Shulchan Aruch: Chapter 259 - Several Laws Governing Insulation & Moving Insulating Materials

Muktzeh means “set aside.” Since these articles are not implements, they are “set aside” and it is forbidden to move them on Shabbos. See section 308, where this subject is discussed in detail. In particular, section 308:8, 53ff. describes the prohibition against moving articles that are not in the category of keilim, “implements” or “utensils.”

Sec. 257:5 defines that term as “any soft substance…, e.g., cotton, the soft wool of an animal, or the remnants of worn out clothes.” In this section, we are speaking about muchin that are dry, for muchin that are wet are considered as substances that increase temperature and are forbidden to be used for insulation.

In the following subsection, the Alter Rebbe describes the manner in which a pot insulated by these muchin can be removed from them.

This phrase is being used to translate the Hebrew דרך מקרה, which literally means “incidentally.” The intent here is that the person used the muchin for insulation without thinking of doing so permanently; they were accessible and he needed insulation, so he used them.

Shabbos 48b.

See sec. 308:52-53, which explains that when an entity is not an implement and not commonly used for a given purpose, it must be designated to be used for that purpose permanently. The fact that it was used for that purpose once or designated to be used for that purpose on one Shabbos is not sufficient for it to be considered in the category of implements.

See sec. 308:3ff. with regard to the prohibition against moving articles that are designated as muktzeh because they were set aside to be used as merchandise. They are considered muktzeh machmas chisaron kis, “muktzeh because [of the possibility] of financial loss,” and may not be moved even to use them for a permitted task or because one seeks to perform another activity in the place they occupy.

The phrase set off by parentheses – “and their owner is meticulous not to use them for any task” – is based on the gloss of Magen Avraham 259:4 and represents an addition to the statements of Rav Yosef Caro in his Shulchan Aruch. This addition represents a leniency: that even though the shearings were placed in a storehouse, they are only considered muktzeh when their owner is meticulous about not using them, i.e., they are muktzeh machmas chisaron kis.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1), the Alter Rebbe analyzes why Magen Avraham mentions the need for the owner to be meticulous about not using the shearings for any task. The Alter Rebbe’s question here is clarified on the basis of his statements in sec. 308:3:

Even a utensil that was set aside not to be used for any purpose, e.g., utensils prepared to be sold as merchandise that are not commonly used for any purpose [are not necessarily deemed as muktzeh]. If the person is not careful never to use them at all [for his personal use], he is not considered to have diverted his attention from using them entirely. Therefore, they are not deemed muktzeh and are not be forbidden to be carried.

To what does the above apply? To an article that is actually a utensil. [Different laws apply,] however, to an article that is not actually a utensil, but is placed in the category of utensils because it is fit to be used for a purpose on Shabbos, e.g., rolls of wool that are fit to be used for support or to sit on them, or the like. If one placed them in a storehouse for merchandise, he nullifies their classification as a utensil and it is forbidden to move them, even if he is not meticulous never to use them for any task.

Seemingly, since these shearings are not keilim, “implements,”there is no need to qualify that the owner is meticulous not to use them. They should be considered as muktzeh, for they are not keilim, they were not designated to be used as insulation for all time, and were stored away as merchandise.

Moreover, since these shearings are not in the category of keilim,and thus are governed by different laws than keilim are, they would be forbidden to be carried even if the owner was not meticulous about not using them for another purpose; for example, he allows people to sit on them. (As support, the Alter Rebbe cites Shabbos 48b.)

Magen Avraham, loc. cit., however, states that the owner must be meticulous about not using the shearings for another purpose. We are forced to say that this is Magen Avraham’s intent – not that the owner is merely meticulous to return them to the storeroom, because Magen Avraham cites as support the rulings in the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Orach Chayim 308:1, 25), which speak about being meticulous about using articles that are muktzeh machmas chisaron kis for other purposes.

As such, the Alter Rebbe first questions Magen Avraham’s ruling, noting that since the shearings were set aside to be used as merchandise and are not keilim, they are considered muktzeh even though they are fit to be used for certain purposes.As support, he refers to the ruling {Shabbos 128b; the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Orach Chayim 308:21); cited in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch 308:52} that an arrangement of stones is considered as muktzeh (unless one performed an act indicating that he desired to sit upon it on Shabbos). The fact that the stones are fit to sit upon does not prevent them from being considered as muktzeh, because they are not keilim and they were set aside for another purpose. Indeed, the Alter Rebbe continues, in the glosses of Magen Avraham to sec. 308: 3, 48, when discussing articles that are muktzeh because they were set aside for other purposes, Magen Avraham does not mention that one must be meticulous not to use those articles for purposes other than the one for which they were set aside.

Nevertheless, the Alter Rebbe clarifies the position of Magen Avraham by analyzing the support he cites for his statement, the ruling in the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Orach Chayim 308:25, discussed in sec. 308:58 of the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch). Rav Yosef Caro writes: “It is permitted to move dried hides, whether they belong to a private person or a craftsman.” Rama comments: “The hides of a small animal are forbidden [to be moved] unless one thought of doing so while it was still day [on Friday].” Even though these hides are too small to sit on – thus they are not in the category of keilim – if a person thought about sitting on them, they are not considered muktzeh.

Magen Avraham’s logic is that if, as Rama rules, thinking about sitting on the small hides is sufficient for them not to be considered as muktzeh, how much more so in the case concerning shearings should actually using the shearings for insulation be effective in removing them from the category of muktzeh.

Now, it is possible to say that Rama is following the logic reflected in his ruling in his gloss to the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Orach Chayim 301:21), that it is sufficient to think about sitting on an arrangement of stones for them not to be considered as muktzeh. Magen Avraham’s argument, however, is based on the ruling of Rav Yosef Caro. In that instance, for the stones not to be considered as muktzeh, Rav Yosef Caro requires a person to either designate them for sitting for all time or to perform an act that indicates he desires to use them for this purpose on the following day. Logically, the same would apply with regard to the shearings mentioned here. Thus, performing an act – the fact that one used them as insulation before the commencement of Shabbos –should seemingly be sufficient for them to be removed from the category of muktzeh. Why then does Rav Yosef Caro require that they be designated for that purpose for all time?

In resolution of that question, the Alter Rebbe explains that Magen Avraham posits that there is another factor involved: the person is careful not to use the shearings for another purpose. Thus, there are two reasons to consider these shearings muktzeh:a) they are not keilim, and b) they are designated solely as merchandise, in which instance, they are placed in the category of muktzeh machmas chisaron kis. Using them as insulation once, the Alter Rebbe explains, is sufficient to remove the first, but not the second, of these restrictions.

One might argue that thinking of using the shearings for insulation is sufficient to remove them from the category of muktzeh machmas chisaron kis. In resolution of that argument, the Alter Rebbe explains that such logic is effective only when the purpose for which one thinks to use the article is a common use of that article {see the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Orach Chayim 308:26), the Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe 308:59}. Magen Avraham does not consider insulation as a common use for shearings. Hence, when a person sets aside shearings to use for merchandise and in general he is meticulous about not using them for any task, the fact that he used them for insulation does not prevent them from being considered as muktzeh. See also sec. 308:59 and notes, which relate to the discussion here.

Although, the Alter Rebbe resolves the questions he raised concerning the leniency of Magen Avraham, he nevertheless leaves this leniency in parentheses, indicating that he is reserving final judgment. Indeed, in 308:3, he omits this leniency completely.

Shabbos 49a.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe observes that in his Shulchan Aruch, Rav Yosef Caro quotes the wording of the Tur, “He should shake the cover and [the insulation] will fall off.” Afterwards, Rav Yosef Caro adds an explanatory phrase: “That is to say, he takes the cover of the pot which is a k’li….” With this addition, he clarifies that it is unnecessary to purposely incline the cover so that the insulating materials will fall off. Instead, one may remove the cover and then he may carry it even with the insulating material on it.

Which is forbidden to be moved, as stated in sec. 309:4. See sec. 309:6.

The literal meaning of the wording the Alter Rebbe used is “into the cover." This is difficult to imagine when the cover is made from a hard material such as metal or ceramic.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), the Alter Rebbe underscores that while it is permitted to move the cover via a pointed metal object or knife, one may not, by contrast, use the pointed object or the knife to move the insulating substances themselves. He supports this thesis by citing Shabbos 123a, which states that when one wants to take unripe fruit that had been stored in straw, one should take a long needle, insert it into the fruit and take it in that manner, rather than moving the straw. The rationale for these laws, the Alter Rebbe explains, is that if one would move away the substances that are forbidden to be moved with a rod or the like, it would not be considered as moving them in an indirect and permissible manner (טלטול מן הצד). On the contrary, the rod is considered as an extension of one’s hand. One would be considered as moving a forbidden object in an indirect manner only when one is not concerned with the forbidden object at all, but rather moves the permitted object and the forbidden object is carried along as a matter of course.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe explains that, when one has no need for the forbidden object, it is permitted to move the permitted object even when the forbidden object will inevitably be moved as a result. See subsection 4 below.

I.e., the pot did not have a cover of its own and one covered it with a piece of wood or a stone. The wood or the stone is muktzeh and forbidden to be carried (see sec. 308:8).

Were that to be true, it would be forbidden to move the pot, because it would be considered as a base for a forbidden object; see sec. 309:4.

See subsections 2-3.

Shabbos 49a, 50b. Tehilah LeDavid 259:2 maintains that the conditions necessary to return food to a range (see sec. 253: 14) must be met in order to be permitted to return food to insulation. From the Alter Rebbe’s wording, however, it does not appear that any of those conditions are required in this instance (see Shabbos KeHalachah, ch. 11, note 86).

Ibid.

“Directly” is used to translate בידים, literally, “with his hands.” The literal translation is not appropriate in this instance because the person is moving the muchin with the pot, and not with his hands. Nevertheless, as explained in Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), moving an object via another entity is considered just as if he moved it with his hands.

Shabbos 49b, 50b.

Our translation follows the emendation suggested by Kuntreis HaShulchan.

Otherwise, one would be bound by the prohibition against moving an article that is not a k’li mentioned above (see note 7).

Even stones designated for that purpose, as described in the previous subsection.

Beitzah 35b.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 4), the Alter Rebbe notes that in his Shulchan Aruch, Rav Yosef Caro mentions a difference of opinion concerning whether it is permitted to use stones for this purpose or not. Nevertheless, from the fact that he states the more lenient opinion in the plural, it appears that he favors that view. Similarly, Darchei Moshe follows this perspective. Moreover, the Alter Rebbe explains that since the mitzvah of honoring the Shabbos is involved and the prohibition is merely Rabbinic in origin, it is fitting to accept the more lenient opinions.

In Kuntreis Acharon to sec. 161 (note 1), the Alter Rebbe discusses whether the person must also not have any other food that he had already insulated for Shabbos, or if it is sufficient that he feel he has insufficient hot food for his meals.

Doing so is prohibited as an aspect of the forbidden labor of demolishing, as stated in sec. 314:19.

Indeed, the Alter Rebbe uses this law to illustrate this principle when restating the concept in sec. 314:19.

For one is not liable for violating the Shabbos prohibitions unless one performs the forbidden activity in the manner in which it is usually performed.

See another example of this concept in sec. 277:4.

The Alter Rebbe uses the expression frequently found in the Talmud(e.g., Shabbos 75a, 103a, 120b, et al.): p’sik raishah vilo yamus, “If its head is severed, will it not die?” i.e., this is the inevitable result of the person’s prior activity. See sec. 253, footnote 52, and sec. 278:4, for further explanation of this term.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe explains that since the non-Jew did not perform the forbidden act intentionally, he is not considered as the Jew’s agent in performing it.

Because a small direct current of air will have a greater effect than an open oven.

It is, however, forbidden to close it thoroughly, since doing so will cut off the supply of oxygen and cause the flames to be extinguished after a short while (Magen Avraham 259:11).

And thus there will not be any prohibition against causing the coals to flare, nor causing them to be extinguished.

I.e., even if it is possible that it is completely cooked (Machtzis HaShekel).

One cannot say – as mentioned in the previous subsection and in sec. 253:10 – that one only instructed the non-Jew to perform a permitted activity and the prohibition was performed as a matter of course, because closing the oven is itself a prohibited activity, i.e., clearly an act that will directly hasten the cooking of the food.

As is the penalty when one cooks food on Shabbos (see sec. 318:1).

It merely cooked quicker as a result of closing the oven.

I.e., if the local custom was to accept the Shabbos before nightfall, as is the practice in many communities. See sec. 261:3.

Sec. 261:3.