Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Such a person is called a chavair. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 2:3), the Rambam explains that this term is used because, as indicated by the following halachah, the term refers to Torah scholars. Chavair means "friend." This term is appropriate to be used with regard to Torah scholars, because since their friendship is based on the Torah, it is true friendship, for its motivation is for the sake of heaven.

Whether his own produce or produce he is given by others.

Both produce that he purchases for his own consumption and that which he purchases for commercial purposes.

From Hilchot Tumat Mishkav UMoshav 10:5, it appears that he must make these statements in the presence of three people who are themselves considered as trustworthy in this regard.

I.e., witnesses who meet the criteria for acceptable witnesses spelled out in Hilchot Edut.

I.e., we assume that he separated the tithes from the produce before he died, for "We can presume that a chavair will not release anything from under his hand unless the appropriate separations have been made" (Pesachim 9a).

I.e., after she is divorced or widowed from the common person.

I.e., a Canaanite servant, for a Jewish servant is not sold to another master (Hilchot Avadim 4:10).

I.e., if a woman or servant does not have a history of non-observance, it is assumed that when they become part of a chavair's home, they will accept the standards of the home. In this instance, however, because they have a history of non-observance, they must formally accept the chavair's standards.

This applies even when they are in the common person's domain.

I.e., since he freely associates with the common people, we suspect that he has accepted certain dimensions of their lifestyle.

Rambam LeAm compares the final two clauses of this halachah and draws an ethical lesson. It is more likely that a person with proper habits will become lax due to the bad habits of a friend than a person with improper habits will change to the better due a friend's positive influence.

I.e., if they state that the appropriate separations have been made from the produce, we accept their word.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Demai 2:2) compares this to dwelling with a snake in its den.

For the sale of produce will be under his direct supervision.

I.e., he cannot rely on the common person's word that the separations have been made. He must supervise the separations himself.

To cite a contemporary application of this concept: If one sees a mashgiach, kashrut supervisor, in a restaurant, one may assume that the food is kosher.

As explained in Chapter 9, Halachot 7-11, a chavair may eat at a common person's home and separate the tithes by leaving over portions of food. He separates the tithes for his portion alone and not for all the food served. If he is serving the meal, the responsibility for the kashrut of the food is his. If he is merely dining, he has no general responsibility as stated in the following halachah.

I.e., just as the previous halachah explains how the chavair must make stipulations for himself, so too, he must make stipulations for his son.

The son was eating together with a common person, but the father was not.

As the previous halachah stated with regard to his own self.

A silver coin of little value employed in the Talmudic era.

I.e., as stated in Halachah 1, a chavair must tithe what he buys and sells. Nevertheless, in this instance, he is not considered as buying or selling, but merely as acting as an agent for the common person.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 6:12), the Rambam elaborates in his description of this situation, explaining that we are speaking about a situation where the seller of the produce is also a chavair and knows that the other chavair has been sent by the common person to purchase produce. If the chavair who is the agent asks to purchase produce without qualifying his statements and explaining who he is purchasing it for, the seller must give him tithed produce. For he knows that the agent is purchasing for the common person and he does not want to cause the common person to sin.

If the seller sees that the agent uses his own money, he might suspect that he is purchasing the produce for himself and not for the common person. Hence, the seller might not tithe the produce (Kessef Mishneh).

The seller will not give him untithed produce for the common person, because he fears that he will partake of it without tithing it. He may, however, give the chavair untithed produce, for he knows that the chavair will not partake of it without tithing it (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah loc. cit.).

We do not apply the principle of bereirah and say that the produce that the agent takes as his own was in fact the produce from which he separated the tithes.

All the above applies if the purchaser does not ask the seller if the produce was tithed. If, however, he asks the seller and the seller states that the produce was tithed, the agent does not have to make any separations, since the seller is also trustworthy (ibid.). Kin'at Eliyahu questions the very basis of the Rambam's assumption. For if the seller is a chavair, he would always tithe his produce and there would be no obligation to tithe produce purchased from him. See also the Radbaz who understands the halachah as speaking about a seller who is a common person.

I.e., after he separated the tithes.

We do not require them to separate tithes for the entire amount. They are not responsible for the portion of the other individuals.

Since the portion belonging to the common person is not distinct, we do not apply the principle of bereirah (Radbaz). Thus when making the division, it is as if each person is selling to the other (Kessef Mishneh). Alternatively, the agent indeed purchased the produce for all five individuals and then the entire mixture became intermingled (Rav Yosef Korcus).

Without tithing. Since a present is not like a sale (Chapter 5, Halachah 6), he is not considered to have purchased the figs from the common person. That would have required him to tithe (Radbaz).

If he desires to eat a significant meal of them. He cannot be certain that the produce is untithed, because it is possible that the common person separated the tithes from other produce (ibid.). The Kessef Mishneh, by contrast, explains that there is an error in the text and he is in fact making separations from produce that is definitely untithed.

See Hilchot Terumah 3:17 with regard to the great terumah, ibid.:20 with regard to terumat ma'aser.

For we fear that the common person will partake of the produce without separating the tithes and thus without separating terumat ma'aser. We do not, however, fear that the common person will partake of produce without separating the great terumah.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 3:1), the Rambam explains that this wording implies that the poor are given only one meal's worth of food. If they are given a substantial amount, they must make the appropriate separations. Support for this leniency can be derived from the fact that the majority of the common people do in fact separate the tithes.

Without separating tithes from it. This is a leniency instituted so that people will give charity and show hospitality (ibid.).

Although guests may themselves be wealthy, since they are required to accept hospitality, they are considered as poor (Meiri, Eruvin 31a).

I.e., even common people.

But not in mortal danger. Needless to say, if the sick person is in mortal danger, any prohibition can be violated to save his life. A person who is not dangerously ill is generally not permitted to partake of any substance that is forbidden by Rabbinic decree (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 155:3). Nevertheless, since the prohibition against demai is more of a safeguard than an outright ban, leniency was granted.

So that he will not be directly responsible for feeding him demai.

Even if it belongs to the common person.

Produce which definitely has not been tithed may not be sent even to a Torah scholar. It may, however, be sent to him in a pressing situation (Chapter 6, Halachah 6).

I.e., to Torah scholars, but not to common people, as stated in the previous halachah.

And the purchaser receives more than what he deserves [the Rambam's Commnentary to the Mishnah (Demai 2:4)].

Hence, the purchaser must assume that the produce is untithed.

A se'ah is 8.3 liter in modern measure according to Shiurei Torah and 16.2 liter according to Chazon Ish.

A dinar is a silver coin of significant value.

I.e., instead of weighing the produce, the seller gives the purchaser a full basket or container, whatever its weight might be. One might think that since the seller is selling by estimation, he is considered as being generous like the wholesalers mentioned above. The Rambam (based on Demai 2:5) teaches us that this is not so.

The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's ruling, noting that the mishnah quotes Rabbi Yossi as exempting the seller in this situation and does not mention a differing opinion. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that the wording of the mishnah indicates that Rabbi Yossi's view is being cited as a minority opinion and not as a view accepted by all.

I.e., he must make the required separations first.

I.e., the individual who would not be obligated to make the separations suggests that they be made as a joint effort, thus obligating himself even though he would otherwise be exempt (Radbaz in response to the Ra'avad).

I.e., the separations are not made equally.

And thus we cannot assume that the produce was tithed beforehand.

I.e., it is not considered as if he is exchanging one batch of produce for another and he is not required to separate tithes for his brother's portion. The rationale is that with regard to matters concerning Rabbinic Law, including demai, we apply the principle of bereirah, and retroactively - after the division of the property has been made - we consider that from the outset, it was as if the estate had originally been bequeathed to each of the sons separately, according to this division.

For we do not apply the principle of bereirah with regard to two different types of produce.

I.e., produce that is demai which had reached the stage where the tithes were required to be separated from it.

If produce is declared hefker, ownerless, before the obligation to tithe becomes incumbent upon it, there is no need to tithe it afterwards. If, however, that obligation has already taken effect, declaring produce ownerless does not remove that obligation (see Chapter 3, Halachah 20; Radbaz).

I.e., produce that is demai which had reached the stage where the tithes were required to be separated from it.

I.e., the owner of the store must consent to accept the produce, for as explained in the following note, the purchaser has already acquired the produce. See the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 3:2).

According to Rabbinic Law, once a person draws movable property (the vegetables) into his possession, he acquires it. The fact that he does not perform any of the other activities mentioned does not detract from his acquisition. Hence, by returning it to the seller, he is in effect selling it back to him. Hence, he is required to tithe it.

Since the obligation to tithe will take effect when the person brings it home, we assume that he tithed it. Hence, the person who discovers it is not required to tithe it again [(the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Machshirin 2:10)]. It must be noted that the Radbaz and many other commentaries offer different interpretations of this law. Indeed, the Rambam in Chapter 3, Halachah 22, appears to operate according to another perspective.

The person bringing his produce to the marketplace may not tithe it until he reaches there, because until that point it is not common to partake of it in an substantial manner only as a snack. Hence, it is possible that it is tevel (ibid.). Nevertheless, the possibility also exists that the tithes have been separated and hence it is considered as demai.

As a safeguard. One might ask: Seemingly, the situation is a sefek-sefeikah, a situation where the doubt is compounded, i.e., perhaps it came from those who bring it home. Even if it came from those who bring it to the marketplace, perhaps these individuals tithed it. Nevertheless, extra stringency is shown with regard to the prohibition against demai than is shown with regard to other prohibitions (Kessef Mishneh to Halachah 13).

I.e., produce discovered in a community where it is customary to bring produce to the marketplace.

I.e., the members of his household who might partake of it under the impression that it has been tithed.

I.e., he took it without the intent of acquiring it as his own, but only to protect it from enemy armies, a fire, or the like [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 3:3)].

Without tithing it. Since he did not acquire it as his own, he is under no obligation to tithe it.

I.e., the leaves pruned by a gardener. Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Ediot 3:3). Compare to Hilchot Terumah 11:10.

For they discard produce that is really unsuitable for ordinary consumption.

The tops and the stems of vegetables that are discarded by a homeowner when preparing the vegetables to be served.

For even though the homeowner may not desire to serve them, they are still fit to be eaten.

For they are no longer considered as food.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 3:5), the Rambam explains that guests would give the mistress of an inn flour and meat and she would prepare meals for them. As the Rambam states, this woman is suspect to exchange the food given for other food of the same type, but of lesser quality. She rationalizes that since she cooks for her guests for little or no payment, she is entitled to make this exchange (Chullin 6b).

I.e., he must tithe the produce he gives her, lest she give it to others and they partake of it without tithing it.

Lest she have given him untithed produce.

According to Jewish Law, marriage is a two-staged process involving erusin, "consecration," and nisuin, "marriage." After erusin, the marriage bond has been established and the woman cannot marry another man without a divorce. Nevertheless, the couple do not begin living together as man and wife until the second stage, nisuin. The Rambam is clarifying that even if the couple have not begun living together, he still trusts his mother-in-law.

I.e., we do not suspect that he gave produce from the sixth year and these women exchanged it for produce of the seventh year which is forbidden.

This appears to represent a reversal of the Rambam's ruling in his Commentary to Mishnah (Demai 3:6). The Radbaz explains that the Rambam's ruling here is based on the Jerusalem Talmud.

For even though she is not suspect to exchange, we fear that she used forbidden yeast or spices.

From which the tithes have already been separated.

Both with regard to tithes and the prohibitions of the Sabbatical year.

Though we suspect that he is lax in his observance of the mitzvah of tithing, we do not suspect that he will commit a transgression that involves a colleague's money (see Gittin 61b).

Who also gave him wheat to grind without separating the tithes from it [the Rambam's Commentary to Mishnah (Demai 3:6)]. We do not know whether he tithed them. Therefore, they are considered as demai.

The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's ruling: Seemingly, the situation is one of compounded doubt (sefek-sefeikah). Perhaps the gentile did not exchange the grain. Even if he exchanged it, perhaps he exchanged it with grain from a common person which need be tithed only because of a doubt. (The Ra'avad himself accepts the Rambam's ruling, but uses it as support for his thesis that there is an obligation for a Jew to tithe produce belonging to a gentile if it comes into his possession, for he maintains that the possibility is that the gentile exchanged it with his own produce.)

The Kessef Mishneh does not accept that thesis and instead offers a resolution, explaining that extra stringency is shown with regard to the prohibition against demai than is shown with regard to other prohibitions. He supports that contention based on Shabbat 23a which states that the majority of the common people separate tithes and yet our Sages imposed stringencies.

With regard to produce given to a gentile for safekeeping, see Halachah 15.

Without tithing.

And is not involved in the management of every particular of its operation. This reflects a general principle with regard to questions involving the kashrut of a person's produce. As long as the owner makes his presence known from time to time, his workers - even gentiles - are not suspected to exchange his produce with other produce.

Implied is that if the owner does not enter from time to time, we would suspect that the worker would exchange the produce. The Radbaz notes that the previous ruling implies that a Jew who is a common person would not be suspect to exchange the produce even if the owner did not enter from time to time. He therefore suggests that this phrase be omitted from the text. There are, however, other commentaries who offer explanations why a manager is judged more stringently than the bailee mentioned in the previous halachah. After all, he is working on an ongoing basis.

Hilchot Terumot 1:11.

I.e., since it is possible that the gentile did exchange, it is possible that there is no obligation to tithe.

Hilchot Terumot, loc cit..

We do not suspect that the gentile exchanged the grain with grain belonging to a Jew who did not separate the tithes, because it is not that common for people to entrust their produce to others. In contrast, people do bring containers of grain to a miller. Hence as mentioned in Halachah 13, we fear that the miller exchanged one person's grain with another's (the Radbaz and Kessef Mishneh in resolution of the Ra'avad's objections).

From Halachah 16, it is apparent that here the Rambam is speaking about a common person whose level of observance is a matter of doubt. If, however, it is known that a person is lax with regard to the separation of tithes, his word is not accepted even on the Sabbath.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Demai 4:1) emphasizes that this leniency is granted only when a person failed to tithe out of forgetfulness. If he intentionally did not tithe the produce, there is no leniency upon which he can rely to partake of it on the Sabbath.

Hilchot Shabbat 23:9, 14; Shvitat Yom Tov 4:26.

Because of the holiness of the day, the common people regard transgressing on the Sabbath as more severe than transgressing on other days [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 4:1)].

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam notes that there is a general principle (Kiddushin 63b) that a person will not sin unless he personally benefits. Thus one might think that we could rely on this person's word, even during the week. Hence, it is necessary to explain that we rely on his statements only on the Sabbath. The rationale is that the presumption that he will not lie applies to most people. There are, however, some that will lie even on the Sabbath [the Jerusalem Talmud (Demai 4:1)].

The Rambam is clarifying that the statement made in Halachah 2: that we trust that the common person will not lie on the Sabbath is conditional. It is a leniency accepted to allow a person to honor the Sabbath alone.

I.e., the festival fell on Friday or on Sunday.

This leniency is granted even though the two days are not considered as a single continuum of holiness (see Hilchot Eruvin 8:5).

I.e., he takes an oath that he will never benefit from him unless he partakes of his hospitality [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 4:3)]. (Although the mishnah speaks of taking a vow, the Rambam speaks of an oath.) The oath is taken to emphasize to the colleague that the failure to accept his hospitality is a sign of serious enmity between them. Hence, this leniency was granted to encourage feelings of closeness.

Kaftor VePerach, ch. 39, states that we are speaking about a situation where the oath was taken on the Sabbath itself. Otherwise, the guest could make a stipulation allowing for a retroactive separation as described in Chapter 9, Halachah 7. The Radbaz, by contrast, states that we are speaking about a situation where the interaction took place during the week. Otherwise, there would be nothing new taught by this halachah, everything could be understood from the previous one.

Whether the tithes were separated or not.

From Halachah 16, it is apparent that here the Rambam is speaking about a common person whose level of observance is a matter of doubt. If, however, it is known that a person is lax with regard to the separation of tithes, his word is not accepted even on the Sabbath.

I.e., the terumat ma'aser fell in a manner in which it was distinct and could easily be separated from the store of produce.

As stated in Halachah 2.

Produce into which terumah or terumat ma'aser has been mixed. The rationale is that partaking of such substances is punishable by death at the hand of Heaven.

The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh offer interpretations that substantiate the Rambam's ruling.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Demai 4:1) explains the logic: If he is willing to separate the first tithe which is given to a Levite, he is certainly willing to separate the second tithe which remains his own (but must be eaten in Jerusalem). See Halachah 15.

While the first tithe must be given away as above.

The Ra'avad objects to this ruling, stating that it is not necessarily a logical continuation of the ruling in the previous clause.

I.e., terumah and terumat ma'aser, if he said that he made these separations (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., both the first tithe and the second tithe.

This bracketed addition represents the resolution offered by the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh to the Ra'avad's objection.

I.e., even the amount separated as terumat ma'aser. For although we are stringent and do not accept his word, we do not reject his statements entirely. Certainly, he himself must bear their consequences and consider the separated produce as if it is required to be redeemed (Radbaz).

Since he is not trustworthy in this regard, his word is not accepted with regard to others as well. Even though one might say that he would not lie since his falsehood could easily be revealed, for it is possible to ask the identity of the seller and determine if he is trustworthy, the agent could always excuse himself saying: "I thought he was trustworthy" (Radbaz).

Although one might argue that there is no reason for him to sin, for he will not benefit from it, that argument is not accepted. For the ease the person experiences in bringing the produce from a close person could be considered enough of a benefit to influence him to lie.

And the lie be detected.

Because he would personally benefit from the wayfarer's acceptance of his statements.

The Ra'avad clarifies the Rambam's ruling, noting that his text of the Jerusalem Talmud (Demai 4:5) states: "In the presence [of the person being recommended], his word is not accepted. Outside his presence, his word is accepted." The Radbaz states that this concept is implied by the Rambam's words, since "so-and-so" implies that the person is not present. The Kessef Mishneh interprets the standard version of the Jerusalem Talmud as follows: "If he says he is not trustworthy, in his presence, he is not considered trustworthy (for he would not say so unless it was true). If he says so outside his presence, he is considered trustworthy (for the other person's statements are considered as slander)." This interpretation fits the Rambam's ruling.

Because we follow the principle that a person will not sin unless he personally benefits (Kiddushin 63b). This, however, is a leniency, granted to the person, because he is a wayfarer [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 4:7)].

And thus could be lying. See parallels in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 20:11.

The Ra'avad qualifies the Rambam's ruling, stating that it applies only when the person he knows is trustworthy. If he is not trustworthy, his recommendation cannot be relied upon. Rav Yosef Korcus states that this is also the Rambam's intent.

In the present age, this problem is solved by Rabbis and/or institutions giving kashrut certificates that are hung in the respective stores or institutions.

For after 30 days have passed, the person has had ample time to familiarize himself with the place and there is no need for further leniency. He will certainly have found a place that will offer him hospitality (Radbaz).

The rationale for the leniency is that the majority of the common people do separate tithes. The laws of demai are merely an additional stringency.

For the common people are generally lax in observance of these prohibitions.

Who bring produce from other places to a city for sale.

The Radbaz asks: Why are we more suspicious here than in the situation mentioned in Halachah 7. In resolution, he explains that people coming to sell their merchandise from another place are more likely to act in collusion than two businessmen in a city.

As explained in Hilchot Terumot1:3, the status of Syria is an intermediate level between that of Eretz Yisrael and the Diaspora. There terumah and the tithes have to be separated because of Rabbinic decree, but not because of Scriptural Law. For this reason, our Sages did not enforce the restrictions of demai on such produce [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 6:11)].

And was purchased from a common person so that the restrictions associated with demai apply.

The fact that they have been taken out of Eretz Yisrael is not significant.

And tithing is not required.

This is a general principle applicable in many areas, both in Jewish business law and with regard to the Torah's prohibitions. When our suspicions are based only on one person's statements, if that person makes a statement that allays those suspicions, we accept it. For our knowledge of the suspicious factor stems from his statements alone; there is no other evidence of such (ibid.). The rationale is that had he desired to lie, he would not have mentioned the factor that arouses the suspicions at the outset.

I.e. "from my field in Syria;" i.e., a place from whose produce tithes must be separated according to Rabbinic decree and he does not say that he tithed the produce.

Were he not to have said that they were from his own field, there would be no obligation to tithe the produce, because we would have assume it came from a gentile's field.

I.e., even if he does not say specifically that they are his.

Even if they are common people whose word is not ordinarily accepted with regard to tithes.

Presents given the poor that are exempt from the obligations to tithe (Chapter 2, Halachah 9).

In which instance we would assume that the terumot and the first tithe were also separated.

I.e., in the third and sixth years of the seventh year agricultural cycle.

I.e., what is meant by the last statement that the ruling depends on whether it is common for people to give such articles as leket, shichachah, pe'ah, or as tithes to the poor.

Pe'at HaSadeh states that the Rambam's words are chosen carefully. It is customary to give leket, shichachah, and pe'ah in the field. Hence, it is not likely that they were given as flour. The tithes for the poor, by contrast, are generally given from the home (see Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 6:10). Hence it is possible that flour was given to a poor person in fulfillment of that mitzvah.

For it is common for people to leave grain as leket, shichachah,and pe'ah, but not to process the grain any further before giving it [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Pe'ah 8:3)].

I.e., if he says that a homeowner gave him flour, his word is not accepted. If, however, he says that he was given grain and he had it ground into flour himself, his word is accepted.

Because it is not common for a person to have grain ground into flour and then give the flour to the poor.

For it was customary for people to give presents from rice while the kernels are still in their husks and not when they have been processed [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.)]. Our interpretation of the following clauses is also based on that source.

Which are left for the poor. We do not accept their word in this instance, for it is not common for a sufficient quantity of such olives to be left to make oil.

I.e., we accept his word based on the principle of miggo; were he to have desired to lie, he could have chosen a more plausible falsehood.

Even if he is a common person.

In contrast to leket, shichachah, pe'ah and the tithe for the poor concerning which the poor person's word is accepted only at certain times.

I.e., the Levite's word is accepted if he says that he separated terumat ma'aser from the tithes that he was given.

Chapter 9, Halachah 1. In both cases, the transgression is punishable by death at the hand of Heaven.

Unless he is a chavair.

I.e., if an Israelite purchases produce from a Levite who is not a chavair and the Levite states that the produce has been tithed and also the second tithe has been separated, the Levites word is not accepted. Although an Israelite's word is accepted regarding the second tithe when we see that he has separated the first tithe (Halachah 5), this does not hold true for a Levite. The rationale is that an Israelite makes a sacrifice when separating the first tithe, but a Levite does not.

I.e., that produce could be purchased from a common person and the separations made afterwards. This concept applies also with regard to the subsequent laws mentioned in this chapter. See similar concepts in Hilchot Shemitah VeYoval 8:14.

For if terumah was mixed with the produce, the prohibition is much more severe.

And we fear that the oil might be terumah or mixed with terumah.

I.e., if the Rabbis would discover that such a mixture would be made, they would declare his entire store of produce forbidden.

That has not been redeemed.

The Ra'avad differs and maintains that the word of a person who is suspect is never accepted even when he testifies with regard to the produce of another person. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh support the Rambam's view.

For his word is accepted more readily than that of one who is suspect.

For in these instances, his statements do not enable ordinary produce to be eaten.

But not with regard to his own.

In Halachah 10.

Which was slaughtered before it was clarified that it possessed a disqualifying blemish. Thus it is forbidden to partake of it and it must be buried.

And is hence, forbidden and must be destroyed.

I.e., the seller claims that the sale was made in error. He wants to nullify the sale so that he can fulfill the mitzvah of tithing the produce and destroying the forbidden produce. Since the objects have already left the seller's hand, his word is not accepted whether he is a chavair or not.