Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Similarly, it can be used as a beverage or for anointing oneself, for these are also considered equivalent to “eating.”

As mentioned in the notes to the previous chapter, there are authorities who consider partaking of the second tithe as an independent mitzvah. The Rambam, however, considers it as part of the mitzvah of separating the second tithe.

See Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 6: 15 which states that the holiness of Jerusalem is not nullified even though the Temple is destroyed, for the city’s holiness derives from the manifestation of God’s presence and that holiness can never be nullified.

When the Temple is not standing, the second tithe must be separated, but we do not partake of it. Instead, we redeem it, as stated in the following halachah.

Sifri to Deuteronomy 14:23.

A commitment to observance that goes beyond the basic requirements of the law.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Ma’aser Sheni 4:1) relates that the Sages of the Talmud would conduct themselves in this manner.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 1, 18.

100 silver coins.

A copper coin of minimal value. Since when the Temple is standing, after the fact, such an exchange is acceptable, in the present era, it can be accepted as an initial and preferable measure (Radbaz).

For, after all, it is being destroyed (Siftei Cohen 331: 149).

Which can be redeemed in this manner as an initial and preferable measure (Hilchot Arachin 8:10).

I.e., in a place where it will permanently be lost.

See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 10:17. Both here and in that source, the Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that a silver coin must be used for these redemptions. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh support the Rambam’s position. See also Chapter 2, Halachah 4 and notes.

For the Temple is not standing, as stated in Halachah I. Moreover, we are all ritually impure, and the second tithe may not be eaten in a state of ritual impurity, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah l.
It must be emphasized that with the term Jerusalem, we mean the city limits in the era of the Second Temple. The fact that an area is included in the contemporary metropolis of . Jerusalem is not at all significant.

For money.
The Kessef Mishneh states that if produce from the second tithe becomes ritually impure, it can be redeemed as indicated by Halachah 8. The Tur ( Yoreh De’ ah 331) [based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Ma’aser Sheni 3:6)] writes that we can water produce that has been detached so that it will become susceptible to ritual impurity. When it becomes ritually impure, it can be redeemed. These concepts are quoted by the Shulchan Aruch and Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 331: 135).

For other produce. The rationale is that produce from the second tithe should not be redeemed or exchanged in Jerusalem, as stated in Halachah 8.

See also Chapter 3, Halachah 17.

See Halachah 9.

I.e., because it will be condemned to rot.

See Hilchot Terumot I 0:2.

I.e., he partook of the produce after it was taken to Jerusalem and then taken out, as stated in the following halachah.

I.e., in cities outside Jerusalem.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 141-143) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 442-444) include these as three of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Rambam explains the rationale for this in General Principle 9 of his Sefer HaMitzvot, quoting Keritot 4b, and giving the explanation that he offers in this halachah.

I.e., since the Torah mentions all three types of produce in both the positive and negative commandments, we can assume that the repetition was meant to teach us that one is liable for each type of produce individually. In his Hasagot, the Ramban disagrees and maintains that one who administers three sets of lashes for partaking of these types of produce is liable for striking a fellow Jew unnecessarily.

Tosafot (Makkot 19b) explain that the violation of a positive commandment is involved, for we are commanded to redeem the produce from the second tithe that is not brought to Jerusalem.

A punishment ordained by the Rabbis for breaking Rabbinic commandments or negative commandments that result from a positive commandment.

I.e., one might think that he would be liable, because a portion of the produce was brought into the city. Hence, it is necessary to state that he is not. See Hilchot Bikkurim 3:2, for it is the source of this law.

I.e., one might think that he would not be liable, because the entire quantity of produce was not brought into the city. Hence, it is necessary to state that he is.

Even though produce . from the second tithe that is pure should not be redeemed in Jerusalem, as stated in Halachah 4, it should be redeemed if it becomes impure. The rationale is that, otherwise, it will be worthless, since it may not be eaten in that state.
Pesachim 36b derives this concept as follows: The mitzvah of redeeming produce from the second tithe is derived from Deuteronomy 14:24: “If you cannot carry it .... “ Se ‘as, the term for “carry” used in that verse is also used in connection with food, as stated in Genesis 43:34. Hence, the verse can be interpreted as meaning that the produce should be redeemed if it cannot be eaten.

Jerusalem. The verse speaks about the redemption of the second tithe.

And thus he does not even have to walk outside to bring it inside (Kessef Mishneh; Or Sameach ). Rashi interprets the passage differently.

The converse is also true. If he was outside and his burden had been brought inside, it cannot be redeemed (Makkot 19b ).

Produce which is demai may be taken in and out of Jerusalem (Halachah 11). Once the second tithe has been separated from it, however, it may not be taken ·out of Jerusalem after it has been brought in. This represents a reversal of the Rambam’s opinion from that stated in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 3:6).

The law is not derived from this verse, for as the Rambam stated previously, the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin. Instead, the verse is an asmachta, a support from the Torah for a Rabbinic law. Significantly, to this writer’s knowledge, our Rabbis have not identified a previous Rabbinic source where this verse is cited as a prooftext.
[This alludes to a question frequently raised: Did the Rambam have sources from the Sages of the Talmud that were lost or were interpretations such as this his original work?]

When a person redeems produce from the second tithe that belongs to him, it is necessary to add a fifth, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 1. Here, however, we are speaking about a situation where that fifth is not worth a p'rutah. Thus the redemption of such produce is not feasible. And since its redemption is not feasible, according to Scriptural Law, such produce need not be treated as produce from the second tithe (Meiri to Bava Metzia 53b). Nevertheless, our Rabbis were stringent and required that the fifth be separated even in such a situation.

I.e., although two Rabbinic decrees are involved, we still rule stringently.

For our Sages imposed their decree with regard to produce alone.

And from which the second tithe has not been separated.

I.e., in this regard, we consider it as if the second tithe had already been separated. Hence, since it passed through Jerusalem, it must be eaten there [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.)].

I.e., it cannot be redeemed for money.

I.e., there is no alternative but to partake of the produce in the holy city.

To be squeezed for wine [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.)].

Since there was no obligation to tithe them at the time they passed through Jerusalem, they are not considered to have been taken in by the city’s barriers.

Since the obligation to separate the second tithe from demai was instituted only because of a doubt, our Rabbis did not apply this stringency. See Halachah 9.

And hence cannot be eaten.

See Halachah 4.

I.e., the decree imposed by our Sages must be upheld because this impurity is merely Rabbinic in origin and thus the holiness of the produce was not defiled [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.):9].

For when it was brought into Jerusalem, it was not fit to be eaten and thus did not possess a measure of holiness (ibid.).

That produce that became impure due to conduct with a secondary source of impurity outside Jerusalem can be redeemed or removed from the city after it was brought in. If, however, produce became impure through contact with a primary source of impurity, one’s intent is not significant. A person may remove it from Jerusalem even if he did not have the intent originally.

Instead, it should be redeemed and eaten in Jerusalem.

After it has dried out, by contrast, it is not fit to be eaten. For that reason, it is forbidden to let it dry out [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.) 2:3; see also Hilchot Terumah 2:8]. This explanation nullifies the Ra’avad’s objections to the Ramham’ s ruling.

Vetch refers to a species of beans generally used as cattle fodder. While they are fresh, however, they are fit for human consumption with difficulty (see ibid.:4; see also Hilchot Terumah 2:2; Hilchot Tuma'at Ochalin 1:9).

Since they are not fit for ordinary human consumption, the restrictions that usually apply to produce from the second tithe were not placed upon a dough made from them. Indeed, the laws governing vetch are more lenient than those governing chilba, for chilba is frequently eaten by humans while fresh. Vetch, by contrast, is eaten only when ordinary food is not available.
The Ra’avad understands the Rambam as ruling that the restrictions are relaxed only with regard to dough made from vetch, but not with regard to vetch itself. If the actual beans were taken outside the city, they must be returned. The commentaries accept this understanding.

I.e., in this context, one is considered to be outside the city.

Note the parallel in Hilchot Rotzeach 8: 11; see also Hilchot Ma’aser 4: 16.

I.e., in this context, it is considered as part of the city, because of the entrance. Diagram

For neither the entrance to the home, nor this portion of it is in the city.

Because the entrance is the primary determinant.

For in actual fact, one is within the city’s walls.

The commentaries note the concurrence between this ruling and that of Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 6:9, but the apparent contradiction between it and that of Hilchot Shemitah VeYovel 12: 12. They conclude that there is no one general principle governing the situation and each set of laws has its own rules.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 150) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 609) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

For after the produce has been redeemed, it is ordinary produce.

With regard to partaking of such produce outside Jerusalem in a state of ritual purity, see the previous chapter.

For the prohibition is only Rabbinic in origin. This applies even if the produce had already been brought into Jerusalem and was then removed.

Le., even though it has become impure. Before it becomes impure, it is forbidden to use it for purposes other than human consumption, as stated in Halachah 10.

This represents a stringency that exists with regard to impure produce of the second tithes, beyond that applying to impure terumah. For impure terumah can be burnt and this produce cannot.

Chapter 2, Halachah 8.

Where it is otherwise forbidden to redeem produce from the second tithe.

See Halachot 1 0-11.

I.e., we do not say that since it became impure before the second tithe was separated and thus the mitzvah associated with that produce could never be fulfilled, the mitzvah does not take effect.

See Hilchot Terumah 7: 10; see also Hilchot Ma ‘aseh HaKorbanot 10:9; Hilchot Chagigah 2: 1.

Leviticus 22: 10.

And thus performs the act necessary to emerge from ritual impurity.

A person who purified himself must wait until nightfall before partaking of terumah. This stringency does not apply with regard to partaking of produce from the second tithe.

See the following halachah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 151) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 608) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
The Rambam explains why he considers this a negative commandment in General Principle 8 of Sefer HaMitzvot, saying that whenever the Torah requires us to declare that we did not perform a specific activity, the performance of that activity is forbidden by Scriptural Law. The Ramban does not accept this principle as he states in his Hasagot.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that this concept is derived from the prohibition against partaking of the second tithe in a state of ritual impurity mentioned in Halachah 1. Since the two prohibitions are mentioned in sequence by the Torah, we can assume that they share the same laws.

Even if the produce had passed through Jerusalem previously.

For his actions involve either the violation of a positive Scriptural command or a Rabbinic ordinance.

A person's mother, father, son, daughter, paternal brother and paternal sister (Hilchot Evel2:1).

Aaron asked this rhetorical question after Moses rebuked him for not partaking of the sin offering. Aaron was explaining that since his sons had died that day, it would not be appropriate for him to partake of a offering that day.

For the verse states today.

I.e., according to Scriptural Law; it is, however, forbidden by Rabbinic decree as above.

I.e., even according to Rabbinic Law, the laws of aninut do not apply.

See Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 2:9-10. See Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 151) which explains that the prohibition is derived from the verse mentioned in the previous halachah and is included in this Scriptural commandment.

And it is forbidden to cause produce from the second tithe to contract ritual impurity.

Even in a state of Scriptural aninut.

Although it may contract ritual impurity. The produce may not, -however, be eaten in a state of ritual impurity until it is redeemed. The amount that may be given to an unlearned person is, however, quite small, as stated in the following halachah.

I.e., he must separate an equivalent amount of produce from his possessions and partake of it according to the strictures of the second tithe. He is thus transferring the holiness of the first batch of produce to the second [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 1:2)]. Since the obligation to separate the second tithe from demai is Rabbinic in origin, certain leniencies are allowed.

The Ra’avad protests the Rambam’s ruling. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that their disagreement stems from two different versions of the Tosefta (Ma’aser Sheni 4:3).

This is referring to an instance where we are certain that the second tithe was not separated from the produce beforehand in contrast to the second tithe that was separated from demai.

In order to prevent this from happening, the Torah gave the option of redeeming the produce, as will be explained.

See Hilchot Shabbat, chs. 8, 9, 18, which mention this measure as significant with regard to food (Kessef Mishneh).

The Ra’avad is more lenient and maintains that a larger amount, a portion the size of an egg, can be given to an unlearned person. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that the difference in the two opinions depends on a textual difference in their versions of Jerusalem Talmud (Demai I :2), the source for the Rambam’s ruling.

Here also, the Ra’avad is more lenient and maintains that a larger amount, a portion the size of an egg, can be given to an unlearned person. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that in this instance as well, the difference in the two opinions depends on a textual difference in their versions of the above source.

And drinking is included in eating (Yoma 76b). In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma'aser Sheni 2:1), the Rambam also cites Deuteronomy 14:26 which speaks about using the money from the redemption of the produce from the second tithe to purchase meat, oil, and wine.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam cites the Jerusalem Talmud (Ma’aser Sheni 2: l) which derives the permission to use oil from the second tithe for smearing as follows: It is forbidden to use oil for a corpse. Now what would oil be used for a corpse? To smear on it. Thus we can infer that it is permitted to use oil to smear on a living person. Others note that smearing oneself is frequently equated with drinking. See Hilchot Sh ‘vitat Asor 1:4-5; Hilchot Terumot 11: l.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 152; see also General Principle 8) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 610) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

In his Commentary to the Torah, the Ramban objects to the Rambam’s interpretation of this verse, but the Kessef Mishneh justifies it.

The literal translation of the Rambam’s words is “a corpse [that it is] a mitzvah [to bury].” As explained in Hilchot Evel 3:5, this refers to a corpse that is abandoned on the road without anyone to bury it.

I.e., he is not liable for lashes, because he can correct the transgression by purchasing food worth the value of the produce and eating it in place of that produce (Radbaz). This applies if the seller is no longer present or he cannot return the money. If, however, he can return the money, he must, as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 16.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma’aser Sheni 2:1), the Rambam explains that this phrase implies an exclusion: Something that is normally eaten must be eaten. We cannot benefit from it in another manner. The examples the Rambam proceeds to give reflect how foods are used for functions other than their primary purpose. See also Hilchot Shemitah 5 :2-3.

Even though oil is primarily used as food, it is also common to smear it on one’s flesh (Radbaz). Wine or vinegar, by contrast, are generally not applied as ointments.

For producing juice from other fruits is not considered the ordinary way of benefiting from this produce. See also Chapter 9, Halachah 3; Hilchot Terumot 11 :2; Hilchot Tuma‘at Ochalin 1 :5.

For this spoils the oil’s taste and thus reduces the number of people who would partake of it [The Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.)].

For this enhances the wine’s taste.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that this concept is also derived froni the phrasing of that mishnah: “To eat what is normally eaten.” Since this food has spoiled, it is not “normally eaten.”

I.e., parts of the plant that are not usually eaten. See Hilchot Terumah 11:10-13 for examples.

I.e., it need not be eaten in Jerusalem, nor in a state ofritual purity.

To impart their flavor to the water.

For it is considered as if a significant amount of the fruit’s flavor was imparted to the water.

Because it does not contain a significant amount of the fruit.

Since there is a doubt whether the produce is really from the second tithe, we do not impose this stringency.

That were ordinary produce.

As explained in Halachah 15.

With ordinary wood [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma’aser Sheni 2: 1)].

I.e., if one seeks to redeem the bread, one must pay its full value, even though as dough it was worth far less. The rationale is that its flavor is enhanced, but not its measure.

In the taste of the produce.
The Ra’avad has protested this ruling based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Ma’aser Sheni 2: 1 ). Indeed, the ruling is difficult to understand, because it runs contrary to the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah and that mishnah serves as the source for the Jerusalem Talmud.
To explain: The Mishnah states: “This is the general principle: Whenever the improvement is obvious, the improvement is judged proportionately. Whenever the improvement is not obvious, the improvement is accredited to the second [tithe].”
The Rambam comments: “Le., the entity that was improved had its weight ... and volume increased, it is not [merely] that the effect of the ordinary produce increased the quality of the produce from the second tithe.”
The Jerusalem Talmud cites the following difference of opinion between Rabbi Y ochanan and Reish Lakish in connection with our Mishnah:
Rabbi Y ochanan says: “Whenever the volume of the produce has increased, the increase is proportionate. Whenever the volume has not increased, the increase is accredited to the second tithe.”
Reish Lakish says: “Whenever the improvement in flavor is obvious, the increase is proportionate. Whenever the improvement in flavor is not obvious, the increase is accredited to the second tithe.”
Now the general rule is that whenever there is a difference of opinion between Rabbi Y ochanan and Reish Lakish, the halachah follows Rabbi Y ochanan. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh understand Rabbi Y ochanan to be explaining · and amplifying the Mishnah, stating that the improvement must be both in flavor and in size, while Reish Lakish maintains that an improvement in flavor alone is sufficient.

Thus meeting the two requirements mentioned above.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling and states that four zuz minus a fourth should be considered as the second tithe. Some commentaries suggest that there is a printing error and the Rambam also agrees with this ruling. According to that version, the reckoning is straightforward. The zuz of increase is divided proportionately according to the ratio of the original value of the substances.
The Kessef Mishneh maintains the accuracy of the present text of the Mishneh Torah, explaining as follows: When everything belongs to one person, three and three quarters zuz are considered as the second tithe as the Ra’avad maintains. When, however, the honey and spices belong to two people, the value of the entire mixture is considered as four and a fourth zuz. One and a fourth is given to the owner of the honey. Thus the owner of the wine has three and three fourths zuz worth which he must eat in accordance with the laws of the second tithe. Note the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma’aser Sheni 2: 1) which follows these same principles, but describes the situation differently.

As stated in Halachah 10.

But rather as food, or for smearing that is pleasurable like eating (Radbaz). Note the parallel in Hilchot Shemitah 5: 11.

A person may give produce from the second tithe tithe to a colleague. Nevertheless, the recipient does not acquire that produce as his own. Instead, it is as if he is a guest of the giver, partaking of his property. More particularly, it is as if the recipient is partaking of God's property.

Indeed, if one attempts to consecrate a woman with such produce, the consecration is not effective, for the money used to consecrate a woman must belong to the husband (Hilchat Ishut 5:4,6).

See the following halachah for examples of all these prohibitions.

For an exchange is equivalent to a sale [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma’aser Sheni 1:1)]

See Hilchot Loveh UMalveh 3:7 which describes when a creditor can enter the debtor’s home to collect security.

In contrast to the previous instance, this is referring to security willingly given by the debtor to the creditor.

I.e., the exchange is forbidden even if he receives produce from the second tithe in return. The Mishnah (Ma‘aser Sheni l: I) states that such an exchange is forbidden even in Jerusalem where the produce would be eaten.

For the recipient of the wine is under no obligation to provide the giver with oil or anything else.

For this is deprecating to the holiness of the second tithe [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma‘aser Sheni l: I)].

I.e., one knows the weight of the produce and he uses it in order to weigh the golden coins onto which the holiness from other produce from the second tithe will be transferred.

I.e., one might think that this is permitted for after all, he is using the produce from the second tithe for a mitzvah, to enable him to transfer the holiness of other produce.

I.e., the produce may dry out, be eaten by mice, or spoil, and thus weigh less than the owner thought (Rav Yosef Corcus).

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that this is permitted. The Kessef Mishneh states that the passage which the Ra’avad uses as a source can be explained differently. Nevertheless, he questions the rationale for the Rambam’s ruling.

I.e., to stack them on his table so that he will appear to have an active business.

One gives the loan only for appearance sake - to create an impression that he is wealthy - and the borrower returns it immediately.

It was customary for a person’s friends to give him money as a wedding gift and for him to repay the favor when the friends married. See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, ch. 7, for a detailed explanation. This is forbidden, because the present is considered as a loan.

I.e., a person invited a colleague for a meal with the expectation that the colleague return the favor (P’nei Moshe, the Jerusalem Talmud, Demai 3:1). Produce from the second tithe cannot be used for such meals, for it is like an exchange.

For he will be paying an obligation levied upon him with funds belonging to God.

As long is the donor is not obligated to make these payments.

So that he will use it as required for money from the second tithes.

That would be forbidden because it would be equivalent to using the produce from the second tithe to pay his debt.

Hinting at such an arrangement ‘without specifically mentioning it.

This is permitted, because the oil smeared on his hand is not financially significant [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma’aser Sheni 2:2)]. Nevertheless, a non-priest is not to put oil which is terumah on his hand to smear it on a priest. The difference between the two situations is that there is no prohibition against having a colleague use oil from the second tithe, while a non-priest is not allowed to benefit from terumah.

Halachah 17.

These are the penalties one would be required to pay for taking a person’s individual property. The thief is, however, required to return the principal. See Hilchot Geneivah 2:1.

The consecration is effective. Since the person has the right to partake of the produce, that right has monetary value and hence may be consecrated. See Chapter 7, Halachah 19, with regard to dedicating the second tithes for the purchase of sacrifices.

I.e., not necessarily the owner, for anyone can redeem consecrated property. The owner, however, must add a fifth (see Hilchot Arachin 7:2-4). Similarly, when a person redeems produce from the second tithe that belongs to him, he must add a fifth, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 1. See Radbaz.

Although there is a difference of opinion concerning this matter in the Mishnah (Ma‘aser Sheni 4:7), the variance in views applies only after the fact. According to all views, the initial and preferable option is for him to make an explicit statement.

See Halachah 18 and Chapter 2, Halachah 2.

The coins need not be in front of him when he makes the declaration. As long as they are within his possession, it is acceptable. See Halachot 11-13.

For the circumstances clarify the nature of his intent [the Rambam’s Commentaiy to the Mishnah (Ma’aser Sheni 4:7)].
In some printings of the Mishneh Torah, there is a note ( which some ascribe to the Ra’avad) that states that for the redemption to be acceptable when he does not make an explicit statement, he must have been involved with the matter beforehand. Rav Yosef Corcus discusses this issue at length, noting that this is indeed the law with regard to the consecration and divorce of a woman (Hilchot Ishut 3:8, Hilchot Gerushin 1:11). He makes two distinctions regarding the situations:
a) in contrast to consecration and divorce, setting aside money for produce from the second tithe is a self-explanatory act; the intent is directly obvious;
b) consecration and divorce must be observed by witnesses. Hence, one must make his intent clear to them. There is no such obligation with regard to the redemption of produce. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 331:136) quotes the Rambam’s ruling.

To purchase food. See Chapter 7, Halachah 3.

The original produce, by contrast, is now considered as ordinary produce and can be eaten anywhere. The Ra’avad differs and maintains that the transfer is not effective, for he maintains that the holiness of the produce from the second tithe can only be transferred to money. Nevertheless, as a stringency, he maintains that the second batch of produce must also be taken to Jerusalem. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam’s ruling.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam on this issue as well and again the commentaries justify the Rambam’s position.

Before redeeming the produce.

See Halachah 6.

In continuation of his comments on the previous halachah, the Ra’avad states that a blessing should not be recited. Since the person is not allowed to transfer the holiness of the produce in this manner, he should not recite a blessing.

Indeed, he should not, lest he be taking God’s name in vain.

There is no definite Scriptural obligation to separate this produce and hence, there is no definite obligation to redeem it. As stated in Hilchot Ma ‘ser 9:4, since the separation is being made only because of the doubt involved, a blessing is not required.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling and maintains that such a ploy is necessary only when transferring the holiness of produce from the second tithe to other produce, but not when redeeming it with money. He explains the Rambam’s position as follows: Produce from the second tithe is sold for a lower price than ordinary produce, because restrictions apply with regard to its consumption. Hence, if produce from the second tithe is offered for evaluation and its identity is known, people will look at it less favorably. The Kessef Mishneh questions this rationale, noting that once this produce is redeemed, there is no difference between it and ordinary produce and hence, its price should not be reduced. Nevertheless, he explains that since the produce originally came from the second tithe, it is still viewed less favorably.
The commentaries explain that the Rambam’s ruling is based on a different rationale, as the Rambam concludes, the intent is not that the value of the produce will be reduced but rather that it is degrading and demeaning for it to be redeemed.

The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh state that the Rambam derives this from the fact that Demai 1 :2 states that such a redemption may be made with coins upon which the holiness of the second tithe of demai had been transferred. Implied is that if we are certain that the produce is from the second tithe, no such redemption can be made. See the Rambam’s commentary to that mishnah where he states that the concept is derived from Deuteronomy 14:25 which states: “And you shall exchange it for silver and you shall bundle the silver,” i.e., the silver originally used for the redemption must be the silver taken to Jerusalem.
See the conclusion of Chapter 5 and the beginning of Chapter 6 which mentions some exceptions to this general principle.

See also Halachah 7 which states that redemption may be made in a pressing situation.

I.e., if the produce was purchased intentionally with money of the second tithe. See Chapter 7, Halachot 1, 15.

I.e., our Sages rescinded the transfer of the holiness to the animal for the reason stated (Sukkah 40b).

See Chapter 7, Halachah 16.

E.g., the situation described in Chapter 6, Halachah 2. This example is also discussed by the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma’aser Sheni 2:6).

I.e., one should not leave the brass coins in a state of holiness. Among the reasons silver coins are preferred is that they are more prestigious and they do not corrode.

Since the separation of the second tithe from demai is merely a Rabbinic stringency, our Sages granted leniency in its application.

I.e., its holiness should not be transferred back to coins.

The Radbaz distinguishes between pediah, “redemption,” which requires coined silver, and chillul, “the transfer of holiness.” The latter does not required coinage at all.

As required by Chapter 5, Halachah I.

See parallels in Hilchot Terumah 10: 15; Hilchot Arachin 7:2.

This is also derived from the above prooftext. Vitzarta, translated as “you shall bundle,” relates to the word tzurah, meaning “form” or “image.” Thus the prooftext is implying that one may redeem produce from the second tithe only with silver with an imprint [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma‘aser Sheni l :2); based on Bava Metzia 47b].

A p'rutah is a copper coin of minimal value. One may not use a silver coin less valuable than this copper coin. The rationale is that its minimal value causes it to be considered as uncoined silver (Radbaz; Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., it has an imprint and was once issued by a government as currency, but is no longer accepted by the present ruling authorities.

The Rambam mentions this interpretation of the verse in his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.). The commentaries have not cited a common prior Rabbinic source. See, however, Midrash HaGadol and Midrash Tana‘im.

But which is no longer being minted at present.

E.g., his pouch fell into the sea, in which instance, his coins are no longer accessible to him (Bava Kama 98a).

The word “yadecha,” translated as “your hand,” can also be interpreted as “your domain.” That is the intent here, because the money need not actually be in one’s hand. As long as the coins are in his domain, and they are accessible, it is acceptable, as evident from this and the subsequent halachot.

The cost of recovering the coins must, however, be deducted before one uses the money to redeem produce [the Jerualem Talmud (Ma’aser Sheni I :2)].

And he is certain that he will rob him.

I.e., the person knows that he will lose his money. Hence, rather than forfeit it without receiving anything for it, he decides that it is preferable for him to use it for something - to redeem his produce. The Kessef Mishneh maintains that the Rambam is not stating that, a priori, he may use the money to redeem his produce. Instead, the intent is that after the fact if he redeems the produce with this money, after the fact, the redemption is effective.

I.e., he must operate under the premise that the money was lost immediately after he saw it last and all the produce that he sought to redeem from that time onward was thus not redeemed.

I.e., the Rambam’s perspective is that in these instances, there are two negative factors: a) the coinage is not legal tender in the place where he is located; b) he does not have the money at hand. Hence, he cannot redeem the produce of the second tithe with it.

Because there is only one difficulty, that the person is not located in the same place as the money, the money is not disqualified.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that there is only one significant factor, whether the money is legal tender in the place it is located. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh discuss the two views at length.

All of the italicized terms are coins used in the Talmudic era.

In all these instances, the transfer of holiness is effective even though the coin was not singled out at the time when the declaration was made. Nevertheless, the transfer of holiness is not effective retroactively, i.e., we do not say that once the coin is taken, the transfer of holiness takes effect from the time the declaration was made.
The above follows the explanation given by Rav Y osef Corcus who notes that the Rambam (Hilchot Terumot 1 :21) does not accept the principle of bereirah with regard to questions of Scriptural Law. The Radbaz explains that this explanation is not necessary, because the Rambam rules· that the obligation to separate the second tithe in the present age is Rabbinic in origin.

Even if the coin was later discovered in the son's possession, the transfer of holiness is not effective, because we do not know whether it was in his possession at the time the declaration was made (Rashas). One might conclude that if one knows that the coin was in the son's possession at the time of the declaration, the separation is effective.

Which he has not yet separated.

Making such a statement is equivalent to separating the second tithe. Note the parallels in Hilchot Terumah 3:8.

I.e., at the time the Temple was standing; alternatively, in the present age, as an expression of piety (Chapter 2, Halachah 2).

I.e., the storekeeper obviously sells the produce for a higher price than the price at which he purchases it.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma’aser Sheni 4:2), the Rambam explains that a moneychanger will take 25 me ‘ah for a sela, but will only give 24. If the produce is worth a sela, the person redeeming it need not pay more than 24.

100 large silver pieces.

Bava Metzia 57a makes such a statement with regard to consecrated property (see Hilchot Arachin 7 :8). The Rambam draws the parallel since the laws governing consecrated property are more stringent than those governing the second tithe.

In previous eras, the minting of coins was less precise and it was possible that a coin would weigh slightly less than the standard weight for it. Alternatively, wear and tear could have reduced its weight.

This is also a leniency, for in ordinary business dealings one would have to reimburse the other party for the difference in value (Hilchot Mechirah 10:12).

I.e., its worth is more than a sixth less than the value of a sela.

Transferring the holiness from it to a coin of fair value. There is no difficulty with the original transfer of holiness from the produce to the coin, for - after the fact - as long as a coin is worth a p'rutah, the transfer of holiness to it is effective as stated in the previous halachah.

For, as stated above, the initial preference is to redeem the produce of the second tithe at its fair market price. That can only be established after its measure is known.

I.e., we are speaking about ordinary produce that has a fixed market value.

Because in such an instance, it is not necessary to evaluate its worth.

Which is still valuable, but is not as valuable as ordinary wine and hence, must be assessed, for once the produce has started to spoil, its value is not a cut-and-dry matter [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah Talmud (Ma’aser Sheni 4:2)].

But is still fit for human consumption. See Chapter 3, Halachah 11, above.

For they will be able to assess the true value of the produce.

Two gentiles or two owners, however, are not acceptable [Jerusalem Talmud (Ma’aser Sheni 4:2)].

Sanhedrin 14b relates that Rav Pappa’s wife helped evaluate his produce.

Because the owner must add a fifth.

The Rambam’s ruling is based on his version of the Tosefta, Ma’aser Sheni 3:3. The Ra’avad maintains that the proper version of that source is: “We compel him to make the first bid. If he desires to retract, he may. This is the stringency of consecrated property over the second tithes.” The Kessef Mishneh notes that this is indeed the version of the Tosefta commonly followed. There is an added difficulty with the Rambam’s ruling, because in all instances of consecrated property, he requires the owner to make the first bid .. See Hilchot Arachin, .ch. 5, in contrast to the statements of Radbaz here.

By contrast, money to which the holiness of the second tithe has been transferred may of course be transported.

In which instance, leniency is allowed, because the obligation is of Rabbinic origin.

The price of produce is a town is always higher than their price in the field, because someone had to undertake the transportation costs. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ma’aser Sheni 2:1).

I.e., they are included in the price of the produce of the second tithe. The rationale is that until the produce is redeemed, any increase in its value is considered part of the produce. Just as he is obligated to bring the produce to Jerusalem, so too, he is obligated to do anything to facilitate its being brought to Jerusalem, including bringing it to a place where it is redeemed.