Shulchan Aruch: Chapter 276 - Laws Pertaining to a Light Kindled by a Non-Jew on Shabbos

Or performs any other labor prohibited for a Jew on Shabbos, as explained in chapter 252.

Although the Alter Rebbe is speaking about oil or kerosene lamps, these same laws apply to turning on an electric light. (All contemporary authorities agree that closing or opening an electric circuit is forbidden. There is, however, disagreement concerning whether turning on an electric light is forbidden by Scriptural Law or by Rabbinic Law.) Some authorities (Tzafnas Paneiach, sec. 60) maintain that closing an electric circuit is forbidden because it is molid, bringing a new entity into existence – a Rabbinic enactment. Many others, however, are of the opinion that turning on electricity is a Scriptural prohibition (Beis Yitzchak, Yoreh Deah, Vol. 1, responsum 120, et al.). See Encyclopedia Talmudis, erech chashmal, p. 174ff.

I.e., his actions indicate that he is acting for the benefit of the Jew, for example, he leaves the Jew’s house after kindling the light or fire for him. See sec. 325:19.

Shabbos 122a. Furthermore, after Shabbos, the Jew must wait for as long as it takes to kindle the light or fire before using it (sec. 325:9).

In contrast, when a given labor was forbidden only according to Rabbinic ruling, a person for whom the activity was not performed may benefit from it (ibid.).

The same laws apply to furnaces or heaters that run on other types of fuel, e.g., gas, oil, or electricity.

This follows the ruling of the Alter Rebbe in sec. 243, Kuntreis Acharon (note 1), that a person who accepts responsibility for a specific task for a given day is considered a kablan (contractor) and not considered as the agent of the Jewish employer. Nevertheless, in his Mahadura Basra, the Alter Rebbe redefined his conception of the matter and ruled that since the worker’s wage is calculated by the day, he is considered a day-worker and, hence, an agent of the Jewish employer.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1), the Alter Rebbe refers to his statements in the Kuntreis Acharon (note 1) to sec. 244, where he refers to the two manners of employing a non-Jew mentioned here.

In contrast to his property or financial position. There are certain situations, e.g., a non-Jew collected grass with the intent of feeding it to an animal owned by a Jew (see Mahadura Basra to sec. 243), where the Jew is considered to have derived physical benefit from a non-Jew’s activity when it is merely his animal that benefitted. By and large, however, the stringency is applied only when he derives actual physical benefit.

And giving such instructions is forbidden, even when the non-Jew works as a contractor.

Talmud Yerushalmi, Shabbos, the end of ch. 16.

I.e., to read or perform any other activity that he could not perform were the light not kindled. Nevertheless, he may sit and eat in the room, converse there with friends, and the like, even though by doing so he is deriving satisfaction from the fact that a light was kindled.

I.e., he need not leave the room where the fire is burning, but he may not approach the fire to warm himself.

I.e., to go beyond the measure of the law.

This obligation applies only when the Jew sees the non-Jew performing the forbidden activity (sec. 243:2; sec. 252:7, 10). See Talmud Yerushalmi, Shabbos 1:9.

See also the Kuntreis Acharon (note 5) there. In these sources, the Alter Rebbe explains that since the non-Jew is using the Jew’s property, he is considered as the Jew’s agent. Seeing the non-Jew kindle a light or a fire in his property without admonishing him is tantamount to acquiescing to his activity.

In his Mahadura Basra to sec. 243, the Alter Rebbe states that when a non-Jew performs an activity for a Jew on his own initiative, even though he is a contractor employed by the Jew, there is no need to admonish him, provided the Jew does not derive direct benefit from the forbidden activity on Shabbos itself. Nevertheless, in the situation at hand, benefiting from the kindling of a light or a fire would warrant admonishment.

The admonishment absolves him from the prohibition against benefiting from the non-Jew’s activity.

Thus there are two different issues and consequences involved:

a) Since the Jew could enjoy direct benefit from the non-Jew’s activity, he is forbidden to do anything that enables him to derive that benefit; and

b) Lest an undesirable impression be created, he is required to dismiss the non-Jew from working for him.

See also the Kuntreis Acharon to sec. 252 (note 5).

In his Mahadura Basra to sec. 243, the Alter Rebbe states that since the Jew derives direct benefit from the non-Jew’s activity on Shabbos, the Jew is obligated to admonish him even if he performs the forbidden labor with his own resources.

In sec. 252:9, the Alter Rebbe explains that since the non-Jew uses his own property, the activity is not yet identified with a Jew; therefore, there is no concern about the impression that could be created. In 252:10, the Alter Rebbe explains that the non-Jew is not considered the Jew’s agent, because he is acting on his own initiative and for his own benefit, because he is certain that the Jew will reciprocate the kindness.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe states that articles belonging to a non-Jew may be given to him on Shabbos, even if it is clear that he will take them out to the public domain (and thus perform a labor that is forbidden to the Jew). The rationale is that he is not acting for the sake of the Jew, but for his own benefit, and he is doing so with his own property.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe refers to the Kuntreis Acharon to sec. 252 (note 5), which explains that when a non-Jew performs an activity on his own initiative, we are not concerned with the impression that may be created even though the activity is being performed in the Jew’s home and for the Jew’s benefit, because everyone knows that the non-Jew expects to be repaid for his efforts and thus is acting for his own benefit. When does concern for the impression that might be created arise? When a Jew instructed the non-Jew to perform the activity. In such a situation, we are concerned that others will think that the Jew instructed him to perform it on Shabbos or that the non-Jew is employed as a day-worker. (Since the non-Jew performs the forbidden activity with his own resources and for his benefit, the only difficulty would be if the Jew specifically instructed the non-Jew to perform the forbidden activity on Shabbos. There would be no difficulty if the Jew instructed him to perform the forbidden activity during the week and the non-Jew understood that it was desired that he also perform it on Shabbos.)

And thus prevent him from kindling the fire.

Because he was not causing it to burn out earlier than it would have, had the non-Jew not added the oil.

There is an additional concept that is important to emphasize: In the Mahadura Basra to sec. 243, the Alter Rebbe writes that there is no obligation for the Jew to admonish the non-Jew if he merely adds a candle or adds oil to the lamp. As long as the original candle or fuel is present, one may benefit from the additional candle or fuel added by the non-Jew (see subsections 13-14).

Shabbos 122a. The basic principle is that once a fire or a lamp is kindled for one person, it benefits others without the need for any additional activity to be performed for their sake.

All agree that there is no obligation to admonish the non-Jew. See subsection 12; see also the Kuntreis Acharon to sec. 252(note 5).

Moreover, one may even motivate the non-Jew to perform a forbidden activity for his own sake, so that afterwards, the Jew will benefit from it. For example, Aruch HaShulchan 276:9writes that he remembers that when he was a child, if there was no light in a house, it was common practice to tell a non-Jew: “We would like to give you a drink of vodka, but we cannot find it in the dark.” Afterwards, they would tell the non-Jew not to extinguish the light.

Similarly, there is no concern about the impression that might be created, because the non-Jew is acting for his own benefit {see the Kuntreis Acharon to sec. 252(note 5)}.

Some commentaries have mentioned that the intent here is kindling a fire, but not a light, since children are sensitive to cold and are considered as ill. Badei HaShulchan 276:18 states that the Alter Rebbe’s statement can be understood as also referring to kindling a light, because there are some children who are afraid of the dark. This leniency is granted until the age of nine or ten, depending on the child’s physical development (Minchas Yitzchak, Vol. 1, responsum 78; Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah 37:2:4).

Because their health is fragile. Nevertheless, as stated in subsection 15 (see also sec. 328:22), this is not a blanket leniency and there must be some form of need.

To cite a related matter: In Eretz Yisrael today, Rabbinic authorities differ on whether to permit the use of electricity generated by the national electric company, since the majority of its workers are Jewish. The lenient authorities maintain that the use of the electricity is permitted because it is generated by machines, without the need of human intervention. Moreover, according to the lenient view, one may benefit from the electricity even when there is a blackout and it is necessary for Jewish workers to fix the problem on Shabbos. The rationale given is that since the electricity is being generated for sick people in life-threatening situations, and that activity is a mitzvah to perform on Shabbos, it may be used by others as well. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Rebbe warmly praised the inhabitants of Kfar Chabad for having a generator installed so they would not be dependent on the use of the national electric grid on Shabbos. See the Rebbe’s Igros Kodesh, Vol. 24, Letter no. 9106.

We are not concerned that the non-Jew will add more oil to the lamp for the sake of a healthy person. Note, however, the contrast in subsection 13.

Mishnah Berurah 276:15 states that the determination is made at the time the lamp is kindled. Once it is determined that use of the light is permitted or forbidden, that ruling remains in effect even if the ratio of Jews to non-Jews changes.

Shulchan Shlomoh 276:6 states that other factors should also be considered, e.g., is there a particularly important person present whose status is greater than that of the others?

Modern halachic authorities have used these rulings in connection with questions regarding an entire apartment building heated by one central furnace. Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah 30:23 writes that if Jews and non-Jews live in an apartment building and the heating is turned on during Shabbos, the Jews may benefit from it even if the non-Jews are not present. More stringent laws apply, however, with regard to an apartment building shared by observant Jews and non-observant Jews. If the heating is turned on during Shabbos for the sake of the non-observant Jews, the observant Jews are forbidden to benefit from it (see Shevet HaLevi, Vol. 3, responsum 64; Baer Moshe, Vol. 7, responsum 14). Igros Moshe, Vol. 1, responsum 123, differs and allows an observant Jew to stay at home even though heat was turned on by a non-observant Jew.

The word “immediately” is added, because it is only when the non-Jew makes use of the light directly after he kindles it that it is apparent that he kindled it for his own sake. If he makes use of it later, it is possible he kindled it for the sake of those dining and only afterwards decided to use it for his own purposes (Levush 276:2; Pri Megadim, Eshel Avraham 276:6).

Kaf HaChayim 276:27 adds that this leniency applies even when the activity for which the non-Jew kindled the lamp does not necessarily require the use of a light.

See sec. 263:4, which states “the members of one’s household will be uncomfortable sitting in darkness and eating.”

An activity forbidden because it resembles or could lead to a Scripturally prohibited labor.

Eating one’s Shabbos meal is considered a mitzvah.

See sec. 331:7, which discusses another situation where this rationale is used to justify leniency.

It must be emphasized that many authorities consider turning on an electric light or heater as performing a Scripturally forbidden labor. See Encyclopedia Talmudis, Vol. 18, erech chashmal. See footnote 2 above.

True, additional light would increase one’s Shabbos pleasure, but still, the fundamental mitzvah of partaking of the Shabbos meal in a pleasurable atmosphere could be fulfilled without kindling additional lights.

See subsection 14.

A Rabbinic prohibition that reinforces yet another Rabbinic prohibition.

Performing a task in an irregular manner is considered a shvus. Therefore, telling a non-Jew to turn on a light in an irregular manner could be permitted to enable a mitzvah – partaking of one’s Shabbos meal – to be performed. See a comparable ruling in Ketzos HaShulchan 134:5.

See also sec. 253, footnote 134, and sec. 306:5, 24.

In the original, shogeg.

In the original, meizid; i.e., after having been informed and admonished. See Beitzah 30a and Yevamos 49b. This principle is also applied in subsection 17 and in sec. 156:7, sec. 338:6, sec. 339:2, and sec. 608:4.

There is an added difficulty with an oil lamp: When it is carried, the shifting of the oil will cause its light to a) be partially extinguished, and then b) to burn brighter, thus involving the two forbidden labors of extinguishing and kindling. Nevertheless, even if one maintains that this is an inevitable result (p’sik raishah) of carrying the lamp, license is granted to have a non-Jew perform an activity that the Jew would be permitted to perform, even though a Scripturally forbidden labor will be performed as an inevitable result, since this was not the non-Jew’s intent (sec. 253:10, 28).

In that source (see also sec. 308:15), the Alter Rebbe distinguishes between carrying an object by hand and carrying it with other parts of his body.

When asking a non-Jew to perform such a forbidden activity, the Jew may not directly instruct him to perform it. Instead, a hint should be given by which the non-Jew will understand the action he is expected to perform. See sec. 307:16.

Since there is no permissible way for the Jew to move the lamp in this instance, it is likewise forbidden to have a non-Jew move the lamp for him.

Sec. 311:15. In that source, the Alter Rebbe uses the example (quoting Shabbos 141a) of straw on a bed. One may lie down on the bed and move the straw with his body even though it is muktzeh, thus demonstrating that there is no prohibition against moving an article that is muktzeh with one’s body.

E.g., a lamp on a tray that is a) not set aside for the use of the candles and b) also serves as a base for a non-muktzeh article.

I.e., those who are of the more lenient opinion.

To explain the Alter Rebbe’s statement: Unanimity does not exist with regard to the halachic rulings concerning muktzeh. There are several different and conflicting Rabbinic positions involved. In the process of arriving at a directive for practice, one must weigh the different opinions against each other and, ultimately, favor one over the other. Despite the existence of more stringent opinions, the Alter Rebbe cites the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam, who permits a non-Jew to carry articles that are muktzeh in an ordinary manner if a Jew could have carried them in an abnormal manner. Similarly, the Alter Rebbe also accepts the leniency suggested by Rabbeinu Asher, Rabbeinu Yonah, and other authorities, who maintain that one is permitted to carry an object that is muktzeh via his body for the sake of that object itself. Rabbeinu Tam, however, does not accept that leniency. Hence, the leniency based on Rabbeinu Tam's opinion cannot be coupled with the leniency permitting carrying a muktzeh object via one’s body for the sake of that object itself, to produce a ruling enabling a non-Jew to carry a lamp for the sake of the lamp itself (even though later, in sec. 311:15, the Alter Rebbe accepts Rabbeinu Asher's approach as halachah).

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), the Alter Rebbe further elaborates in explanation of this concept, citing proofs that Rabbeinu Tam does not accept the leniency of moving an object that is muktzeh with one’s body for the sake of the article itself. In his Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe also focuses on another ruling by Rabbeinu Tam (in his commentary to Shabbos 122a): that a non-Jew is permitted to draw water from a well in the public domain for a Jew to drink. The reason for the leniency is that the Jew himself could climb down into the well and drink the water. Hence, the non-Jew is permitted to draw it for him. (Thus it parallels the law at hand: Since the Jew could carry the lamp in an abnormal manner, he is permitted to have a non-Jew carry it in an ordinary manner.)

Rabbeinu Asher does not accept Rabbeinu Tam’s ruling regarding a non-Jew drawing water for a Jew. Nevertheless, we cannot definitely declare, the Alter Rebbe explains, that he would not accept Rabbeinu Tam’s ruling regarding a non-Jew carrying a light for a Jew, because a distinction can be made between the two cases: With regard to drawing water, the Jew is not permitted to draw water from the well in the public domain under any circumstances. True, he may descend into the well to drink, but he may not draw water from it. Hence, it could be said according to Rabbeinu Asher that a non-Jew may never draw water for him. In contrast, the Jew is permitted to carry the lamp, albeit in an abnormal manner. Hence, Rabbeinu Asher might well agree that a non-Jew could carry the light for him in an ordinary manner.

Mateh Yehudah (Ayash) 276:10, states that the restriction stated here applies to a servant or someone else who is accompanying the Jew strictly as a favor to him. If, however, a non-Jew happens to be going somewhere and lights a lantern for his own purposes, a Jew may accompany him. However, if the Jew is an important person and the non-Jew is familiar with him, it would be forbidden (Shabbos 122a).

If, however, the non-Jew kindles it for his sake and the sake of the Jew, it is forbidden for the Jew to benefit from it, as stated in subsection 7. See also Kuntreis Acharon (note 4), summarized in footnote 58.

See footnote 16 above regarding the obligation to admonish a non-Jew when one receives direct benefit from his activity. In a similar vein, Mishnah Berurah 276:27 writes that if the Jew sends the non-Jew alone into the dark – even for a purpose solely connected with the Jew – he need not admonish the non-Jew if he kindles a lamp, because the Jew does not directly benefit from the light. See also subsection 12.

To relate the above to a contemporary issue: A Jew and a non-Jew were about to enter a place whose doors or lights operate electronically. If the non-Jew is merely accompanying the Jew for the Jew’s sake, the Jew may not follow the non-Jew through the door. If, however, the non-Jew was also going for his own purposes and opened the electronic door because he needed to do this for his own purposes, the Jew is permitted to follow him. See Minchas Yitzchak, Vol. 4, responsum 25.

Subsections 3-5. This leniency applies even if the lamp belongs to the Jew.

These two versions of the text were both written by the Alter Rebbe himself. In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 4), the Alter Rebbe explains his equivocation. To provide some background: The law cited by the Alter Rebbe in subsection 11 is quoted from the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Orach Chayim 267:3). On that law, Turei Zahav 276:5 states the law the Alter Rebbe quotes in this subsection, and Turei Zahav concludes with the following rationale: “Even though this washing is being performed for the sake of the Jew, the kindling is not considered as having been performed for the Jew, since the Jew’s physical person does not benefit from this.”

In his Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe explains that there are two ways of understanding the intent of Turei Zahav’s concluding words, “does not benefit from this”: a) that the Jew’s physical person does not benefit from the lamp, or b) the washing. He notes that Magen Avraham 276:6 comments on the ruling of Rav Yosef Caro cited above: When the non-Jew kindles a lamp for both himself and the Jew, it is forbidden for the Jew to benefit from the light. On that basis, it is difficult to understand why it is stated (in the law cited in subsection 11) that “[the servant] is going primarily [to provide] for the Jew’s needs and for his sake.” Seemingly, even if he went for both their sakes, since he knew the Jew was going to accompany him, it can be assumed that he also had the Jew in mind and kindled the lamp for both their sakes. In resolution, it can be explained that the Alter Rebbe is speaking of an instance where it was known that the non-Jew kindled the light for his own sake alone. Nevertheless, since he was going for the Jew’s sake, the Jew is forbidden to benefit from the light, because it is considered as if it was kindled for him.

A distinction can thus be made between this law and the law as stated by Turei Zahav: The physical person of the Jew is considered to benefit directly from the non-Jew accompanying him. By contrast, his physical person does not benefit directly from the non-Jew’s washing the dishes. It cannot be said that when the non-Jew accompanies the Jew, a light is prohibited, because it is forbidden for the Jew to benefit from the light, while when washing dishes, the maidservant is permitted to kindle a light only when the Jew does not benefit from it. On the contrary, since the maidservant kindled the light strictly for her own purposes and not for the Jew at all, there is no reason why the Jew should be forbidden to benefit from it.

With regard to the actual washing, there is no difficulty in instructing the non-Jewish servant to wash the dishes, even in a situation where a Jew would be forbidden to do so, e.g., she will use hot water, use a sponge, or perform other activities that a Jew would be forbidden to perform.

From the Kuntreis Acharon (note 5) to sec. 252, one might conclude that since the maidservant is kindling the light in the Jew’s home, he is obligated to admonish her because of the impression that might be created. Nevertheless, from the Mahadura Basra to sec. 243, it appears that as long as the Jew’s physical person does not directly benefit from the forbidden labor, there is no need to admonish the non-Jew.

Shiurei K’nesses HaGedolah 307 offers a practical suggestion related to this ruling based on the conduct of Rabbi Eliyahu ben Chayim, the chief rabbi of Constantinople. If he wanted to study a holy text (which a non-Jewish servant would not be able to identify) that was found in a dark room, he would tell the non-Jew to bring something else from that room. When the non-Jew kindled a lamp and entered the room, he would go in and take out the holy text he wanted to study.

The Alter Rebbe is speaking about a fire within a hearth or a fireplace in a home. When an individual seeks to warm himself by it, he can sit directly in front of the fire and enjoy its heat. If others also wish to warm themselves, they will have to sit farther back and thus will not feel the heat unless more wood is added to the fire. With regard to the prohibitions mentioned in this subsection, see subsection 15, which explains that these prohibitions do not apply in countries that experience severe winters.

See sec. 318:5 and sec. 325:18, which mention other restrictions enacted for similar reasons.

Adding wood to a fire would constitute the performance of a forbidden labor. As the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain, we are concerned that perhaps the Jew will ask the non-Jew to add wood for his sake. See also the conclusion of sec. 252:10.

I.e., a house that is well-insulated with a furnace to warm it (see Abarbanel, Yirmeyahu 36:2).

The literal translation of the term the Alter Rebbe uses is “a summer home.”

The same principles apply with regard to our contemporary heating units. Once the unit is lit, it does not matter how many people warm themselves by it. To a certain extent, parallel laws apply with regard to benefiting from air-conditioning in the summer. See Yabia Omer, Vol. 7, Orach Chayim, responsum 38, which discusses the issue.

See subsection 3. In his Mahadura Basra to sec. 243, the Alter Rebbe rules that one may derive benefit from the fire and there is no need to admonish the non-Jew, since all he did was add to an existing fire or to an existing light and the Jew could have, in any case, benefited somewhat from that fire or light.

In the main text, the Alter Rebbe rules that one may rely on the more lenient views that allow one to benefit from a fire that a non-Jew kindled on Shabbos for his own benefit or for the benefit of a sick person. He continues in subsection 15 that if the wood that was kindled in a permitted manner was consumed entirely, it is forbidden to warm oneself in front of the fire burning from the fuel added on Shabbos. In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), the Alter Rebbe states that he did not accept the ruling of Turei Zahav 276:3, which permits benefiting from the heat of a fire – even when the original wood is still burning – only in a situation of great need. According to the understanding of Turei Zahav, the authorities who rule leniently and permit benefiting from a fire grant that leniency even when the original wood has been consumed by the fire. The rationale is that, according to Turei Zahav, it is impossible to determine when the original wood was consumed by the fire. Hence, he maintains that the authorities who rule leniently, do so even when the original wood was consumed. Nevertheless, since the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Orach Chayim 276:4) rules stringently concerning a situation where a lamp kindled by a non-Jew remains burning after a lamp that was kindled in a permitted manner is extinguished (see subsection 14), Turei Zahav maintains that a similar stringency should be followed with regard to a fire, unless the situation is one of great need.

This approach is not shared by Bayis Chadash and Magen Avraham 276:12. Indeed, in his Shulchan Aruch, despite his stringent ruling with regard to the lamp cited above, Rav Yosef Caro (Orach Chayim 276:1) mentions a difference of opinion with regard to benefiting from a fire. Moreover, the manner in which he states the law appears to indicate that he favors the more lenient view and accepts it as law. Nevertheless, because Turei Zahav rules stringently, leniency should only be granted in a situation of necessity.

With regard to a situation where the original wood has been consumed by fire, however, despite the fact that Rav Yosef Caro, Bayis Chadash, and Magen Avraham rule stringently, in a situation of great need, one may rely on the opinion of Rabbeinu Meir of Rothenberg cited by Turei Zahav. Rabbeinu Meir maintains that even after the original candle or fire is extinguished, we are not concerned that perhaps one will add to the fire. We may rely on this leniency in a time of great need, because since the question involves a dispute concerning a matter of law, it is permitted to rely on a minority view in times of need. See Niddah 9b.

Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah, ch. 30, note 19, adds an additional leniency based on the laws mentioned here: If a non-Jew kindled a lamp while daylight was still shining into a room, a Jew may benefit from the lamp’s light until there is no longer any daylight.

See the Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), explained in footnote 69, for a detailed explanation of the different Rabbinic positions involved.

See the Mahadura Basra to sec. 243, which states that if there is a small amount of light shining in a room, one may hint to a non-Jew to kindle other lights.

The Aruch HaShulchan 276:12 states that the intent is cold that could cause illness. He adds that this is not a standard measure, but rather varies according to an individual’s constitution.

Nishmas Shabbos, Vol. 5, responsum 96b, maintains that if the heating system in one’s home malfunctions on Shabbos, it is permissible to ask a non-Jewish neighbor to call a repairman, provided one pays after Shabbos.

As stated in sec. 328:19, it is permitted to instruct a non-Jew to perform a forbidden labor for a person who is sick, even if he is not dangerously ill.

Or others who are sensitive to cold.

As mentioned above, according to the Mahadura Basra to sec. 243, if the non-Jew lights the fire solely for the benefit of a Jew, he should be admonished even if he uses his own wood. If, however, he merely adds to an existing fire, there is no need to admonish him, even if he uses the Jew’s wood.

Since the non-Jew was hired to perform a specific task (kindle fires), he is considered a contractor (kablan), and as long as his Jewish employer does not instruct him to kindle the fires on Shabbos, he is considered as acting on his own initiative to earn his fee.

In his Mahadura Basra to sec. 243, the Alter Rebbe states that when a maidservant hired for a year to perform a variety of tasks kindles lights or fires on Shabbos, she is considered as acting on her own initiative as long as the Jewish employer did not instruct her to kindle them.

See the end of subsection 8 above.

Cf. Koheles 2:14, as interpreted by Rashi; i.e., a wise man thinks ahead and takes all potential factors into consideration. Today, when heating devices can be controlled by timers and the like, these words of counsel remain relevant.