Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Produce from which the tithes (and/or terumah) have not been separated. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Berachot 7:1), the Rambam interprets this as a composite of the words tav lo, meaning "it is not good."

From Chapter 3, Halachah 7, and Halachah 5, of this chapter, one might surmise that this applies whether the owner of the produce or another person brought it into the owner's home.

From Chapter 3, Halachah 4, it appears that this refers to produce for which all the tasks necessary to prepare it were completed.

Although according to Rabbinic Law, it is sufficient to bring the produce into one's courtyard as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 3, according to Scriptural Law, it must be brought into one's home.

More particularly, the term karfef used by the Rambam, refers to an unprotected yard.

He is, however, liable according to Rabbinic Law, in these instances. In his notes to Berachot 35b, the Meiri writes that even according to Scriptural Law, it is forbidden to do this as an initial preference; the leniency is granted only after the fact.

This expression introduces a deduction for which the Rambam has no definite prior source in the Rabbinic literature. The Kessef Mishneh questions why the Rambam uses this expression when the Jerusalem Talmud (Ma'aserot 3:1) explicitly states that the obligation established by three of the six situations is Rabbinic in origin. He explains that there is no explicit source for the other three. Hence, this expression is appropriate.

In the previous halachah.

In Chapter 3, Halachah 3.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

Since it is so small, it is not fit to serve as a dwelling. Based on Hilchot Mezuzah 6:2, one might assume that tithes are required if the home comprises this area even though it is not square in shape.

For roofs are not considered as dwellings.

I.e., since the roof is small, it is not considered as an independent entity, but instead, is considered as part of the home (Kessef Mishneh).

Shelters made of branches and wood [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aserot 3:7].

Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.).

Structures constructed to provide shade from the summer sun.

Booths that do not have permanent roofs.

This is the meaning of the term sukkot Ginosar in the mishnah (loc. cit.). Ginosar (the area around Lake Kinneret) was known for the quality and abundance of its produce. Workers would be hired to pick this produce during the harvest and they would construct semi-permanent structures in which they would dwell over the summer.

Potters would construct sukkot with two rooms. The inner room would be their dwelling, while the outer room would serve as a workshop and storefront. If produce was brought into the inner sukkah, the obligation to tithe is established. See the notes to Halachah 9 with regard to this ruling.

Note the clarification in the following halachah.

I.e., if the owners of these structures bring produce into them, they are obligated to tithe it before partaking of it.

I.e., if a person brings produce into a house belonging to a colleague, he is not obligated to tithe it. On the surface, the question may be raised: Even if a person brings produce into a colleague's home, he is not obligated to tithe it, as stated in Halachah 1. Why then are a leanto and a guardhouse singled out here?

It is possible to explain, however, that if a person makes it a practice of bringing produce into a colleague's home, he becomes obligated to tithe it when he does so. In contrast, even if he makes a practice of bringing produce into his colleague's leanto, an obligation to tithe is not established, because a leanto is not a permanent dwelling.

From the Jerusalem Talmud (Ma'aserot 3:7), it appears that the term "school" refers to a school where young children are taught Scripture, while the term "house of study" refers to a study center where older students are taught the Oral Law.

Even if he does not have an apartment there, since he is continually there, it is considered as his established abode (Radbaz, gloss to Halachah 6).

In contrast to the house of study mentioned in the previous halachah, this is a house of study for adults where they meet and share ideas (Radbaz).

For the sexton, as was common in certain situations.

Since it contains a dwelling for the sexton, even the portion of the structure that serves as a synagogue or a house of study is considered as part of a dwelling (Radbaz). See also parallel rulings in Hilchot Mezuzah 6:6 and Hilchot Shabbat 28:4.

Our translation is based on the gloss of Rabbi Yosef Korcus who cites II Chronicles 9:25.

For until the produce has been brought to a dwelling or the marketplace, it is still considered as being in an intermediate phase of preparation.

In this instance as well, if the structure contains an apartment, e.g., for a guard or the like, bringing produce into any part of the structure establishes an obligation to tithe.

A distinction must, however, be made. The obligation to tithe produce brought into a home is Scriptural in origin and the obligation to tithe produce brought into a courtyard is of Rabbinic origin.

In Halachah 1, the Rambam makes such statements with regard to bringing produce into a home. He deduces that similar concepts apply with regard to bringing it into a courtyard.

All of these signs are indications that the courtyard is regarded as private property and not the public domain.

I.e., although two people share it, and one may carelessly leave it open, since the other locks it, it is regarded as private property. Hence bringing produce into it establishes the obligation to tithe.

A structure common in Greek and Roman times with two or three walls and a roof. (Occasionally, there would be an opening in the roof.)

In and of themselves, these structures are not considered dwellings and bringing produce into them would not create an obligation. Nevertheless, since they lead to and/or are auxiliaries to an area that is considered part of a permanent dwelling, they are considered as part of that dwelling.

The Radbaz notes that in Halachah 4 and in the following halachah, the Rambam states that bringing produce into a potter's outer sukkah does not create an obligation, while bringing it into the inner sukkah does. Why don't we, he asks, apply the same principle? Let us say that the outer sukkah is an entrance and/or auxiliary to the inner one. He explains that for the inner sukkah to create an obligation is itself a new development and the obligation is not strong enough to be extended to the outer sukkah.

For as above, in and of themselves, these structures are not considered significant dwellings.

For they are both considered as permanent structures, leading to and auxiliary to the home.

See the notes to Halachah 4 and those to the previous halachah. The commentaries question why the Rambam repeats the same law in such close proximity.

Since a person spends much time in his store, it is considered as equivalent to a home for him.

The Radbaz emphasizes that if the person spends a Sabbath on his journey, the commencement of the Sabbath establishes an obligation to tithe as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 3.

I.e., if he does not transport the produce to his intended destination, but instead, changes his mind in the middle, and returns with it (Kessef Mishneh).

Who sell perfumes to women [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aserot 2:3)].

This is speaking about their own produce or produce which was given to them to partake of (ibid.). If they were intending to sell the produce, there is an immediate obligation to tithe it. It is like bringing it to the marketplace (see Chapter 3, Halachah 2).

Rav Yosef Korcus explains that in this instance - in contrast to the previous halachah - the obligation falls before they reach their ultimate destination. The rationale for the distinction is that since these traveling salesmen do not have an ultimate goal, wherever they spend the night is significant for them.

I.e., one which is not guarded (Halachah 8).

For bringing produce into his home does not establish an obligation to tithe unless the person brings them there intentionally (see Chapter 3, Halachah 5). The person must, however, remove them from the home. He may not partake of them in the home without tithing them.

For bringing produce to a roof does not establish an obligation to tithe (Halachah 3).

This is the version in the standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah and is also found in authoritative manuscripts and early printings. The version of the Mishneh Torah which the Radbaz and Rav Yosef Korcus followed states: "brought them to dry them on the roof."

The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's ruling, explaining that bringing produce into a friend's courtyard does not establish an obligation to tithe unless one does so intentionally, but not when one does so out of forgetfulness. He also cites a version of the Tosefta (Ma'aserot 2:10) which supports his understanding.

Rav Yosef Korcus offers two justifications for the Rambam's ruling. First of all, he states that the phrase "he should not partake of them" could be interpreted as referring to the owner of the courtyard and not to the owner of the produce. Alternatively, he explains that even if it refers to the owner of the produce, since the courtyard he brings it into is part of a permanent dwelling, he should not partake of it until he tithes it. Leniency was given to traveling salesmen (Halachah 13), because they brought the produce into the courtyard with the intent of removing it immediately. In this instance, however, the owner does not necessarily intend to remove it immediately. Why then should he not be obligated to tithe?

In his gloss to Chapter 5, Halachah 8, the Ra'avad notes a seeming contradiction to the Rambam's ruling here. In his gloss to that halachah, the Radbaz explains that the stringency here is to correct a misimpression that might result in the eyes of an observer. The Kessef Mishneh, however, finds the Rambam's rulings difficult to reconcile and suggests that there is a printing error here.

Nevertheless, Rav Yosef Korcus continues, the Rambam's statements appear to be self-contradictory, because in the previous clause it appears that if one brings produce into a home after forgetting, he is not obligated to tithe it, but this clause states that if he brings it into his colleague's courtyard, he is. Seemingly, bringing it into one's own home would be a stronger factor than bringing it into a colleague's courtyard. Among the resolutions he offers is that when a person forgets and brings the produce into his own home, he is certainly acting inadvertently, without intent. If, however, he brings it into his colleague's courtyard, that could be considered as a conscious change of mind.

I.e., it is no longer considered as an extension of the home, but as a separate entity like a field.

For once he has plowed the majority, he will certainly plow the remainder.

But not the entirety of the courtyard.

The rationale is that since he did not sow the entire courtyard, we assume that his sowing is only temporary and soon, he will revert to considering the courtyard as that and not as a field.

The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam on this point, maintaining that planting trees does not remove land from the category of a courtyard. He explains that the Rambam used an incorrect version of the Jerusalem Talmud (Ma'aserot 3:10). For the Rambam's version of that passage conflicts with the rulings of Eruvin 23a regarding eruvin. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the obligations of eruvin and tithes are governed by different principles and deductions cannot necessarily be made from one situation to the other.

This indicates that he is not intending to uproot them and return the area to the function of an ordinary courtyard. Hence, it is considered as an orchard and he may snack from the produce before tithing.

In this and in the following halachot, the intent is to snack, not to eat a significant meal.

For he is then considered to have completed the work associated with harvesting figs and they are in a courtyard. Compare to Chapter 5, Halachah 3.

I.e., any place above three handbreadts off the ground (Radbaz).

I.e., he can collect them instead of eating from them one by one.

In other instances (see Ma'aserot 3:10), the foliage of the tree is considered as being in the same domain as its trunk. In this instance, however, the ruling depends on the domain in which the produce is collected.

Following the same logic stated in Halachah 15.

This applies to an instance where one intentionally brought the produce into the courtyard. If one did so unintentionally, there is no obligation to tithe as stated in Halachah 13.

I.e., once the produce has entered the courtyard, the obligation to tithe is irrevocably established.

Our translation is taken from Rav Kappach's translation of the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aserot 3:10).

One in which the majority was sown as stated in Halachah 14.

See Chapter 2, Halachot 1-2 which explain that according to Scriptural Law, one is obligated to tithe produce only when he harvests it for his own personal use. Similarly, one who purchases produce is not liable to tithe it according to Scriptural Law.

As indicated by the following halachah, this applies when the purchaser bought the produce to partake of it. If he purchased it as merchandise, the obligation to tithe does not take effect until one purchases it with the intent of partaking of it.

With regard to the laws of acquisition, according to Scriptural Law, the payment of money brings about a kinyan, the transfer of an object from one person's domain to another. Nevertheless, our Sages decreed that such a transfer should be brought about by drawing the object to be acquired out of the seller's domain (meshichah; see Hilchot Mechirah 3:5). Nevertheless, with regard to the obligation to tithe, they did not alter the Scriptural Law.

For making up his mind does not establish a binding obligation.

For a Torah sage should go beyond the letter of the law and accept financial responsibilities that are not mandated by Torah Law. See Hilchot De'ot, the conclusion of ch. 5.

The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh emphasize that he should not return the produce unless the seller agrees. Nevertheless, even if the seller agrees to accept the produce, the purchaser must make restitution from his own produce or funds for the produce that he tithed.

This applies even if the work necessary to prepare it has been completed.

Although our Sages required one who purchases produce to tithe it, they instituted this obligation only when one intended to partake of it himself, just as the Scriptural obligation to tithe applies only for a person who harvests produce to partake of it himself (Siftei Cohen 331:119).

A coin used in the Talmudic era of moderate value.

His wording implies that he acquires them after he selects them and picks them from the tree, for the terms of purchase state that he would "select it," i.e., detach it.

Without tithing.

I.e., though it was attached when he negotiated the deal, the purchase takes effect after he detaches it. Hence, he is obligated to tithe the produce, because a sale is one of the factors that establish such an obligation [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aserot 2:6)].

The Radbaz questions why the Rambam mentions two clusters of figs. The same laws would apply if only one cluster was involved. He explains that since it is not common for people to purchase a large amount of produce while it is still attached to the ground, it is important to emphasize that this law applies even when he purchases a large amount.

And a sale of attached produce does not convey an obligation to tithe.

As stated in Hilchot Mechirah 5:1, an exchange is considered as equivalent to a sale.

Hence it is forbidden even to snack from them.

Chapter 3, Halachah 3.

I.e., detached produce.

I.e., the produce is on the trees and it does not become the other person's until he picks it.

The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the person who partakes of a particular number of figs is obligated to tithe them. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam's ruling.

Instead, it is considered as if each person gave the other a present.

For partaking of untithed produce.

There are certain dimensions of Jewish business law in which a present is considered as a sale and others in which it is not (see Hilchot Gezeilah 9:13; Hilchot Mechirah 29:14). The Jerusalem Talmud (Ma'aserot 2:1) states that even those authorities who maintain that giving a present should be considered as a sale (see Hilchot Shemitah VeYoval 11:19) agree that this stringency should not be enforced in the present age, because in the present age, the obligation to tithe is of Rabbinic origin. The Rambam mentions this leniency without differentiating between the era when the obligation to tithe was Scriptural and the present age, because he maintains that the entire obligation to tithe produce obtained through purchase is of Rabbinic origin.

Who is not necessarily relied upon with regard to tithes.

As presents [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aserot 2:1)].

As a snack.

For we assume that the produce has not been taken home and thus has not incurred the obligation to be tithed. Hence, one is permitted to snack from it without tithing (ibid.).

Since the common person passed through the marketplace and did not stand there to sell his produce, we assume that he is one of those who brings his produce home. Furthermore, we proceed on the assumption that he has not taken the produce home yet and thus it never incurred the obligation to be tithed. Therefore when the recipients take it home, it incurs that obligation for the first time. Indeed, they must separate not only the tithes, but also terumah.

These separations must be made, for in such a situation, the produce incurs the obligation to be tithed after the work associated with its preparation was completed (see Chapter 3, Halachah 1).

As will be explained in Chapter 9, in the Second Temple period, the common people became somewhat lax with regard to the mitzvah of separating tithes. When they became aware of this situation, the Sages ordained that one should not partake of produce from a common person without tithing it, for perhaps he did not do so. One should not, however, recite a blessing, for it is possible that it was tithed. Similarly in this instance, it is possible that the common person tithed his produce, but it is possible that he did not.

I.e., he is assuring the recipients that they may take the produce home without qualms because it has already been tithed [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.)].

For we do not accept the common person's word (ibid.).

Which could be interpreted as assurance that the produce had not been taken home by the common person and thus it has not yet been tithed.

Because a large amount of produce will certainly not be eaten in the marketplace. We do not rely on the common person's assurance that he tithed it or that he will tithe it in the future.

For we are unsure of whether or not it was tithed or not. The same concepts apply with regard to the instances mentioned in the later clauses.

As in the first clause of the previous halachah.

As in the later clause. The fact that his statements are self-contradictory is not a matter of concern, for the obligation to tithe is Rabbinic in origin and our Sages established their rules as general guidelines to be applied even if some ramifications are difficult to understand (Aruch HaShulchan).

I.e., here to, the above principles produce seemingly contradictory rulings.

As a snack. They may not eat a significant meal.

Even if it is brought within the gate or the store.

For they are located there on a consistent basis [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aserot 2:2)].

Chapter 4, Halachah 11. As the Ra'avad notes, the Rambam's decision here appears somewhat contradictory to his ruling there. See the notes to that halachah.

And thus, the other people in the store or gate are not obligated to tithe.

See Hilchot Sechirut, ch. 12, based on Deuteronomy 23:25-26, which describes a worker's right to partake of the produce with which he is working.

Because the worker does not acquire the produce that he eats. Instead, he is eating because of the Torah's license. Hence, he is not required to separate tithes (Siftei Cohen 331:123).

Who must tithe his produce as stated above.

To remove weeds so that the tree will grow better. In such an instance, he is not entitled to partake of the olives according to Scriptural Law, because his work does not involve the produce itself. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aserot 3:3).

As In Chapter 4, Halachah 15, et al. For in this manner, the work associated with the olives is not completed.

Because collecting even a small number of them would be considered as the completion of a task. He is obligated to tithe, because since he is eating due to the stipulation, it is considered as a purchase.

I.e., to remove small onions and/or weeds from an onion patch so that the large onions would have the opportunity to grow.

I.e., the leaves of the onions. According to Scriptural Law, the worker is not allowed to partake of the onions, because his efforts to do not complete the preparation of this produce (Hilchot Sechirut 12:4). Nevertheless, this owner agreed to allow the worker to partake of the onion leaves.

As explained in the previous halachah.

Who was performing work with the olives that would entitle him to partake of them according to Scriptural Law, e.g., he was harvesting them.

A Talmudic measure equivalent to half a log, 171 cc according to Shiurei Torah, 300 cc according to Chazon Ish.

As stated in Halachah 9.

It must be emphasized that we are speaking about an instance where the employer gives the worker special license to dip the olives in salt. Otherwise, he is forbidden to do so, as apparent from Hilchot Sechirut 12:10 (Rambam LeAm).

See Halachah 18.

As stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 3.

Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aserot 2:8).

Without separating tithes.

Because that is not the species of produce with which he is working.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aserot 3:2), the Rambam states that we are not speaking about workers employed to harvest the produce of the field, for they would have a right to partake of this produce according to Scriptural Law. Instead, we are speaking of workers who are plowing or performing other similar tasks.

They may partake of the produce freely, not merely one at a time.

This addition is made on the basis of the gloss of the Radbaz.

For a present is not considered like a sale and does not obligate the separation of tithes, as stated in Halachah 5.

As stated at the beginning of Chapter 3. If the tasks were completed, it would be forbidden to partake of a significant meal from this produce.

See Chapter 6, Halachah 9. The Radbaz mentions that the produce must have matured to the extent that it could be obligated to tithed. Otherwise, there would be no prohibition in paying one's debt with it.

And since the owner is required to provide them with food, allowing them to partake of this produce would be equivalent to paying a debt.

For the work associated with this produce is completed and it is forbidden to partake of it unless it is tithed.

I.e., cook without spices.

In brine, the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aserot 4:1).

This obligation is, however, merely Rabbinic in origin.

Our Sages [the Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 6:1)] raise this question and leave it unresolved. See the Radbaz who mentions instances where smoking is considered as cooking and others when it is not.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that when produce was picked before it was ripened, it would be buried in this manner to hasten its ripening and softening process.

Although this activity helps prepare them to be eaten, it is not considered as cooking or pickling (Radbaz; see also the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.).

Apparently, this ruling applies even if the cooked food has been removed from the fire and placed in another utensil (a kli sheni). See Radbaz and Chapter 3, Halachah 15.

The Radbaz states that this applies whether the spices were untithed and the oil had been tithed previously or the oil was untithed and the spices had been tithed previously.

If they were not brought home. Crushing these pungent herbs and mixing them with oil is equivalent to cooking them.

Creating a liquid (wine) from the grapes is equivalent to cooking.

Containing other food.

Because the wine was absorbed immediately by the food in the pot and never became a distinct entity. We are speaking about food that is cold. Otherwise, exposing the wine to heat would establish the obligation as stated in the previous halachah (Kessef Mishneh).

As stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 3.

A white fluid that resembles milk in its appearance [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aserot 4:1)].

Where the olives are kept until they become soft and fit to be squeezed for their oil (ibid. 4:3).

See Hilchot Terumah 5:14,15 which give examples of instances where a person made an improper separation of terumah and hence, was required to separate terumah a second time.

Chapter 3, Halachah 3, states that separating terumah creates an obligation to tithe the remaining produce. In this halachah, the Rambam emphasizes that even if the separation of terumah was defective and terumah had to be separated a second time, the obligation to tithe has still taken effect (Radbaz).

As stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 3, the onset of the Sabbath establishes an obligation to tithe. Nevertheless, this applies only when the tasks associated with the preparation of the produce was completed beforehand (Beitzah 35a).

The rationale is that since the work associated with them has been completed, it is possible to partake of them on the Sabbath. Now eating any food on the Sabbath is significant for it is a dimension of the mitzvah of oneg Shabbat, taking pleasure in the Sabbath. Hence, the obligation to tithe is established (Siftei Cohen 331:127).

Even a snack.

For the onset of the Sabbath establishes an obligation to tithe as above.

The Rambam is quoting the Mishnah (Ma'aserot 4:2). The Jerusalem Talmud raises the question: Why is it necessary to state that the children were intending to partake of them on the Sabbath? Even if that was not their intent, the commencement of the Sabbath would have established the obligation to tithe. The Jerusalem Talmud answers that the new insight is that since it was children who hid the produce, it would be permitted to be eaten as a snack on Friday. If, however, adults set aside the produce for use on the Sabbath, it is not permitted to snack from it on Friday. See also Siftei Cohen 331:129.

Its figs were of a high quality and hence, set aside to be used on the Sabbath when one must use produce of the highest quality.

Even during the week (Radbaz).

I.e., snacking. Eating a significant amount establishes an obligation to tithe.

The tithing should be done before the Sabbath, because it is forbidden to tithe on the Sabbath itself (Hilchot Shabbat 23:9).

Since he began partaking of them before the commencement of the Sabbath and places them aside so that he would not partake of them on the Sabbath, their status does not change. He need not tithe them if he partakes of them after the Sabbath (Siftei Cohen 331:130).

Produce from which terumah and tithes were not separated. It was common to rub the surface of grapes and figs to smooth them (Kessef Mishneh). The Radbaz states that oil was applied to their surface.

Although this activity causes the produce to spoil slightly faster, this is not significant over the long run. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aserot 1:8).

The Rambam is speaking about aspects of produce, e.g., leaves, peels, seeds, some of which are considered waste products (and hence, permitted to be eaten by non-priests) and some of which are considered as food (and forbidden to them). See Hilchot Terumah 11:10-13 where the Rambam gives many different examples of these categories. Any substance that is considered as food with regard to terumah is also considered as food with regard to the other prohibitions mentioned by the Rambam. Conversely, any substance that is not considered as food with regard to terumah is also not considered as food in the other contexts.

Even priests who are permitted to use impure terumah (Radbaz).

Impure terumah, e.g., oil, may be used as fuel for kindling. The priest might think: "Since I want to use all of this oil as fuel, why should I separate the terumah? Let me kindle it all as tevel." This is not permitted as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

Our translation follows the interpretation of the Radbaz. Others interpret the term mechapin as "cover."

I.e., kindling the Sabbath lights with oil that is tevel. This is certainly forbidden, because terumah and the tithes may not be separated on the Sabbath.

In the verse, the noun terumah uses a plural form alluding to two types of terumah: pure terumah and impure terumah. See also Hilchot Terumah 2:14.

To cover seeds that were strewn over the field with earth (Radbaz). It was forbidden to do this until after terumah and the tithes were separated because this resembles sowing tevel.

The obligation to separate terumah and the tithes does not take effect until the work associated with the preparation of the produce has been completed (see Chapter 3, Halachot 8-13). Since the produce has not reached this stage, one might think that there is no prohibition against sowing it.

According to Scriptural Law, there is no prohibition against sowing tevel. The obligation to tithe applies only when one eats. Nevertheless, our Sages (Pe'ah 1:16) imposed this stringency.

For gathering them together to sow them completes the work associated with their preparation [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aserot 1:8)].

The Radbaz states that if he gives the trees to a colleague for the colleague to plant in his field, the fruit must be tithed.

Thus the fruit was never considered as an independent entity from the tree so that the obligation to tithe it could be considered.

For they were not gathered with the intent of reaping produce and thus the obligation to tithe did not fall upon them.

For the obligation to tithe was incurred when the produce was harvested originally.

The Ra'avad states that this applies only to crops like onions or the like where a bulb is planted and it increases as it grows. If, however, seeds which do not grow until they decompose are planted, this law does not apply. The Radbaz states that the Rambam would not necessarily accept this limitation.

I.e., not only the new crop but also the old crop which was tithed and then sown, as explained in the subsequent notes.

The percentage to be separated as terumat ma'aser.

Which was reaped in the same year as that produce was reaped, for it is forbidden to separate the terumah [or terumat ma'aser] for produce from one year from produce from a different year (Hilchot Terumot 5:11).

For although it is now considered as part of the new crop, since it still physically exists, there is an obligation to separate terumat ma'aser for it.

Since one sowed the onions themselves and tithes had already been separated from them, there is reason to think that there would be no need to tithe them again. Indeed, it would be undesirable to do so, for it is improper to tithe produce that has already been tithed. Nevertheless, in this instance, there is an obligation to tithe. The rationale is that the new growth of the onions outweighs their initial mass and that initial mass is considered as betal, insignificant and subsumed in the greater whole. This concept is illustrated in other contexts; see Hilchot Terumot 11:22; Hilchot Shemitah 4:21, et al.

At which point the obligation to tithe applies.

I.e., this completes the tasks associated with the preparation of the produce and causes the obligation to tithe to be incurred.

And the produce which existed previously is considered as betal to the new produce, as above.

To tithe the original produce. Even this opinion agrees that the new produce which grows must be tithed.

Hence, the laws governing onions cannot provide guidance in this instance (Kessef Mishneh).

E.g., wheat or barley.

Like onions or garlic.

For violating our Sages' decree not to sow tevel.

For the prohibited entity no longer exists.

I.e., it is permitted to partake of them and the required separations must be made.

Compare to Hilchot Terumah 11:21 and notes.

We are translating the term chaver according to the Rambam's wording in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 5:8). More specifically, it refers to a person who adheres to the laws of tithing. Torah scholars are mentioned, because we assume that they adhere to those laws (Chapter 9, Halachah 1, Chapter 10, Halachot 1-2).

I.e., since both are known to tithe their produce, it is possible that both will think that the other one tithed, when in fact neither of them did so.

Which both the seller and the purchaser thought had been tithed.

I.e., this is the first step such a person should take.

Once the produce has ceased to exist, there is no way a person can correct his past lapses.

The Ra'avad states that the produce separated must itself be tithed, for it is possible that in fact the original produce had been lost. The Radbaz states that the Rambam would also accept this point.

He says this after the sale, so that the purchaser knows that the produce must be tithed. He must bring witnesses who testify that he is telling the truth, i.e., that the produce is tevel. Otherwise, the seller's word would not be accepted. See also Chapter 12, Halachah 18, and notes.

And thus the seller is required to reimburse him for the tithed produce.

I.e., separating the tithes for the produce that was sold from other produce.

I.e., ordinarily, the ruling would favor the seller, based on the principle: "When a person seeks to expropriate property from a coleague, the burden of proof is upon him." In this instance, however, the seller is penalized, because he violated a Rabbinic prohibition by selling tevel (Radbaz).

For one is receiving a monetary advantage for the tevel.

I.e., the king had levied a tax on all his countrymen equally. Such a tax must be paid, because "the law of the land is your law" (Hilchot Gezeilah 5:12).

Otherwise, he would be paying a debt with tevel.

I.e., both sellers inform the purchaser that they are selling him tevel (Radbaz).

We do not suspect that the two batches of produce are from different years and thus the tithes for one should not be separated from the other (ibid.).

See Halachah 13 for a definition of the Hebrew terms chokar and mekabel used in the Hebrew text of this halachah.

The sharecropper does not have to tithe the crop before he gives the owner his share. This is not considered as selling tevel, for the owner's share of the produce never belonged to the sharecropper. Nevertheless, if the division is not made in the presence of the owner, the sharecropper should separate the tithes, lest the owner think the produce he receives has been tithed and transgress by partaking of it without tithing (ibid.). Even if the owner is a gentile, this applies for another Jew may see the Jewish sharecropper bringing produce to the gentile and purchase it from him under the impression that it was tithed (ibid.).

For it is forbidden to take produce from the grainheap in which it is gathered without separating terumah (ibid.).

The renter does not have to separate the tithes, because - as above - this portion of the crop never belonged to him. From the outset, it was designated for the owner.

For in that instance, he is paying the owner with the untithed produce and that is forbidden.

The Radbaz notes that - as indicated by the previous halachah - a penalty was not imposed on a person who enters into a sharecropping agreement with a gentile unless it was his ancestral field. The Radbaz explains the difference between the two situations: When a person rents a field for a specific amount of produce, he usually does so as a last resort and receives only a minimal amount. Therefore, if there are restrictions made against him doing so, he may sell the land. When, by contrast, a person seeks a sharecropper, he is reserving the option to sow it himself. Hence, he is less likely to sell it.

For no one will seek to hire it from him.

This and the measure mentioned in the following clause were part of the safeguards the Sages employed to uphold the Jews' possession of our Holy Land. For in the Roman era, gentiles would frequently seize Jewish property without cause. Rather than have it remain in the gentile's possession, our Sages desired that he be compelled to sell it back to a Jew.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 6:2), the Rambam states that this ruling applies only in Eretz Yisrael, for it is only there that we are careful about land not being sold to a gentile. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 331:121), however, quotes this law without making that restriction. It is possible to explain that even in the Diaspora, there is a concept of maintaining the stability of the Jewish community by not giving up Jewish land to gentiles.

I.e., the gentile seized a field which a Jew had inherited from his ancestors. Because of his connection to the field, the Jew desired to till it and promised to give the gentile a share under a sharecropping agreement.

These terms refer to sharecroppers operating under different types of agreements.

See Hilchot Sechirut 8:1-2 which also discusses these distinctions.

I.e., making a division for the sake of convenience [see the standard printed text of the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 6:8); Rav Kappach's version differs)].

But before terumah and the tithes were separated. Since the priests or Levites are entitled to the tithes and/or the terumah, they wished to purchase the produce and separate them for themselves. See Chapter 1, Halachah 3.

The Ra'avad accepts the Rambam's ruling, but differs with regard to its motivating rationale. He explains that since the Israelite completed the tasks associated with the preparation of the grain, he has the right to give away the terumah and the tithes and the priest or Levite is not entitled to take that from him. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh note that the rationale given by the Rambam is mentioned in the Jerusalem Talmud (Pe'ah 1:6) and thus question the Ra'avad's position.

Since there is a certain amount of difficulty involved in the completion of these tasks, we do not penalize them.

But not to a fellow priest or Levite.

The rationale is that we operate under the presumption that when the priest or Levite sold the produce, he included a stipulation that the terumah and/or the tithes were his. Even though this stipulation was not explicitly made, we assume that it was understood (Rav Yosef Korcus).

Although they sold tevel - and thus it would be appropriate to penalize them - since they made it known that the produce was tevel, no penalty is imposed.

Since the tasks associated with the produce were completed, the obligation to tithe is immediate. Hence, if the priest or Levite desired to retain possession of the terumah and tithes, they would have to make an explicit stipulation.

In this instance as well, since the field belongs to the priest or Levite, it is as if he made a stipulation that the terumah and/or tithes should be given to him.

The second tithe or the tithe given to the poor.

I.e., olives that have already been harvested from the tree (Radbaz).

Hence if the priest or Levite desired that the terumah and/or tithes be left for him, he would have to make an explicit stipulation to that effect. Thus if the olives - or any other produce - have not been harvested, if the land is owned by a priest or Levite, he retains the right to the terumah and/or tithes as above.

Even if the purchaser later sells that field to another person, he cannot override the stipulation that was part of the original sale.

Were his stipulation not to be powerful enough to retain a portion of the land itself, it would not be effective, because it would be tantamount to purchasing an entity that has not come into existence. Such a purchase is not effective (Bava Batra 63a).

The commentaries note an apparent contradiction between the Rambam's ruling here and his ruling in Hilchot Bikkurim 9:11. Although there are explicit Talmudic sources for both rulings, their logic appears contradictory. Among the resolutions offered is that here, the Rambam is speaking about landed property, while in Hilchot Bikkurim, he is speaking about an animal and the principles of ownership are different in these two instances.

I.e., he no longer has any special rights to the terumah or tithes.

His grandson, however, does not have a right to them (Aruch HaShulchan).

I.e., the Israelite's.

The Israelite is stipulating that he retains the right to separate the terumah and the tithes for all of the produce and give them to any priest or Levite he desires. Although as stated above, when the owner of the field is a priest, he can retain the rights to the terumah and the tithes. Nevertheless, as part of his contractual arrangement with the renter, he may give him the right to distribute them (Radbaz).

I.e., a priest cannot give his right to collect terumah to a person who is not a priest. Similarly, a Levite may not make another Levite. Since the renter desires to make the arrangement permanent, it is forbidden, for a person who does not have a right to take the terumah and tithes is taking them.

I.e., the creditor will continue to deduct the value of the tithes from the debt until the debt is paid.

Even though the creditor is taking them for the Levite, since he does not have an inherent right to them, he may not collect them.

I.e., at this stage, the tasks associated with the preparation of the produce were completed and tithes are required to be separated from it.

To summarize the situation: The first testator, the Israelite, had completed the tasks involved with the preparation of his produce, but died before he had the opportunity to separate the terumah and the tithes. The first heir and second testator, the priest, also died before he had the opportunity to make these separations. Nevertheless, since had he in fact separated them, he would have been allowed to keep them as his own, we consider it as if he actually did so. Therefore when the final heir, the Israelite, takes possession of the produce, he must separate the terumah and the tithes to fulfill the mitzvah. He may then, however, keep them as his own property. (He may not, however, partake of the terumah, he must sell it to a priest.)

This halachah is speaking about an instance where the person worded the arrangement with the gentile in such a manner that the gentile does not receive possession of the produce until after it reaches the "phase of tithing." Otherwise, there would be no obligation to separate tithes. See Hilchot Terumah 1:13.

In contrast to the following clause, this phrase does not refer to an ordinary common person, but one who has a reputation for being lax in the observance of this mitzvah (see Ra'avad). For with regard to a common person, we apply certain safeguards lest he not have tithed, but nevertheless, we are not certain that he has not tithed. On the contrary, our presumption is that he did tithe.

This is a penalty, imposed so that a person will not give his field to a person who does not observe the mitzvah of tithing.

Since the majority of the common people tithe (Shabbat 23a), since he has not incurred the responsibility to tithe at all, he was not penalized.

Since the produce reached the "phase of tithing," and there are some common people who do not tithe, our Sages required that this measure be taken.

Before a division of produce is made.

I.e., if they partook of some of the produce while it was forbidden for them to do so.