Shulchan Aruch: Chapter 278 - Lights May Be Extinguished [on Shabbos] for Sake of a Person Who Is Sick

SECTION 278 Lights May Be Extinguished [on Shabbos] for the Sake of a Person Who Is Sick (1-4)

1 A lamp may be extinguished in order to enable a sick person to sleep, if [his life] may be endangered1 if he does not sleep.2 Similarly, if one fears that robbers may kill him, he may extinguish a light so that they will not see him. For a threat to life – even concern for the mere possibility of [mortal] danger – supersedes the Shabbos [prohibitions], as will be explained in sec. 328[:2].

According to Rabbinic Law, however, it is forbidden to extinguish a light if there is no concern for mortal danger, merely financial loss3 – or similarly, for the sake of a person who is not dangerously ill. If one does extinguish it, he is exempt.4

[The rationale is that] according to Scriptural Law, [performing a forbidden labor is] prohibited only when it is a melachah ha­tzorichah legufah, a labor performed because one requires the object itself with which the [forbidden] labor was performed.5 For example, one extinguished burning wood because [he desires] the coals [produced], which are fit to [be used by] smiths.6 [In this instance,] the actual forbidden labor of extinguishing was performed with the coals themselves, which the person needs. In contrast, a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah refers to a forbidden labor which a person performs for a purpose that does not involve the object with which the forbidden labor was performed. For example, one extinguishes a lamp because he wishes to save the oil, so that it will not be entirely consumed at this time.7 Alternatively, he wishes to save the earthenware lamp so that it will not crack when the wick burns against it. In these instances, the actual forbidden labor of extinguishing is performed with the wick, yet the person’s intent in the performance of this task is that he requires the oil or the lamp [and it has nothing at all to do with the wick]. Similarly, when one extinguishes a fire [that threatens his property], he does so to save his property. Another parallel: one who extinguishes a coal so that people at large will not be injured by it.8

[To return to the instance at hand:] When one extinguishes a light for the sake of a sick person or because of robbers, it is a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah since he is not performing the task because he requires the coals or the wick, the objects with which the task of extinguishing is being performed.

[Moreover,] even if he extinguishes the lamp for the sake of the wick, he is exempt, unless he needs to light it again afterwards, and it was a new wick that was being lit for the first time, and it was not singed before it was kindled. [In such a situation,] extinguishing it makes it better suited for burning than it was originally.

If, however, he does not need to kindle it again – or even if he needs to kindle it again, but it is an old wick that was already kindled once, or even if it is a new wick that was never kindled before, but it was singed before it was kindled – [then,] extinguishing it does not make it better suited for burning than it was originally. [Hence, extinguishing it] is considered a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah. [The rationale is that,] true, he requires the actual object with which the forbidden labor was performed – the charred tip [of the wick] which was extinguished – so that it will be easier for him to kindle it again. Nevertheless, since [the wick,] i.e., the object with which the forbidden labor was performed, is not made in any way better suited [for its task] through the performance of this forbidden labor than it was in its original state, the forbidden labor is not necessary for that object, because it does not improve it at all. A forbidden labor is considered as a melachah hatzorichah legufah only when the performance of the forbidden labor improves the object with which it was performed beyond its original state. [Only] then is [the forbidden labor] considered as having been performed for the sake of the object. Moreover, the person must also have a need for the actual object with which the forbidden labor is performed and which is improved by it.

2 To which [forbidden labor] does the above [principle] apply? To extinguishing, which is a forbidden labor involving impairment: one impairs the fire. Therefore, it is not considered as having been performed for the sake of the object unless the actual substance of the object with which [the forbidden task] was performed is required by a person, and that object is improved by the performance of the forbidden labor, enhancing it beyond its original state.

Similar [concepts apply] with regard to [the forbidden labor of] demolishing a building in order to rebuild it9 and to [the forbidden labor of] tearing [a garment] in order to resew it.10 According to Scriptural Law, there is no prohibition unless one had the intent that the second building be an improvement over the first. The same applies to sewing a garment. Thus, demolishing the building or tearing the garment is [intended for] the improvement of the building or the garment, i.e., that it [ultimately] be superior to its original state. For without demolishing it or tearing it, it is impossible to improve the building or the garment and bring them to a superior state.

[Different laws, however, apply to other forbidden] labors that do not involve impairment: Even if they do not improve the actual object with which they are performed, since the object itself with which the [forbidden labor] was performed is required by the person, it is deemed a melachah hatzorichah legufah, a labor performed because one requires the object with which the [forbidden] labor was performed. For example, one transfers a hatchet from one domain to another in order to chop with it.11 Even though the hatchet is not at all improved through its transfer, the person is liable, since he needs the transferred object itself. If, however, he has no need for the transferred object itself, e.g., one who transfers a corpse for burial,12 in which instance he has no need for the corpse itself, this transfer is considered as a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah, a forbidden labor performed for a purpose that does not involve the object itself. This principle applies in all analogous situations.

There are authorities13 who maintain that even with regard to forbidden labors that involve impairment, [for an act to be considered a melachah hatzorichah legufah,] there is no need that [the object with which the forbidden labor was performed] be improved beyond its original state, except with regard to extinguishing a fire. [In that instance,] one is not liable unless he intended to singe the wick by extinguishing it so that it would be easier to rekindle it. If, however, his intent in extinguishing it is to save it and prevent it from burning out entirely at this time even though he intends to rekindle it, it is considered as a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah. [The rationale is that] the fundamental entity with which the forbidden labor was performed is the charred tip [of the wick] to which the fire takes hold. Since his intent in extinguishing [the fire] is not for the sake of this charred tip, but rather because he requires that the fire not consume the remainder of the wick, it is considered that the forbidden labor is not being performed for the sake of the object with which it is being performed, but for the sake of another object, [and is therefore considered] a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah.

3 All the above follows the opinion of the authorities who maintain that one is exempt for the performance of a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah14 and it is forbidden only according to Rabbinic Law. There are, however, others who differ with the above and maintain that, according to Scriptural Law, one is liable even for the performance of a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah.15 Nevertheless, even according to their view, it is permitted to extinguish a lamp for the sake of a person who is dangerously ill. Similarly, one who fears robbers in an instance where there is concern for mortal danger [may extinguish a lamp]. If, however, there is only concern for physical discomfort, in an instance where it is impossible that this discomfort will ever lead to mortal danger,16 it is forbidden to extinguish the light and, according to these authorities, one who extinguishes it is liable.

The differences between these two approaches with regard to directives for actual practice will be explained in their appropriate places.17 There are many instances where all authorities agree that there is no Scriptural prohibition unless [the forbidden labor] is performed for the sake of the object itself.18 [Conversely,] there are many instances where all authorities agree that one is liable according to Scriptural Law, even though [the forbidden labor] was not performed for the sake of the object with which it was performed.19 All of these situations will be explained in their appropriate places.

4 All authorities agree that, at times, according to Scriptural Law, one is liable [for performing an activity] in an instance where it is inevitable20 that [it will cause] a forbidden labor to be performed [even though one does not intend that the forbidden labor be performed].21 In which instances does this apply? When one does not intend that a forbidden labor be performed, it is certainly [a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah, since the person] has no need [for the purpose associated with the forbidden labor].

To cite a possible example: It is known that a person is pleased with a forbidden labor that was performed unintentionally as a result [of his actions] and he desires its outcome even though he did not intend that it be performed. It is [now considered] necessary,22 [since it is desirous] for him at present, even though initially it was performed as a matter of course, without his intent.

What is implied? For example, there is a hole in a [wine] barrel that was plugged with flax bast and the flax bast has absorbed much wine. Thus, it is impossible that one will not squeeze wine out from it when he removes it and then reinserts it and tightens it in place. Even though he intends to do no more than plug the hole, it is inevitable [that wine will be squeezed from it].23 [Now,] if a container is placed under the flax bast plug, into which the wine that is squeezed from it drips, the person is liable when he plugs [the hole]. For it is obvious that he is pleased [that] the wine squeezed from the flax bast [will drip] into the container, for then he can benefit from it when it is [collected] in the container. When, by contrast, [the wine] was absorbed in the flax bast, he could not benefit from it at all. Thus, he is considered to have performed a melachah hatzorichah legufah even though he did not intend to perform [the forbidden activity]. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.24