Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 67) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 116) include bringing the meal-offerings as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

By placing it in the isaron measure found in the Temple Courtyard (see Chapter 2, Halachah 8). Once it was sanctified, it could not be taken out of the Temple Courtyard. Hence all the stages of its preparation had to be completed within the Temple Courtyard (Radbaz). Indeed, one of the chambers in the Temple Courtyard was the Chamber of the Makers of the Chavitin (Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 5:17).

Because half was sacrificed in the morning and half in the afternoon.

See Halachah 4.

See Chapter 2, Halachot 4, 7.

Menachot 51a explains that since the chavitin is cooked on a flat frying pan, it is obvious that oil should be added to it like the other meal offerings cooked on such a frying pan (see Halachah 7). Hence by saying that the chavitin is prepared in oil, the verse implies that additional oil is added. The need for three lugin is then derived from a textual association of the terms used.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Challah 1:6) the Rambam defines the term cholait, the verb translated as "scalded" here as: "pouring boiling water over the flour."

Menachot 15a derives this point from a comparison to the showbread which also comprised twelve loaves.

I.e., when the quantity of three lugim is divided in twelve (an equal portion for each loaf), we arrive at the figure of a revi'it (a fourth of a log). There was a measure of this size in the Temple. Hence the oil would be poured into this measure for each loaf to provide it with the desired amount of oil.

Thus there were three phases in the cooking process of these loaves. First, the flour was scalded as mentioned in the previous halachah. Then the loaf was made and then baked. Afterwards [see also the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 9:3)], the oil was boiled and the loaf fried in it. See also Chapter 9, Halachah 19, which describes all these different stages of the cooking process. The same term, murbechet, is use to describe both that offering and the chavitin offering.

I.e., he should only bake it slightly (Kessef Mishneh). This interpretation is also borne out by Chapter 9, Halachah 19.

Afterwards, it is fried to complete the cooking process (Kessef Mishneh).

The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the cakes should not be divided. Thus instead of offering twelve half-cakes as the Rambam maintains, he maintains that six full cakes should be offered in the morning and six in the afternoon.

I.e., although half should be offered in the morning and half in the afternoon, an exact division is not required. The division is made by hand and not with a utensil. The Kessef Mishneh supports the Rambam's position, noting that the concept of dividing the cakes by hand and not with a utensil is stated in Menachot 87b.

I.e., in the late afternoon.

Further details concerning the bringing of this offering are mentioned in Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 3:18-22.

Both an ordinary priest and a High Priest bring a meal-offering prepared in the same way to mark their initiation into office (Chapter 12, Halachah 4).

For the meal-offering of a priest is never eaten (Chapter 12, Halachah 9).

But no less than an isaron (ibid.:5).

One may bring as many isaronot as he desires, even 1000 (or more).

A log of oil for every isaron of flour, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 7.

Even if the offering contained many isaronot, it is measured out, isaron by isaron (Kessef Mishneh).

As stated in Menachot 6:3, oil is added to all of the meal-offerings offered other than those which are baked in the oven three times: it is placed in the container before the flour, it is mixed into the flour and then it is poured over the mixture of flour and oil. This sequence is not explicitly stated with regard to the offering of fine flour. In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains the process through which it is derived that the above concepts apply to this meal-offering as well.

I.e., a trough where the oil and flour are mixed. Both the Radbaz and Kessef Mishneh state that, from the Rambam's wording, it appears that this trough was not a sacred utensil. They question that conclusion, for once the flour had been put in a sacred utensil, it does not appear appropriate to place it in an ordinary utensil again. Indeed, they explain that perhaps the second utensil was also sacred.

A handful of frankincense for every offering regardless of its size (Chapter 12, Halachah 7).

Care was taken so that they do not leaven (Kessef Mishneh).

As required by Leviticus 2:6.

Menachot 63b notes that Leviticus 7:9 states of such an offering being cooked "in a deep frying-pan," while the others are described as being cooked "on a flat frying-pan." Implied is that the deep frying-pan had an edge large enough to contain liquids.

And thin like the dough of pancakes [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 5:8)].

Oil is not, however, placed in the container before the flour is (Menachot 6:3).

I.e., only "mixed with oil." No other oil is used in preparing them.

The Radbaz supports this supposition, explaining that if the wafers were smeared before they were baked, they would not absorb the oil.

I.e., those fried in a deep frying pan and a flat frying-pan or the two types baked in an oven. Excluded is only the flour offering which is presented without being baked or cooked.

Menachot 76a derives this from a comparison to the thanksgiving offering. See Chapter 9, Halachot 17-18.

For even a thanksgiving offering is acceptable if its loaves are less than the required number (ibid.:22).

These four types of meal-offerings. Again, a flour offering is excluded.

Menachot, loc. cit., explains the rationale, stating that Leviticus 2:6 mentions "breaking them (i.e., into two) into pieces" (i.e., that the two are divided again).

For their meal-offerings are consumed entirely by the altar's pyre. Meal-offerings brought by females of the priestly family are broken into pieces.

For making them any smaller would make them appear insignificant.

Note, however, Chapter 17, Halachah 6, which states that the offering must not be so large that it could not be mixed with its oil.

As required by Chapter 12, Halachah 6.

Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 7:8 rules that if the required amount of oil is not added to a meal offering, it is not acceptable. Nevertheless, after the fact, the oil does not have to be applied to the offering in the manner detailed above.

Menachot 3:2, the source for this halachah, mentions the above concepts and adds that the offerings are acceptable if salt and oil were not placed upon them. In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that the intent is not that the offering is acceptable without salt and oil, but that they need not be added to the offering by a priest.

I.e., as the optimum manner to perform the mitzvah.

As stated in Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 1:18, a sacred utensil may not be made of wood, bone, stone, or glass, only of metal.

Placing it in the sacred vessel with the intent to consecrate it brings about its consecration. See Chapter 2, Halachah 9, Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 3:20.

As described in Halachah 5.

Or fried, i.e., any of the other types of meal offerings.

See Halachot 6-10.

I.e., up until this point, the services could have been performed by a non-priest. From this stage onward, they must be performed by a priest. See Chapter 12, Halachah 23.

I.e., he touches the altar's corner with the utensil. He does not have to have the flour itself touch the corner (Kessef Mishneh).

So that it will not be mixed with the flour taken in the handful (Sotah 14b).

Although the handful of flour was consecrated together with the other flour, it should be consecrated again now that it has become a separate entity. Sotah, loc. cit., draws a comparison to the blood from a sacrificial animal which is consecrated together with the entire animal at the time of its slaughter and is consecrated again when collected in a sacred utensil.

Although placing the handful of flour in two utensils is unacceptable, it does not disqualify it.

As required by Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 5:23.

I.e., he should empty the flour from the sacred vessel over the pyre.

We have mentioned flour, because taking a full handful - but only a handful, not more and not less - of flour can be easily pictured. In truth, however, an exact handful must also be taken from those meal offerings that were already baked and that is much harder to picture.

On the basis of Menachot 11a and Yoma 47b, many commentaries maintain that the handful is taken only with the priest's three middle fingers. The pinky and the thumb are not included. Therefore it is considered as one of the difficult services in the Temple. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 1:2; see also Yoma 1:5), however, the Rambam rejects this understanding and maintains that all of the priest's fingers should be used in taking the handful.

The Ra'avad (in his gloss to the Sifra) states that he should cup his hand and then insert his fingers into the flour until his palm is covered. He then closes his fingers over his palm.

I.e., closing his fingers over themselves and not over the palm of his hand and thus collected only a small amount of flour (Rav Yosef Corcus).

Instead of from the middle (Radbaz). There are also other interpretations to these concepts.

Menachot 11a and Yoma 47b question whether these two ways to take a handful are acceptable and does not reach a conclusion. Therefore the Rambam rules that as an initial preference, one should not take a handful in this manner, but if one does so, it is acceptable after the fact.

And thus the handful was overflowing.

In modern measure, approximately 28 cc according to Shiurei Torah.

For Leviticus 2:2 states that "a full handful" must be offered. Thus if one cannot bring a portion of the handful, it is disqualified and should not be brought at all (Menachot 27a).

I.e., the offering should not be brought unless both are included.

Both are necessary because Leviticus 2:2 mentions the "full handful of flour" and "all of its frankincense." This emphasis is repeated in Leviticus 6:8, indicating that it is an absolute requirement.

I.e., if one does not bring the entire amount, one should not bring the offering at all.

Halachah 5; Chapter 12, Halachah 7.

See Halachah 4 for the distinction between the two terms.

See Chapter 12, Halachah 4.

With regard to sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, see Halachah 8.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 1, 4.

See Chapter 16, Halachah 14; Chapter 17, Halachah 12.

See Chapter 16, Halachah 13.

See Chapter 16, Halachah 14.

See Hilchot K'lei HaMikdash 6:9-10.

Before bringing it.

This is not considered as bringing an offering in partnership.

Even though he mentions a specific animal, since his promise focuses on the animal's value and not the animal itself, it is considered as a vow and not a pledge. Moreover, he made a promise incumbent on himself - that he bring the value of the animal as a sacrifice - and did not designate the animal's worth itself. See also Halachah 6.

The obligation is on him; he has made a commitment to bring the sacrifice.

I.e., pledging that the animal would be sold and the money received be designated for the purchase of a sacrifice.

I.e., the animal or its worth is designated as a sacrifice.

For the obligation is incumbent on him and it was not fulfilled.

Moreover, the sacrifice must be offered in an acceptable manner. If it was disqualified, he is still obligated to fulfill his vow.

Because he personally is under no further responsibility. He fulfilled his obligation by designating the animal.

As stated in Halachah 4, this is considered a vow. The rationale is that he said: elai, "I promise to bring." That expression indicated his willingness to accept responsibility.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Arachin 5:5), the Rambam states that he is obligated to pay only the value of the dead ox, not its value when it was alive.

Since he made an explicit stipulation freeing himself of responsibility, he is not considered as liable.

See Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 9:14 and the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 13:10) which refers to the temple constructed in Alexandria by Chonio, the son of Shimon the Just.

The Mishnah (Menachot 13:10) states merely "a burnt offering," omitting the words "to sacrifice in the Temple." The commentaries question why the Rambam felt it necessary to add them.

Since he promised to bring a burnt-offering, it is necessary that it be brought to Jerusalem. The fact that he added that he would bring it elsewhere is not significant.

I.e., according to the Rambam, the animal set aside is considered as designated as a burnt-offering and the person is liable for offering a sacrifice outside the Temple. Nevertheless, he is considered to have fulfilled his vow for the reason stated by the Rambam.

As is done at the conclusion of one's nazirite vow.

Thus when Leviticus 5:1 introduces the obligation to bring a sin-offering, it states: "If a person will sin...."

I.e., one who is not obligated to bring such a sacrifice.

The types of sacrifices these individuals are obligated to bring vary dependent on the person's financial standing, as explained in Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 1:3. Accordingly, one might think that regardless of the financial status of the person who pledged to bring the sacrifice, the type of sacrifice to be brought is determined by the financial status of the person who is obligated to offer it. Nevertheless, as stated in Arachin 13a (and quoted by the Rambam in Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 5:11), this is not the case. If a wealthy person vows to bring the sacrifices of a poor person afflicted by tzara'at, he must bring the sacrifices of a wealthy man. Hence, we are forced to say that here the Rambam is speaking of a poor person who took such a vow.

Rashi (Arachin 21a) interprets the passage as referring to an instance where the person obligated to bring the sacrifice did not know it was being offered on his behalf. If he did know, however, he must consent. The Rambam differs and maintains that since he gave his consent originally and the atonement associated with these sacrifices is achieved immediately, it is not necessary that he consent at the time the sacrifice was offered (Rav Yosef Corcus; see Halachah 17).

Since the atonement associated with these sacrifices is more encompassing, it requires not only his initial consent, but also continuous willful activity (ibid.).

The Rambam is referring to the wording of the Mishnah (Nedarim 1:1). The intent of the Mishnah is that the wicked make vows hastily and moreover, obligate themselves for vows which constitute a commitment incumbent on their person that they will not necessarily be able to fulfill. As the Rambam writes in Hilchot Nedarim 13:25 and in his commentary to the above mishnah, it is preferable not to take vows, for it is possible one will not be able to fulfill them. See also ibid. 1:25.

For the upright do not take vows for the reason stated in the previous note (ibid.:26).

For the upright do make pledges, for a pledge involves the sanctification of an article at hand and if the upright wish to take such action, there is nothing preventing them from fulfilling their vow. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that the upright would bring their sacrificial animals to the Temple Mount and only then, pledge to bring them. In this way, there would be no question of them keeping their word.

The Rambam does not mention oaths, because the upright try to avoid taking oaths entirely.

See Hilchot Nizirut 1:16 which states:

There are places where people are inarticulate and mispronounce words, calling subjects by different names. [In those places,] we follow the meaning of the local term.

What is meant by the statement that all the terms used for the word korban, "sacrifice," are equivalent to the term korban? When one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a konam," "...a konach," or "...a konaz," they are all terms referring to a korban.

This is a general principle applying with regard to oaths (Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:10-12) and vows (Hilchot Nedarim 2:2).

In the continuation of the halachah, the Rambam describes a situation in which one is liable for a sacrifice he intended to give even though he does not say anything. That, however, is not a contradiction to the statements here, because here, the person's statements contradict his intent.

Which is consecrated to the Temple treasury.

Both of these terms refer to commitments to make donations to the Temple treasury. See Hilchot Arachin, ch. 1, for a more complete description.

I.e. the tithes (including the second tithe and the tithe for the poor) separated from one's crops (see Hilchot Ma'aser and Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni). Also, implied are the tithe offerings. See Hilchot Bechorot, ch. 4.

Leket, pe'ah, ollelot, etc., as described in Hilchot Matanot Aniyim.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 83) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 438) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 155) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 574) count this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

As stated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2, lashes are only given for the violation of a prohibition that involves a deed.

For the calculation begins anew with the consecration of the second animal.

Rosh HaShanah 6b explains that since a woman is not obligated to bring a burnt-offering (olat re'i'ah) for the pilgrimage festival, one might think that the entire concept of a pilgrimage festival - and hence, this commandment - does not apply to her. This supposition is, however, negated, for she is obligated in bringing the peace-offering of rejoicing (shalmei simchah) that are sacrificed on festivals.

The prohibition is not to delay paying one's vow. Since the heir did not make the vow himself, he does not violate this prohibition if he does not carry out the vow at the appropriate time. He is, however, to bring the sacrifice. See Rosh HaShanah 6b.

As Ketubot 86a-b explains, the court is obligated to compel every individual to observe every positive commandment incumbent upon him, even if it requires beating him to the point of death.

The Rambam's wording appears to imply that if the court sees the person acting indolently with regard to the sacrifice, it is obligated to subject him to compulsion even if the first festival has not passed. This point is not, however, accepted by all authorities (Rav Yosef Corcus).

In Hilchot Gerushin 2:20, the Rambam explains why acting under compulsion in such circumstances can be considered willful activity. [For there also, a bill of divorce must be written with the husband's consent and yet he can be compelled to consent.]

The concept of being compelled against one's will applies only when speaking about a person who is being compelled and forced to do something that the Torah does not obligate him to do - e.g., a person who was beaten until he consented to a sale, or to give a present. If, however, a person's evil inclination presses him to negate [the observance of] a mitzvah or to commit a transgression, and he was beaten until he performed the action he was obligated to perform, or he dissociated himself from the forbidden action, he is not considered to have been forced against his will. On the contrary, it is he himself who is forcing [his own conduct to become debased].

With regard to this person who [outwardly] refuses to divorce [his wife] - he wants to be part of the Jewish people, and he wants to perform all the mitzvot and eschew all the transgressions; it is only his evil inclination that presses him [to act otherwise]. Therefore, when he is beaten, until his [evil] inclination has been weakened, and he consents [to the divorce], he is considered to have performed the divorce willfully.

The Rambam's statements have implications far beyond their immediate halachic context. The Rambam is saying that the fundamental desire of every Jew is to affirm his Jewishness and observe the Torah and its mitzvot. Even when a person's conscious mind does not necessarily consent to this inner motivation, it is at work, molding his character without his knowledge. And at times, either because of undesirable circumstances - being compelled against his will as above - or because of desirable ones - an expression of Divine favor - this inner drive will surface.

As stated in Hilchot Arachin 3:14:

They take... [from the persons obligated] against their will. They are not required to return the collateral by day or by night. They sell all the landed property and movable property in [those person's] possession including their clothing, household articles, servants, and livestock, taking their payment from everything.

Burnt-offerings also feature in bringing atonement for the failure to fulfill positive commandments. Nevertheless, in that instance the atonement is achieved through the person's repentance and the offering is considered merely as a present. In contrast, a sin-offering is required to bring about the atonement itself.

See Hilchot Nazirut 8:10.

This is speaking about an animal that is not consecrated. If an animal that is consecrated becomes pregnant, its status is automatically transferred to its offspring [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Temurah 5:1)].

In which instance, the offspring should be sacrificed as a burnt-offering.

In the discussion to follow, it is important to note that burnt-offerings are only male. Peace-offerings can be both male and female. Sin-offerings may also be female (Chapter 1, Halachot 8-11). Nevertheless, as stated in Hilchot Temurah 4:2, the offspring of a sin-offering is not sacrificed, but instead, set aside to die. Hence the Rambam speaks only of the offspring of peace-offerings.

The difference between the first clause and the second clause is that the first clause speaks about the offspring first. Consecrating the offspring certainly does not determine the mother's status. In the second clause, by contrast, the person consecrated the mother first. Now consecrating the mother determines the status of the offspring, for the offspring is considered as "the thigh of its mother." Hence ordinarily if an animal is consecrated as a peace-offering, its offspring also has that status and should be offered as such a sacrifice (Hilchot Temurah 4:1). Nevertheless, in this instance, if the person originally had the intent of consecrating the offspring as a burnt-offering, the offspring is given that status, because it was never meant to be a peace-offering. The person could only make one statement at a time and the fact that he chose to speak about the mother first does not affect the offspring's status.

The phrase translated as "immediately," toch kedai dibbur, has a very specific halachic meaning: "Within the time it takes to say Shalom Elecha, Rebbi" ("Greetings my master"; Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17).

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Temurah 5:3), the Rambam explains that generally if one seeks to retract his statements immediately, the retraction is effective. There are, however, several instances marriage and divorce, the acceptance of a false divinity, blasphemy, the consecration of sacrifices, and the transfer of holiness from one animal to another where retraction is not possible.

Nevertheless, the Rambam's perspective is not accepted by all authorities. Siftei Cohen (Choshen Mishpat 255:5) takes issue with him and argues that one may retract the consecration of an animal. Other sages, however, support the Rambam's position.

So that it will be sacrificed for that purpose and hence, the portion of the animal consecrated as a burnt-offering will have been offered as such.

For that limb was consecrated.

There is a difficulty because the person bringing the burnt-offering will be bringing a sacrifice that does not belong to him entirely. The Jerusalem Talmud (Temurah 1:5) resolves this difficulty, explaining that we are speaking of an instance where the person vowed to spend a specific amount to bring a burnt-offering. Since the animal is worth that amount, he has fulfilled his vow.

This concept is debated without resolution by our Sages in Temurah 11b. The argument centers on the fact that the concept that one can consecrate a limb from an animal as a sacrifice was derived from the exegesis of a verse (Leviticus 27:9). Now that verse is referring to an animal sacrifice and hence, our Sages question whether the concept applies to all sacrifices or only those involving animals.

Because there is no way that one animal can be offered for two purposes.

For in this way, his vow will be kept to the fullest extent of his capacity.

Here he must be obligated, because as stated above, a sin-offering may not be brought on one's own initiative.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:1 regarding what is done with the animal. There the Rambam speaks about an animal separated as a sin-offering that was lost and discovered after its owner had brought another sin-offering in its stead. Since this animal was consecrated for a specific purpose and cannot be sacrificed for that purpose, it cannot be used for any other purpose and is hence caused to die. Similarly, in the instance at hand, since the animal cannot be sacrificed for the purpose for which it was consecrated, it is caused to die.

For half an animal cannot be sacrificed.

This is a concept that applies in many different contexts of the laws concerning the consecration of animals. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 3:24.

Since only its worth was consecrated (for originally, it could not be sacrificed), there is more reason to think that it would not become acceptable afterwards.

Zevachim 59a. This is also a concept that applies in many different contexts of the laws concerning the consecration of animals. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 3:23; Hilchot Shegagot 3:8, et al.

Violating the prohibition of temurah.

And thus from his statements, there is room to say that it could be sold and the proceeds used to purchase an offering rather than it having to be sacrificed itself.

It is male and unblemished.

For any animal that is consecrated and fit to be offered as a sacrifice should be offered (Radbaz).

The Kessef Mishneh elaborates, proving that here also, the Rambam's intent is that it should be left to pasture until it becomes blemished and then sold.

I.e., an animal from a non-kosher species.

Or any other type of sacrifice.

The animal is not consecrated at all. Not only is it considered as ordinary property, the person who took the vow is under no obligation and need not sell the animal and purchase a sacrifice with the proceeds.

We have punctuated the Rambam's words in this manner so that there is a direct correlation between the law stated in Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:10 and the one stated here. Others maintain that the source refers to the first clause. In Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach (see below), the Rambam speaks of consecrating an animal "for the altar." If he states: "This animal is a sacrifice," no holiness is attached to it at all (see the gloss of the Ra'avad there). Similarly, in this instance, since he wished to designate the animals as a sacrifice, his words are of no consequence at all.

The commentaries explain that this reference is to Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:10 where the Rambam states:

One who consecrates an animal which is a tumtum, androgynus, tereifah... to the altar is like one who consecrated stones or wood.... The holiness does not take effect with regard to its physical substance. It is considered as ordinary property in all contexts. It should be sold and the proceeds of the sale used to purchase any sacrifice one desires. It is not considered like a blemished animal, for a sacrifice may be brought from the species of a blemished animal.

Similarly, in the case at hand, since a sacrifice cannot be brought from such animals, they should be sold and the proceeds used to purchase the appropriate sacrifice.

For we assume that he made his promise in a manner that it would be of consequence (Radbaz).

The Rambam is referring to a difference of opinion among our Sages, Nedarim 29a, whether or not the consecration of the value (but not the physical substance) of an object for a limited time expires if nothing is done within that time. As will be stated, his ruling is that it does expire.

The Rambam is speaking of a situation where the cow's worth was consecrated, because all authorities agree that if the physical substance of the cow was consecrated, it would have to be redeemed for the first consecration to be nullified (ibid.).

This point is added, because it possesses an added dimension of severity beyond the first instance. For a cow may not be offered as a burnt-offering, but it may be offered as a peace-offering. Thus it is fit to be sacrificed for the sake of the offering.

The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling and maintains that the animal must be redeemed for the initial consecration to be nullified. The issue is debated by the subsequent commentaries.

In his gloss to Hilchot Nedarim 12:10, the Lechem Mishneh states that this applies only when the animal is pregnant and thus the fetus exists. If, however, the animal is not pregnant, the person's words are not binding.

The Radbaz states that the animal of higher quality should be offered as the sacrifice.

For the person's initial vow encompassed both of them.

Since he is only obligated to bring one sacrifice, he is allowed to sell the second animal and use the proceeds for whatever purpose he desires.

An animal whose gender cannot be determined, because it is masked by a piece of flesh.

An animal that has both male and female organs.

I.e., they are not consecrated at all and they may be used for ordinary purposes. Since the person specified that he was consecrating the offspring as a sacrifice and these animals are unfit for sacrifice, his words are of no consequence whatsoever.

Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:10 (cited above). See the second interpretation given in the notes to Halachah 6.

I.e., animals that are of a type able to be sacrificed, but disqualified for a particular reason. See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach, op. cit.