל – הֲרֵי זֶה מְלָאכָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ, וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בְזֶה.

וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִיםלא,13 שֶׁאֲפִלּוּ מְלֶאכֶת הַקִּלְקוּל אֵין צָרִיךְ שֶׁיִּהְיֶה הַתִּקּוּן יוֹתֵר טוֹב מִבַּתְּחִלָּה.לב חוּץ מִמְּכַבֶּה הַנֵּר, שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַבְהֵב הַפְּתִילָה עַל יְדֵי כִּבּוּי זֶה שֶׁתְּהֵא נוֹחָה לַחֲזוֹר וּלְהַדְלִיקָהּ.לג אֲבָל אִם אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ עַל הִבְהוּבָהּ, אֶלָּא שֶׁמִּתְכַּוֵּן בְּכִבּוּיוֹ לָחוּס עָלֶיהָ שֶׁלֹּא תִדְלַק כֻּלּוֹ עַכְשָׁו, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמִּתְכַּוֵּן כְּדֵי לַחֲזוֹר וּלְהַדְלִיקָהּ לְאַחַר זְמַן, מִכָּל מָקוֹם עִקַּר גּוּף הַדָּבָר שֶׁמְּלֶאכֶת הַכִּבּוּי נַעֲשֶׂה בּוֹ הוּא הַפֶּחָם שֶׁבְּרֹאשָׁהּ שֶׁהָאוּר אָחַז בּוֹ, וְכֵיוָן שֶׁאֵין כַּוָּנָתוֹ בְּכִבּוּיוֹ בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לְפֶחָם זֶה אֶלָּא בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לִשְׁאָר הַפְּתִילָה שֶׁלֹּא אָחַז בָּהּ הָאוּר – הֲרֵי זֶה מְלָאכָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה לְגוּפָה אֶלָּא לְדָבָר אַחֵר שֶׁאֵין הַמְּלָאכָה נַעֲשֵׂית בּוֹ:לד

3 All the above follows the opinion of the authorities who maintain that one is exempt for the performance of a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah14 and it is forbidden only according to Rabbinic Law. There are, however, others who differ with the above and maintain that, according to Scriptural Law, one is liable even for the performance of a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah.15 Nevertheless, even according to their view, it is permitted to extinguish a lamp for the sake of a person who is dangerously ill. Similarly, one who fears robbers in an instance where there is concern for mortal danger [may extinguish a lamp]. If, however, there is only concern for physical discomfort, in an instance where it is impossible that this discomfort will ever lead to mortal danger,16 it is forbidden to extinguish the light and, according to these authorities, one who extinguishes it is liable.

The differences between these two approaches with regard to directives for actual practice will be explained in their appropriate places.17 There are many instances where all authorities agree that there is no Scriptural prohibition unless [the forbidden labor] is performed for the sake of the object itself.18 [Conversely,] there are many instances where all authorities agree that one is liable according to Scriptural Law, even though [the forbidden labor] was not performed for the sake of the object with which it was performed.19 All of these situations will be explained in their appropriate places.

ג וְכָל זֶה לְהָאוֹמְרִיםלה שֶׁמְּלָאכָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ14 פָּטוּר עָלֶיהָ וְאֵינָהּ אֲסוּרָה אֶלָּא מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים. אֲבָל יֵשׁ חוֹלְקִין עַל זֶה וְאוֹמְרִיםלו שֶׁאֲפִלּוּ מְלָאכָה שֶׁאֵין צְרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ חַיָּב15 עָלֶיהָ מִן הַתּוֹרָה. וּמִכָּל מָקוֹם, אַף לְפִי דִבְרֵיהֶם מֻתָּר לְכַבּוֹת הַנֵּר בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיִּישַׁן הַחוֹלֶה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ סַכָּנָה.לז וְכֵן מִי שֶׁמִּתְיָרֵא מִפְּנֵי הַלִּסְטִים, וְיֵשׁ חֲשַׁשׁ (סַכָּנָה בְּדָבָר) סַכָּנוֹת נְפָשׁוֹת.לח אֲבָל אִם אֵין שָׁם אֶלָּא חֲשַׁש צַעַר הַגּוּף בִּלְבָד בְּעִנְיָן שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לָבֹא לְעוֹלָם לִידֵי חֲשַׁשׁ סַכָּנָה מִצַּעַר הַהוּא16 – אָסוּר לְכַבּוֹת.לט וְאִם כִּבָּה – חַיָּב לְפִי דִבְרֵיהֶם.

וְהַחִלּוּקִים שֶׁבֵּין ב' הַסְּבָרוֹת אֵלּוּ לַהֲלָכָה וּלְמַעֲשֶׂה יִתְבָּאֲרוּ כָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד עַל מְקוֹמוֹ.מ,17

וְיֵשׁ דְּבָרִים הַרְבֵּה שֶׁהַכֹּל מוֹדִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶם אִסּוּר מִן הַתּוֹרָה אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן צָרִיךְ לְגוּפָן.מא,18 וְיֵשׁ דְּבָרִים שֶׁהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בָּהֶם שֶׁחַיָּב עֲלֵיהֶם מִן הַתּוֹרָה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין צָרִיךְ לְגוּפָן.מב,19 וְיִתְבָּאֵר גַּם כֵּן כָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד בִּמְקוֹמוֹ:

4 All authorities agree that, at times, according to Scriptural Law, one is liable [for performing an activity] in an instance where it is inevitable20 that [it will cause] a forbidden labor to be performed [even though one does not intend that the forbidden labor be performed].21 In which instances does this apply? When one does not intend that a forbidden labor be performed, it is certainly [a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah, since the person] has no need [for the purpose associated with the forbidden labor].

To cite a possible example: It is known that a person is pleased with a forbidden labor that was performed unintentionally as a result [of his actions] and he desires its outcome even though he did not intend that it be performed. It is [now considered] necessary,22 [since it is desirous] for him at present, even though initially it was performed as a matter of course, without his intent.

What is implied? For example, there is a hole in a [wine] barrel that was plugged with flax bast and the flax bast has absorbed much wine. Thus, it is impossible that one will not squeeze wine out from it when he removes it and then reinserts it and tightens it in place. Even though he intends to do no more than plug the hole, it is inevitable [that wine will be squeezed from it].23 [Now,] if a container is placed under the flax bast plug, into which the wine that is squeezed from it drips, the person is liable when he plugs [the hole]. For it is obvious that he is pleased [that] the wine squeezed from the flax bast [will drip] into the container, for then he can benefit from it when it is [collected] in the container. When, by contrast, [the wine] was absorbed in the flax bast, he could not benefit from it at all. Thus, he is considered to have performed a melachah hatzorichah legufah even though he did not intend to perform [the forbidden activity]. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.24

ד וְהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בִּ"פְסִיק רֵישֵׁהּ וְלֹא יָמוּת"מג,20 שֶׁחַיָּב עָלָיו מִן הַתּוֹרָה לִפְעָמִים.21 וְכֵיצַד מָצִינוּ זֶה? וַהֲלֹא כְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מִתְכַּוֵּן לִמְלָאכָה – בְּוַדַּאי אֵין צָרִיךְ לְגוּפָהּ כְּלָל.מד

מָצִינוּ בִּכְגוֹן שֶׁהַדָּבָר יָדוּעַ שֶׁנּוֹחַ לוֹ בִּמְלָאכָה שֶׁנַּעֲשֵׂית בְּלֹא כַוָּנָתוֹ וְחָפֵץ הוּא בָּהּ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן לָהּ,מה וַהֲרֵי הִיא צְרִיכָה לוֹ עַכְשָׁו22 שֶׁכְּבָר נַעֲשֵׂית מֵאֵלֶיהָ בְּלֹא כַוָּנָתוֹ. כֵּיצַד? כְּגוֹן נֶקֶב שֶׁבְּחָבִית שֶׁמּוֹצִיאִין בּוֹ הַיַּיִן שֶׁפָּקוּק בִּנְעֹרֶת שֶׁל פִּשְׁתָּן, שֶׁהַנְּעֹרֶת בְּלוּעָה מִיַּיִן הַרְבֵּה, וּכְשֶׁמּוֹצִיאָהּ וְחוֹזֵר וּפוֹקֵק בָּהּ וּמְהַדְּקָהּ בְּחֹזֶק – אִי אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁלֹּא יִסְחוֹט יַיִן מִמֶּנָּה, וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מִתְכַּוֵּן אֶלָּא לִסְתּוֹם הַנֶּקֶב23 – הֲרֵי זֶה "פְּסִיק רֵישֵׁהּ",מו וְאִם יֵשׁ כְּלִי תַּחַת פְּקִיקַת הַנְּעֹרֶת שֶׁהַיַּיִן הַנִּסְחָט מִמֶּנָּה נוֹטֵף לְתוֹכוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב עַל פְּקִיקָה זוֹ, שֶׁהַדָּבָר יָדוּעַ שֶׁנּוֹחַ לוֹ בַּיַּיִן הַנִּסְחָט מֵהַנְּעֹרֶת לְתוֹךְ הַכְּלִי שֶׁיּוּכַל לֵהָנוֹת מִמֶּנּוּ כְּשֶׁיִּהְיֶה בַּכְּלִי,מז אֲבָל כְּשֶׁיִּהְיֶה בָּלוּעַ בִּנְעֹרֶת – אֵין לוֹ בָּהּ הֲנָאָה שֶׁל כְּלוּם, וַהֲרֵי זוֹ מְלָאכָה הַצְּרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן לָהּ. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָזֶה:מח,24