Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

I.e., other than a priest or Levite (see Halachah 8).

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 143) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 506) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. Chulin 134b states that the priests merited these gifts in recognition of the heroism of Pinchas in stopping the Jews' lewd behavior with the Midianite women.

This is a matter of debate among the commentaries. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:21) quote the Rambam's view, but also mention the opinion of Rashi and Rabbenu Meir of Rutenberg who maintain that this mitzvah is not practiced in the Diaspora. They conclude that this latter view is observed. The Sefer HaChinuch, loc. cit., writes that in the abstract, he agrees that the law should be observed in the present era as well, but "we do not have the power to compel the butchers to observe it." See also the Responsa of the Chatam Sofer, sec. 301, where he writes that he would observe this mitzvah.

These blemishes are listed in Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash, ch. 7, Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach, ch. 2.

Since they are permanently blemished at the time of their consecration, it is obvious that they will ultimately be redeemed and used for ordinary purposes, not as a sacrifice. Hence it is never considered that their actual bodies became consecrated. Once they are redeemed, they are like any ordinary property. Hence the obligation to separate the presents falls upon them (Radbaz).

Such blemishes are listed in Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach 2:7.

Even permanently.

In such a situation, the consecration of the animal encompasses its actual body. The rationale is that in the first instance mentioned in this clause, the blemish is not permanent. Hence, it does not block the consecration. And in the second instance, the blemish comes after the consecration already took effect. And since the consecration affected the actual bodies of the animals, it continues to have an effect even after the animals have been redeemed. They are considered as pesulei hamukdashim and are exempt from this obligation (Radbaz, based on Bechorot 15a).

A sheep that had not given birth before gave birth to two offspring, a male - which would be separated as a firstborn - and a female which would not - and it is not known which of them was born first. See Hilchot Bechorot 5:1. Alternatively, a firstborn animal became mixed together with other animals [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:20).

A priest to whom a firstborn animal is given is not obligated to separate the presents and give them to another priest. In the instance described above, the Israelite who is the owner of the animal may retain possession of it, for we follow the principle: "When one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him." Thus since a priest cannot prove that the animal was a firstborn, it remains the property of the owner. Nevertheless, he must give the presents to a priest based on the rationale presented by the Rambam.

E.g., a sheep that had not given birth before gave birth to two males. Thus one of them is certainly the firstborn and must be given to a priest. The question is which one. Hence the weaker one is given to the priest and the other one remains the property of its owner, but may not be slaughtered until it receives a disqualifying blemish (Hilchot Bechorot, loc. cit.).

I.e., in exchange for giving the priest the weaker animal, the priest forfeits his claim on the other animal. Hence, although there is a possibility that it is an ordinary animal and the presents must be given to the priest, to obtain those presents, the priest is required to prove that claim and he cannot. Hence, the owner may retain possession.

Which the owner must offer as a sacrifice (Hilchot Bechorot 6:4). Were this to be the case, he would not be required to give the presents to a priest.

In this instance, the priest desires to expropriate the presents.

I.e., we cannot obligate him to give the presents to a priest, because unlike the firstborn, the priest has no claim to the animal as a whole.

It is exempt from the obligation to separate the presents as stated in Halachah 2.

Our translation is based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed text differs slightly.

In this instance, the priest desires to expropriate the presents.

Because he knows that only one animal was consecrated and then disqualified.

If, however, he slaughters a kosher wild animal (e.g., a deer) or a kosher fowl, he is not required to give the presents to the priest.

More particularly, the Hebrew term seh can refer either to a sheep or a goat.

For even though it is a hybrid, it is definitely a domesticated animal and hence, there is an obligation for presents to be given.

Not only half.

Generally - and indeed, this interpretation is indicated by the standard published text of Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 1:13 - a ko'i is defined as: "a mixed species that comes from the mating of a kosher domesticated animal and a kosher wild beast." Accordingly, the Tur (Yoreh De'ah 61) questions the Rambam's ruling for it appears to contradict his own statements in the continuation of this halachah. Rav Yosef Caro (in his Kessef Mishneh to the Mishneh Torah and his Beit Yosef to the Tur) explains that the Rambam understands the term ko'i as referring to an independent species that we do not know whether to classify as a domesticated animal or as a wild beast. He maintains that the proper version of Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot is "any animal whose classification as a domesticated animal or as a beast is doubtful is a ko'i" and he maintains that Hilchot Shechitah 14:4 serves as proof of this interpretation.

Chulin 132a explains that since it is only part sheep, only part of the presents are granted. We do not take the species of the father of the animal into consideration.

For, as in the previous law, we do not take the species of the father of the animal into consideration. Although this matter is not determined definitively, since "when one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him," the priest cannot claim the presents definitively either (Siftei Cohen 61:10).

Presents need not be separated when an animal is killed without ritual slaughter - or when the ritual slaughter is performed improperly and the animal is forbidden to be eaten (Tosefta, Chulin 9:1). Nevertheless, if the slaughter is performed properly, the presents must be given to a priest, regardless of the reason for which the animal was slaughtered. This is derived from a comparison to the covering of the blood after the slaughter of an animal (Ra'avad).

The use of the plural term implies that the law applies even if there are many for whom the animal is being slaughtered (see Chulin 136a).

For even though that produce must be destroyed at the appropriate time, while it is in a person's possession, it is his personal property. See Bechorot 12b.

As above, when one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him. And it is impossible for a priest to prove that the Levite is obligated.

From Chulin 131a, it is obvious that a Levite does not have the right to receive presents (Siftei Cohen 61:12).

For now they are in the possession of the priest. He may therefore retain them, for the Levite cannot prove that he is exempt.

The Rambam's view is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:23). The Rama maintains that since the law is that a priest is not entitled to take it, if he takes it by force, he is required to return it. This difference of opinion reflects a divergence on an issue of a greater scope. See Hilchot Bechorot 5:3, where the Rambam rules that when there is a question concerning whether an animal is a firstborn or not, a priest is not permitted to take possession of it. If he takes possession of it, however, it is not expropriated from him. In that instance as well, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 315:1) follows the Rambam's approach and the Rama differs.

That the priests are exempt from giving presents.

During which he is allowed to keep the presents for himself.

Since he sells the meat, he is acting on behalf of others and they are not absolved from the obligation of giving the presents. See the gloss of Rav Yosef Korcus who debates whether this is a Scriptural Law or a Rabbinic decree.

See Hilchot Talmud Torah, ch. 6.

We are speaking about a situation where the animal belongs entirely to the priest or the gentile. It is the ownership of the animal, not the identity of the slaughterer which is significant. Since neither the priest nor the gentile would be required to give these presents, a slaughterer who acts on their behalf is also exempt.

Hence, if he does not give a priest the presents, people will suspect him of withholding them.

And thus it is evident that they are partners.

The Tur (Yoreh De'ah 61) differs with the Rambam, explaining Chulin 133a,b (the Rambam's source) differently. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro elaborates in support of the Rambam's interpretation (even though at the outset, he states that the interpretation of the Tur appears more appropriate to the simple meaning of the passage. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:25), he follows the Tur's interpretation.

And we nevertheless assume that the presents were in the gentile's portion.

Rashi (in his commentary to Chulin 132a, the source for the Rambam's ruling) and similarly, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:29) interpret this as referring to a sale and not a partnership agreement.

Even if they were not marked [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 10:3)].

The Radbaz explains that the rationale is that his stipulation runs contrary to the Torah - for the Torah requires that the presents be given - and whenever a person makes a stipulation that runs contrary to Torah law, the stipulation is nullified. Hence, it is as if the stipulation was never made and the priest's partner must separate the presents as stated in the previous halachah.

The commentaries note an apparent contradiction between the Rambam's ruling here and his ruling in Hilchot Ma'aser 6:19 where he states:

When a priest sells a field to an Israelite and tells him: "[I am selling it] on the condition that the tithes from it belong to me forever," they belong to him. [The rationale is that] saying "on the condition that" is tantamount to setting aside for himself [the portion of the field] where the tithes [grow].

Although there are explicit Talmudic sources for both rulings, their logic appears contradictory. Among the resolutions offered is that here, the Rambam is speaking about the ownership of an animal, while in Hilchot Ma'aser, he is speaking about landed property and the principles of ownership are different in these two instances.

The new concept taught by this halachah is that one can be exempt from part, but not all, of the presents.

Because at that time, he was not obligated, as stated in Halachah 10.

Hence, the convert may retain possession of the presents. As mentioned in the notes to Chapter 8, Halachah 9, when a similar situation arises concerning challah, the Rambam rules that the convert is liable to separate the dough. Nevertheless, a distinction between the two can be made because of the severity of that prohibition.

In which instance, it is forbidden to partake of the produce until the terumah and the tithes are separated.

In contrast to the produce where the terumah and tithes must be separated from the produce as a whole.

I.e., he has no legal obligation to make financial restitution. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro questions whether the person has a moral and spiritual obligation to make restitution and in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:15), he rules that he does.

There is no one priest who can claim that the presents are his and they must be returned to him, for until they are given, the owner has the right to give them to any priest he desires.

I.e., the maw.

For they belong to him.

Since it was obvious that the maw was among the organs he purchased, the purchaser should have realized that it was not included in the price. Instead, he was paying him for the remainder of the meat (Kessef Mishneh).

Since the maw did not belong to the butcher - for it must be given to the priest - he had no right to sell it (ibid.). See also the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 10:4) which states that it is forbidden to buy the presents, because by doing so, one would be aiding theft.

I.e., some of the organs that have to be given the priest.

For we do not suspect that a person sinned. Instead, the recipient assumes that the sender purchased the presents from a priest; alternatively, there were no priests in the area and he followed the advice given in the following clause.

And thus there is no one to give the presents to.

For if he sets them aside, they will spoil. There is no difficulty in doing so, for the presents are not consecrated at all.

See the notes of Rav Kapach to the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 10:4). There he writes that the original version of the Rambam's Commentary did not contain this law, but the later version did.

For even a portion of the organs of an ox are of a significant size.

The Turei Zahav 61:1 states that this is derived from the fact that the prooftext speaks of "the foreleg," i.e., the important one. An animal's foreleg is comprised of three bones. According to the Rambam, the lower two are given to the priest. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 10:4).

Chulin 134b states that one should take the jaw until the place where the animal is slaughtered. See the accompanying diagrams.

This fat is forbidden to be eaten (Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 7:6).

Chulin 134b explains that this is an act of generosity on the part of the priests. Since the presents are their personal property without any sanctity at all, they can do with them as they see fit. From the wording of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:4), however, it appears that this custom is not universally accepted.

In Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 19:1 it describes a challalah as a woman born from relations forbidden to the priesthood or a woman who is forbidden to the priesthood who engaged in relations with a priest.

The term challal refers to the offspring of relations forbidden to a priest.

Hence, just as the presents may not be given to a challal, they may not be given to a challalah.

The concept that challalim are not priests applies in many contexts. See Hilchot Nesiat Kapayim 15:5, Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 19:5, Hilchot Terumah 6:7, et al.

The Siftei Cohen 61:5 states that a priest should not give or sell them to gentiles or feed them to dogs unless they are no longer fit for human consumption.

The Rambam's source (Chulin 133a) mentions that the recipient of these presents must be a Torah scholar. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 61:14) also mention that point. Apparently, the Rambam thinks that it is not an absolute necessity.

Once they are given to him, however, there are no restrictions on what he may do with them.

Turei Zahav 61:12 states that this is derived from the word "and you shall give" in the prooftext. Implied is that the presents should be given. They should not be taken by the priests on their own initiative.

See parallels in Hilchot Terumah 12:18.

If, however, a priest prefers to eat them in another manner, he may. It is not an obligation to partake of them in the manner described (Tosafot, Chulin 132b).

This verse does not speak about the presents of meat explicitly, but rather the portions of the sacrifices given to the priests. Nevertheless, the concepts can be derived one from the other. See Rashi, Chulin, loc. cit..

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 144) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 508) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

I.e., as opposed to the presents described in the previous chapter, the Levites are required to separate these shearings.

But not in the Diaspora. Thus it resembles terumah - for both are called "first" and hence share similarilities in many laws - and not the presents of meat. Although the Mishnah (Chulin 11:1) states that this mitzvah also applies in the Diaspora, according to the Rambam, the halachah does not follow that view.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 333:1) follows the Rambam's view. The Tur and the Rama state that theoretically, this mitzvah should also be observed in the Diaspora, but in practice, that view is not followed.

I.e., terumah. See Hilchot Terumah 1:1.

I.e., needless to say this law would apply if the animal was consecrated for the sake of sacrifice on the Altar, for in that instance, the animal is forbidden to be shorn and it is forbidden to work with it. Moreover, even if the animal is consecrated only for the sake of the Temple treasury, in which instance, it will ultimately be redeemed for personal use, since while it is consecrated, it is not "your sheep,' as the Rambam continues to explain, there is no obligation to give its first shearings.

I.e., even if the animal was consecrated only for the sake of the Temple treasury, as above, these laws apply. The rationale is that a blemished kosher animal that is consecrated to the Temple treasury is redeemed with the intent to be used as a sacrifice.

Since it was blemished at the time it was consecrated, the animal was never fit to be offered on the altar. Hence, the consecration never affected the actual physical substance of the animal. Accordingly, once it is redeemed, it is considered as an ordinary animal and its first shearings must be given to a priest

Since the temporary blemish will be healed, it is considered as if did not exist.

Since when consecrated, the animal was fit for sacrifice, the consecration affected its physical substance. Hence, even after it was redeemed, it is not considered as an ordinary animal and it is exempt from the first shearings. See the parallel in Chapter 9, Halachah 2.

Rav Yosef Corcus explains that the Rambam (based on one of the opinions in Chulin 137a) is referring to the priestly garments which are made from wool and linen. For, otherwise, goats' wool is also fit to make ordinary garments. This explanation is also quoted by Siftei Cohen 333:2. The intent is not, however, that the first shearings should be used only for priestly garments, for as the Rambam states in the following halachah, the first shearings were given to the priests for their personal garments.

According to the Rambam, the terumot also include oil and other fruits.

Described in Chapter 9.

I.e., the portions of the sin offerings, guilt offerings, and peace offerings which are granted to the priests.

See Hilchot Gezeilah, Chapter 8.

See Hilchot Arachin VaCharamim, Chapter 6.

Which becomes the property of the priests; see Hilchot Arachin VaCharamim4:19.

See Chapters 11 and 12.

See Hilchot Shemitah VeYovel, Chapter 13, with regard to both these points.

He is considered to have acquired the wool because he made a significant change in its nature. This ruling applies after the fact. As an initial preference, it is forbidden to make such a change [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 11:3; Rav Kappach's edition)].

For this is not considered as a significant change.

The Radbaz explains that this law depends on the concept stated in Halachah 4: If the wool of a hybrid (the offspring of a sheep or a goat) is soft, the first shearings must be separated. If not, it is exempt.

As mentioned in the notes to Chapter 9, Halachah 5, the Rambam understands the term ko'i as referring to an animal which our Sages were unable to classify as a domesticated animal or a wild beast.

For the animal is alive at present and the removal of its wool is considered as shearing.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that this is derived from the very definition of the mitzvah, 'the shearing of the sheep.' A dead sheep is not considered a sheep and cutting its wool is not considered as shearing.

The Radbaz questions why the first shearings are different than all the other presents given to the priests where such a law is not found. He explains that the other presents involve grain and meat and a granary or a slaughter house are not located at a great distance from the residential area of a city. Hence, it is not very difficult for a priest to go and collect them. Sheep, by contrast, may not be allowed to pasture near residential areas. Hence, since it is far more difficult for a priest to collect them, the Torah made the owners responsible for the shearings.

Chulin 136b notes that in this respect, although they are also called "the first," the first shearings are different from terumah and challah. With regard to these separations, if one designates his entire crop as terumah or his entire dough as challah, his statements are of no consequence. The Radbaz explains that the term terumah - and challah is also called terumah - implies elevating one portion of a group from another portion. Hence, there must always be something left behind. The term 'the first shearings' does not have such a connotation.

Rav Yosef Corcus notes that Chulin 136b associates this ruling with the Rabbi Ila'ai's opinion that the first shearing applies in the Diaspora as well as in Eretz Yisrael. Thus there is an apparent contradiction between the Rambam's ruling here and his ruling in Halachah 1 that the mitzvah of the first shearing applies only in Eretz Yisrael. Rav Yosef explains that the Rambam's ruling in Halachah 1 is based on custom and not on the acceptance of the opinions that differ with Rabbi Ila'ai.

This point is obvious. The Rambam (and his source, Chulin 138a) mention it only because of the contrast to the following laws. Rashi, however, interprets that passage differently. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 333:7) follows the Rambam's understanding, while the Tur and the Rama follow Rashi's view.

I.e., he never becomes the real owner of the sheep; he acquires them only for the right to shear their wool.

And that portion contains the minimum measure mentioned in Halachah 13.

Since the seller has not begun shearing the sheep at all, it would seem reasonable to say that each person should give the first shearings from his portion. Nevertheless, the ruling is not so.

And thus they remain in his portion. Selling these presents is prohibited and we assume that the person would not desire to transgress.

Chulin 138a explains that the seller tells the purchaser: 'I did not sell you the first shearings. The money I took from you is for the remainder of the wool that is not the priest's portion. I merely gave you the opportunity to give the presents to the priest of your choice."

Even though one may separate the first shearings from one type of wool for another type as evident from Halachah 15, in this instance, since the two types are owned by two separate people, each should separate the first shearings from his own wool.

I.e., the priest desires to expropriate the first shearings from the owner. See the parallel in Chapter 9, Halachah 13. The Radbaz explains that this ruling follows the principle: When there is a doubt concerning a prohibition, we rule stringently. When there is a doubt concerning financial matters, we rule leniently.

Chulin 11:1 derives this from a non-literal interpretation of II Samuel 25:18.

A sela is approximately 20 grams in contemporary measure.

Chulin 11:2 states that this measure is required, for only then will the gift to the priest be significant, for it will be possible to make a small garment from it.

I.e., the Rambam follows the opinion (Chulin 135a) that the partnership is not recognized as a single entity. Hence, it is necessary for the share of each of the partners to comprise at least the minimum amount. The Kessef Mishneh notes the parallel to Chapter 6, Halachah 20.

The Radbaz states that this is implied by the very term 'the first of.'

Because at the time he sheared the first sheep, he possessed a flock of the minimum size. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 333: 12) states that this applies even if he sold some of his sheep after shearing them.

One should not, however, separate the shearings of inferior sheep for those of superior sheep [Rama (Yoreh De'ah 333:12)].

Because at the time he sheared the first sheep, he did not have a flock of the minimum size.

Five selaim is 100 grams in contemporary measure. This measure of wool was sufficient to fashion a sash (avneit) for a priest (Chulin 138a).

See Chapter 9, Halachah 20.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 80) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 392) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. This obligation was established in commemoration of the slaying of the Egyptian firstborn before the Exodus.

I.e., the obligation is incumbent on the baby's father, not his mother, as stated in the following halachah.

The P'nei Meivin, Yoreh De'ah, Responsum 226, infers from the wording "a woman is not obligated," that she may do so if she desires. Eidut LiYisrael states that this is the common custom if the child does not have a father.

The Rambam's wording implies that the obligation is incumbent on the son. Nevertheless, as a newborn, the son cannot fulfill it and so, the obligation becomes his father's. See the Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 392), the Siftei Cohen 305:11, Likkutei Sichot, Vol. XI, p. 44ff., and others who debate whether the mitzvah is primarily the father's or the son's. This difference is not merely theoretical. Among the practical question that result is: If the father did not redeem the son until the son was thirteen, who has the fundamental responsibility to observe the mitzvah, the father or the son?

13, at which age he is obligated to observe the mitzvot. See Minchat Chinuch, loc. cit., who discusses a situation where the son redeemed himself beforehand.

The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 305:15) states that a silver plaque should be placed around the child's neck as a reminder that he has not been redeemed. See also Halachah 11. The Sifei Cohen 305:20 states that this is not practical. In many instances, the silver plaque will become lost before the child comes of age and he will not be aware of the responsibility incumbent upon him. Instead, it is preferable that the redemption be performed by the Jewish court. Eidut LiYisrael also mentions that if the child's grandfather is alive, there are opinions that he should perform the redemption.

For the mitzvah incumbent on his own person takes precedence (Kiddushin 29a,b).

I.e., make a pilgrimage to the Temple to behold the Divine presence.

Even though he could possibly redeem his son afterwards, and he will not be able to make this pilgrimage again, the redemption of his son takes precedence.

This follows the Rambam's rulings in Hilchot Berachot 11:11 where he writes that a person who performs a mitzvah involving his own person should praise God who "commanded us to...." If the mitzvah involves others, by contrast, the blessing should conclude "commanded us concerning...." The commentaries, however, note that in ibid.:12 and in Hilchot Milah 3:1, the Rambam writes that one who circumcises his own son should recite the blessing concluding "to circumcise...," for the mitzvah is incumbent on his own person. Seemingly, this should also apply with regard to the redemption of a son.

It is possible to resolve the question as follows: The mitzvah of redeeming the son is primarily the child's. Hence, the father uses the form "concerning...." The mitzvah of circumcision, by contrast, is primarily the father's. Hence he uses the form "to...."

This blessing is recited as an expression of thanks whenever one performs a mitzvah infrequently (Hilchot Berachot 12:9). Even though one recited this blessing at the child's circumcision, it should be recited again at his redemption, for the two are separate mitzvot to be performed at separate times (Radbaz). Similarly, as an expression of thanks, it is customary to mark the redemption with a celebratory feast. This feast is considered a seudat mitzvah, a feast associated with a mitzvah.

For the blessing should precede the observance of the mitzvah.

For he is certainly performing a mitzvah involving himself. The Rambam's ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 305:10). The Tur and the Rama rule that even in such a situation, the conclusion of the blessing should be "...concerning the redemption of the firstborn."

I.e., its observance is not limited to Eretz Yisrael, nor to the time when the Temple is standing.

Shiurei Torah defines this as 101 or 96 grams of pure silver.

We have translated kessef as "silver" and not "money" to allude to the concepts stated below.

This includes not only promissory notes given by a particular individual, but also the fiat currencies of the present day, for such currency does not have any inherent value. In practice, silver coins are almost always used for the redemption of the firstborn.

And he must be redeemed again.

As stated in Hilchot Mechirah 11:15, when a person undertakes a financial obligation, even though according to law he was not liable, he is bound by his commitment.

This applies even if he actually pays him the five selaim, for that money is being paid to satisfy the obligation he voluntarily undertook and not to discharge the obligation the Torah placed upon him (Bechorot 49b).

The Turei Zahav 305:2 and the Siftei Cohen 305:3 explain that according to Scriptural Law, the commitment is effective in redeeming the son. Nevertheless, our Sages ruled that it is unacceptable lest a person attempt to redeem his son with promissory notes from other people.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro debates this ruling at length and in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 305:5), he rules that the utensil must be worth five selaim to a person in a given situation. If, however, there is no way that it would be considered as worth five selaim, the son is not redeemed. The Turei Zahav 305:5 and the Siftei Cohen 305:5, however, maintain that the Rambam's words should be understood simply.

Giving each a half-sela.

The Pitchei Teshuvah 305:10 states that it is not desirable to redeem one's son in this manner. As an initial preference, one should give all five selaim to one priest, at one time.

Since the father expected the present to be returned, it is as if he never really intended to give it to the priest (Bechorot, loc. cit., Radbaz). This applies only when the priest actually returns what he was given, for if he does not return it, we assume that after the fact, the father consents that the priest retain possession and as a result, the son is redeemed.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 305:8) states that the priest should not frequently return what is given to him for the redemption. It should only be done occasionally, when the father is poor.

A present given with the intent that it be returned is considered as a valid present (Kiddushin 6b). Thus the father's gift was within the limits of law. Hence, it is acceptable. In the first instance, by contrast, since the present was not given wholeheartedly, it is as if it was never given. Nevertheless, receiving the redemption as a present with the stipulation that it be returned is frowned upon by our Rabbis. The Shulchan Aruch describes a priest who does so as having "transgressed."

See Numbers 3:45 which commands "Take the Levites in place of all the firstborn of the children of Israel."

I.e., the father is an Israelite and thus the son is an Israelite.

The commentaries have noted that there is no exact verse in the Torah that corresponds to the Rambam's wording. Similar phrases are found in Exodus 13:2 and Numbers 3:12.

The identity of the father does not change the status of the mother or the child and it is just as if the child was from a Jewish father. See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 15:3.

I.e., he is obligated to redeem himself when he comes of age, for as stated in Halachah 2, there is no obligation for a woman to redeem her son. There are authorities who maintain that, in the present age, the Jewish court should redeem such children, for it is possible that when the child comes of age, he will not be aware of the mitzvah and will fail to observe it.

Such relations - even if she is raped - caused her to be deemed a zonah and she is disqualified from the priestly family. Her children do not bear its holiness, nor does she have any of the rights granted to its members (Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 18:1).

The children born from relations between a priest and a woman forbidden because of the unique prohibitions incumbent upon the priests, as explained in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 19:3-6.

I.e., if the son is the first issue of his mother's womb.

I.e., were the father to have lived until the son was 30 days old, there would have been an obligation to redeem the child. Nevertheless, since the father was a priest - and the fact that he entered into a forbidden relationship does not disqualify him from the priesthood - it is considered as if he paid himself and the child was redeemed (Turei Zahav 305:17).

Because he died after the obligation took effect, as indicated by Halachah 17.

For the first time, as obvious from the following halachah.

I.e., as a Jew.

I.e., the father is an Israelite and thus the son is an Israelite.

Implied is that we do not rely on her word alone.

The priest is considered as if he desires to expropriate property - the five selaim of the redemption - from the child. Since the priest cannot prove that the child was born as an Israelite, the child is not obligated. See parallels in Chapter 9, Halachah 13, and Chapter 10, Halachah 12.

As the Radbaz mentions, this child may be considered as the father's firstborn and receive a double share of his inheritance. Nevertheless, in this context, he is not considered as a firstborn.

Even though it is her first Jewish child.

A stillborn, aborted, or miscarried fetus.

See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 10:1 which states: "Every woman who gives birth is impure like a niddah, even if she did not suffer uterine bleeding. [This applies whether] a woman gives birth to a living child or one which is stillborn, and even if she miscarries [and discharges a fetus]." The remainder of that chapter mentions different questionable circumstances involving such miscarriages.

In the instances mentioned, the embryo that was miscarried is not given the halachic status of a fetus and none of the laws applying to childbirth apply.

See ibid. 5:15.

ibid. 10:2.

Even though it was removed from the womb piece by piece, the mother is considered impure as if she gave birth (Ibid.:6) and the subsequent child is not considered as a firstborn.

From the Rambam's wording, the commentaries have inferred that if the baby emerges dead, a boy born next is considered as the mother's firstborn. The rationale is that a baby born in the eighth month is considered as if it would never be a viable birth. This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 305:23).

For the emergence of the forehead is considered as birth in several halachic contexts (e.g., Hilchot Nachalot 2:2).

And the Torah obligated only the first issue of a woman's womb.

These concepts also apply with regard to the definition of a firstborn with regard to the inheritance (ibid.:11).

I.e., as soon as the thirty-first day begins. These days are counted from sunset to sunset and not from hour to hour. It is customary to redeem the son on his thirty-first day of life, because one should not delay the observance of a mitzvah. If, however, the thirty-first day is the Sabbath or a festival, the redemption is performed at the earliest possible opportunity afterwards.

Treifah, the Hebrew term used by the Rambam, is interpreted as referring to an ailment that will cause the person to die within a year.

For the obligation to redeem the child never took effect.

For that gift is not effective in redeeming the child, as stated in the following halachah.

When quoting this law, the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 305:12) states that the father must also recite the blessing for the redemption. He does not, however, recite the blessing Shehecheyanu.

Because the obligation to redeem him has not taken effect. This ruling applies even if the coins remain in the priest's possession until after the thirtieth day. For the redemption to take effect, the priest must return the money to the father and then he must give it to him again. See Siftei Cohen 305:18.

There is a difference of opinion concerning this issue in the Talmud (Bechorot 49a,b). The Rambam's ruling follows the position of Shmuel, even though Rav differs and rules that the son is not redeemed. Although ordinarily, in such differences of opinion, the halachah follows Rav with regard to questions involving Torah prohibitions, in this instance, the Talmud explicitly states that the halachah follows Shmuel. There is, however, a question regarding the proper version of the Talmudic text and the Rambam's ruling does not follow the standard published version (Radbaz). The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 305:13) quotes the Rambam's ruling, while the Rama rules that if the money no longer exists, the redemption is not effective.

As explained above, the priest is considered as if he desires to expropriate property - the five selaim of the redemption - from the father. The rationale is based on the fact that the money is presently in possession of the father. There are commentaries who maintain that if the priest would seize the five selaim, he would be entitled to retain possession of them, because the father would now have to prove that he is not obligated and that is likewise impossible. They support this conclusion with the Rambam's ruling in Hilchot Bechorot 5:3 that if there is an animal whose status is unclear and there is a doubt whether it is a firstborn, should a priest seize possession of it, we do not expropriate it from his property. Others, however, differentiate between the two instances, explaining that in Hilchot Bechorot, the priest has seized a specific entity concerning which an unresolved doubt exists. In this halachah, by contrast, although there is a question whether the father is under obligation to the priest, the money that the priest seizes definitely belongs to the father. Hence, it must be returned (Machaneh Ephrayim, Hilchot Zechiyah, sec. 8; see also Radbaz to Halachah 21).

In the manner described at the conclusion of the previous halachah. This is an uncommon occurrence. Hence, unless there is specific knowledge that the father redeemed him in this manner, we assume he did not.

For we assume that the person fulfilled the mitzvah incumbent upon him at the earliest possible opportunity.

I.e., he made such statements on his deathbed [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 305:14)].

Thus there is a question whether the son must be redeemed or not, for if the female emerged first, the son need not be redeemed.

Since there is a doubt concerning the obligation, the burden of proof is on the priest, as stated in Halachah 19. Not only does this apply with regard to the father, the son is under no obligation to redeem himself when he comes of age. This is the underlying principle governing many of the situations described in the following halachot.

For one of his sons is certainly a firstborn and hence, he is required to redeem him. Although the father does not know which of his sons he is redeeming, he is obligated to perform the redemption (Radbaz).

For the father can claim that the son who died was the firstborn and since he died within 30 days of his birth, there is no obligation to redeem him, as stated in Halachah 17.

In which case, each of the sons could argue that perhaps the other was in fact the firstborn and hence, he is not required to give toward the redemption. This ruling represents a reversal of the Rambam's opinion from his ruling in his final version of his Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 8:3). [Apparently, the issue was one that the Rambam debated back and forth, because his earlier version of that text does not mention an exemption.] The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 305:265) quotes the Rambam's ruling here. The Tur and the Siftei Cohen 305:30 rule that the sons are exempt if the father died before the passage of the 30 days. The rationale they give is that each of the sons can claim that the obligation is on the other.

For their redemption in the manner stated in Halachah 18.

For there is no obligation to redeem a son who died before he reaches the age of 30 days.

Giving each five selaim for one of the sons, without specifying which one.

I.e., each priest can maintain that he received the redemption for the son that is alive and it is the other priest who is required to return the funds.

In the second instance, however, he need not redeem both sons, because it is possible that his daughter's birth preceded the birth of one of them. Thus with regard to that child, we follow the principle stated in Halachah 19.

Although two mothers and two pairs of children are involved, the situation is abstractly the same as that described in Halachah 20.

For the woman who had not given birth previously obviously gave birth to a firstborn son. The fact that his identity is unknown is not significant.

Because it is possible that the firstborn died and therefore, there is no obligation if he dies within thirty days of his birth.

Whether within 30 days of the sons' birth or afterwards, as in Halachah 20. See, however, note 68.

Although the entire sum could not be expropriated from either of the sons - for each one could claim that it is the other who is liable - it can be expropriated from the estate. For the father was certainly obligated and that obligation is transferred to his estate.

The commentaries question the Rambam's ruling, maintaining that seemingly the instance here is analogous to the case described in Halachah 30. What difference does it make if the two women mentioned are the wives of one man or two? The Radbaz explains that since we are speaking about one man with two wives and one is exempt, we assume that the exemption will continue unless it is indicated otherwise.

So that it was not known which woman was the mother of which child.

For, as in Halachah 21, each priest can claim that he received the redemption for the son who is presently alive.

The priest owes one of the two five selaim, but there is no way of determining which one. Thus if each approached him and demanded money individually, he could avoid paying, claiming that the father must prove that it was his son that died. When, however, he is approached by the two fathers in a single claim, he has no recourse other than to pay [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 8:5)].

Because there is no way it can be proven who is the father of the male and thus responsible for his redemption.

I.e., when he attains majority. For there is no question that he is a firstborn (Turei Zahav 305:23).

The priest owes one of the two five selaim, but there is no way of determining which one. Thus if each approached him and demanded money individually, he could avoid paying, claiming that the father must prove that it was his son that died. When, however, he is approached by the two fathers in a single claim, he has no recourse other than to pay [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Bechorot 8:5)].

Because there is no way it can be proven who is the father of the male and thus responsible for his redemption.

Because it is impossible to prove that a male was born first. See Halachah 23. From the Rambam's wording, it could be inferred that different rules apply when the women gave birth to two males and one female. It would appear that according to the Rambam, each of the males would have to redeem himself when he comes of age. The Tur (Yoreh De'ah 305) rules that in such a situation, the sons are exempt. See Turei Zahav 305:24.

Even though the identity of his son is not firmly established, his wife definitely gave birth to a firstborn son and he is obligated to redeem him.

For there is no way of proving that the woman who had not given birth previously was the mother of the male. Hence, the exemption is granted not only to the father, but also to the son when he comes of age.

More specifically, there are five possibilities regarding this situation:

a) the woman who had not given birth before gave birth to one male (and the other woman gave birth to a male and a female);

b) she gave birth to two males (and the other woman gave birth to a female);

c) she gave birth to a male and then a female (and the other woman gave birth to a male);

d) she gave birth to a female and then a male (and the other woman gave birth to a male);

e) she gave birth to a female (and the other woman gave birth to two males).

Since her husband would be obligated in the first three of these situations, he is considered as obligated, because of the higher probability.

As mentioned in the notes to Halachah 25, there is a difference of opinion among the commentaries with regard to the rulings in the two halachot. The Ra'avad reverses the Rambam's ruling in both instances, maintaining that here, the father is exempt and there, he is obligated. And the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 305:31) rule that he is exempt in both instances. These differences of opinion depend on textual differences in the versions of Bechorot 49a and differences in the interpretation of that passage.