Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Relatives are also among these unacceptable as witnesses. See Hilchot Edut from ch. 9 onward for a detailed discussion of which witnesses are not acceptable.

See the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh to Hilchot Melachim 3:7 which explains that since we are required to hold the king in awe, he is not allowed to testify. See also Hilchot Edut 11:9.

In which instance, their testimony would not be effective in cases of monetary law.

It would seem that according to the Rambam, they are liable for a sh‘vuat bitui. The same law applies with regard to the subsequent halachot. See Chapter 9, Halachah 14.

Since their testimony is not effective, they are not liable.

Making such a statement does not create a binding financial obligation (Sh ‘vuot 35a).

I.e., were his mother to have undergone either divorce or chalitzah, he would be disqualified from the priesthood.

The son is liable for execution for wounding his father (Hilchot Mamrim 5:5), the kindler is liable for desecrating the Sabbath, and the seducer or rapist for adultery.

Hilchot Na ‘arah Betulah 1: 13 explains that this concept is derived from the exegesis of Exodus 21 :22.

As stated in Hilchot To ‘en V’Nitan l :2, one witness does not make one liable financially, but it does require an oath. There are times when this requirement will also lead to financial payment, for the defendant may chose to pay rather than to take the oath. Nevertheless, since the matter depends on the defendant’s choice and not the witness’ testimony, he is not liable for a sh ‘vuat ha ‘edut. See Chapter 8, Halachah 1. Nevertheless, as stated in Halachot 8-10 of this chapter, when the testimony of one witness does create an obligation for financial payment, the witness is liable for a sh ‘vuat ha ‘edut.

For a woman who commits adultery forfeits all the privileges granted her in her ketubah (ante-nuptial agreement). See Hilchot Ishut 24:6. Generally, a person who is guilty of a transgression that involves capital punishment is not held liable for any financial responsibility. This case, however, is an exception, because the woman is not paying anything. It is just that her conduct voids her husband’s obligation to pay her.

In the era of the Temple, when a man suspected his wife of committing adultery, he would warn her not to enter into privacy with the suspect. Two witnesses had to observe that warning being given. If she in fact entered into privacy with him afterwards as verified by two witnesses, she would have to drink the special sotah waters. If she had indeed committed adultery, the water would cause internal hemorrhaging and she would die. If she was innocent, she would be granted blessings. Here we are speaking of the husband charging either of these two pairs of witnesses to testify.

See Hilchot Sotah 2: 1.

Hilchot Sotah 1: 14. Since there are witnesses who testify that she received a warning and that she entered into privacy with the man who was singled out, there is basis to assume that she committed adultery with him. Hence the testimony of one witness is sufficient.

See Hilchot To ‘en V’Nitan 2: 1 that mentions the individuals placed in this category: those who took false oaths in the past and those disqualified from testifying because of transgressions they performed.

Hilchot To ‘en V’Nitan 2:4.

See Hilchot Gerushin 12: 15 which states that our Sages were lenient and accepted the testimony of only one witness in order to allow a woman to remarry. And since they allowed her to remarry on that basis, they also allowed her to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

I.e., she took possession of movable property during the lifetime of her husband and after his death, sought to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from it. Otherwise, the moveable property left by her husband is not under lien to his obligations and she must expropriate his landed property. This applies according to the ruling of the Talmud. At present, however, our Rabbis have ordained that a person's movable property is on lien to all of his debts (Radbaz; see Hilchot Ishut 16:8).

Chapter 9, Halachah 3. This ruling also applies to the situation that is described in Halachah 11.

The term the Rambam uses has a specific halachic meaning: the time it takes to say: “Shalom Alecha Rabbi, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 17.

More specifically, an adjustable guilt offering, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 12.

Since the first witness denied knowledge of the matter, the testimony of the second witness will not be effective, for he is only one witness.

He is liable, for had he testified, his testimony would have obligated the defendant.

I.e., within the time period, toch k'dei dibbur, mentioned above.

And hence they are not liable for a sh ‘vuat ha ‘edut as stated in Chapter 9, Halachah 1.

As long as a person is alive, he or she is considered as alive with regard to all the halachic ramifications of that state.
This and the following clause apply when the witnesses observed the testimony before they married the women in question. Otherwise, their testimony will not be acceptable, for they must be fit to testify both at the time they witness the testimony and at the time they deliver it in court.

This constitutes acceptance of the oath. If, however, they remain silent outside the court, they are not considered to have accepted the oath.

As stated in Chapter 9, Halachah 2, for witnesses to be liable, they must make their denial in court.
They are, however, liable for a sh ‘vuat bitui for every oath they accepted outside the court (Radbaz).

For the same denial applies to all of them. Since they never denied the matter in court, each denial they make is still significant (in contrast to the instance mentioned in Halachah t 8).

That they are liable for an oath administered outside the court.

Chapter 9, Halachot 1, 10.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam concerning this issue, stating that he has made a great error in interpreting the difference of opinion between Rabbi Meir and the Sages mentioned in Sh ‘vuot 30b. The Ra’avad maintains that their difference of opinion concerns only whether the denial of knowledge of the matter must be made in the presence of the court or outside of it. Both, however, agree that an oath is significant, whether made in the presence of the court or outside of it. The Rambam, however, maintains that since the witnesses did not take the oath themselves or respond to it, they are not liable. It is only when the oath is administered in court that the oath is significant even though the witnesses do not respond to it.

They are, however, liable for a sh ‘vuat bitui as stated in the following halachah.

As stated in Hilchot Edut 3:5, once witnesses testify in court, they cannot change that testimony. Since their testimony would no longer have an effect, they are not liable for a sh ‘vuat ha ‘edut.

Chapter 9, Halachah 14. This also applies to all the other instances in this chapter where it was stated that the witnesses were not liable for a sh ‘vuat ha ‘edut.

See Chapter 1, Halachot 7-8.

See Halachah 5 which mentions the oaths required by the court.

See Halachot 8-9.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 7) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 435) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. Note the Hasagot of the Ramban to Sefer HaMitzvot and the Ra’avad’s objections at the beginning of the Mishneh Torah which differ and argue that this should not be considered as a · positive commandment. See also Hilchot Nedarim 1 :4 which states that there is a positive
Scriptural commandment for a person to carry out an oath or vow he took.

For this reveals the reverence and awe in which God’s name is held.

For that implies drawing a certain equation between that other entity and God.

See the Radbaz who explains why the expression: “As God lives and by the life of your soul” (II Kings 2:4, 4:30) is not a contradiction of this principle.

When the Jewish people were compelled by God to accept the Torah by oath. One might think that we would apply the principle (see Chapter 5, Halachah 11, and notes) that one oath does not take effect when another is already in effect. Hence, taking the oath would be taking God's name in vain. This is not so as the Rambam continues to explain.

Thus if David - a paradigm of pious conduct - could take an oath for this purpose, so can others.

In contrast to landed property, servants, and promissory notes (Hilchot To ‘en V’Nitan 5: 1).

This situation is referred to by our Sages with the term modeh bimiktzat: “one who admits a portion [of a claim].” See Hilchot To’en V’Nitan 1:1.

“Whenever [the testimony of] two [witnesses] would require him to make financial restitution, [the testimony ofJ one [witness] obligates him to take an oath” (Ibid.).

If, however, the plaintiff suspects the defendant is liable, but is unsure of his claim, he cannot require the defendant to take an oath (ibid.:1). Similarly, if the defendant is unsure whether he is liable or not, he may not take a Scriptural oath to absolve himself of responsibility. The Rambam’s statements here are significant in another context. There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if a plaintiff who makes a claim that is supported by the testimony of one witness must be certain of the veracity of the claim himself or whether he can be doubtful, but rely on the testimony of the witness. The Maggid Mishneh (in his gloss to Hilchot Gezelah 4: 17) and the Kessef Mishneh (in his gloss to Hilchot To ‘en V’Nitan 3:6) maintain that the Rambam follows the latter view. Here, however, it appears otherwise.

See ibid.:2; Hilchot Sechirut 1 :2; 2:8.

The Ma ‘aseh Rokeach states that the word Shema vc~ serves as an acronym for the names of these three oaths: Shomrim, Modeh bimiktzat, eid echad ,nlpo:,. n,,c ,c,,o,w inN ,V.

See Hilchot Sechirut 11:6 which explains that when an employer denies owing a worker his wage, the worker may take an oath and collect his due.

See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 14:1.

For example, Sh ‘vuot 44b mentions several other instances when such an oath is required of a defendant: a person who claims that property was stolen from him and there is substantial circumstantial evidence corroborating his claim (as stated in Hilchot Gezeilah 4:2), a storekeeper who disputes a client’s claims with regard to payment (Hilchot Mechirah 20:8).

See Hilchot Shluchim V’Shutafim 9: 1.

I.e., in contrast to the oaths mentioned in the previous halachah which were established by the Sages of the Mishnah.

The Seifer Meirat Einayim 75:16 interprets the term heset as meaning “placed upon,” i.e., it is an oath which our Sages placed upon a person. Others interpret it as relating to the root meisit, meaning “entice.” The purpose of this oath is to entice a defendant to admit an obligation.

This will impress him with the seriousness of the matter.

The Rama (Choshen Mishpat 87:15) quotes opinions stating that the defendant should not hold the scroll. Instead, it should be placed before him and he should place his hand on it.

I.e., he may not sit. Note, however, Halachot 11-12.

This term is used to refer to Rav Yosef Migash, the Rambam’s teacher, and Rav Yitzchak Alfasi, Rav Yosefs teacher.

“The Holy Tongue,” i.e., the Hebrew of the Tanach and the Mishnah. With regard to this ruling, see Halachah 14.

The Hagahot Maimoniot quote Rashi (Sh ‘vuot 38b) who states that it has become customary not to administer oaths using God’s name, for the awesomeness of the punishment for taking His name in vain would lay waste to the world. This principle is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch ( Choshen Mishpat 87: 19).

He is referring to himself.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

For this is equivalent to a judge making an error in a law explicitly stated in the Mishnah, in which instance the law is that the judgment is revoked (Sh ‘vuot 38b ).
The Rama (Choshen Mishpat 87:15) quotes an opinion that states that a Torah scroll is not required. Any sacred text with God’s name is sufficient. Similarly, in one of the Rambam’ s responsum, he writes that a Chumash is sufficient.

For Exodus 12:9 says of tefillin: “So that the Torah of God will be in your mouth.”

This is a token of respect for him. See Sh ‘vuot 38b.
The Siftei Cohen 87:41 quotes Rav Hai Gaon who states that the term Torah scholar has been given many definitions, but that employed today is “anyone who puts on tefillin.” On this basis, the Siftei Cohen writes that in the present day, there is no difference between Torah scholars and ordinary individuals.

See Halachah 8.

The Ra’avad states that it is not customary to administer a sh ‘vuat hesit with God’s name in the present age, for we fear that people will take false oaths. Hence to reduce the punishment that might be incurred, God’s name is not mentioned. To compensate for that omission, the court should employ various techniques to impress the person taking the oath with the seriousness of the matter. As the Radbaz states, his argument with the Rambam appears to be practical, but not theoretical. In the era of the Talmud, the Rambam’s ruling would be followed.
Other authorities do not accept the Rambam’s view even theoretically. They maintain that even in the era of the Talmud, a sh ‘vuat heset was not administered with God’s name. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 87:18) mentions the Rambam’s view, but follows that of the other authorities.

I.e., even languages other than Lashon HaKodesh.

For Sh ‘vuot 38b, 39a and the Tosefta, Sotah 7: 1 state that an oath can be administered in any language.

And a person is liable for a sh ‘vuat hapikadon only if he understands what he is saying, as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 7.

See Halachah 20.

See Halachah 6.

In the following two halachot.

For the prooftext from Zechariah cited in the admonition is speaking about a definite claim. See also Halachah 19.

See also Chapter 12, Halachah I; Hilchot Teshuvah 1 :2.

Sh ‘vuot 39a derives this concept from Ecclesiastes 5:5 which states: “Do not let your mouth cause your flesh to sin.” “Your mouth” refers to taking a false oath and “your flesh” to one’s family.”

Here the intent is the Jewish people themselves. Our Sages (see Sukkah 29a) use this expression as a euphemism.

The Sefer Meirat Einayim 87:58 notes that this concept applies, not only with regard to a false oath, but to all the transgressions mentioned in the Torah. Nevertheless, there is a stringent aspect that applies with regard to a false oath. With regard to other transgressions, the interrelation affects one when he has the opportunity to rebuke the transgressor. With regard to a false oath, by contrast, it applies even when one does not have such an opportunity.

The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 87:60 interprets this as meaning that he is sent away from the court. For once he leaves the court, he cannot change his mind and decide to take the oath.

Once the plaintiff has retracted his request for the defendant to take the oath, he is considered to have waived his claim and can no longer prosecute it again. See Hilchot Mechirah 5:1.

This malediction refers to the plaintiff as well. For as Sh ‘vuot 39b states, the negative repercussions of taking the oath affect them both. The Radbaz explains that the plaintiff shares in the responsibility, for he should have been more careful and not entered into a business arrangement without having the matter observed by witnesses. And if the oath is true, he should have been more careful with his accounts, so as not to require God’s name to have been employed for such matters.
The Sefer Meirat Einayim 87:61 explains that when the plaintiff sees that the defendant is prepared to take a false oath, he should have offered a compromise rather than continue to pressure him and thus cause God’s name to be taken in vain.

As stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 15-16, this measure is employed so that later, the defendant will not try to absolve himself saying: "I had this-and-this intent in my heart when taking the oath." Since the oath is being administered to him according to the understanding of others, it is their interpretation that is upheld.

Although he does not dispute the Rambam’s ruling, the Radbaz questions why an admonition is not administered in these instances. The Meiri and the Sefer Meirat Einayim 87:61. explain _that when the plaintiff is making a definite claim, it is one person’s word against the other’s. Thus there is reason to think that the defendant’s oath is false and to prevent him from doing so, we issue this warning. When, however, an oath is taken because of a doubt, the defendant is not being challenged. Hence, there is less reason to suspect that he would take a false oath.

For in all situations, it is preferable that an oath not be taken. For this reason, courts have adopted the policy of trying to negotiate compromises in all litigation (Radbaz).

See Chapters 7 and 8.

I.e., it is one fifth of the new total and not one fifth of the original principal.

Chapter 1, Halachah 9.
The Ra’avad writes that at present since God’s name is not mentioned in the oath administered by the judges, there is no liability for a guilt offering or to pay the additional fifth.

Chapter 1, Halachot 3, 7.

But are not subjected to lashes, Chapter 1, Halachah 8.

See Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 5:10.
The Ra’avad differs and maintains that lashes are sufficient to atone for a person’s sin entirely. The Radbaz explains that the sin of taking a false oath is two dimensional, involving not only the particular transgression of taking a false oath, but also the desecration of God’s name. The lashes atone for the particular transgression of the false oath, but not for the desecration of God’s name. That requires more severe retribution as the Rambam explains.

Hilchot Teshuvah 1 :2.

The Ra’avad states that although one is not liable for a sacrifice or lashes for such an oath, it is forbidden to take such an oath. At first, the Kessef Mishneh states that it is possible that this is also the Rambam’s intent, but afterwards, states that the Rambam’s wording implies that such statements are not considered oaths at all.
The Radbaz writes (and this understanding is borne out by one of the Rambam’s responsa) that according to the Rambam, such an oath is not binding and need not be released. The Ra’avad differs and maintains that such oaths must be released and if they are false, one transgresses the prohibition against taking a false oath. See also the notes to the following halachah.

See the following halachah and notes.

See Chapter 6, Halachah 10; Hilchot Nedarim 2:12.

The Ra’avad differs with this principle, maintaining that there is no difference between the Torah and the other books of the Holy Scriptures with regard to their fundamental holiness. Thus a person who takes an oath by the contents of any of the other books of the Bible is also liable.
The difference between these two understandings depends on whether one understands the passage from Nedarim 14b as referring to only vows ( as is explicitly stated, and as is the Ra’avad’s understanding) or as apply also to oaths (as the Rambam maintains). The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 212:1) quotes the Rambam’s view.

I.e., he states that explicitly.

In which instance the person is liable for taking an oath, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 2.

For he is not taking an oath by God’s name .

The Chatam Sofer (in his commentary to Nedarim 14b) states that the Rambam is referring to an instance where the person specifically picked up the Torah scroll for the purpose of taking an oath. Otherwise, even if he was holding the scroll in his hand before taking the oath, this law would not apply. Rashi understands the passage differently.

For by taking the Torah scroll in his hand, the person is implying that he is considering the matter with the seriousness of an oath (Nimukei Yosef).

For he knows the distinction mentioned in the previous halachah and thus understands that the oath is not effective and does not intend for it to be binding. Note, however, the Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 212) who severely criticizes scholars who take an oath by the Torah, knowing that it is not effective to deceive the people to whom they are taking the oath.

Who does not know the above distinction.

As explained in Halachah 3.

Note the contrast to the law that applies when a servant takes a Nazirite vow (Hilchot Nazirut 2:7).

The Ra’avad, however, maintains that the Rambam’s ruling applies only to oaths that will affect the servant’s capacity to work. If that is not the case, the oath can take effect. As the Rambam writes in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nazirut 9: 1 ), there is a difference between vows and oaths in this regard. The Ra’avad’s statement will apply with regard to vows, but not to oaths (Or Sameach).

Which is not effective as stated in Nedarim 47a. See also Chapter 5, Halachah 1.

Boys under 12 and girls under 11. See Hilchot Nedarim 11:1.

For they are not liable for any of the Torah's commandments.

The Radbaz explains that we are not speaking about a person in mortal danger, for that would apply with regard to an adult as well. Instead, the intent is aggravation or sickness.

The commentaries question whether the Rambam’s intent is that he has transgressed a Scriptural commandment or merely a Rabbinic one. The Minchat Chinuch (Mitzvah 30) states that the transgression is Scriptural in origin and the violator should be punished by lashing. This opinion is also mentioned by the Magen Avraham 215:6. From the Kessef Mishneh to Hilchot Milah 3:6, it appears that even the Rambam would consider the prohibition as Rabbinic in nature. The latter understanding is shared by many other Rishonim. Their position is - as explained by the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 215:3 - that since he is reciting a blessing, his mention of God’s name is not entirely frivolous.

See the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger who questions the Rambam’s statements, based on the ruling that a person who is unsure whether or not he recited the Grace After Meals must recite the blessing again. Seemingly, the recitation of that blessing would be problematic, because there is a doubt whether or not he is required to do so or not. Thus it is possible that he is transgressing a Scriptural commandment. In resolution, Rabbi Akiva Eiger explains that since the person is obligated to recite the blessing, even if that obligation stems from a doubt, he is not considered to be taking God’s name in vain.

Chapter 1, Halachah 15.

See the concluding chapters of Hilchot Talmud Torah for a description of the implications of this ban.

Cf. Jeremiah 9:4.

The Turei Zahav 334: 18 mentions that the Rambam’s view is more lenient than that of the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol who maintains that this leniency applies only when one does not know of the prohibition at all. According to his view, one who knows of the prohibition, but accidentally recites a blessing in vain must be placed under ban.

I.e., the seven names for God mentioned in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, ch. 6.

See Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 4) which quotes Sanhedrin 56a and Temurah 4a as deriving this concept from another prooftext (Deuteronomy 6: 13).

For one does not treat something that is truly revered with such carelessness.

See Hilchot Berachot 4: 10 which states that when a person recites a blessing in vain, he should say Baruch shem kevod malchuto leolam va ‘ed, “Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom forever.”

Chapter 6, Halachah 1.

For this indicates that he does not accept the Oral Tradition that Moses communicated. For the release of vows is not explicitly stated in the Torah, but instead communicated by the Oral Tradition, as stated above.

See Chapter 6, Halachot 9-10 which gives examples of such situations.

For it is possible that unwittingly, he could take a false oath and thus bring severe retribution upon himself and others. See Gittin 35a which explains how a woman unknowingly took a false oath and caused one of her sons to die.

See Hilchot Nedarim 1 :4 which states that keeping an oath or a vow fulfills a Scriptural mitzvah. Nevertheless, there is a difference between oaths and vows. As the Ra’avad (see also Hilchot Nedarim 13:25) mentions, it is desirable to have vows released. Oaths, by contrast, should be observed and not released.