Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

If the pot was made out of metal, it is possible to purge the flavor of the non-kosher food the pot absorbed through hagaalah. This process is not effective with regard to an earthenware pot.

Since the dish contains meat and the flavor of the forbidden meat was absorbed in the pot, the laws applying to a forbidden substance mixed with its own type apply. Since we do not know how much of the forbidden substance is absorbed in the pot, we assume that the entire pot is forbidden. For this reason, the Rambam does not mention that if there is 60 times the amount of the forbidden food in the kosher food, the kosher food is permitted. For it is very rare that a pot be able to contain sixty times its own volume (Radbaz).

According to the Rambam, it should be tasted by a gentile to determine whether the forbidden flavor is detectable or not, as stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 30. As mentioned, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 98:1) accepts the Rambam's premise, but the Rama states that in the present age, we do not rely on the statements of a non-Jew who tasted food to determine whether it is kosher or not.

The meaning of the Rambam's words is not clear. Rashi (Avodah Zarah 75b) interprets the term as meaning "which has not been left overnight." Tosafot, by contrast, states that it means "that has not been left for 24 hours." The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 103:5) follows the latter view.

After that time, however, the flavor is impaired and thus will not cause a substance cooked in the pot to become forbidden.

This is a safeguard less cooking in a pot that had not been used for non-kosher food for a day lead to cooking in one that had been used for non-kosher food that day (Avodah Zarah, loc. cit.).

Our Sages did not enforce their decree after the fact. Nevertheless, at the outset, an earthenware pot that was used for non-kosher food may never be used.

See Halachah 5 regarding the obligation for this immersion.

Lest any forbidden food be stuck to them.

This will purge any forbidden food that was absorbed in them. There should be at least one day between the last time a pot was used for non-kosher food and the time when hagaalah is performed.

See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 121:2 which discusses what must be done if they were immersed in the mikveh before hagaalah was performed.

That the forbidden article and the utensil were in direct contact with fire without a medium of water or any other liquid.

Only then will the forbidden flavor that was absorbed be purged.

In that way, there will not be any portion of it that is not exposed to the water.

I.e., we follow the principle: "As it absorbed a forbidden flavor, so it purges it." Hence boiling it thoroughly will cause any forbidden taste that is absorbed to be purged.

And thus it would be difficult to submerge it a larger pot.

And thus the boiling water will also cover the edge.

In Halachah 2.

As the Jerusalem Talmud (Avodah Zarah 5:15) states, this immersion was instituted to mark the article's transition from the impurity of the gentiles.

Most commentaries understand the Rambam as explaining that the requirement for immersion is an asmachta, i.e., an obligation that is essentially Rabbinic in origin. Although our Sages cited a verse that can be seen to allude to it, the intent is not that the obligation is derived from the verse. Instead, the verse is merely a hint which the Rabbis found to allude to their teaching (Rabbenu Nissim).

There are, however, others who note that the Rambam occasionally employs the term he employs here - midvrei sofrim - to refer to obligations and laws that are of Scriptural origin. They are not explicitly stated in the verse, but instead derived through the principles of Biblical exegesis. According to this view, the obligation is of Scriptural origin (the Rashba, Vol. III, Responsum 255, 259).

I.e., after you have purged it from the taste absorbed because of gentile cooking, add another dimension of purity through immersion.

This requirement also applies to glass dinnerware, as stated in Halachah 3.

Avodah Zarah 75b explains the association with metal utensils as follows. Our Sages associated this obligation with the purification of the spoil taken in the war against Midian and the verse which mentions those spoils (Numbers 31:22) refers to metal utensils. Glass utensils are also included, because, halachically, they share similarities to metal utensils.

I.e., utensils used to prepare, serve, or partake of food. Even utensils that are used in the preliminary phases of preparation of food, e.g., a knife used to slaughter or skin an animal, are required to be immersed according to certain authorities [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 120:5)].

For even though he has permission to use them, he has not become their owner. The Kessef Mishneh quotes certain opinions that maintain that utensils taken as security must be immersed, because if the debt is not repaid, they are considered as payment [see Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 120:5).

In this context, there are many authorities who question why the utensils that are "purchased" by a gentile before Pesach are not required to be immersed.

Needless to say, plastic utensils need not be immersed.

The Rama ((Yoreh De'ah 120:1) states that they should be immersed without a blessing.

By exposing the knife to fire, the person will burn away any non-kosher substances. By honing it, he will grind away its surface and together with it, the taste of the forbidden substance it absorbed.

One must insert it in ten different places in the earth. It is not sufficient to insert it in the same place ten times [Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 121:7)].

For sticking it into the earth will remove any traces of forbidden fat on its surface and the taste of forbidden food that is absorbed will not be released when it is used for cold food.

These activities may cause any forbidden taste absorbed by the knife to be released. Hence before the knife is used, the traces of the forbidden flavor must be removed as above.

The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 121:7) quotes opinions that maintain that honing the knife is not sufficient to allow it to be used for hot foods. He states that this is accustomed practice. Even so, after the fact, if a person slaughtered an animal with a knife that was honed in a grinder, thre is no prohibition involved (Siftei Cohen 121:20).

To remove any traces of forbidden fat that might be present.

This is permitted only after the fact. At the outset, it is forbidden to slaughter with such a knife unless measures are taken to remove the absorbed fat (Siftei Cohen 10:8).

For according to some opinions, through the slaughter of the animal, the forbidden fat on the knife can become absorbed in the surface of the meat where the animal was slaughtered. Hence it is necessary that it be removed. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 10:1) rules that it is necessary to take this measure and remove the surface of the meat.

To remove any trace of forbidden blood or fat. Nothing more is necessary, we do not say that the blood or fat became absorbed in the knife.

The Turei Zahav 10:15 states that unlike a knife used by gentiles mentioned in the previous halachah, it was not used frequently with a non-kosher substance. Hence washing it thoroughly is sufficient.

These decrees were about the eighteen decrees passed when the students of the School of Shammai outnumbered the students of the School of Hillel, as related in Shabbat 1:3 (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 2:6).

See the following halachah.

See Halachot 12-24.

E.g., the food was cooked by gentiles on Jewish premises (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.).

See Chapter 11, Halachah 9.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch do not mention this restriction or the accompanying leniency. The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 112) explains the Rambam's logic as follows: Avodah Zarah 30a relates that one of the Sages, Shmuel was sitting with Abalat, a gentile. They were served boiled wine. Abalat withdrew, lest he touch the wine and cause it to become forbidden. Shmuel called him back, telling him there was no prohibition against boiled wine.

Rabbenu Asher asks: Since the prohibition against gentile wine was instituted as a protection against intermarriage, what difference does it make whether the wine is boiled or not? He answers that boiled wine is not common. Hence our Sages did not include it in their decree.

Rambam maintains that boiled wine is common and hence included in our Sages' decree. For this reason, it is forbidden to drink it together with gentiles. How then could Shmuel drink with Abalat? Because there were a majority of Jews at the gathering and such a situation is not included in our Sages' decree.

Thus according to the Rambam [and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 114:1) who quotes his ruling, it is forbidden to drink at a bar frequented primarily by gentiles. The Rama mentions that it is customary in the Ashkenazic community to rule leniently with regard to alcoholic beverages made from honey and grain.

Hence a gentile's touch renders it forbidden.

Because bread is a staple of life and there is no Jewish bread available, our Sages allowed for leniency when purchasing bread from a commercial baker. For buying from him will not lead to close personal relationships. Nevertheless, according to the Rambam, this leniency is granted only: where there is no Jewish bakers and in the fields, not in the cities. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 112:2) rules more leniently and does not forbid this in a city. The Rama rules even more leniently and allows the purchase of bread from a gentile baker even in places where bread from a Jewish baker is available.

There are opinions which maintain when there is no bread from a commercial baker available, one may even use bread baked by a gentile homeowner [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 112)]. The Rama states that one may accept this leniency.

The Radbaz states that this leniency applies only with regard to baking bread. With regard to cooking, a Jew must take a more active role in the cooking process. This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 113:7). The Rama, however, differs and maintains that kindling the oven is sufficient for cooking as well.

There is a slight difficulty with the Rambam's statements, because quince are only edible when cooked.

Today, when monarchy is a point of history, the phrase "fit to be served on the table of kings" refers to food served at a dinner for the President or dignitaries of similar status.

Avodah Zarah 38a gives this and the leniency mentioned in the previous halachah as alternate explanations when food cooked by gentiles is permitted. Since the matter is left unresolved by the Talmud, the Rambam and the subsequent authorities rule leniently in both situations.

A legume used as cattle fodder, but also served to humans on occasion.

The Kessef Mishneh states that this is speaking about fish that are frequently served salted even without being cooked (e.g., sardines or herring served in brine). It is permitted to eat such fish for, as the Rambam states in the following halachah, in this context, salting is not considered as cooking. This leniency does not apply to large fish, for they are unfit to be eaten unless they are cooked or roasted. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 103:12) mentions this ruling, but also a dissenting view that allows leniency even with regard to large fish.

Since they were fit to be eaten before they were roasted, the fact that they were roasted by a gentile afterwards does not cause them to be forbidden. This applies even when a gentile performed the salting. For that salting did not cause the fish to become forbidden and yet, it made it fit to be eaten (ibid.).

In his Kessef Mishneh, R. Yosef Caro rules that this applies only when the cooking process would have been completed without the gentile's activity; the gentile merely hastened it. He does not, however, quote this ruling in his Shulchan Aruch. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 113:6) rules that even if the food would not have cooked without the gentile's activity, it is permitted. The Turei Zahav 113:6 and the Siftei Cohen 113:8, however, raise questions concerning that leniency.

In contrast to certain other halachic contexts.

See the conclusion of Halachah 15.

Implied is that the designation of a food as important enough to be served on the tables of kings is a relative matter, determined by each locale in accordance with its own practice (Makor Mayim Chayim).

For this is frequently done in order to flavor beans.

I.e., cooked that day. The Kessef Mishneh states that, according to the Rambam, we assume that a pot owned by a gentile had been used to cook non-kosher food that day. This is not the view of the majority of Halachic authorities.

For we fear that the gentile used non-kosher fat or that the fryer in which they are prepared was used that day for non-kosher meat.

When quoting this law, Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 113:5) emphasizes that if the gentile intends to cook, even if he did not intend to cook a particular substance, that substance is forbidden. For example, when a gentile lit an oven with the intent of cooking food without realizing that there was meat in the oven, the meat is forbidden.

Since they can be eaten fresh, they are not forbidden when cooked (Halachah 14).

Avodah Zarah 38b relates that it was customary to eat a dish made from roasted lentils mixed with vinegar. This was considered like cooking. As a safeguard against partaking of such a mixture, they also forbade roasted lentils mixed with water. It was not, however, customary to partake of grain mixed with vinegar. Hence, there was no reason to forbid grain mixed with water.

The wording the Rambam uses alludes to the Biblical prohibition of the rebellious elder (see Deuteronomy, ch. 17, and Hilchot Mamrim, ch. 3). The Jerusalem Talmud (Avodah Zarah 2:8) relates that Rav once refused to partake of gentile oil. Shmuel ordered him to do so. "If not," he threatened, "I will have you labeled a rebellious elder."

Avodah Zarah 35b states that Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi and his court permitted gentile oil to be used.

I.e., the flavor of forbidden meat absorbed in the pot.

I.e., because it is ordinarily eaten raw and because meat spoils its flavor.

Which would be boiled to make beer.

Avodah Zarah 38b originally postulates that only date dregs cooked in small pots with openings too narrow to put in non-kosher meat are forbidden. The conclusion of the passage, however, permits even date dregs cooked in large pots for the reason mentioned by the Rambam.

In some halachic contexts, pickling is considered as cooking. Nevertheless, with regard to this prohibition, our Sages ruled leniently. We do not forbid them because of the suspicion that wine or vinegar will be sprinkled over them, because wine or vinegar would not be sprinkled over them in the storeroom, only in a retail outlet [Rashi (Avodah Zarah 39b)].

Because of the gentile wine.

As stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 13, vinegar made from gentile wine is forbidden. And as indicated in the next halachah, other types of vinegar are also forbidden.

For if wine dregs were cast into the vinegar in the storage room, it would spoil (Avodah Zarah 32b). In a store, however, we assume that it will be sold quickly and in that brief time, it will not spoil (Turei Zahav 114:5).

Although the Rambam's wording in Hilchot Shabbat 24:11 might lead one to think that one must rebuke a child for performing a task forbidden by Scriptural Law, both the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh explain that his statements there should be interpreted within the context of his statements here.

Hence, he is not responsible for his actions.

Note, however, the Rama (Orach Chayim 243:1) which quotes opinions that maintain that once a child has reached the age where he is fit to be educated in the observance of the mitzvot, the court - and every individual person - is obligated to rebuke for transgressing.

To give a contemporary example, a parent cannot have a child turn lights on and off on the Sabbath.

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Shabbat 21:1, the term shvut refers to activities forbidden by Rabbinic Law, because they resemble forbidden labors or because they might lead one to commit a forbidden labor.

Note, however, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 243:1 which rules that when there is a necessity, not even a severe necessity, Rabbinic prohibitions can be overstepped with regard to a child.

This is a general charge, applying to the Torah and its mitzvot in their totality.

See the notes to the following halachah with regard to whether these restrictions are of Scriptural or Rabbinic origin.

The Radbaz states that one partake of such foods for curative purposes if necessary.

The Bayit Chadash (Yoreh De'ah 116) states that this also applies to metal utensils. The Rambam mentions glass only because that was the ordinary practice at that time.

See the Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 116) who debates whether the prohibition mentioned in this and the previous halachah are of Rabbinic or Scriptural origin. It is possible to explain that the restrictions were instituted by the Rabbis and they employed the Biblical verse merely as an asmachta, an allusion and a hint, but not a source per se.

The wording of the Rambam here and his statements in Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 179) imply that the prohibition itself is Scriptural in origin. The only reason a person is not given lashes is because the simple meaning of the verse refers to the prohibition against teeming animals.

See Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Mahadura Basra 3:11 which mentions several points concerning this restriction:

a) Our Sages did not, however, require their ordinance to override considerations of public embarrassment. For example, [a person is allowed to wait] until he finds a private place to relieve himself or until he will not be causing an interruption in prayer.

b) The Rashba maintains that the prohibition "not [to] make your souls detestable" does not apply to deferring urination. c) Whenever one can contain himself, whether from urinating or from eliminating, for the length of time it takes to walk a parsah (a Persian measure equal to approximately four kilometers), all opinions agree that the prohibition "not [to] make yourselves loathsome" does not apply.

It would appear that the Rambam's intent is not only the subjects spoken about in the last halachot, but also the totality of the laws of kashrut.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 146) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 451) include this among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. As mentioned at the beginning of the Mishneh Torah, the Ra'avad differs and does not consider this a mitzvah.

The Rambam's wording echo his statements in Hilchot Berachot 11:2: "There are other mitzvot that are not obligations, but resemble voluntary activities, for example, the mitzvah of mezuzah.... A person is not obligated to dwell in a house that requires a mezuzah in order to fulfill this mitzvah." Similarly, in the instance at hand, a person is not obligated to slaughter. If, however, he desires to eat meat, he must fulfill this mitzvah.

Note the Kessef Mishneh who elaborates, explaining that although Rashi does not interpret the verse in the same manner the Rambam does, there is support for the Rambam's interpretation.

I.e., in both instances, ritual slaughter is required. The Kessef Mishneh notes that Chulin 27b derives this equivalence from another source and explains why the Rambam cites this verse instead.

See the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh who explains that there are some differences between the laws governing the slaughter of each of these types of animals.

For the blessings for all mitzvot must be recited before their observance (Pesachim 7b).

We do not, however, say "to slaughter," for, as above, the mitzvah to slaughter is not obligatory. It is dependent on the person's desire (Hilchot Berachot 11:15).

For after the fact, the recitation of the blessings is not essential (Kessef Mishneh).

Partaking of the meat at this time does not, however, represent a transgression of the prohibitions against eating a limb or flesh from a living animal (see Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot, ch. 5). For once the animal has been slaughtered, these prohibitions no longer apply.

This prohibition is considered as a prohibition of a general nature (Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2-3), i.e., prohibitions that include several diverse and unrelated acts, and lashes are not given for the violation of such prohibitions.

The Rambam's words provoke a question: Of course, this meat must be salted thoroughly as must all meat so that its blood will be removed (Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 6:10). Why would one think that this meat is different?

It would appear that the explanation is that other meat may be eaten if it is roasted or its blood sealed by being cast into vinegar (ibid.:12) and these options do not apply with regard to the meat in question.

One might think that man would have to gather them alive for them to be permitted. Hence the Rambam emphasizes that this is not so (Kessef Mishneh). The general principle is: Whenever the mitzvah of ritual slaughter does not apply, the prohibitions against eating flesh from a living animal and eating a dead animal do not apply.

The commentaries note that Shabbat 90b states that one who eats a live locust violates the prohibition: "Do not make your souls detestable." [See also Rama (Yoreh De'ah 13:1) who issues a similar warning with regard to partaking of live fish.) How then can the Rambam say that it is permitted?

Among the resolutions of this question are:

a) The passage in Shabbat refers only to a non-kosher locust, not a kosher one.

b) The Rambam, here, is saying that one may cut off part of a living locust and eat it, but not that one may eat an entire locust alive.

c) Here the Rambam is speaking with regard to the laws regarding ritual slaughter. He is not focusing on those involving other prohibitions.

In the following chapters, the Rambam proceeds to answer all of these questions.

I.e., in the Introduction that precedes Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah. There the Rambam explains that the Oral Law is called "the mitzvah," because it gives us instruction concerning the observance of the mitzvot. Without it, we would not know how to fulfill them.

As will be explained in Halachah 9, ritual slaughter involves cutting the gullet and the windpipe. In this halachah, the Rambam defines where the gullet may be cut.

In contrast to the surface of the gullet which is smooth.

I.e., the end of the throat, where it is attached to the jaw..

The animal is considered a nevelah and it is forbidden to partake of it. See Chapter 3, Halachah 18 (Kessef Mishneh, note Siftei Cohen 20:5).

This is the Rambam's interpretation of Chulin 44a. Rashi interprets that passage as referring to a space the size of four fingers. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 20:2) follows the Rambam's understanding, while the Rama cites that of Rashi.

The first of the fowl's stomachs. The crop is not considered part of the gullet and it is forbidden to slaughter there.

The windpipe is made up of a series of rings. Above the top ring, there is a slanted covering that is called the cap.

When the animal extends its neck, the flanks of its lungs rise upward.

See Chulin 45a which discusses these questions but leaves them unresolved.

I.e., the place of slaughter on the neck should be aligned with the place of slaughter on the windpipe and the gullet in their natural position. In this instance, the external place of slaughter - the position on the neck - was correct, but the signs were not cut in the usual place.

This applies only after the fact. At the outset, one must slaughter in the center of the neck.

Since the acceptability of the slaughter is dependent on them, they are referred to as the simanim, "signs," i.e., indications that the slaughter is acceptable.

But not the majority.

See the Turei Zahav 21:2 who emphasizes that the difference in size need not be significant. As long as more than half is cut, the slaughter is acceptable.

But no more than half.

This is speaking about a situation where the animal is alive. The fact that an animal's windpipe is slit slightly does not cause it to be considered as a trefe. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 21:5) adds that we must be careful that the gullet has not been punctured, for that would render the animal trefe. See the Turei Zahav 21:4 and the Siftei Cohen 21:5 who debate whether it is possible to rely on this leniency at present. See also Chapter 3, Halchot 6-7.

To make sure that the minimal measure for slaughter was slit.

Obviously, once the head is cut off, it is no longer possible to check.

Because of the doubt involved. See the following halachah.

This is the rationale for the stringency stated in the previous halachah (Kessef Mishneh).

The Kessef Mishneh notes that many marsh plants splinter easily and they are unacceptable for they will perforate the gullet.

Generally, it is accepted that a spike that can be detected by a fingernail disqualifies an animal. Nevertheless, the Rambam appears to be referring to an even smaller measure. His approach is followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 18:2) which speaks of a spike that is even the size of a hairsbreadth being sufficient to disqualify a knife.

Alternatively, it can be understood that the two are synanomous. This understanding is reflected by Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 1:14 which speaks about "a stone being blemished so that a fingernail would become caught in it like a knife used for ritual slaughter."

For the spike will perforate the gullet, rendering the animal trefe before the slaughter was completed (Maggid Mishneh).

The commentaries offer two explanations for this ruling. The Rambam's position is that when the spike is felt only on one side of the knife, one may slaughter with that side. Others add that the blemish must be positioned to the very far end of the knife, either near its point or near its handle. In such an instance, it is possible that the blemish never actually touched the signs and thus did not disqualify the ritual slaughter. See Shulchan Aruch [Yoreh De'ah and Rama (18:4)].

Who raises his head and tail, creating a curve for its body (Kessef Mishneh).

Since it does not have a blemish, it will not disqualify the signs.

Provided one does not interrupt the slaughter in the middle as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 2.

The Rama (Yoreh De'ah18:6) writes that since it is difficult to understand what exactly is meant by such a knife, we do not permit this leniency.

As apparent from Halachah 14.

For example, by passing the animal's neck back and forth below the knife [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 6:4)].

As indicated by the following halachah, an entity may not be used for ritual slaughter if it is connected to its source. When an entity is stuck into the ground, it is not connected to its source and hence, after the fact, the slaughter is acceptable. Nevertheless, because of the similarity to the forbidden situation, initially, one should not use such an entity for slaughter.

Chulin 16a states that it is a Scriptural decree that the cutting edge used for slaughter must be a separate entity, something that one could take in his hand.

I.e., a blade with a jagged edge which is unacceptable as stated above.

Since the jaw as a whole is moveable, we are not concerned with the fact that the tooth is in a fixed position (Kessef Mishneh).

We do not say that rather than cut the signs, the knife burnt them. The latter would disqualify the slaughter.

It must be noted that the Tur (see also the gloss of the Radbaz) quotes the Rambam as ruling that the slaughter is unacceptable for the above reason. This approach is also followed by many other Rishonim. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro states that the Rambam rules that the slaughter is acceptable. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 9:1), however, he quotes both views without stating which should be followed. All authorities agree that such a knife should not be used as an initial and preferred option.

Using the same motions as he would use to slaughter an animal.

The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam, maintaining that after ritual slaughter, no inspection is necessary unless the person desires to use the knife to slaughter another animal immeidately. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro justifies the Rambam's ruling and he cites it in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 18:3).

This ruling also depends on the principle stated in Halachah 13, that during its lifetime, an animal is forbidden. Hence it is not permitted unless we are certain that it was slaughtered in a proper manner (Radbaz; Siftei Cohen 18:2).

And this would cause the slaughter to be unacceptable as mentioned above.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that since the skin of a fowl is soft, it is not very probable that this caused the blemish on the knife. Nevertheless, our Sages adopted this stringency.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 18, for the ramifications of this ruling.

I.e., it is possible that the knife could have become blemished when cutting the skin of the first animal. Hence, that animal - and all the subsequent ones - were slaughtered with an unacceptable knife.

Since he checked the knife at the outset and it was acceptable, we rely on probability. As long as we have a way of explaining how the knife was blemished, we do not say it was blemished on the animal's skin, for the likelihood of that happening is very low.

Here also, since the knife was inspected initially, there is no reason to suspect that the slaughter was unacceptable, we do not disqualify it [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 18:12)] .

This is referring to a slaughterer who slaughters on behalf of people at large, not only for his own private purposes.

The Radbaz notes that the Rambam's words appear to differ slightly from the simple meaning of Chullin 18a, his source. From Chullin, it appears that the necessity to show the knife to the wise man is a mere token of respect, while from the Rambam it appears that it is a necessary safeguard to check that the slaughter is kosher.

The difference between these approaches can lead to a variance in practice. If we say that this inspection is merely for the sake of respect, then the sages may forgo the respect due them and allow an expert to slaughter even though he does not present his knife. If, however, it is a necessary precaution to insure that the slaughter is performed correctly, an inspection is always necessary.

Both of these perspectives have continued to be given emphasis throughout the Rabbinic literature, although the halachah as prescribed by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 18:17) is that a sage may forgo the honor due him. The present custom in many slaughtering houses today is for the slaughterers to work in pairs and for one to check the knife of the other. At times, a visiting Rabbinic authority comes and he inspects the knives of all of the slaughterers.

I.e., we assume that not only on this occasion, but on others, he slaughtered using an unacceptable knife, thus disqualifying the meat.

As will be explained, ritual slaughter is accomplished by drawing the knife back and forth across the neck. If a knife is two small to enable this, it should not be used [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 8:1)].

See the Ramah (Yoreh De'ah 24:2) who quotes opinions that require a knife used to slaughter a animal to be twice the length of the animal's neck. The custom is also to use a knife of such measure for a fowl.

Two candles are considered a torch [Rama (Yoreh De'ah 11:1)].

Otherwise, it is possible that the animal will be slaughtered incorrectly without him realizing.

Nevertheless, it is forbidden to do so as an initial and preferred option [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 11:1)].

I.e., he was not aware that the day was either the Sabbath or Yom Kippur; alternatively, he did not know that it was forbidden to slaughter on these holy days.

The Turei Zahav 11:2 states that one must, nevertheless, wait until the conclusion of the Sabbath or Yom Kippur before partaking of the meat, as is the law when one cooks on the Sabbath.

For slaughtering on the Sabbath.

If he does so intentionally, he is considered as an apostate who desecrates the Sabbath and his slaughter is disqualified (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Chullin 1:1; see Chapter 4, Halachah 14). The Siftei Cohen 11:3 states that in certain instances the leniency would also apply if he slaughters intentionally.

This is the term the Sifri to the above verse and other Rabbinic texts use to describe ordinary meat in contrast to animals offered as sacrifices.

Since the slaughter was acceptable, the animal is not considered as a nevelah. Hence it does not impart ritual impurity.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMekudashim 19:13-14.

Without intending to partake of the meat. I.e., using the meat for this or the following purposes is forbidden.

For the prohibition is only against slaughtering ordinary animals in the Temple courtyard, for this resembles the slaughter of the sacrifices (Kessef Mishneh). Since none of the above actions are considered as ritual slaughter, they do not cause the animal to become forbidden.

The Rashba (as quoted by the Kessef Mishneh) questions the Rambam's ruling, stating that the prohibition applies only to fruit that resemble the first fruits and bread that resembles the loaves of the Thanksgiving offering.

Since the prohibition is not explicitly mentioned in the Torah, he is not liable for lashes - as appropriate for the violation of an explicit Scriptural prohibition (Kessef Mishneh). Nevertheless, since the source for the prohibition is a Scriptural verse, it has the weight of a Scriptural commandment. Others, however, interpret the Rambam as implying that the prohibition is entirely Rabbinic. The verse cited previously is merely an asmachta.

The above applies to the prohibition against slaughetring in the Temple Courtyard. With regard to partaking of the meat, all authorities agree that the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin. See Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 16:6.

As stated in Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 5:13-14, when a pregnant animal is slaughtered, the fetus it is carrying is considered as one of its limbs. Even if it lives, it does not have to be slaughtered again; the slaughter of its mother causes it to be permitted.

In this instance, the mother may not be slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard. Since there is no other way for the fetus to be permitted, the slaughter of the mother inside the Temple courtyard does not cause it to be forbidden.

I.e., pour the blood directly into.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 2:9), the Rambam writes that we suspect that the person worships "the element of water," water in its pure elemental state and not the water before us.

In this context also, the Rambam (ibid.) explains that we fear he is worshipping the power that controls the image seen in the water.

Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 11:3) writes that we fear that onlookers will say that he is collecting blood to offer it to false deities.

Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 12:2) mentions this ruling, but also the ruling of the Rashba that, after the fact, the slaughter is permitted. The Rama rules that, in the present age, when pagan rites are uncommonly practiced, one may rely on the more lenient view.

As long as he is not slaughtering directly into the water, it does not appear that he is worshipping it.

And thus the knife was above its neck.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 19.

The Turand the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 6:4) rule that slaughtering an animal in such a manner is unacceptable even if the slaughterer states that he is certain the animal's throat was not pierced in this manner. The rationale is that an animal's head is heavy and its weight will most likely cause its throat to be pierced.

Chapter 3, Halachah 11. Even though the throat of the animal is cut, it is not considered ritual slaughter. Ritual slaughter involves bringing the knife back and forth across the neck or bringing the neck back and forth across the knife. Any other act that cuts its throat is not acceptable.

Since a fowl is light, the slaughterer can hold it securely and maneuver it back and forth over the knife without difficulty. See Chullin 16b.

Provided the slaughter of the animal is accomplished in that one action. If the slaughterer lifts the knife, that disqualifies the slaughter.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 24:2) requires that a knife be of this length even if one does not cut off the animal's head.

For it is not feasible that passing a knife the length of the animal's neck alone will be sufficient to slice off its head in one motion [Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.)]. Hence, we must assume that the animal's head was severed by pressing the knife against the neck. This disqualifies the slaughter as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 11.

He cut in a slant, cutting the windpipe at an angle and continuing to descend at that angle and cutting the gullet.

The Kessef Mishneh interprets this as meaning that the person cut in several places on the signs. Others interpret it as meaning a cut that slants back and forth (Turei Zahav 21:3).

In contrast to the slaughter of sacrificial animals (see Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 1:3).

Here, we are not speaking about refined spiritual intentions; the Rambam is stating that even if the person slaughters the animal without paying attention to what he is doing or even if he had no intent to slaughter it, the slaughter is acceptable.

Since the deed is significant and not the intent.

While he is intoxicated, he may reach the point where he is no longer able to control his conduct. See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 1:8).

The others must watch. Otherwise, there is no way that we can insure that the slaughter is acceptable. Indeed, if such a person slaughters in private, the slaughter is disqualified [Rama (Yoreh De'ah 1:5)].

This applies only after the fact [Radbaz; see Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 1:5)]. At the outset, only a person fully in control of his intellect and emotions should be entrusted with ritual slaughter.

On its own accord or because of the wind. If, however, a person pushed the knife, since it was set in motion by human action, the slaughter is acceptable (Chullin 31a).

For the animal was slaughtered by the power of the water and not by human power.

Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 7:1) rules that the slaughter is acceptable only after the fact. At the outset, one should not slaughter in this manner. The Siftei Cohen 7:1 states that this is the Rambam's opinion with regard to the first clause of the halachah as well.

It is forbidden to partake of the animal, because this resembles bringing a sacrifice to a false deity. Nevertheless, since one is bringing the offering for a particular purpose and not in actual worship of the false deity, it is not forbidden to benefit from the animal (Kessef Mishneh).

This is the translation of the Hebrew term mazal; i.e., the person is not worshipping the material entity but the spiritual source from which its existence emanates.

For this is considered as worshipping a false deity.

See Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 11:1; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:2.

He is not slaughtering the animal itself for the sake of the false deity - in which instance, there would be no question that it is forbidden - but, nevertheless, at the time of slaughter, he does intend to offer its blood or fats to the false deity.

In Chapter 15, Halachah 10, of those halachot, the Rambam writes that one who slaughters a sacrificial animal with the proper intent for the sake of sprinkling its blood or burning its fats for an improper intent, the slaughter is unacceptable.

The Turei Zahav 4:2 writes that according to the Rambam, because of the doubt, it is forbidden to benefit from the animal. Others (see also Siftei Cohen 4:2) rule that it is forbidden to partake of the animal's meat, but one may benefit from it.

As indicated in the following halachah, there are certain sacrifices that a person may offer on his own initiative. Since he has not actually consecrated the animal, the prohibition against sacrificing consecrated animals outside the Temple does not apply according to Scriptural Law. Nevertheless, because of the impression created, our Sages forbade the slaughter of an animal for that intent (Maggid Mishneh). The Tur (Yoreh De'ah 5), however, states that we fear that he might have consecrated it, implying that there is a question of a Scriptural prohibition involved.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 5:1) rules that this law applies even when the slaughtered animal has a blemish which would disqualify it as a sacrifice, for there are times when a person will conceal the blemish.

From the fact that the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah, sec. 7) quotes this and the following halachot, we see that these laws also apply in the present age although the Temple is destroyed. See the conclusion of the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh to Halachah 20 which mentions a difference of opinion concerning this matter.

As indicated in the following halachah, there are other sacrifices for which a person may consecrate an animal only when he is required to bring that offering. He may not pledge such a sacrifice on his own initiative.

Since he cannot consecrate animals for such offerings, we do not worry about the impression that may be created. On the contrary, an onlooker will consider the person's statements facetious (Siftei Cohen 5:4)

For these are sacrifices that a person can consecrate on his own initiative. Hence slaughtering an animal for this purpose is forbidden as stated in the previous halachah.

Seemingly, the Paschal offering does not resemble the others for it is an obligation incumbent on a person and can be brought only on the fourteenth of Nisan (Chullin 41b). Nevertheless, it is placed in this category for the reason explained by the Rambam.

The instance of a doubtful guilt offering is debated in Chullin, loc. cit., without the Talmud reaching a definite conclusion concerning the matter. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah, loc. cit.) quotes the Rambam's view. The Tur and the Rama, however, follow the view that a person can consecrate a doubtful guilt offering on his own initiative and hence, forbid ritual slaughter for this intent.

For a firstborn animal is consecrated by birth; a person cannot consecrate it through his statements.

For the tithe offerings are consecrated through the tithing rite; a person cannot consecrate it through his statements.

For unless a person has a consecrated animal at home, there is no reason that an onlooker might think that the substitution is of consequence (Chullin, loc. cit.).

For these are sacrifices that a person cannot consecrate unless he is required to.

Rashi (Chullin, loc. cit.) explains that when a person is liable to bring a sin offering, he makes the matter known so that he will be embarrassed and thus further his atonement. Therefore the onlookers will know of his obligation and will not regard his statements as facetious.

From the Rambam's words, it would appear that this is not merely a Rabbinical safeguard, but that his statements bring about a substitution (temurah) of the animal and he is liable for slaughtering it outside the Temple courtyard.

As stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 4, a woman may slaughter animals. And since she may slaughter ordinary animals, her slaughter of sacrificial animals would be acceptable. Note, however, the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chullin 2:10) which speaks about a man slaughtering an animal on behalf of a woman.

Since this offering cannot be brought on a person's own initiative, her statements are considered facetious.

A woman who miscarries is also obligated to bring such a burnt offering.

The word here matches the Rambam's statements in the revised text of his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.) as published by Rav Kappach. The Rambam's original text - and the version of his Commentary to the Mishnah commonly circulated - present an entirely different conception of this halachah.

Hence we suspect that perhaps he took a Nazarite vow in private and the matter has not become known (Kessef Mishneh, Lechem Mishneh).

Since his activity in slaughtering the animal was significant, his intent is also of consequence.

I.e., without waiting; thus the slaughter is not disqualified.

He makes such statements to make it appear that the slaughter is unacceptable so that his colleague will suffer anguish. Nevertheless, his statements have no effect. The Rambam's view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 5:3). The Tur and the Rama states that there are opinions which forbid the slaughter regardless of whether the other person has a share in the animal or not because of the impression that is created.

I.e., even if the gentile considers it as a sacrifice to a false deity.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 14:1.

Who is to young to be involved in the worship of false deities.

As stated in Chapter 4, Halachot 11-12, the gentile's slaughter is not considered halachicly significant and it is as if the animal died without being slaughtered.