Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 141) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 477) includes this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. The Rambam's wording implies that the nullification of the debt comes as a result of the person's action. It is not automatically nullified at the conclusion of the seventh year. For that reason, the Rambam states in Halachah 28, when a person comes to pay a debt after the conclusion of the seventh, the creditor must say that he is nullifying the debt (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. XVII, p. 289ff.).

For, according to the Rambam, the debt is not nullified until the conclusion of the Sabbatical year (Halachah 4).

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 230) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 475) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

As stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 9, after the exile of the tribes of Reuven and Gad, the laws of the Jubilee year no longer applied according to Scriptural Law.

See Chapter 10, Halachot 13, 15, for details regarding this concept.

Gittin 36a.

I.e., according to the Rambam's interpretation of Gittin, loc. cit., the nullification of debts applies in the present era, even in the Diaspora. His view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 67:1). In his gloss to that text, the Rama quotes different opinions among the Ashkenazic authorities. Some maintain that the Rabbis did not ordain the observance of this law in the present age. Others maintain that it should be observed as a custom. Significantly, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Hilchot Halvaah 34, follows the Rambam's view.

I.e., even according to Rabbinic Law (see Tosafot, Gittin, loc. cit.).

With regard to the Hakhel ceremony. The interrelation of these verses has its source in the Sifri.

According to other authorities, although the debt is not remitted until the end of the Sabbatical year, from the beginning of the Sabbatical year, the creditor is forbidden to demand payment. See Shulchan Aruch HaRav, loc. cit. 36.

I.e., the sunset marking the advent of Rosh HaShanah.

Because it is forbidden to demand its payment (Likkutei Sichot, loc. cit.).

Since the people considered the day as a festival, the recipients of the meat could not pay for it in an ordinary manner. Hence they promised to pay for their shares later, considering the money as a debt [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 10:2)].

When the laws of the annulment of debts would no longer apply. The Rambam is speaking about a situation that could have occurred in the time the new month was sanctified based on the testimony of witnesses (in contrast to the present era, when we follow a fixed calendar). In that era as well, the court had a presupposition of the day when Rosh HaShanah would fall and the people celebrated it as a holiday in anticipation of its sanctification. Nevertheless, the moon was not actually sanctified - and thus the holiday officially declared as such - unless witnesses came. Now it was possible, especially if the night was cloudy, that witnesses did not see the moon and hence could not go to the court to give testimony. Hence the day could not be declared as Rosh HaShanah.

The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's ruling, based on the principle (stated in Halachah 11), that a debt stemming from money owed on account to a grocer is not nullified at the end of the Sabbatical year. Indeed, the source for this law (the Jerusalem Talmud, Sh'vi'it 10:1) states that it follows the opinion that maintains that such an account is nullified by the Sabbatical year. The Radbaz, however, explains that the situations are not identical. For it is common practice for a grocer to sell on account. A butcher, by contrast, expects immediate payment. A similar distinction is suggested by the Kessef Mishneh.

I.e., once a loan is recorded in a promissory note, in the event the debtor does not pay, the creditor can use the promissory note to collect the debt from the landed property belonging to the debtor at the time of the loan (even if it was subsequently sold to others). Since the property is on lien, one might think that the situation is comparable to a loan supported by security (Halachah 14), which is not nullified by the Sabbatical year. That law, however, does not apply in the present instance, because although the lien applies to the debtor's property, it is not associated with a specific property.

Since the land has been designated as payment, it is as if the loan has already been paid.

For example, a person claimed that a colleague owed him 100 zuz and the colleague admitted only to owing 50. In such an instance, the colleague is required to take an oath regarding the other 50 zuz. If he fails to take the oath before the conclusion of the Sabbatical year, that obligation is nullified.

This is a specific term that, as explained in Hilchot Sh'vuot 11:5-6, refers to oaths administered because of the denial of a specific and definite claim that would create a monetary obligation were the defendant to have admitted to it.

See Hilchot Sh'vuot, loc. cit., which explains that these individuals can be compelled to take an oath even though the plaintiff does not have a definite claim against them.

With regard to a watchman, the explanation is that - unlike a loan - the property being watched is considered as always being in the possession of the owner. Hence, the obligation for it is not nullified by the Sabbatical year (see Radbaz). A partner is considered as a watchman (Bava Batra 42b).

The rationale is that the obligation was not firmly established before the conclusion of the Sabbatical year, for until the borrower's admission of the debt or the substantiation of the claim by witnesses, the creditor cannot press for payment in a court of law. Hence, the end of the year does not lead to the nullification of the debt. See the Jerusalem Talmud (Sh'vi'it 10:1). The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, but it is supported by the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh and quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 67:7). Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch does add to the Rambam's wording the concept that the debtor took an oath to support his denial. In his gloss to the Tur, the Darkei Moshe explains that addition, stating that unless the debtor has taken an oath to support his denial, then we are speaking of an ordinary loan and the conclusion of the Sabbatical year nullifies both the loan and the obligation of an oath to support one's denial, as stated in Halachah 6.

For in ten years time, he will demand payment of the debt.

For the loan has not become due. And as long as there is no payment demanded, the debt is not nullified, for the Sabbatical year only nullifies a debt for which payment is called for (the Responsa of Rabbenu Asher, sec. 86).

The Radbaz and Rav Yosef Corcus explain that even though the collector has promised not to demand payment of the debt, since there is a payment date before the end of the Sabbatical year, the borrower is under obligation to pay. Hence, it is as if payment is being demanded from him.

This is a general principle, applicable in many contexts. Whenever a person establishes a stipulation that runs contrary to the Torah's laws, his stipulation is nullified. For the Torah is not given over to man's will and no mortal can bend it to fit his whims (see Makkot 3b; Hilchot Ishut 6:9).

The difference between this clause and the previous one can be explained as follows: In the previous instance, the person was attempting to postulate that the Torah's laws should not apply. This is not within a mortal's power. In the second clause, by contrast, the person is saying that although the laws of the Sabbatical Law do apply, he asks the borrower to accept an obligation even though the Torah releases him from it. Torah Law does not prevent him from accepting such an obligation. See the parallels in Hilchot Mechirah 11:15.

See also the comments of Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 67), that one is permitted to make such a stipulation. It is not merely that, after the fact, one is bound by it.

Based on this principle, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Hilchot Halva'ah:35 draws the following conclusion:

At present, in these countries, it is not customary [to employ] a pruzbol. [Some] have explained the custom [as follows]: Since it has become customary to collect all debts after the Sabbatical year, even without a pruzbol, and the borrower knows of this practice, it is as if the lender made a stipulation at the time of the loan that [the loan was being given] on condition that the borrower never nullify this debt, even in the Sabbatical year. Thus [the borrower] made himself liable for a financial obligation not required of him by the Torah in which instance, his stipulation is binding and he is obligated according to Scriptural Law.

Nevertheless, that text continues, stating that "any G‑d-fearing person will be stringent with regard to his own conduct and make a pruzbol, [for] it is something that does not involve a loss and is easy to arrange."

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 10:1), the Rambam explains that until a summary of an account is made, it is not considered as a debt. Instead, the seller trusts the purchaser and is willing to wait for payment. Thus all of the different transactions are considered as one sale. The Kessef Mishneh explains that since it is not customary for the seller to demand payment of such accounts, the account is not bound by the prohibition: "Do not demand payment." Hence, the mitzvah to nullify the obligation also does not apply.

Similar concepts are reflected in the treatment of the subject by Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Hilchot Halva'ah, subsec. 39, which states: "Since a storekeeper usually extends credit for a year or two and it is unusual for him to demand payment immediately, it is as if he set a time for payment after the Sabbatical year."

The Rama (Choshen Mishpat 67:14 offers two explanations for "establish[ing it] as a debt":

a) setting a time for payment;

b) totaling up the account to arrive at a sum.

For in such an instance, it is no different than any other debt.

Here also the Kessef Mishneh explains that since it is not common for a worker to demand payment of his wages immediately, until he does so, they are not considered as a debt.

See Deuteronomy 22:28-29, Hilchot Na'arah, ch. 1.

See Exodus 22:15-16, Hilchot Na'arah, ch. 1.

See Deuteronomy 22:13-21, Hilchot Na'arah, ch. 3.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 10:2, the Rambam explains that debts are obligations which a person accepts upon himself. Hence they can be nullified. These obligations, by contrast, are penalties imposed upon the transgressor by God. Hence, he cannot absolve himself from them unless he makes payment.

The Kessef Mishneh questions this explanation, for the Torah also requires a person to satisfy the monetary obligations he takes upon himself. He therefore explains that the intent is that since these penalties are written in the Torah, it is as the debts were handed over to the court in which instance, they are not nullified by the Sabbatical year, as stated in Halachah 15.

Rambam LeAm explains the difference between the two on the basis between the distinction between mamon, a financial obligation between men, which a man can release, and k'nas, a penalty required by God from the transgressor that although paid to the person violated is not an obligation to him.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 67:16) defines "establish[ing] as a debt" as calling the defendant to court. Sefer Meirat Einayim 67:31 emphasizes that once the court's decision is written up, it is considered as if the debt has been handed over to the court.

The money he agrees to pay in the event of a divorce (or which his estate must pay in the event of his death).

Since the obligation need not be paid until the woman demands payment, it is not considered as a debt that could be nullified by the Sabbatical year.

I.e., she admitted that a certain portion of the money owed her had already been paid. See Hilchot Ishut 16:14.

Kiddushin 9b states: "A creditor acquires the security given him." Thus when the loan is given in return for security, it is as if he transferred ownership of the security for the loan until it is repaid [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 9:2)]. Thus it is as if there is no outstanding obligation for the Sabbatical year to nullify.

For this amount is not in his possession. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quote other opinions which do not accept this view and maintain that this portion of the debt is not nullified. In his Kessef Mishneh, however, Rav Yosef Caro elaborates in support of the Rambam's position.

Giving them the actual promissory note, not merely assigning it to them (Rav Yosef Corcus, explaining why this is acceptable according to Scriptural Law, while a pruzbol is merely a Rabbinic institution).

The verse continues: "The Sabbatical year is drawing near and you will look negatively at your brother and refrain from giving him." See Halachah 30 which discusses this charge.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 10:3), the Rambam cites the interpretation of this term in Gittin 37a: "the amendment of a matter."

As stated in Halachah 2, the nullification of debts in the present era is a Rabbinic injunction. And since it is a Rabbinic institution, Hillel and his court had the power to institute a provision to reduce its application. Were it to have the power of a Scriptural Law, the Rabbis would not be able to institute such a provision.

The Ra'avad differs with this concept, explaining that it applies even when the Sabbatical Law is observed according to Scriptural Law. The difference between the two authorities reflects a difference between the two Talmudic Sages, Abbaye and Rava, the Rambam follows Abbaye's understanding and the Ra'avad that of Rava. This, however, is slightly problematic, for the Bava Metzia 22b states that, with the exception of six specific instances, whenever there is a difference of opinion between these two Sages, the halachah follows Rava's understanding.

The Radbaz explains the Rambam's viewpoint, stating that our Sages' preference for Rava's position applies only when these Sages are arguing concerning their own logical conclusions. When, by contrast, they are arguing about the interpretation of another Sages' position as in the present instance, the halachah can follow Abaye's view.

They were the heads of the leading courts in Eretz Yisrael shortly at the beginning of the post-Mishnaic era. Similarly, the court composing a pruzbol must be one of the leading courts in its region and in its era (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).

Gittin 36b explains that the institution of a pruzbol depends on the principle hefker beit din, hefker; "When the Jewish court absolves a person's ownership, the absolution is binding." As proof of this principle, it cites examples of actions taken by Ezra the Scribe and Joshua. The Rambam understands the Talmud to be saying that even when a financial obligation is Rabbinic in origin, to absolve it, one must have authority comparable to that of Ezra and Joshua. (Significantly, in Hilchot Sanhedrin 24:6 - where the Rambam describes the above principle - and in Hilchot Nachalot 6:12 - where he shows another application of it - he does not state that the courts involved must be made up of judges of unique distinction.)

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 67) does not accept the Rambam's ruling and maintains that a pruzbol may be composed by any court. The Ramah (loc. cit.:18) states that this leniency can be accepted. Note also the contrast between this law and Halachah 27.

Our translation is taken from the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 10:4).

The Rambam is quoting the wording of the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 10:4). Although Rabbenu Nissim interprets this to mean that the Rambam accepts the view (Gittin 33a) that two judges are sufficient to compose a pruzbol, most authorities require that there be at least three judges on a court which officiates over a pruzbol, as indicated by the statement of the law in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 67:19).

The creditor is not transferring the actual promissory note to the court - in which instance a pruzbol would not be necessary, as stated in Halachah 15. Instead, he is making a formal notification of the matter to the court. See Sefer Meirat Einayim 67:39.

I.e., even after the Sabbatical year passes.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam writes that this wording teaches us that a judge may also serve as a witness. This is not allowed in questions involving Scriptural Law, but in questions involving Rabbinic Law, leniency is granted.

The rationale is that when the borrower possesses land, the creditor's debt is secured, because he may expropriate the land in payment (Radbaz). Even though the land does not appear to be worth the full value of the debt, we follow the principle (see Hilchot Mechirah 13:8) that the land may never be considered overpriced (Sefer Meirat Einayim 67:41).

Our text follows the manuscript copies and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed text reads slightly differently.

The lender may transfer this property to the borrower without his knowledge, but not against his will [Shulchan Aruch and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 67:22)].

Even if he possesses only a flowerpot with a hole in it.

Since the borrower is entitled to use the land, he is considered to have sufficient rights to it to enable a pruzbol to be written.

I.e., the man referred to here is the borrower.

Since he is entitled to the benefit from this property, it can be used for a pruzbol.

I.e., when a guardian took out a loan for the sake of orphans, if the guardian possesses land a pruzbol can be composed because the guardian is considered like a guarantor.

Because ultimately, the guarantor's property is also on lien to the loan.

For each one must entrust his debt to the court.

For in the one pruzbol, he entrusts all of his debts to the court.

This halachah, based on Sh'vi'it 10:5, was the subject of much review and rethinking within the Rambam's own mind. He rewrote his commentary to this mishnah four times, each time, changing his thought somewhat.

At first, he wrote that only a pruzbol written before a loan prevents it from being nullified. Once a loan has already been given, the laws of the Sabbatical year apply to it, and a pruzbol cannot nullify it. It was not until his second revision of his commentary that he changed it, amending it to read like his conclusion in the text above.

Since that is the date on the pruzbol, its legal power takes effect from that date even though it was written later and it could have included the loans that were given until the date when it was actually composed.

For it is nullified by the Sabbatical year.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ketubot 9:7), the Rambam explains that the lender's word is accepted based on the principle that a person will not sin when he could achieve the same result in a permitted manner (Gittin 37b). Since he could easily preserve the debt by composing a pruzbol, we assume that he did so rather than transgress the prohibitions of the Sabbatical year, as stated in Halachah 26.

I.e., in the Talmudic era, the Roman's passed many decrees with the intent of stamping out the observance of the mitzvot. One of them was a prohibition to make a pruzbol (for by doing so, they would undermine the observance of the Sabbatical year). Failure to observe these decrees led to very severe punishment. In fear, many people would compose a pruzbol so that they could collect their debts, but destroy it lest it cause them danger (Kessef Mishneh).

The Kessef Mishneh explains that even though the danger passed, the Rabbis never rescinded the leniency granted to allow for a uniformity in Jewish practice.

Gittin, loc. cit. explains that this is like "opening the mouth of the dumb," i.e., offering support to a litigant to enable him to collect what is due him.

Below the age of majority [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 67:28)].

The Radbaz cites (Gittin 37a) which states that the Jewish court is considered as "the father of the orphans" and we assume that they do not want to impose Rabbinic decrees in a situation that will harm the orphan's interests. This applies both to loans that they themselves made or that their father made and which are due to his estate (Sefer Meirat Einayim 67:50).

And thus the loan would be nullified by the Sabbatical year, as stated in Halachah 22.

Based on the principle of migo, i.e., had he desired to lie, he would have told a more effective lie. This argument is reinforced by the accepted presumption mentioned previously: that if a person has a permitted way to perform a function, he will not use a forbidden path, i.e., he would make the loan with a valid pruzbol, rather than rely on an invalid one.

Generally, a migo is an accepted argument in its own right. Nevertheless, in this instance, the migo must be reinforced by the assumption, for migo is usually employed as an argument in defense of one's position and not to expropriate money and here the plaintiff is seeking to employ it to expropriate money (Biurei HaGra 67:58).

See Halachah 11.

To lie, i.e., here too, we are relying on the principle of migo, as reinforced by the assumption the Rambam proceeds to mention.

Lending with a pruzbol.

Lending without a pruzbol.

The Rambam's wording implies that both the lender and the borrower must be Torah scholars. His ruling is quoted verbatim by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 67:20). The Rama, however, rules that not only Torah Sages, but even ordinary individuals can benefit from this leniency.

This leniency is part of the rationale, for the observance of the concept of pruzbol by the Ashkenazic community. Since all that is necessary to preserve a loan is a verbal statement made in the presence of three knowledgeable people, it is proper for everyone to do so (Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Hilchot Halva'ah:35).

The Ra'avad (as understood by the Kessef Mishneh) objects to the Rambam's ruling, for, as stated in Halachah 17, the Rambam maintains that a pruzbol must be composed by a leading court, while here, he seems to imply that any few students are acceptable. The Kessef Mishneh resolves the apparent contradiction by saying that the students the Rambam refers to here are in fact distinguished judges, and there is no difference in practive between the subjects of the two halachot. Rav Yosef Corcus (in his gloss to Halachah 17) states that as long as the important court approves of such an act, the actual pruzbol may be made in the presence of lesser scholars.

As stated in Halachah 18

And thus, according to law, the debt is nullified and need not be repaid. This halachah is speaking about an instance where a pruzbol was not composed.

I.e., they approve of this step and consider it pious behavior. The Sages thought it desirable for a debt to be returned, for in this way, people will continue lending each other money in the future.

For according to law, he can no longer collect the debt.

And thus, by accepting it, he is not violating the Torah's commandment to nullify the debt. Indeed, he has fulfilled the commandment to release the debt, for the Deuteronomy 15:2 introduces this commandment with the phrase: "This is the matter (d'var) of remission." D'var, translated as "matter," also relates to the word dibbur meaning "speech," implying that it is sufficient to make a statement of remission to fulfill the mitzvah [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 10:8)].

For the debt has been absolved.

Because it would resemble accepting payment for a debt.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 231) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 480) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. See also Halachah 16 above.

Zevachim 106a; Sifri to the above verse. The fact that this commandment employs two such terms indicates that it is a severe prohibition.

As opposed to many other mitzvot for which reward is granted only in the World-to-Come. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Pe'ah 1:1) for a discussion of this matter.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 140) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 330) includes the commandment to count the sets of years among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. As the Rambam states in Sefer HaMitzvot the mitzvah is not to count a 50 year cycle, but rather to count seven sets of seven year cycles.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 136) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 332) includes the commandment to sanctify the fiftieth year among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. In Sefer HaMitzvot, the Rambam explains that the sanctification of the year is reflected in considering the produce of that year ownerless.

The Sanhedrin, the court of 71 judges which served as Judaism's supreme Rabbinic authority.

I.e., their fulfillment is not incumbent on each person individually, but on the people as a whole, and hence, on the High Court, who acts as their agent.

Zevachim 118b derives the fact that it took the Jews seven years to conquer Eretz Yisrael from the statements of Caleb quoted in Joshua 14:7 and it postulates that the division also took seven years.

Avodah Zarah 9a states that the Torah was given in the year 2448, when the forty years the Jews wandered in the desert and the fourteen years that the land was conquered and divided are added, a total of 2502 are reached. Thus the counting began in the 2503rd year.

I.e., our counting begins from the creation of Adam which was on Rosh HaShanah, for Adam's creation superseded the creation that preceded his to the extent that Rosh HaShanah is considered the anniversary of creation and the beginning of the year and not the 25th of Elul even though that date was the first day of creation.

Adam's creation is mentioned as occurring in the second year after creation, because any portion of a year is considered as a year. Thus the five days from the 25th of Elul until Rosh HaShanah are the first year referred to here. Hence, there is a theoretical conjunction of the sun and the moon for that year. See Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh 6:8 and notes which mention the day and time of the first conjunction.

I.e., they were in the midst of counting the seventeenth Jubilee as explained in the following note.

I Kings 6:1 relates that the first Temple was built 480 years after the exodus from Egypt. When the 40 years of wandering in the desert and the 14 years when Eretz Yisrael was conquered and divided is subtracted from that figure, 426 years remain. When the 410 years that the First Temple stood (as stated in Yoma 9a) are added, a total of 836 is reached. 836 divided by 50 equals 16. Thus the Jews were exiled in the 36th year of the seventeenth Jubilee cycle. Note the discussion of the Rambam's wording "17 Jubilees" by the Ra'avad, Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh and others based on Rosh HaShanah 9a.

And for the 70 years of the Babylonian exile, the Jubilee year cycle was not followed. See Halachah 5.

See also Chapter 12, Halachah 15.

For they began counting from Ezra's arrival.

See Halachah 8. The Rambam's intent is that the mitzvot of the Jubilee year were not observed.

For the destruction took place on the ninth of Av.

The Second Temple stood for 420 years (Yoma, loc. cit.). Thus if the reckoning of the Sabbatical and Jubilee years began in its seventh year, there is a total of 414. Eight Jubilee cycles produce a total of 400 years. Thus the year following the destruction was the 415th year and it was the year following the Sabbatical year.

In the Talmudic era, it was customary to date legal documents from the time of Alexander the Great's ascent to the throne. See Hilchot Gerushin 1:27.

This corresponds to 1176 C.E. This date is interesting in another context, for it gives us some insight into the Rambam's writing and editing of the Mishneh Torah. In his Introduction to the Mishneh Torah, the Rambam mentions the date of the composition of the work as 4937, and in Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh 11:16, he speaks of the date 4938. Thus it is apparent that he worked on the text for several years, wrote the Introduction in 4937, and then edited and added to the work in 4938.

I.e., that date is 1121 years after the last Jubilee observed before the destruction of the Second Temple. Thus if that figure is divided by fifty, 21 years are left over. Hence, it is a Sabbatical year.

See Avodah Zarah 9b.

For it is accepted that the year following the destruction was the beginning of a Sabbatical cycle, as stated in Halachah 4.

I.e., when 1107 is divided by 7, there is a remainder of 1.

The Radbaz states that this was the practice in his day and this is the present practice in Eretz Yisrael and throughout the world, for the Rambam's ruling is accepted by both the Beit Yosef and Rama (Choshen Mishpat 67:1). See Sefer Meirat Einayim 66:5.

For the obligations of the second tithe and the tithe for the poor depend on the years of the Sabbatical cycle.

I.e., the way the law has actually been observed.

This applies whether the Jubilee year was observed in its full sense, as in most of the First Temple era, or it was merely counted as throughout the Second Temple era.

The tribes of Reuven and Gad and half of the tribe of Menashe were exiled approximately 18 years before the remaining seven and a half tribes. They in turn were exiled approximately 130 years before the destruction of the Temple and exile of the tribe of Judah.

For each tribe was given an ancestral heritage of its own.

With regard to the freeing of Hebrew servants.

I.e., it is the presence of the Jewish people in the land and not the existence of the Temple which determines the land's sanctity.

See Hilchot Avadim, ch. 1-2.

The laws governing the latter three subjects are described in Chapters 12 and 13.

I.e., if a gentile accepts the observance of the Seven Laws Given to the Descendants of Noah, he is granted the right to dwell in Eretz Yisrael. See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6; Hilchot Melachim 8:10-11.

See Chapter 9, Halachah 3, with regard to the nullification of debts. With regard to the observance of the Sabbatical year, the Rambam's statements are the subject of a difference of opinion among the commentaries. Our translation follows the version of the text suggested by Rav Yosef Corcus which is accepted by Rav Shabsi Frankel. It is also the conception followed by the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 331). The Kessef Mishneh, however, interprets the text differently, reading the last line as: "with the exception of the Sabbatical year in Eretz [Yisrael] and, according to Rabbinic Law, the nullification of debts." Some commentaries have suggested that the Rambam's statements in Sefer HaMitzvot (positive mitzvah 135) support this interpretation. Most other Rishonim follow the conception that the observance of the Sabbatical Law is a Rabbinic ordinance in the present era. See also Chapter 12, Halachah 16, and notes and Hilchot Terumah 1:26 and notes.

Yom Kippur.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 137) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 331) includes this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. This mitzvah also includes setting the servants free, as the Rambam mentions in his listing of the mitzvot at the beginning of these halachot.

Sefer Hamitzvot, loc. cit., states that, thematically, this sounding of the shofar differs from the sounding of the shofar on Rosh HaShanah. On Rosh HaShanah, the shofar is sounded as "a remembrance before God." In the Jubilee, by contrast, the sounding of the shofar is the proclamation of freedom required by the Torah.

The commentaries note that this difference is also reflected in the wording used to describe the commandments. With regard to the sounding of the shofar on Rosh HaShanah, the Rambam (Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 170, Hilchot Shofar 1:1) states the mitzvah is to hear the sounding of the shofar, while here he states that the mitzvah is to sound the shofar.

I.e., first, the shofar is sounded in the High Court (the Sanhedrin of 71 judges) and then it should be sounded by every individual.

I.e., the verse uses two forms, the first singular, and the second plural, for the same verb. On this basis, it is derived that first, the shofar is sounded by the court for the people as a unified entity, and then, it is sounded by each person individually. See Rosh HaShanah 30a, 34a.

I.e., sounding three series of tekiah, shevarim, teruah, tekiah blasts. See Hilchot Shofar, ch. 3, for details.

The Or Sameach interprets this phrasing to mean that although the Jubilee is observed in the Diaspora, the shofar is not sounded there.

See Hilchot Shofar 1:1.

I.e., even when Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath.

I.e., the Sanhedrin of 71 judges.

I.e., an ordinary local court.

See Hilchot Shofar 2:8-9.

I.e., if these three mitzvot are not fulfilled, the Jubilee year is not granted its sanctity (Rosh HaShanah 9b).

This would appear to refer to the sounding of the shofar by the High Court, and not its sounding by every individual.

A Hebrew servant is granted his freedom in the Jubilee year, whether he was sold into slavery on his own initiative or by the court and even if he willingly extended his servitude, as Leviticus 25:40 states: "Until the Jubilee year, he will work with you." See Hilchot Avadim, ch. 2.

As described in the following chapter.

Even though the laws of the Jubilee year do not take effect until the sounding of the shofar on Yom Kippur, the sanctity of the year begins on Rosh HaShanah [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Rosh HaShanah 1:1)].

Lest the shofar not be sounded in the court and thus the laws of the Jubilee year not apply, as stated in the previous halachah.

For the likelihood is that it will be sounded.

Even though the laws of the Jubilee year do not take effect until the sounding of the shofar on Yom Kippur, the sanctity of the year begins on Rosh HaShanah [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Rosh HaShanah 1:1)].

We have used this translation because both work with the land and work with trees are forbidden in the Sabbatical year. See Chapters 1 and 2 above.

By both Rabbinic and Scriptural Law.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 2.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 224-226) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 333-335) include the prohibitions against working the land, harvesting the aftergrowth of crops, and harvesting fruit in the Jubilee year among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

I.e., the respect given to the produce of the Sabbatical year, as explained in Chapter 5.

See Chapter 6.

See Chapter 7.

As related in Chapter 9.

See Leviticus 25:23-28.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 138) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 340) includes this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. This mitzvah is described at the beginning of the following chapter.

On Yom Kippur, as stated in Halachah 14.

As stated in Chapter 9, Halachah 4.

For the entire passage speaks about an "ancestral heritage," i.e., land given to a person's ancestors when the land was originally divided among the tribes (Radbaz). This excludes Jerusalem which was never divided among the tribes (Rambam LeAm).

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 227) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 339) include the commandment for the land not to be sold in perpetuity among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

For whenever a person acts in violation of Torah Law, his deeds are of no avail (Temurah 4b). Since their deeds are of no consequence, they are not punished by lashes (Mishneh LiMelech).

Even though a Jubilee year will definitely fall within the span of the sale.

As explained in the following chapter. Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 139 and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 341) include the commandment to carry out the laws pertaining to a walled city among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 138) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 340) include the command to enable a field to be redeemed or for it to be returned to its owner in the Jubilee year among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

As the Rambam explains in the following halachah, the sale of such a field is considered as a rental agreement until the Jubilee year, with the purchase price being divided equally among the years remaining until the Jubilee. Thus each year has a set value. If the seller wants to redeem his field, he must pay back the money for the remaining years.

Thus the right to use the field was sold for 10 dinar a year.

Although this verse is speaking about the consecration of a field and its redemption from the Temple treasury, Arichin 29b-30a explains that the same principles should be applied to a sale to a private person.

As one might conclude from Leviticus 25:15 as cited in the previous halachah.

For these are considered as temporary benefits which the field regularly produces.

Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Kilayim 2:5). See also the Kessef Mishneh to Chapter 1, Halachah 15.

And thus it has value only to be cut down as firewood.

The purchaser is forbidden to benefit from it alone, because the tree is considered as part of the permanent features of the field and thus was not included in the original sale. On the other hand, the owner cannot take the entire benefit for himself, for the purchaser is entitled to benefit from it for the duration of his ownership of the property.

If, however, the body of the land itself increases in value, that increase is not granted to the purchaser. See Halachah 16.

The use of the plural form implies that the sale must be for at least two years.

If, however, the body of the land itself increases in value, that increase is not granted to the purchaser. See Halachah 16.

I.e., he cannot redeem it until the same date two years later. We do not count the years as beginning from Rosh HaShanah, but from the date of the sale.

When it is forbidden to sow a field.

Which prevented crops from growing in the entire land (Bava Metzia 106a).

Since crops could have grown during those years, and he chose not to sow the land on his own, they are considered "years of its crops." The Kessef Mishneh states that this law also applies if the purchaser leaves it fallow for two years. The Radbaz, however, does not accept this conclusion.

Arachin 29b explains that this is a logical conclusion. If the advent of the Jubilee causes a field that was sold to be returned to its original owners, it will certainly prevent the sale of one that was not sold as of yet from taking effect.

As implied by the phrase "years of its crops," a sale must take effect for at least two years. Hence, the Jubilee does not nullify this sale and the land remains his for one year after the sale. Kin'at Eliyahu notes that since a Jubilee is always preceded by a Sabbatical year (when the purchaser cannot benefit from it), the land must have been sold two years before the Jubilee.

For such land is still called "his ancestral heritage" (Arachin 14b).

The bracketed addition is based on the gloss of the Radbaz who explains that this law would not apply to non-fruit trees. They could be redeemed within the two years. He also explains that the seller must have specifically stated that the sale does not include the land. Otherwise, a certain amount of land is automatically included as stated in Hilchot Mechirah 24:1-2. See also the notes to Hilchot Arichin 4:25.

For the term "ancestral heritage" implies land.

Although the verse is speaking about the return of a purchased field that was consecrated, similar principles apply even if the field was not consecrated.

That purchaser must reimburse the person to whom he sold the field. Although the profit of the purchaser/seller is minimized according to the number of years remaining to the Jubilee, he still retains the profit for the years the sale was viable.

I.e., the owner need not compensate the purchaser/seller for his loss.

This is referring to an increase that comes about because of market fluctuations and not as a result of improvements made by the purchaser as indicated by Halachah 8 (Radbaz).

Here also, the Rambam is speaking about a decrease as a result of market fluctuations. Needless to say, the same law would apply if the value of the land was reduced because of the purchaser's actions.

The classic example of this is the redemption of the field sold by Elimelech by his relative, Boaz, as described at the conclusion of the book of Ruth.

As the Radbaz mentions, in several sources (e.g., Chapter 12, Halachah 4), we find the principle that a present is considered as a sale. [Kin'at Eliyahu asks: If so, why is the prooftext necessary?]

I.e., we consider it as if they sold the share the other received in return for the share that they received. We do not apply the principle of bereirah, i.e., consider the portion received as the portion destined for them at the outset (Bechorot 52b).

I.e., there is no need to nullify the entire division and recalculate. Instead, it is sufficient to merely exchange portions (Kessef Mishneh).

Who receives a double share of the inheritance. From the wording of Deuteronomy 21:17, our Sages conclude that this double portion is given to the firstborn as a present. Hence, since a present is considered as a sale, the share is returned and the inheritance redivided [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 9:11)].

And is therefore given his brother's share of the inheritance (Hilchot Nachalot 3:7). He is also called a "firstborn" (Deuteronomy 25:6) and thus the concepts mentioned in the previous note apply to him.

See Hilchot Ishut 12:3; Hilchot Nachalot 1:8, 6:8.

I.e., he is considered as a single heir and not as a purchaser.

As the Maggid Mishneh states in his gloss to Hilchot Mechirah 24:17, it is an embarrassment for the members of a family that their relatives will not be buried in the family plot.

See Hilchot Ishut 12:2,4.