Shulchan Aruch: Chapter 242 -To Be Meticulous in Honoring Shabbos

I.e., there are Scriptural Commandments to remember Shabbos and not to perform forbidden labor during Shabbos. Nevertheless, the Tur — and, subsequently, the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro and that of the Alter Rebbe — do not begin by discussing those mitzvos. Instead, they first mention the Rabbinic commandments of honoring Shabbos and taking pleasure in it, because these texts present the laws as they are observed in chronological order. To properly honor the Shabbos and take pleasure in it, one must begin his preparations well before the commencement of that holy day.

In sec. 529:7, the Alter Rebbe writes: “[The obligation to] rejoice is not stated with regard to Shabbos.” In Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 4, p. 1091, the Rebbe explains that there is not a mitzvah to rejoice (to experience simchah) on Shabbasos, because the experience of happiness is subsumed into the loftier experience of pleasure, to the extent that it is not perceivable as an independent feeling. Elsewhere (Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 33, p. 62) the Rebbe raises the question: How can one reconcile the ruling in sec. 529 with the statement of Sifri (to Bamidbar 10:10) that “the day of your rejoicing” refers to Shabbos?

In resolution, the Rebbe differentiates between spiritual and physical joy, and in that way makes a distinction between the joy of Shabbos and the joy of the festivals. The joy of Shabbos is primarily of a spiritual nature, while the rejoicing of the festivals encompasses the physical as well.

Yeshayahu 58:13.

The verse continues: “And you honor it [by refraining from] following your [ordinary] ways, pursuing your concerns, and speaking about [mundane matters].” The obligations implied by the phrase “[If…] you call Shabbos, ‘a delight,’ ” are discussed in this section. The obligations deriving from the charge “And you honor it” are discussed in sec. 262:3. Those associated with “[refraining from] following your [ordinary] ways” are discussed in the supplementary portion of sec. 301. This section discusses those associated with “…pursuing your concerns,” while sec. 307 speaks of those stemming from “…speaking about [mundane] matters.”

Literally, min haTorah, “from the Torah.” See note 9 below.

A general category including festivals.

Vayikra 23:10.

Mechilta, Parshas Bo, sec. 9; Sifra, Emor, sec. 12.

Further particulars concerning the mitzvah of honoring Shabbos are mentioned in sec. 262. The mitzvos of honoring and taking pleasure in the festivals are mentioned in sec. 529.

Although pleasure and honor are mentioned in the works of the Prophets, that does not give them the status of Scriptural commandments; Scriptural commandments must be mentioned in the Torah itself — see Encyclopedia Talmudis, Vol. 7, p. 106, entry Divrei Kabbalah. See the Kuntreis Acharon (note 1), which analyzes whether the obligations to honor and delight in the Shabbos are of Scriptural or Rabbinic origin.

To clarify the statements of the main text: Certain authorities (see Rashi’s commentary to Shmos 20:8) explain that since that verse refers to Shabbos as “holy,” there is a mitzvah to honor it by eating special foods.

Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 30:1), however, understands the mitzvah of honoring Shabbos with special foods as a Rabbinic ordinance. He interprets the derivation of the verse in the sources mentioned in sec. 6 as an asmachta, a Rabbinical ordinance that our Sages associated with a verse, even though they did not derive it from the verse itself. Nevertheless, even Rambam would agree that it is forbidden to fast on Shabbos, as stated in Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim, sec. 418.

A marginal note appended to the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch states that here, the term “festivals” refers to the holidays of the festivals and not to Chol HaMoed, the intermediate days of Pesachand Sukkos. Although there are certain aspects of rejoicing that are obligatory on these days, they are not mandated by a Scriptural commandment. See sec. 529:5.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe explains that the pleasure and happiness that one experiences on festivals (and according to the first opinion, the pleasure experienced on Shabbos) in partaking of food and drink fulfills a Scriptural commandment. Other forms of pleasure and happiness experienced on festivals and Shabbos fulfill only a Rabbinic commandment.

Talmud Yerushalmi, Berachos 1:4; see Eruvin 21b.

Yeshayahu 58:14.

Our Sages (Shabbos 118a) state that this reward is given to one who observes the Shabbos as prescribed by law. Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 30, p. 125, explains the correlation between that rationale and the statement here that the reward is given for taking pleasure in the Shabbos.

Purgatory. Our Sages (Shabbos 118b) state this reward is given to one who partakes of three meals on Shabbos.

In contrast to the festivals, during which there is an obligation to drink wine (sec. 529:4-7).

I.e., in addition to the wine one drinks for Kiddush.

Beitzah 15b.

Ibid., 16a.

See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 16, p. 180, which explains that, on one hand, a person may borrow money for his Shabbos expenses, relying on G‑d’s assurance, even though he does not know how he will be able to repay the debt. Nevertheless, one may not borrow in an entirely reckless manner; he must have some property that will serve as security for the debt.

Peah 8:7; Shabbos 118a.

Shabbos, op. cit.

I.e., if his situation did not improve and he now has nothing left to meet his needs for the coming week.

Peah, loc. cit.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), the Alter Rebbe states that this law can be derived from the mishnah (Peah 8:7), that a poor man passing through a town is given three meals for Shabbos,including certain extra amenities. If such generosity is shown a poor man who travels through a town, certainly — the Alter Rebbe postulates — it should be shown to the poor inhabitants of the town, for they should be given precedence over the poor people from outside that town (Bava Metzia 71a).

Devarim 15:8.

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See that section in the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro and its commentaries.

In which instance, he should not undertake the extra expenses so that he will not need the increased funds, as stated in the previous subsection.

Zohar, Vol. I, p. 48b.

As mentioned in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 31, p. 190, note 15, the emphasis on partaking of fish on Shabbos is of mystical derivation. See Emek HaMelech, Shaar Tikkunei HaTeshuvah, sec. 5.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe speaks of a person who is ill, and eating brings him discomfort. He is not required to eat on Shabbos, since it is more pleasurable for him not to eat than to eat.

Even one who could personally afford to pay the extra amount.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 4), the Alter Rebbe states that there are those who maintain that such measures need not be enacted unless the price is raised more than a third above the norm. The rationale: One should spend up until a third more than the normal amount in order to fulfill a mitzvah in an embellished manner. The Alter Rebbe does not accept that ruling, explaining that purchasing fish is itself an embellishment of the mitzvah and there is no obligation to further embellish it by paying more than the ordinary price of fish.

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See Rama 694:2, who rules that a poor man given money for a Purim feast may use that money for his other needs. Similarly, even though the food was given to the person for Shabbos, he may partake of it on other days.

Interest is forbidden by Scriptural Law only when it involves an agreement made to repay a loan for a fixed amount in addition to the principal. When additional payment is made for the extension of other types of credit (e.g., for merchandise bought), the prohibition is Rabbinic, not Scriptural. It must be emphasized that the prohibition against lending at interest applies not only to the lender, but to all parties to the transaction.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), the Alter Rebbe states that the prohibition against interest forbidden by Scriptural Law is superseded only by an actual threat to life (see Turei Zahav, Yoreh Deah 172:21). By contrast, the strictures against interest that is forbidden by Rabbinic Law are relaxed when a mitzvah is involved, as stated in the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 160:18), et al.

There is another difference between the Scriptural and Rabbinic prohibitions against taking interest: Even when a threat to life is involved, license is granted only to the borrower to take a loan with interest, not to the lender. When the Rabbinic prohibitions against interest are relaxed because of a mitzvah, by contrast, license is given to the lender as well.

Shmos 20:8.

Mechilta, Parshas Yisro, sec. 7.

Beitzah 16a.

Tehillim 68:20.

For who can assure himself that he will find the best food at the end of the week?

He was confident that his bitachon, trust in G‑d, was so great that it would lead to positive results on this material plane and he would, indeed, have the finest portion for Shabbos. For a thorough development of the concept that bitachon in G‑d can lead to positive results, see As a Father Loves His Only Son, p. 11ff.

Bava Kama 82a.

Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah, ch. 42, note 13, questions whether this ordinance applies at present, when most people have washing machines at home and doing laundry does not involve that much difficulty. Indeed, Piskei Teshuvos 242:10 quotes numerous authorities who rule leniently concerning this matter.

See Rambam, Hilchos Bikkurim 5:1, which describes the mitzvah of challah, stating: “It is a positive commandment to separate a portion… from the dough…, as [Bamidbar 15:20] states: ‘Raise up the first of your dough, the challah, as an offering….’ According to Scriptural Law, this first portion does not have a minimum measure.” In the Talmudicera, this dough was given to the priests, to be eaten in ritual purity. In the present era, since we are considered ritually impure, the dough is burnt.

As Rambam (ibid. 2:15) states, it is not necessary to separate challah unless one’s dough is the size of an entire omer of flour, the volume of 43 P eggs. Exactly what that means using modern measurements is a matter of debate among the Rabbis. According to Shiurei Torah, a blessing should be recited when separating challah from a dough made from 3 pounds and 10 O ounces of flour, and one should be stringent and separate challah — without a blessing — from a dough made from 2 pounds and 10.1 ounces of flour.

Magen Avraham 242:1 adds another dimension to this practice: Adam, the first man, was considered the “challah of the world.” [Yalkut Shimoni (Bereishis, sec. 32) states that Adam was given that title because G‑d formed his body by kneading earth like dough.] The Sin of the Tree of Knowledge, committed on the Friday afternoon of Adam’s creation, brought about the decree that Adam — and mankind in general — would be subject to death. By separating challah, the woman atones for the actions of Chavah, the first woman, who led Adam to sin.

Which was forbidden by Rabbinic decree (Avodah Zarah 35b). Nevertheless, because of the difficulty in obtaining bread baked by Jews, eating kosher bread baked by a non-Jewish commercial baker was condoned by many authorities (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 112:2). The authorities agree, however, that bread baked by an ordinary non-Jew is generally forbidden (ibid.:3). Nevertheless, when a baker’s bread is not easily available, some authorities permit bread baked by an ordinary non-Jew (ibid.:8).

I.e., license was granted only to eat kosher bread baked by non-Jews, not non-kosher bread. Nevertheless, in many instances, it is necessary to rely on assumptions that the bread is kosher. One who bakes bread at home, by contrast, knows with certainty that his bread is kosher.