Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

When a person issues a financial claim against a colleague which would require the latter to pay were he to admit [liability]1 and [the colleague] denies [his obligation] and takes an oath or the plaintiff administers an oath to him and he denies [any obligation]. [If he is lying,] the defendant is liable for an oath concerning a sh'vuat hapikadon.2

[The above applies] even if [the defendant] does not respond Amen.3 For with regard to a sh'vuat hapikadon, one is liable whether he took the oath on his own initiative or another person administered the oath to him and he denied [any obligation], even though he did not respond Amen. For denying the claim after the plaintiff administered the oath is equivalent to responding Amen.4

[This does not apply] when [the plaintiff] lodges a claim which if acknowledged by the defendant, i.e., if he would admit that it is true, would not require him to make payment, e.g., he lodged a claim concerning a k'nas.5 For a person is not required to pay a k'nas based on his own admission.6 [In such an instance,] if a person denied [an obligation], he is exempt from a sh'vuat hapikadon, but liable for a sh'vuat bitui.7

Similarly, if [the plaintiff] lodged a claim concerning landed property, a servant, or a promissory note, and [the defendant] denied [the claim] and took an oath, he is exempt from a sh'vuat hapikadon, but liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath.

Why is one [who took an oath concerning such claims] exempt from [the obligations of a false] sh'vuat hapikadon? Behold, were he to have acknowledged [his obligation], he would have been held liable and [required] to pay what he denied. Because [Leviticus 5:21-22] states: "Concerning an entrusted object, a [financial] deposit, a robbery; he oppressed his colleague, or discovered a lost object." All of this concerns movable property which if he would admit his liability he would have to make financial restitution from his own domain.

This excludes landed property for it is not movable property. For landed property is always revealed before its owner8 and is always in their possession.9 [Similarly,] it excludes servants, for an equation is established between servants and landed property.10 And it excludes promissory notes, for their actual substance is not of financial value.11

[The above laws apply] whether one took an oath after the plaintiff lodged a claim against him or whether he took it on his own initiative even though a claim was not lodged against him.12

What his implied? He took the initiative and said: "Why are you following me? Do I have any money belonging to you? I am taking an oath that I am not in possession of any of your money." Since he denied [an obligation] and took an oath, [he is liable,] even though [the plaintiff] did not lodge a claim against him.

[One is liable] whether he took an oath to the person to whom he owes the money or to his agent who was given power of attorney. For a person's agent is equivalent to his own self.13

One is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon unless he requires him to take an oath in a language that he understands.14

When a person consciously takes a sh'vuat hapikadon, even though he takes a false oath and is warned by witnesses at the time he takes the oath, he is not liable for lashes, but instead must merely bring a guilt offering. For the Torah excluded him from those who are liable for lashes15 and obligated him to bring a guilt offering whether he transgressed willfully or inadvertently, as we explained.16

If one denied [an obligation] and took an oath [concerning it] four or five times or the plaintiff administered an oath to him four or fives times and he denied each one of them, he is liable for a guilt offering for each individual oath.17 [This applies] whether this took place in a court or outside the court.

[The rationale is that] were he to have admitted his obligation after making his denial, he would be liable to make restitution even though he made the denial in a court. Thus with each denial, he is making himself exempt from payment. Hence, he is liable for each individual oath.

If five different people were lodging claims against him and telling him: "Give us the entrusted article of ours that you have in your possession," and he responds: "[I am taking] an oath that I do not have anything of yours in my possession," [should his oath be false,] he is liable for only one sacrifice.18

[If he answers: "I am taking] an oath that I don't have anything of yours, or of yours,... or of yours, in my possession," he is liable for each [statement].19

If his colleague told him: "Give me the entrusted object, [financial] deposit, stolen object, and lost object [of mine], that you have in your possession," and he responds: "[I am taking] an oath that I do not have anything of yours in my possession," [should his oath be false,] he is liable for only one [sacrifice].20 Even if the total of all the claims is [merely] a p'rutah, they are all included together and he is liable.21

[If he answers: "I am taking] an oath that I don't have an entrusted object, [financial] deposit, stolen object, and lost object of yours in my possession," he is liable for each [statement].22

[If the plaintiff says:] "Give me the wheat, barley, and buckwheat of mine that you have in your possession," and [the defendant responds]: "[I am taking] an oath that I do not have anything of yours in my possession," [should his oath be false,] he is liable for only one [sacrifice].23 [If he answers: "I am taking] an oath that I don't have any wheat, barley, and buckwheat of yours in my possession," he is liable for each [statement].

If five different people were lodging claims against him and telling him: "Give us the entrusted article, [financial] deposit, stolen object, and lost object [of mine], that you have in your possession," and he responds to one of them: "[I am taking] an oath that I don't have an entrusted object, stolen object, lost object, and [financial] deposit of yours, or of yours,... or of yours in my possession," he is liable for each claim [made] by each individual. Thus he is liable for 20 guilt offerings.24

If [the defendant] claims that he lost an entrusted object or denies [receiving it], he took an oath, and afterwards admitted [that it was in his possession], and then claimed that it was lost, took an oath, and then admitted [that it was in his possession], he must pay the principal and an additional fifth for each oath that he took.25 [This is derived from Leviticus 5:24 which literally translates as] "its fifths,"26 [implying that] the Torah took into account several fifths for [one sum of] principal.

What is implied? The principal was [worth] four [zuz]. One denied [receiving an entrusted article], took an oath, and then admitted [that he possessed it]. Afterwards, he claimed that it was lost, took an oath and then made a second admission, and then claimed that it was lost, took an oath and then made an admission another time. He is required to pay seven [zuz].27 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

A value less than a p'rutah is not considered as financially significant.28 Hence, if a person lodges a claim against a colleague for less than a p'rutah or for articles worth less than a p'rutah and [the defendant] denied the obligation and took an oath, he is exempt with regard to a sh'vuat hapikadon29 and liable for a sh'vuat bitui.30

A person is exempt [from liability for] a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following situation]: He stole an ox belonging to a colleague and slaughtered it or sold it.1 His colleague lodged a claim against him, telling him: "You stole my ox and you slaughtered it or sold it." [The defendant] responded: "I stole it, but did not slaughter it or sell it" and took an oath to support his claim.

[The reason for his exemption is that] were he to have acknowledged that he slaughtered or sold [the ox] on his own accord, he would not have been required to pay four and five times its worth for this is a fine, as explained in Hilchot Genevah.2 Thus it is as if he did not deny a financial obligation. Therefore he is exempt [from liability for] a sh'vuat hapikadon, but liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath, saying that he did not slaughter [the ox], when [in fact] he did.

Similarly, a person is exempt [from liability for] a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following situations]. A person lodged a claim against him saying: "Your ox killed my servant," and he denied the incident and took an oath.3 A servant lodged a claim against his master saying: "You knocked out my tooth" or "You blinded my eye."4 For if he acknowledged the claim, he would not be obligated to pay because it is a fine.5 He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When a person lodges a claim against a colleague concerning a matter that involves both a fine which he would not be obligated to pay if he admits his liability on his own initiative as explained [above] and a financial claim which he is liable to pay on his own admission, he denies the entire claim, and takes an oath, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon.6

What is implied? A person lodged a claim [against a colleague,] telling him: "You raped or you seduced my daughter."7 [The defendant] responded: "I did not rape or seduce her" and took an oath to this effect, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. For although he would not be required to pay the fine were he to have admitted [his guilt], he is obligated to pay for the embarrassment and damages even on his own admission.8

Similarly, if a person tells a colleague: "You stole my ox," and he says, "I did not steal it" and takes an oath, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. Although he would not obligated to make the double payment [for a stolen object] on the basis of his own admission,9 he would be obligated to pay the principal on the basis of his own admission.

When a person tells a colleague: "You inflicted a wound upon me,"10 and [the defendant] denies it, or "Your ox killed my ox,"11 and [the defendant] denies it, taking an oath, [the defendant] is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. Had he admitted [his act], he would be obligated to make restitution.

[A watchman] is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following instance]: A person entrusted his ox to an unpaid watchman, the ox died, and he lodged a claim against the watchman, saying: "Where is the ox I entrusted to you?" The watchman responded: "You did not entrust anything to me," "You entrusted it, but it was stolen," or "...lost"12 and took an oath [to that effect]. [The rationale is] that had he admitted and related the matter as it occurred, he would not have been liable to make financial restitution, because he is an unpaid watchman.13 He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

[Similarly, a person] is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following instance]: A person lent his ox to a colleague and then demanded its return, saying: "Where is the ox you borrowed from me?" Now the ox had died, but the borrower said: "It was stolen" or "...lost" and took an oath to this effect. [The rationale is that] he did not free himself from making restitution by his denial and is nevertheless liable to pay whether the animal died, was stolen, lost, or taken captive because he was a borrower, as will be explained in the appropriate place.14 He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

This is the general principle: Whoever does not free himself from financial responsibility unless he makes this denial is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon if he takes an oath. [This applies] whether he took the oath on his own initiative or the plaintiff administered the oath and he stated his denial even though he did not answer Amen nor utter the oath himself.

[A thief] is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon [in the following instance]: He stole his colleague's ox. [The colleague] demanded payment, telling him: "You stole my ox."

[The thief] responded: "I did not steal it."

Why, then, is it in your possession?"

"You entrusted it to me [for safekeeping]" and he took an oath to that effect.15

[The rationale is that] had he admitting stealing it, he would have been liable to pay the value in any case.16 By saying now that it is an entrusted object, he exempts himself from liability for theft and for loss,17 i.e., were the ox to be lost or stolen after this admission, he is not obligated to pay.

Similarly, if he were to claim that he rented it and took an oath to that effect, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon, for he freed himself for liability in the cases of injury or death. Similarly, if he claimed: "You lent it to me" and took an oath to that effect, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon, for he freed himself for liability if it dies while performing its work, as will be explained in Hilchot Sheilah.18

Therefore if one says: "I did not steal it. Instead, you entrusted it to me...", "...hired me to watch it...", or "...lent it to me. Here is your ox. Take it." If he took an oath to that effect, he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon,19 for he admitted owing the principle and did not exempt himself from any liability with this denial.20

Similarly, he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon if he uses any of the following excuses and takes an oath to that effect: "You sold it to me, but I have not paid for it yet. If you want, take the money for it. If not, here is your ox," "You gave it to me as payment for work which I will perform for you. If you desire, I will perform the work. If you do not desire, take it and depart," "I found it wandering on the road and did not know that it was yours. Now that I know, take it and depart," or "It chased after my ox. Here, it's yours." He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath.

When a person is financially obligated to two partners, one demands payment from him, he denies his obligation and takes an oath, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon21 for he denied a financial obligation. If they both demanded payment from him and he admitted the entire obligation to one of them, but said: "I borrowed only from this one,"22 should he take an oath to this effect, he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon, for he did not free himself from any liability. He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui.

Similarly, if there was a person who owed a debt supported by a promissory note, but he denied it and took an oath to that effect, he is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. [The rationale is that because of] the promissory note, [the person's] landed property is placed under lien. Thus the person is denying [an obligation involving] landed property. And as we have already explained,23 a person who denied a claim involving landed property is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. He is, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath.24

If a person owed a debt to which there were witnesses, he denied [his obligation], and took an oath [to that effect], he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon. For by denying his obligation, he freed himself from the liability of paying immediately. When the witnesses will come, he will be obligated to pay and thus his denial will not be effective.25 It is, however, effective in that perhaps the witnesses will not come, they will come and their testimony will not be substantiated,26 or they will be disqualified.27 Therefore28 he is liable.

When a plaintiff1 demands that witnesses testify concerning a matter that through their testimony alone2 will obligate the defendant to pay this plaintiff a financial claim involving moveable property,3 [the witnesses] denied [knowing] testimony and took an oath to this effect - whether in a court of law or outside of it - they are liable for sh'vuat haedut,4 for they caused the plaintiff a financial loss through their denial.

Similarly, if the plaintiff administered an oath to them and they denied the matter, [they are liable] even though they did not take an oath or answer Amen to the oath he [administered]. Since they denied the matter, they are liable, provided he administered the oath to them in court.5

The witnesses are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut unless they deny [knowing testimony] in court. Whether they took the oath or the oath was administered to them in court or outside the court, the denial must be in court alone, as [can be derived from Leviticus 5:1]: "If he will not testify, he will bear his sin." [Implied is that] in the place he will testify and [that testimony] will have an effect,6 there, if he does not testify, he will be liable.

When the plaintiff demands [that the witnesses] testify concerning a claim that does not involve a financial obligation,7 concerns landed property, servants, or promissory notes, they deny [knowing testimony], and take an oath to that effect, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. For they are liable when denying testimony concerning financial claims that resemble an entrusted object, a [financial] deposit, a robbery, or a lost object which the verse8 mentions in this passage. This refers to moveable property which is itself of financial worth9 that were they to testify on [the plaintiff's] behalf, [the defendant] would have to pay.

Similarly, when one administers an oath to witnesses who [can testify regarding] a fine and they deny [knowledge] of the matter, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. [The rationale is that] were the defendant to come and acknowledge his liability for the fine first,10 he would not be liable to pay even though the witnesses came afterwards and testified accordingly. Thus the witnesses did not make him liable through their testimony alone. Instead, it was their testimony together with the denial of the defendant that made him liable. Since their testimony would not be effective if he acknowledged [his liability], if they denied [knowing of] the matter and took an oath, they are not liable.

[When a plaintiff administers an oath to witnesses, saying:] "I am making you take an oath that you come and testify on my behalf that so-and-so owes me a double payment"11 or a four- or five-fold payment12 and the witnesses deny [knowledge of the matter], they are liable for a sh'vuat haedut because of the principal which is a financial obligation,13 but not because of the double payment which is a fine.

Similarly, if he administered an oath that they testify that so-and-so raped or seduced his daughter and they deny [knowledge of the matter], they are liable for a sh'vuat haedut because of the [payment due] for embarrassment and damages.14 For if the defendant acknowledged his obligation, he would have to pay these obligations, but not because of the fine. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

Witnesses are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut until they deny [knowledge of the matter] and take an oath after the plaintiff or his agent15 demand [that they testify]. If, however, they take an oath first, before a demand is made of them, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut.

What is implied? [The witnesses] saw the plaintiff following after them, they told him: "Why are you following us? We are taking an oath that we do not know any testimony involving you," they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. [The rationale is that] the plaintiff did not make a demand of them. Instead, they took the oath first on their own initiative.16

Similarly, if the defendant administered an oath to them that if they knew testimony involving the plaintiff they should come and testify and they deny [knowledge of the matter], they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut unless the plaintiff makes them take the oath.17 Needless to say, if he administered an oath that they should come to testify that so-and-so owes so-and-so money and they deny [knowledge of the matter], they are not liable. For the person making this demand is not the plaintiff himself. Similarly, if the oath preceded [their knowledge of] the testimony, they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut, as [implied by Leviticus 5:1]: "And he heard the voice of an oath [when] he was a witness." [It can be inferred that knowledge of] the testimony preceded the oath and not that the oath preceded the knowledge of the testimony.

What is implied? [The plaintiff says:] "I am administering to you an oath that if you will know of testimony concerning me that you come and testify," and the witnesses responded Amen and afterwards they observed a matter concerning him.18 If he demands that they testify and they deny [knowledge of the matter], they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut.

Witnesses are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut until the plaintiff singles them out and administers an oath to them or they take an oath.19

What is implied? A person stood up in a synagogue and said: "I am administering an oath to anyone who knows testimony concerning me to come and testify on my behalf." They all - including his witnesses - responded Amen. Afterwards, he demanded of his witnesses that they testify and they denied [knowledge of the matter]. They are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut, because he did not single out the witnesses individually. If, however, he said: "I am administering an oath to all of those standing here that if they know testimony concerning me to come and testify on my behalf." [If] his witnesses were among those present and [then] they denied [knowledge of the matter], they are liable for a sh'vuat haedut, because he singled them out among the others.20

Similarly, if he told the witnesses: "Come and testify on my behalf that so-and-so owes me a maneh" and then stands in a synagogue and said: "I am administering an oath to anyone who knows testimony concerning me to come and testify on my behalf," should they not come and testify, they are liable, because he made a demand of them previously. [This applies] provided they are present in the synagogue and a court is also there.21 If a court was not present, they are liable for a sh'vuat haedut if they answered Amen and deny [knowledge of the matter] while in a court of law.22 If they did not answer Amen, they are not liable.

Whether one administers an oath to his witnesses or tells them "I am commanding you with an oath" or "I am binding you with an oath," they are liable provided he administers the oath23 with God's name or with one of the terms used to describe Him as explained.24

The witnesses are not liable unless the oath is administered to them in a language that they understand.25

Thus you have learned that witnesses are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut unless ten conditions are [met]. They are:26

a) [The witnesses] must be charged [with testifying] by the plaintiff;

b) [The matter] must involve a financial claim;

c) It must involve movable property;

d) Their testimony alone, had it been given, would be sufficient to require the defendant to pay;

e) They must deny [knowledge of the matter] after the plaintiff charges them;

f) They must issue their denial in court;

g) God's name or a term used to describe Him must be mentioned in the oath;

h) The knowledge of the matter must precede the oath;

i) The witnesses must be singled out at the time of the oath or at the time they are charged;

j) The oath must be in a language that they understand.

Whenever we have used the expression "they are not liable" [in this chapter], the intent is that they are not liable for a sh'vuat haedut. They are, however, liable for a sh'vuat bitui, provided they take the oath or answer Amen to an oath administered by a colleague, because they took a false oath.27

When, by contrast, one is liable for a sh'vuat haedut, he is only liable for a sh'vuat haedut and is not liable for a sh'vuat bitui, even though he took a false oath and did so intentionally. [The rationale is that] the Torah removed a sh'vuat haedut from the category of sh'vuat bitui to make a person who deliberately [takes a false oath] liable for a sacrifice for its violation just as one who took it inadvertently.28 He is not, however, liable for lashes, as [can be derived from Leviticus 5:5 which] states: "For one of these."29 A person who takes a [false] oath is liable for one type of oath, but not two. [We do not hold him liable for both] a sh'vuat haedut and a sh'vuat bitui.

[When the plaintiff says: "I am administering] an oath to you unless you come and testify that so-and-so has an entrusted object, a [financial] deposit, stolen property, and a lost object of mine in his possession," [and the witnesses respond: "We are taking] an oath that we do not know of any testimony concerning you," they are liable for only one [sacrifice].30 [If they say: "We are taking] an oath that we do not know of any testimony concerning an entrusted object, a [financial] deposit, stolen property, and a lost object of yours in so-and-so's possession, they are liable for each [statement].31

[When the plaintiff says: "I am administering] an oath to you unless you come and testify that so-and-so has wheat, barley, and buckwheat of mine in his possession," and [the defendant responds]: "[We are taking] an oath that we do not know of any testimony concerning you," they are liable for only one [sacrifice].32 [If they answer: "We are taking] an oath that we do not know of any testimony concerning any wheat, barley, and buckwheat of yours in his possession," he is liable for each [statement].

Similarly, if many people charged them with testifying and they said: "[We are taking] an oath that we do not know of any testimony concerning you," they are liable for only one [sacrifice]. [If they said:] "...concerning you, and you, and you," they are liable for each [statement], as explained with regard to sh'vuat hapikadon.33

When a person administers an oath to a colleague that he knows testimony concerning him and ultimately, it is discovered that he does not know testimony, [the colleague] is not liable, neither for a sh'vuat haedut34, nor for a sh'vuat bitui. [The rationale is that] a sh'vuat bitui involves only matters that have both a positive and negative dimension.35 Were the person to have said: "I am taking an oath that I do not know testimony concerning you," that would not be a sh'vuat bitui, but instead a sh'vuat haedut. Hence since the negative dimension of the statement is not a sh'vuat bitui, the positive dimension, taking an oath that one knows testimony, is not a sh'vuat bitui.36

It is clear that when a person takes an oath to a colleague that he testified on his behalf and he did not testify or that he did not testify and he testified, he is liable for a sh'vuat bitui;37 there is no connection to a sh'vuat haedut at all.38