Shulchan Aruch: Chapter 266 - Laws Pertaining to a Person Who Was in Midst of a Journey when Night Fell

This applies not only to money, but to anything of substantial value, e.g., jewelry.

Shabbos 153a.

As mentioned in sec. 246:7, “A person is commanded to have his livestock rest on Shabbos, as it is written (Shmos 23:12), ‘…So that your ox and your donkey may rest.’ ”

Even though a) the purse is muktzeh, and b) one is prohibited against asking a non-Jew to perform any action on his behalf he himself is prohibited to perform (see 243:1), in this instance, he is permitted to give it to the non-Jew, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain.

The Alter Rebbe is speaking after the fact. Needless to say, as he proceeds to state, if possible, this Jewish traveler should work out an arrangement with the non-Jew on Friday before Shabbos commences.

The 2000 cubits (approximately 3000 feet or .9 km) from the borders of the city, beyond which it is forbidden to proceed on the Shabbos. See secs. 396-397.

If the nearest place to rest is beyond the Shabbos limit, he may only proceed there if there is mortal danger. See 248:13-14, Mishnah Berurah 266:9.

I.e., the prohibition of carrying in a public domain on Shabbos. Nevertheless, even where there is merely a Rabbinic prohibition involved, the leniency still applies. See subsection 6 and Kuntreis Acharon (note 2) which mention more details regarding when such leniency is granted.

It is preferable to give the item(s) to the non-Jew bein hashmashos rather than on Shabbos itself,because it is permitted to perform an activity forbidden as a shvus bein hashmashos when a substantial loss is involved (sec. 261:2). Optimally, as mentioned in the main text and in note 5, the item(s) should be given to the non-Jew while it is still day on Friday.

The purse.

I.e., he found the object, but has not yet acquired it. Since it is not yet his, there is not the same concern over losing it. See also subsection 20.

Shabbos 153a. In this way, the donkey will carry it on the journey, not the person.

Ibid., 153b. Once an animal lifts up one foreleg and one hind leg, it is considered as having left its place and is no longer at rest.

Before one places an article on an animal, as long as it is not carrying anything, not even wearing a saddle, he is permitted to encourage it to begin walking (Mishnah Berurah 266:9).

Shabbos 3a. See sec. 347:1.

To flesh out the Alter Rebbe’s statements: The prohibited act of carrying on Shabbos involves three phases: a) an akirah, lifting the article up from its state of rest; b) carrying it four cubits in the public domain, or transferring it from a private domain to a public domain, or vice versa; and c) a hanachah, placing the article down. To be liable according to Scriptural Law, one must perform all three actions. Nevertheless, according to Rabbinic Law, it is forbidden to perform any one of these three actions when it leads to the entire labor ultimately being performed, even by another.

Therefore, if a person picked up an object in the public domain, carried it four cubits, and then loaded it onto another person while that person was standing still, the first person is liable because he will have performed all three phases mentioned in the previous note.

Since the article was loaded onto the second person while he was walking, it is not considered to have come to rest. Thus, although the first person performed an akirah,he failed to perform a hanachah.

Since the animal performed the hanachah, if it is carrying the article when it begins to walk again, it will be performing a new akirah.

I.e., the prohibition against performing work with one’s animal mentioned above.

Although in this instance, the person will have performed both the akirah and the hanachah, since in the interim the article was carried more than four cubits by the animal, these two acts are not connected. The rationale is that since the animal transported the article in the public domain, but did not perform either an akirah or a hanachah, and though the person made both an akirah and a hanachah, he did not transport the article, neither the person nor the animal is considered to have carried according to Scriptural Law. Out of consideration for a person’s concern for his money, our Sages did not impose any restrictions in this instance.

If, however, the animal were to perform the hanachah after carrying the object for more than four cubits, it would have both transported the article and performed a hanachah. Hence, its action would be forbidden by Rabbinic Law.

Since one has handled muktzeh, at least one Rabbinic prohibition has already been violated. Nevertheless, one should minimize any prohibitions, as explained in the text.

See subsection 21 below. There the Alter Rebbe speaks of reaching “the first guarded place,” i.e., the first place where he can securely deposit his property. See also Kuntreis Acharon (note 9), where the Alter Rebbe discusses whether or not one may have the animal proceed to his house with the purse.

Although the Alter Rebbe focuses here on the forbidden labor of transferring an article, the same concept applies with regard to other forbidden labors, e.g., having an animal plow a field or thresh grain (Badei HaShulchan 118:27).

Shabbos 153b. In addition to the positive commandment of having one’s own animal rest (mentioned in footnote 3), the Torah contains a related prohibition. Shmos 20:10 states: “Do not perform any work on Shabbos, neither you, nor your son, your daughter, your servant, your maidservant, and your beast,” which our Sages interpret as referring not only to one’s own animal, but also to an animal belonging to someone else. As long as one actively causes an animal to perform a forbidden labor, he violates this prohibition.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1), the Alter Rebbe mentions that Magen Avraham 266:1 speaks about a hired animal and states that one should be stringent because there is a Rabbinic opinion that a hired animal is considered as one’s own. The Alter Rebbe explains that he did not mention this concept because, according to halachah, a hired animal is not considered as one’s own, as stated in sec. 246:8 and the Kuntreis Acharon (note 3) there.

True, in those sources the Alter Rebbe rules that, as a stringency, one should give weight to the view that considers such an animal as one’s own. Nevertheless, in this instance, the stringency will lead to a leniency, because if the animal is considered as his own, the Jew would then have to have the non-Jew carry his purse. Therefore, since fundamentally we rule that the animal does not belong to him, it is better that the animal carry the purse, because of the reason stated above.

For, as explained above, since the akirah and hanachah are not connected with each other, a Scriptural prohibition is not involved, only a Rabbinic decree.

See sec. 243:1 and notes.

Thus he fulfills the positive commandment mentioned in footnote 3.

See subsection 4. See also sec. 246:9-10. There, the Alter Rebbe discusses the laws applying to declaring an animal ownerless or transferring ownership of it to a non-Jew, so that one does not violate the prohibition against having his animal perform work on Shabbos.

For riding on an animal is forbidden by Rabbinic decree, as stated in sec. 305:23 and sec. 339:1.

There are two opinions quoted in the source cited. According to the more lenient opinion, a place is not deemed a public domain unless 600,000 pass through it. The Alter Rebbe concludes that the prevailing custom follows this opinion. (Although he concludes that a G‑d-fearing person should follow the more stringent view, the prevailing custom is used as the yardstick for the present ruling.)

{There is great controversy among the contemporary authorities as to whether an eruv may be constructed around major metropolises today. Since their public thoroughfares are sixteen cubits wide, any eruv is certainly invalid according to the more stringent view. Furthermore, there are many opinions regarding how to count the 600,000 people, and large cities could be deemed public domains according to Scriptural Law even in keeping with the more lenient view. The matter thus becomes problematic, since an eruv cannot be constructed in a public domain. For an overview in English, see “The Contemporary Eruv,” Bechhofer, ch. 3.}

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe focuses on his statement in the main text, that license is not given to ride on the donkey, explaining that this is derived from the ruling of Magen Avraham 266:7, which does not grant license to ride on a donkey to save its saddle, even if the saddle is very valuable.

In that source, Magen Avraham refers to the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro, Orach Chayim 334:2, which mentions a difference of opinion among the Rishonim on whether it is permitted to hide valuables that are muktzeh to prevent them from being stolen by thieves, or in an instance when a fire broke out and it was necessary to abandon one’s home.

Based on that ruling and Magen Avraham 334:3, it would appear that the authorities who rule stringently there would also rule stringently with regard to the question here: having an animal carry one’s purse when Shabbos commences while he is on a journey. They would explain that license was granted only out of fear that he would violate the Scriptural prohibition against carrying. Thus, in the present age, when only the question of violating a Rabbinic prohibition is involved, they would not grant leniency.

Moreover, even the authorities who rule leniently with regard to moving valuables that are muktzeh in the instance of a fire grant that leniency only because they maintain that in that instance, there is likelihood that a person will panic and violate a Scriptural prohibition, digging a pit to bury his valuables.

Therefore, since the roads in the Alter Rebbe’s time did not meet the criteria of a public domain, even when Shabbos commenced while one was traveling, there is no question of a Scriptural prohibition being violated were one to carry his purse. For this reason, Magen Avraham questions whether today the leniency of giving one’s purse to be carried would apply.

Nevertheless, the Alter Rebbe explains, our Sages’ leniency – allowing one’s purse to be carried by a non-Jew or a donkey – applies even today, for the reason stated later in the main text: It is preferable that one Rabbinic prohibition be violated – having a non-Jew or an animal carry the purse – than the person violate a number of Rabbinic prohibitions – handling the purse and carrying it himself.

Based on this rationale, riding on a donkey should not be permitted in the present era, for it is no less serious a prohibition than carrying the purse oneself. Indeed, from a comparison of the rulings of the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro, Orach Chayim, sec. 336:1 and sec.348:1, it could be argued that riding involves a more serious prohibition.

A question arises based on the above explanation: In the situation described in sec. 334, the person also might come to violate a more serious prohibition. Why then does the stricter opinion not allow leniency?

The Alter Rebbe differentiates between the situation described here and that described in sec. 334. In the situation described in sec. 334, it is far from certain that the person will violate a more serious prohibition. In the situation here, by contrast, it is almost a certainty that the person will do something to save his money. If he is not granted a permitted means of doing so, he will do so in a forbidden manner and most likely will carry it in the way that is most comfortable – by carrying it himself. Therefore, in this case the Rabbis distinguished between more and less severe Rabbinic prohibitions, and granted license to violate the prohibition against having a non-Jew or an animal carry the purse, so that one does not violate a more serious Rabbinic prohibition by carrying it himself.

The Alter Rebbe continues to bring support for this distinction he made by referring to – and explaining – other related halachic situations.

An area which does not meet the criteria of a public domain (reshus harabim), but in which it is forbidden to carry on Shabbos according to Rabbinic Law. See sec. 345:19.

Our translation is based on the Kuntreis Acharon (note 2).

Having the animal perform a forbidden labor in the manner described.

Carrying in a karmelis and handling muktzeh.

2000 cubits according to Rabbinic Law and twelve mil according to Scriptural Law according to certain views, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to state.

With regard to traveling by ship. See also sec. 325:11 and sec. 404:1 which deal with the concept of whether the Shabbos limits apply ten handbreadths above the ground.

See sec. 396:1.

Both factors – that the person is sitting (or standing) in a comfortable place and the donkey’s feet are touching the ground – are significant. If only one factor is present, this prohibition does not apply. For this reason, since a ship floats above the bed of a river or sea, the law is more lenient. See sec. 248:3.

If he would become separated from the caravan and left alone in the desert, he would be in danger.

And under ordinary circum- stances, there would be a prohibition against riding on an animal. Here, however, since walking would cause him to lose contact with the caravan and force him to travel alone, leniency is granted.

These same laws apply to a car, bus, or train. See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 28, p. 126, note 15.

And conversely, he is forbidden to transfer an article from the coach to the ground.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe states that whenever a partition is more than three handbreadths above the ground, it is not considered as a valid partition that would define the status of a domain. If, however, it is less than three handbreadths above the ground, we apply the principle of lavud and it is as if it is connected to the ground. See also Kuntreis Acharon 248:3.

I.e., without its wheels.

Indeed, as long as it is more than three handbreadths high, it is considered as a makom p’tur.

A place in the public domain that is distinct, but whose area is too small to warrant it being considered as a private domain, a public domain, or a karmelis. Any object less than 32 cm by 32 cm (slightly more than twelve and a half inches) is considered a makom p’tur. See sec. 345:27.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe explains that we follow the principle of gud achis mechitzah, i.e., we consider the boundaries of the upper surface of the domain as if they extended straight to the ground without being reduced in size, even though in actual fact the area of the lower surface is less than that of the upper surface.

Shabbos 153a. I.e., rather than carry it himself, he should give it to a person who, though Jewish, is not obligated in the observance of mitzvos.

Chagigah 2b-3a. See Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 1:5 and sources quoted there. See also sources quoted in Encyclopedia of Jewish Medical Ethics, Vol. 2, p. 673, footnotes 76-113; “Mental Incompetence and Its Implications in Jewish Law,” in Contemporary Halachic Problems, J. David Bleich, Vol. 2, p. 283-299.

When a deaf-mute has been taught to overcome his disability (e.g., through using sign language), there are various opinions among the halachic authorities regarding his exemption from the obligation to observe the mitzvos. See sources quoted in Encyclopedia of Jewish Medical Ethics, Vol. 1, p. 292, footnotes 50-54. See also the bilingual edition of this text, Vol. 2, section 55:11.

Shabbos 153b.

I.e., when he comes of age.

Obviously, even such a person has at least a token level of understanding. The intent is that his condition is such that he will never become responsible for the fulfillment of mitzvos.

The word “mature” was added to the translation to clarify the matter, because there are children with intellectual precocity. Nevertheless, all minors lack a certain degree of maturity. For that reason, the Alter Rebbe does not make distinctions with regard to the age of the children involved or their intellectual capacity.

See sec. 343:3, Badei HaShulchan 147:4, for details regarding determining this age.

See sec. 343:2ff., which describes the nature of this obligation. Sec. 343:5 states that one not should not accustom the child to desecrate Shabbos, even regarding a Rabbinic prohibition. Even though here the child will be performing a Scriptural prohibition, the Sages allow it for the reason explained in the text.

Subsection 3.

I.e., not perform forbidden labor.

As stated in that source, this prohibition applies even when the child has not reached the age when he is required to be trained in the observance of the Torah and its mitzvos.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), the Alter Rebbe focuses on his ruling in the main text – taken from Magen Avraham 266:8 – that even if the purse is given to a child while it is still day (and thus there was no prohibited akirah), it must be taken from him before he stops, for even a hanachah without an akirah is forbidden. This also applies when one places the purse on an animal.

Based on this explanation, a resolution can be offered to a question raised by Shiltei Giborim. Sefer HaTerumah states that a person who is carrying a valuable object on Friday can begin to run before the commencement of Shabbos. Thus, he will not have performed an akirah. When he reaches his home, he should toss the object inside in an irregular manner, so that he will not have performed a hanachah for which he is liable. (See subsections 12 and 13.) Shiltei Giborim asks: Why is he required to start running before the commencement of Shabbos? Even if he starts running on Shabbos itself, he would not be liable because the hanachah is being performed in an irregular manner!

Based on the above, however, the stringency of Sefer HaTerumah is in place. For, as stated previously, it is desirable not to perform either an akirah or a hanachah once Shabbos has commenced. Nevertheless, this stringency applies only in a domain that is defined as a reshus harabim according to Scriptural Law. In the present age, when public thoroughfares generally do not meet the criteria for a reshus harabim according to Scriptural Law, the leniency suggested by Shiltei Giborim may be relied upon if the person cannot walk less than four cubits at a time (see the end of subsection 13).

See Badei HaShulchan 147:11, which discusses the law if a father gives his child something without the intent that he perform a prohibited act with it.

Shabbos 153a.

See subsection 2 above.

Shabbos 153b. See Tehilah LeDavid 266:6, which states that even if the person is accompanied by a friend, they should not move the purse by passing it to each other (see sec. 301:52 and sec. 349:4). Since the purse is muktzeh, the friend is not given license to move it on his behalf.

I.e., the prohibition also applies during bein hashmashos.

Shabbos 5b.

Which is, of course, forbidden.

For when a person performs a forbidden activity on Shabbos in an unusual manner, he is not liable.

Because it is not the manner in which objects are ordinarily placed down.

Proceeding in this manner may indicate that he is carrying a valuable article and his slow pace will expose him to danger.

Although even when one walks without stopping, seemingly the same concepts would apply; nevertheless, it is necessary that one run, as stated in the following subsection.

Shabbos, loc. cit. Our Sages considered the option of running less desirable than the option of walking less than four cubits at a time and permitted it only in case of danger (Kuntreis Acharon, note 6).

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 4), the Alter Rebbe mentions that there are authorities who allow the leniency of running with an article only when one is carrying a large package. Since it is not common to run while carrying a package, the person will remember and will not pause out of forgetfulness. When carrying a purse, by contrast, they maintain that this leniency is not granted. The Alter Rebbe, however, does not quote these authorities, because even they would rule leniently in a case of danger. In particular, this is true in the present era, when generally the concept of a public domain does not apply. In such a situation, even the more stringent opinions would rule leniently.

In subsection 3.

See footnote 31 above.

As explained in Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), since the prohibition against carrying in a karmelis is of Rabbinic origin, further leniency can be granted.

When he began to run with the article after nightfall.

Although in general it is forbidden to run on Shabbos (Berachos 6b; Shabbos 113b; supplement to sec. 301, subsection 1), license to do so is granted in this instance for the reason the Alter Rebbe proceeds to state.

Shabbos 153b.

Ibid.

For stopping solely for the purpose of adjusting one’s burden is not considered as truly stopping. In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), the Alter Rebbe mentions that his source, Magen Avraham 266:16, uses this wording and quotes Rashi’s commentary to the above passage rather than Shabbos 5b, where the concept is explicitly stated in order to emphasize the following idea: that if necessary, one may pause to adjust his burden.

Magen Avraham (and the Alter Rebbe) use the wording “he is not liable” and not “he is permitted,” because license is granted only when there is no other alternative.

A responsum of unknown authorship (printed in Hosafos to the responsa of the Tzemach Tzedek, Orach Chayim, p. 14b) notes the apparent contradiction between the Alter Rebbe’s statements here – that the person is termed “negligent” for going out to a karmelis holding an object close to nightfall on Friday – and those in sec. 252:18, where he grants a person license to do so. Several possible resolutions have been offered; see Yagdil Torah, Vol. 23.

I.e. after nightfall.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to a purse worn as part of a belt.

Even though he did not perform the akirah on Shabbos, the fact that the hanachah is forbidden is sufficient to warrant this stringency.

Thus, he must either leave the article unattended in the public domain or karmelis,remain there with it for the entire Shabbos, or have a Jew or a non-Jew watch over it for the duration of Shabbos.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 6), the Alter Rebbe relates to the words “he forgot it and was not aware of it at the time he went out” in the main text, citing his source as Magen Avraham 266:10, and explains the connection to Magen Avraham 252:24.

The Alter Rebbe also focuses on the ruling of Rama 266:12, which does not allow a person who discovered that he was unknowingly carrying an article in the public domain to use any of the leniencies mentioned above. Instead, Rama requires him to leave it there and have a non-Jew watch it for him until after Shabbos. On that ruling, Magen Avraham 266:20 writes: “If he was afraid to leave it in the marketplace lest non-Jews take it, he may run with it.”

The Alter Rebbe states that Magen Avraham could not be speaking about a person who was negligent and intentionally brought the article into the public domain right before nightfall with the intent to store it away before nightfall, but forgot to do so. This explanation is not acceptable, because then there would be no difference between the ruling applying to a person who was negligent and the ruling applying to one who was carrying an article on a journey when Shabbos fell. (And, as stated in subsection 16, there is a difference: One who is negligent is not granted this leniency.) Therefore, we are forced to say that Magen Avraham and Rama are speaking about an instance where the person was not negligent, but rather, forgot he was carrying the article at the time he went into the public domain. (It can be explained as well that Rama does not grant the person license to run with the article, because license to run with the article is granted only when there is no alternative, and in a town, it is likely that he will be able to find a non-Jew who will watch the article for him. On that statement, Magen Avraham comments: “If he is afraid…,” i.e., Magen Avraham also agrees that preferably he should have a non-Jew watch it. If, however, that is not feasible, then he may run with the article.)

The Alter Rebbe also questions whether, when it is not possible to find a non-Jew to watch the article, the Jew is required to watch it himself or whether he is permitted to employ the leniencies mentioned above. The Alter Rebbe leaves the matter unresolved. This could be the reason why the words “via a non-Jewish or Jewish watchman” are in parentheses, for often the use of parentheses indicates that the Alter Rebbe was somewhat in doubt about the ruling included in the text and wished to revisit the matter at a later time.

An alternative version is brought in parentheses: Instead of “went out with it,” that version states “carrying it out with him.”

As explained in subsections 11-12.

For walking in such a manner will certainly arouse a robber’s suspicions.

See subsection 13.

See the conclusion of footnote 86 above.

We have changed the translation of the verb to a passive form to indicate that he is not required to guard the purse himself, but may instead charge a non-Jew with doing so.

I.e., there is no need to rebuke him for performing this act on behalf of the Jew. Even if the Jew benefits, the non-Jew is simply making it easier for himself; by returning the article to the Jew’s home at an earlier time, he is not required to guard the article the entire Shabbos. See also Kuntreis Acharon (note 8), explained in footnote 103 below.

I.e., a place where the prohibition against carrying an article for more than four cubits does not apply.

He is not, however, permitted to handle the purse itself, because it is muktzeh. Similarly, if a person discovers that he has a forbidden object in his pants pocket, he need not remove it the moment he discovers it, but can go into a private room where the object will be secure. He must remove the object indirectly, e.g., through shaking it out of the pocket without moving the object directly. He can also walk to a private room, remove his pants, and then either shake out the object or put away his pants in a secure place.

He may not, however, remain standing, holding the muktzeh article. Instead, he must decide where he wants to deposit it and go there directly (see Kuntreis Acharon to sec. 301, note 11).

In that source, the Alter Rebbe speaks about a utensil that is used for a task that is forbidden on Shabbos. Although such an article is muktzeh, it may be moved if one requires its place on Shabbos. Once it is in the person’s hands, he need not cast it aside immediately, but instead may carry it until he reaches the place where he desires to set it down. Although the purse is included in a stricter category of muktzeh, and in that source, the Alter Rebbe quotes an opinion that prohibits moving an article in this category of muktzeh, in this instance, moving it is allowed because of the second reason (quoted in the parentheses). See also the following footnote.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe states that it is permitted to move an article that is muktzeh with one’s body. Badei HaShulchan 113:11explains that the Alter Rebbe requires both of these rationales because there are authorities who rule stringently and do not accept either one alone.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 7), the Alter Rebbe focuses on the ruling in the main text that when a person discovers an ownerless article on Shabbos, it is forbidden to instruct a non-Jew to move it, even if doing so involves only the prohibition against moving an article that is muktzeh. Even if the article is valuable, there are many authorities who maintain that the fact that he will suffer a loss does not override the prohibition against carrying muktzeh – only if it is a great loss (see 307:12). Moreover, the fact that the person is forbidden to have the non-Jew take the ownerless article is not considered as a loss at all, only loss of the potential to profit. Hence, license is not granted to instruct a non-Jew to acquire it on the Jew’s behalf, as stated in the main text.

It is, however, permitted to guard an article that is muktzeh on Shabbos, as stated in the main text. See Shabbos 107a, which states that when a fowl flies under the fringes of one’s garment on Shabbos, one can watch it until the end of Shabbos. This leniency is granted despite the fact that the fowl is muktzeh. As the Alter Rebbe concludes in the main text, it is certainly permitted to instruct a non-Jew to watch an article that is muktzeh, for there are no acts that are permitted for a Jew to perform on Shabbos, but forbidden for him to instruct a non-Jew to perform on his behalf.

See subsection 2 and footnote 11.

See sec. 307:12, which mentions this opinion.

For, as stated in Kuntreis Acharon (note 7), there no acts that are permitted for a Jew to perform on Shabbos, but forbidden for him to instruct a non-Jew to perform on his behalf. See footnote 99.

See the conclusion of subsection 18 and footnote 93. In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 8), the Alter Rebbe focuses on the ruling in the main text: that it is not necessary to admonish the non-Jew if he brings the article to the Jew’s home. Since the Jew does not need the non-Jew to deliver the article to the Jew’s home – for on the Jew’s part, it would suffice for the non-Jew to remain watching the article in the place where it was found – the non-Jew is considered as acting for his own sake by bringing the article. For in this way, he will not have to remain there the entire day to watch it.

True, in sec. 252:10, there are authorities who require one to admonish a non-Jew when he performs a forbidden act with property belonging to a Jew. Nevertheless, there are many authorities who do not accept this stringency. Their view can be relied upon in the present instance. Certainly this leniency applies according to the stance later adopted by the Alter Rebbe in the Mahadura Basra to sec. 243. There he rules leniently regarding this issue, maintaining that as long as the Jew does not receive actual physical benefit on Shabbos from the forbidden activities that a non-Jew performs on Shabbos on his behalf, he is not required to admonish him.

Shabbos 153a.

I.e., following the guidelines in subsection 3.

Thus there was no prohibited akirah, because the animal began walking before the commencement of Shabbos until the time it entered the town.

The Mishnah (Shabbos 153a) states: “He reaches (הגיע) the outermost courtyard, he removes….” In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 9), the Alter Rebbe notes that from the wording in the sources for this ruling (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 21:10; the Tur; the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro, Orach Chayim 266:9), it appears that they understood the mishnah to require that the articles be deposited in the outermost courtyard of the town. The Alter Rebbe questions why, with regard to the package mentioned in subsection 15, license is granted to proceed until one’s home, while here such license is not granted. Seemingly, greater leniency should be granted here because an animal is carrying the burden and not the person himself.

The Alter Rebbe explains that it is possible to say that the mishnah is not stating a requirement, but rather describing the most common situation, and, in fact, a person would be allowed to proceed to his house with the animal carrying the burden. He concludes by stating that he is speaking only theoretically; further analysis is required to define the actual halachah.

I.e. the articles that are not muktzeh. As reflected by the conclusion of the subsection, the person is not only allowed, but is obligated, to remove the articles because of the suffering the animal undergoes.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 10), the Alter Rebbe focuses on the directive in the main text to remove the burden from the animal before it stands, so that the animal will not even perform a forbidden hanachah (even though it will not be coupled with a forbidden akirah). He explains that although Maharsha (in his gloss to Shabbos 153b) states that we are not concerned with the animal performing a forbidden hanachah, from the words of many Rishonim, it is obvious that it is an issue that must be reckoned with.

The Alter Rebbe also questions the statement of Magen Avraham 266:11, which says that it is unnecessary to remove the burden from the animal when it hesitates before entering the person’s courtyard. The Alter Rebbe explains that the obligation to do so is not a mere stringency, but a fundamental requirement. He concludes that the matter requires further investigation. Perhaps that is the reason that this paragraph is in parentheses.

A measure of volume equivalent to approximately 8 liters (approximately 2.1 gallons) in modern measure according to Shiurei Mikveh. Fifteen seah equals a volume of approximately 120 liters (approximately 31.7 gallons). (When measuring the 40 seah of water for a mikveh, much stricter calculations are used.)

As explained in that source, unloading such a large store of produce is considered as excessive exertion that is inappropriate on Shabbos.

See end of subsection 25.

Shabbos 153a. This leniency was also granted in consideration of the suffering that would be caused to the animal were the burden to remain on its back the entire Shabbos.

Ibid., 154b.

Shabbos, loc. cit. See fig. 14 on the opposite page. He is not obligated to remove them from the cushions. Nevertheless, because he has the option to do so if he desires, it is not considered as if he negated the possibility of using the cushions, which would be forbidden, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to state.

True, by letting the sacks fall on them, he negates the possibility of using them for a brief amount of time and that is also forbidden (Rabbeinu Nissim, Shabbos 66b). Nevertheless, that prohibition is lifted in light of the significant loss he would otherwise suffer (see Kuntreis Acharon, note 11).

In that Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe explains the above statements, noting that Rashi (Shabbos 154b) states that one must actually remove the cushions later. Nevertheless, the wording of Rabbeinu Yitzchak Alfasi; Rambam; the Tur; and the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro, Orach Chayim 266:9, supports the interpretation given above. (See also sec. 313:7.)

The Alter Rebbe also discusses the prohibition against nullifying the use of a utensil for only a portion of the day, stating that there is a difference of opinion among the Rishonim whether or not it is permitted to do so only when a significant loss is involved. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of the later authorities follow the more stringent view.

The two points are interrelated: According to the more stringent opinion, it could be said that the person is not considered to have negated the possibility of using the cushions by placing them under the utensils, since he could remove the cushions at any time. Why then do the later authorities grant this leniency only when a significant loss is involved? Because the glass utensils are fragile and therefore the cushions must be removed gently. During the time it takes to do so, it is impossible to use the cushions. Thus, he will have nullified the use of the cushions for at least a brief time.

Our translation follows the latest edition of the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch and assumes that a printing error crept into the earlier editions.

See sec. 261 for the definition of this term.

When an article that is muktzeh rests on another article bein hashmashos, the article on which it rests becomes a basis ledavar haassur, a base for a forbidden article (see sec. 308:60 and sec. 309:3, 6, et al.), and it, too, is forbidden to be moved on Shabbos.

I.e., to let the sacks fall on them as described above.

Our Sages forbade doing so because they considered this tantamount to destroying the article (see sec. 265:3).

In sec. 305:24, the Alter Rebbe explains that a person should unload an animal by placing his head under the burden, easing the burden down, and letting it slide gently to the ground.

I.e., supporting them with his body as they slide to the ground.

There are authorities who rule that the prohibition of muktzeh must be upheld even when a significant loss is involved. Nevertheless, in this instance, they rule leniently because: a) the person is not actually moving the sacks, just supporting them as they fall; and b) the animal’s suffering must also be taken into consideration, as stated in sec. 305:24.

This principle applies even in situations where an animal’s suffering is not an issue.

See the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, Hilchos Ovrei Derachim VeTzaar Baalei Chayim, subsection 4, which states: “One is, however, obligated to exert himself physically to save all animals, even those that are ownerless and even those belonging to gentiles, from suffering….” Needless to say, it is forbidden by Scriptural Law to perform a deed that causes suffering to any animal.

Shabbos 154b.

I.e., a significant loss, as indicated by the statements at the beginning of the subsection.

Which is forbidden because they are muktzeh. When viewing the Alter Rebbe’s rulings here and in the previous subsections as a unit, it appears that the prohibition against slightly moving an article that is muktzeh is more severe than the prohibition against nullifying the use of a utensil temporarily; the prohibition against nullifying the use of a utensil for the entire Shabbos is more severe than the prohibition against moving muktzeh slightly; and the prohibition against moving muktzeh in an ordinary manner is the most severe of all these restrictions.

In that era, houses of study were frequently situated in the fields on the outskirts of the town.

Beitzah 15a. In the Talmudicera, it was common to wear tefillin throughout the entire day, even when involved in mundane matters. Needless to say, the same law applies to the arm tefillin. The Talmud(and the Alter Rebbe) do not mention them, because they need not be worn visibly (see sec. 27:8).

Similar laws also apply when one finds tefillin in the public domain or in a field. See sec. 301:51-53.

There is no mitzvah to wear tefillin on Shabbos. On the contrary, one who wears them violates the prohibition “Do not add (bal tosif) to the Torah’s commandments)” and is considered to be denigrating the holiness of the Shabbos (sec. 31:1). Nevertheless, if one wears them as an ornament, there is no prohibition against wearing them on Shabbos according to Scriptural Law. That said, our Sages forbade going out to the public domain while wearing tefillin, lest one feel the need to relieve himself, remove them before entering the lavatory, and thus carry them four cubits in the public domain (sec. 301:3).