Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Even if both species are kosher ( see Minchat Chinuch, mitzvah 244); see Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De’ah 294:1.

But not fish (Kessef Mishneh ).

I.e., he transgresses a negative commandment, included as one of the 365 negative commandments by Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 21 7) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 244).

In contrast to the laws regarding sowing mixed species of crops and grain(Chapter 1, Halachah 1) and sowing mixed species in a vineyard (Chapter 5, Halachah 2).

Although the prooftext states “your animal,” this is not meant as an exclusion (Sifra to that verse).

The punishment given for violating a Rabbinic ordinance.

For the owner is not involved in their mating. The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 297:3) states that in a place where there is a suspicion that others will ~ause the two animals to mate, it is forbidden to place them in the same corral.

Based on Bava Metzia 90a, the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh state that the difficulty is that it is forbidden to give a gentile instructions to perform a prohibited activity. According to the Rambam (Hilchot Melachim 10:6), it is forbidden for a gentile to crossbreed species. The Rama (loc. cit.4), however, states that if the act is perfonned for the benefit of the gentile, there is no prohibition.

I.e., if the mated species are not kosher.

Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 1:13.
Here we see another difference with produce that grows from mixed species. The latter is forbidden, while in this instance, the mixed offspring is permitted. Implied is that the prohibition against mixed produce affects the cheftza, the actual substance of the forbidden entity, while the prohibition against mating mixed species applies only to the gavra, the person performing the mating.

In the text of the Mishneh Torah, this phrase is repeated a second time.

Our translation is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Kilayim 1 :6).

The Radbaz notes that the term “wild ox” is sometimes used to refer to a buffalo, which is considered a separate species and not part of the ox species. He states that here the intent is different and the Rambam is referring to a species of domesticated animal. See also Siftei Cohen 297:6.

A ko’i is a hybrid born from breeding a deer and a goat. There is an unresolved question among our Sages if it is considered as a domesticated animal (behemah) or a wild beast (chayah) [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Bikkurim 2:8]. In Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 1:13, he states that the term refers to any hybrid that comes from mating a domesticated animal with a wild beast.

In Hilchot Nizirut 2:10-11, the Rambam writes:
In certain matters, a ko ‘i resembles a wild beast. In other matters, it resembles a domesticated animal. In still other matters, it resembles both a wild beast and a domesticated animal and in still other matters, it resembles neither a domesticated animal, nor a wild beast. ...
What is implied? [When] a ko ‘i [is slaughtered, its] blood must be covered as the blood of a wild
beast must. Its fat is forbidden as is the fat of a domesticated animal. It is considered a union of mixed species if it is mated with either a domesticated animal or a wild beast, as if it were neither a wild beast, nor a domesticated animal. And it must be ritually slaughtered as. is required for both a domesticated animal or a wild beast. Similarly, there are other halachic considerations that apply with regard to it and they will all be explained in their appropriate place.
See Hilchot Shechitah 12:8-9; Hilchot Bikkurim 9:5; 10:7; Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTumah 1 :6, et al, which mention other laws applying to this animal.

As the Rambam emphasizes in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Kilayim 8:4), the fundamental principle is that the species of the mother is the determining factor whether the union is considered as mixed species or not.

The Kessef Mishneh suggests that since the determining factor is the species of the mother, the text should read “he is not liable for lashes.” According to that interpretation, the bracketed additions in the translation are inappropriate.

Which comes from mating a horse and a donkey.

I.e., according to the Rambam - other Rishonim differ - according to Scriptural Law, one is permitted to work with two animals from two different kosher species. It is only mating them which is forbidden. The Rambam's understanding is based on his interpretation of the Mishnah (Kilayim 8:2) which he understands to be divided in half, the first clauses referring to the prohibition of mating stated in the previous halachah, and the latter clauses to the prohibition against working with different species. The commentaries note that the Rambam's perspective is shared by the Tikkunei Zohar, Tikkun 14.

I.e., he transgresses a negative commandment, included as one of the 365 negative commandments by Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 218) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 550).

I.e., not only in Eretz Yisrael (see Kiddushin 36b).

In which instance, one might think that one is not liable because he did not perform a deed.

For that implies a combined activity [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Kilayim 8:2)].

For he has not had them perform a forbidden task.

The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh emphasize that the animals from the two must be yoked or tied together in some way for one to be liable for leading them. If they are separate, he is not liable. yoked or tied together in some way for one to be liable for leading them. If they are separate, he is not liable.

Hilchot Ma’ achalot Assurot 6: 1 quotes Deuteronomy 14:4-5 which states: “These are the animals that you may eat: an ox... a gazelle and a deer,” including both domesticated animals and beasts in the general category “animals.”

Bava Kama 55a raises the question whether one is liable for stripes for rebellious conduct for such an action or not, for the two cannot function as a team in the ordinary sense, since the fish cannot leave the water and the goat will not enter it. Since the question is left unresolved, the Rambam maintains that the person is not liable.

I.e., he was holding the reins of the animals.

I.e., an animal was sanctified as an offering, but then developed a blemish that disqualifies it. It was redeemed and thus is considered as an ordinary animal in that after it is slaughtered, it may be eaten without any of the strictures associated with consecrated food. While alive, however, it is forbidden to work with it or shear it, like consecrated animals.

When the term “wool” is used without any adjective, it refers only to sheep’s wool (the Jerusalem Talmud, Kilayim 9:1).

Although the Rambam uses the term Yam HaMelech, his intent is the Mediterranean Sea and not the Dead Sea. See Hilchot Tzitzit 2:2 and his Commentary to the Mishnah (Keilim 9: 1) for other examples of such usage.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Kilayim 9:2), the Rambam states that this fabric is a type of silk. Others identify it with cissaros blossoms.

For silk resembles linen and kelech resembles wool (ibid.). Rav Yosef Corcus and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 298:1) state that certainly a mixture of wool and silk should be forbidden. Nevertheless, he continues that at present, silk is very common and recognized by everyone. Hence, there is no need to forbid it because of the appearance it will create.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, meaning that making a smooth mass is not sufficient to create an article forbidden by Scriptural Law. To explain the difference of opinion: The Mishnah (Kilayim 9:8-9) states:
The prohibition against kilayim applies only with regard to fibers that are spun into thread and woven, as it is written: “Do not wear sha ‘atnez,” [i.e., the prohibition applies to fibers that] are made into a smooth mass, spun, and woven. Sheets of fabric are forbidden for they have been made into a smooth mass.
In his commentary to that mishnah, the Rambam states:
“Made into a smooth mass”- This refers to making fabric. It involves smoothing down the surface of the substance made into a even mass ....
“Spun” - This involves mixing wool and linen together and spinning them into threads.
“Woven” -That [these threads] should be woven together .... It implies connection and establishing union.
If one mixed wool and linen together, spun them into threads, wove them into a gamient, and smoothed its surface ... , that garment will be considered as mixed fabrics. This applies with regard to mixed fabrics as defined by Scriptural Law. For, [according to Scriptural Law, a garment] is not considered as mixed fabrics unless [making it] involved all these three activities. Anything other than this [that involves wool and linen] is mixed fabrics [only] according to Rabbinic Law.
Some of the Geonim wrote as above. I, however, consider that as incorrect. Instead, any one [of these activities] is sufficient to cause a garment to be considered as mixed fabrics according to Scriptural Law. The statement in tractate Niddah [61b which implies that all three activities are necessary] is not the wording of the Talmud, but an interpretation.
Our translation is taken from Rav Kappach’s translation of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah which is a revised edition. Originally - and this is the version followed by the standard published text of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah - the Rambam wrote that the ruling that all three activities are necessary for the prohibition to be of Scriptural origin is “a correct ruling, concerning which there is no doubt.” Thus originally the Rambam also subscribed to the opinion followed by the Ra’avad [which is also shared by Rashi (Niddah, loc. cit.), but later changed his mind [adopting the view stated here and in Tosafot (Niddah, loc. cit.)]. The Kessef Mishneh and the Radbaz discuss the issue in their glosses to the Mishneh Torah. See the Tur and commentaries (Yoreh De’ah 300. The Siftei Cohen 300:1 writes that the majority of the authorities follow Rashi’s view. It must be emphasized that all of the opinions maintain that any combination of wool and linen is forbidden according to Rabbinic Law, the debate involves only the extent of the Scriptural prohibition.

In the previous halachah, the Rambam stated that any one of the following activities: making fabrics into a smooth mass, spinning, or weaving them is sufficient to incur liability. He also gave examples regarding the first two types of activities mentioned. As mentioned in the previous note, he interprets the term “weaving” as creating a connection. In this halachah, he gives examples of how creating a connection between two fabrics causes one to be liable.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Kilayim 9: 10), the Rambam explains that the sack or the basket causes the two fabrics to be considered as one. It is forbidden to carry the sack or basket on one’s back, lest it be considered that one is benefiting from mixed fabrics.
This follows Rav Kappach’s amended text of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah. The standard printed text follows a slightly different version.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid. :9), the Rambam explains that we are speaking about attaching a thread of wool to one side of a leather strap and a thread of linen to the other. Since the two fabrics are connected, the Scriptural prohibition is involved. See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 300:5) which takes a somewhat more lenient position.

According to Scriptural Law, on a linen garment, the white strands of the tzitzit should be made from linen, while the techeilet (sky-blue) threads should be made from wool dyed that color using the blood of a chilazon. According to Rabbinic decree, safeguards should be taken and mixed fabrics should not be used for tzitzit.

Menachot 39a.

Deuteronomy 22: 11.

lbid.:12.

I.e., it is not necessary that the fabrics be spun and smoothed out together.

Unlike the laws ofkashrut, concerning which a forbidden substance can become betal, of no consequence, if the kosher substance is greater than it according to Scriptural Law, and 60 times its size according to Rabbinic Law, there is no such leniency in this instance.
Tosafot (Nidah 61 b) explains the rationale for this ruling. Generally, a forbidden entity can become nullified, because it is of no consequence when compared to the kosher substance into which it is mixed. Such logic does not apply in this instance, because there is no prohibited object to be nullified. Both the linen and the wool are pennitted. Hence, they remain significant no matter how small an amount there is.
Rabbenu Asher quotes this explanation, but questions it, noting that seemingly the same concepts apply with regard to a mixture of milk and meat. Both of them are permitted; it is their mixture that is forbidden and yet, one can become beta! if there is 60 times the presence of the other substance. Rabbenu Asher, however, distinquishes between the two instances. In a mixture of milk and meat, what is significant is the flavor of the food. Hence, if the flavor of either the milk or meat can be detected, it is forbidden. If not, it is permitted. In the case of a mixture of fabrics, the existence of the mixed fabrics itself is what is forbidden. Hence, since neither are forbidden, they cannot become nullified. See Siftei Cohen 299: I and Turei Zahav 299: l who also discuss this concept. See also Halachah _27 which explains what should be done to detect a thread that is kilayim.

The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that this is not a contradiction to the previous halachah. Indeed, were one to have separate threads of sheep’s wool, the garment would be forbidden even if they were mixed with many times their sum of camel wool threads. For the sheep’s wool threads are never nullified. In this instance, however, there is room for leniency, because there are no sheep’s wool threads. As the threads are being made, the sheep’s wool is combined with the camel’s wool and since the majority is camel’s wool, it is the determining factor.

I.e., of leather, not of wool.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s rationale, explaining that it runs contrary to the principle stated in Halachah 5. He follows his thesis stated previously - see the notes to Halachah 2 - that according to Scriptural Law, mixed fabrics are only forbidden when they are smoothed into an even mass, spun, and woven together. If only one of those activities is performed, the.prohibition is merely Rabbinical. In this instance, there is only one activity. Hence the prohibition is Rabbinical and since the amount of woolen strands is not substantial, there is room for leniency.
The Radbaz supports the Rambam’s rationale, explaining that the fundamental point here is that the strands of wool are not threads. Hence, they are not of significance and the laws of mixed fabrics do not apply regarding them.

And thus they do not touch each other.

See Halachah 3.

With regard to tzitzit, tying causes the garment to be considered as kilayim, because the wool and the linen are themselves tied together. In this instance, by contrast, the linen is not tied to the wool, but rather tied around it like a belt [Tur (Yoreh De'ah 300)].

Surrounding both garments, but not tying the two together. Even though he cannot remove either of the garments without untying the knot, it is permitted. See Siftei Cohen 300:10.

I.e., tie the linen and woolen garments together.

I.e., there is no prohibition against benefiting from them.

I.e., covering oneself with a blanket made from both linen and wool.

I.e., blankets or sheets spread on the floor or on furniture.

Our translation is taken from Rav Kapach’s notes to the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Kilayim 9:2) who interprets the Arabic term the Rambam employs as referring to cushions one places behind his back for support.
The Ra’avad cites the Jerusalem Talmud (Kilayim 9:1) which qualifies the leniency, stating that it applies only when the pillows and cushions are solid. If they are stuffed, they are forbidden lest they become wound around a person’s flesh. This view is also cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 30 I: I).

.e., there must be something else interposing between one’s flesh and the kilayim.

Note the gloss of the Radbaz who explains why the Rambam deviates slightly from the wording used in his source, Beitzah 14b.

Our translation is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Kilayim 9:6). The slippers were worn to walk on cushions and spreads and not for the person’s own benefit.

The Radbaz asks: Since the person is not benefiting from wearing the slipper, what difference does it make whether it has a heel or not? He explains that if the slippers have heels, they appear as functional garments and hence, it is forbidden to wear them if they contain kilayim.
Alternatively, if they have a heel, it is impossible that they will not warm one’s feet. The Kessef Mishneh states that indeed even if the slippers have heels, it is permitted to wear them. The Rambam mentions slippers without heels, only because that was the kind of slippers worn at the time.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 301:13) quotes this law also with regard to wearing slippers like rubbers that are kilayim.

I.e., draped over their legs.

As mentioned above, the prohibition against kilayim is twofold: not to wear them and not to have them come upon one's person. It is forbidden to wear kilayim under any circumstances (see Halachah 18), but it is forbidden to have them come upon one's person only if one benefits [Yevamot 4b; Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 301)]. In this instance, although he may actually benefit from the kilayim, since he does not have the intent to benefit, the benefit is not significant. See the notes to Halachah 18.

Our translation is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Kilayim 9:5).

So that the kilayim will not be draped over their bodies at all.

I.e., draped over their shoulders and thus they are carrying the garments that are kilayim on their bodies.

I.e., holding the hot egg will warm the cloth which in tum will warm his hands.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, noting that the Babylonian Talmud (Beitzah 16a) rules that there is no prohibition in a similar instance. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh show a source for the Rambam’s ruling in the Jerusalem Talmud (Kilayim 9:3) and explain that there is no contradiction between that ruling and the passage from Beitzah.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro connects this ruling to the concepts explained in Halachah 16. Wearing kilayim is forbidden under all circumstances, he explains, even if one does not receive any benefit. When, however, kilayim merely “come upon” one’s body, there is no prohibition when one does not derive benefit. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 301:5), he quotes the Rambam’s ruling.
The Tur and the Rama follow the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that even wearing kilayim is permitted, provided one does not intend to benefit from wearing them. This touches on an issue of a larger scope: Whether a prohibited activity that is not perfonned with the intent to benefit is forbidden or not. The Rambam apparently maintains that it is forbidden, while Rabbenu Asher maintains that it is permissible. This explanation is, however, difficult, for in Hilchot Shabbat I :5, the Rambam rules that according to Scriptural Law, there is no prohibition when one performs an act without an intent to benefit. The Radbaz explains that there is a difference of opinion concerning this matter among the Sages. Since the prohibitions of the Sabbath are regarded seriously by people at large, in that context, the Rambam did not worry about taking the more lenient position. The laws regarding kilayim are not considered as severe. Hence he felt it necessary to take a more stringent position. See also the Turei Zahav 301 :7 and the Siftei Cohen 301:8 who offer explanations of the Rambam’s view.

I.e., if one’s personal garments are not subject to customs duty, but merchandise is, one might desire to wear garments of kilayim that were meant to be sold so that they will not be considered as merchandise and thus he would avoid paying customs duty for them. See Rav Kapach’s edition of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Kilayim 9:2). See Hilchot Gezeilah 5:11-12 on which basis it can be derived when it is permitted to deceive a customs inspector and when doing so is forbidden.

The Turei Zahav 300:11 maintains that we are speaking about a permanent knot, i.e. a double knot, even though the Beit Yosef states that one knot is sufficient for there to be a prohibition involved.

Since they are tied together, they considered as connected and part of one garment.

For his hand will be warmed by them (Siftei Cohen 300:12). Even though he does not intend to benefit from the activity, it is still forbidden as above. As in Halachah 18, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 300:6) follows the Rambam’s view, while the Rama follows the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who grants leniency in such a situation.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Kilayim 9:3).

Here the Rambam uses a slightly different interpretation than that found in his Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.).

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam explains this term as referring to the cloths which a person holds when reading from the Torah.

The cloth a barber puts on the shoulders of the person receiving a haircut (ibid.).

In his initial version of his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.; which is followed in the standard printed version of the text), the Rambam rules that there is no prohibition involved in these instances. Later, however, based on the ruling of the Jerusalem Talmud, he changed his mind and forbade them for the reason given here.

In the Talmudic era, laundry tickets were made of small fragments of cloth. If they were kilayim, there would be a difficulty involved.

This concept also has ramifications with regard to the laws of ritual purity. If they are connected so loosely and an object that conveys impurity touches one, the other does not become impure, nor is one liable for separating them on the Sabbath [Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Kilayim 9: 10)].

In the above source, the Rambam explains that if the two cloths are pulled in opposite directions, they will separate effortlessly.

The bracketed additions are made on the basis of the commentary of the Rav Ovadiah of Bartenura to the above mishnah and the Turei Zahav 300:3. It appears from the Rambam, that he changed his understanding of the mishnah slightly, for there he interprets the two clauses as complementing each other and describing the same circumstance. Here, however, he describes them as two separate instances.

The Radbaz notes that in Hilchot Shabbat l0:9, the Rambam rules that for a person to be liable, in addition to sewing two stitches, he must tie the threads in a knot. He explains that the laws of the Sabbath are stricter than those applying to kilayim. For one to be liable on the Sabbath, one must perform a labor that has a permanent effect, while to be liable for kilayim, all that is necessary is that the two garments be connected at the time.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 300:2) quotes the ruling of the Rambam. The Tur and the Rama follow the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that to be liable, one must tie the two threads.

Tosafot, Niddah 61b, notes that we must be careful not to wear tzitzit in the presence of a corpse lest this be considered as “mocking the poor,” i.e., mocking the dead who can no longer observe the mitzvot [see Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 23:4)]. Nevertheless, wrapping a corpse in a garment that is forbidden is not considered as mockery, because since the person is not deriving benefit, even during his lifetime, there would be no prohibition. The OrZerua, Vol. II,sec.421, emphasizesthatevenaftertheresurrectionofthedead, there will be no difficulty with the dead being clothed in kilayim, for in that future era, the observance of mitzvot will be nullified.

Provided it is obvious in contrast to Halachah 27.

For it is firm and thus, as stated in Halachah 13, will not become wound around his body.

For this is “bringing kilayim upon oneself.” Furthermore, we cannot say that he is doing this unintentionally, because he is using the saddle-blankets to protect himself from being sullied by the compost.

This situation resembles the sellers of clothing mentioned in Halachah 16.

See Halachot 6-7 above which emphasize that a thread of shaatnez can never become nullified.

Hilchot lssurei Bi’ah 18:17. See also Hilchot Sha ‘ar Avot HaTumah 16:1.

The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam on this point. He agrees that according to Scriptural Law, one is not liable in a situation of doubt, but maintains that our Sages required us to be stringent when there is a doubt. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh agree with the Ra’avad in principle, but explain the Rambani’s words as follows: Because all that is involved is a Rabbinic prohibition and this is an exceptional and abnormal situation, our Sages granted leniency.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 302:1) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Tur and the Ramah follow the approach of the Ra’avad and allow leniency only when the prohibition against kilayim is Rabbinic in origin.

This law is relevant at the present time as well, because the thread and the lining of garments are often made from linen. For this reason, Sha’atnez laboratories have been established in most major cities to examine garments to see if they contain linen.

Despite the embarrassment it might cause, because every moment he wears it, he transgresses the prohibition against kilayim.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 303:1) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Tur and the Rama maintain that this ruling applies only when the person is conscious of. the transgression he is performing. If, however, he performs the violation unintentionally, the garment should not be removed from him in public.

Whom he is obligated to honor (Hilchot Talmud Torah, ch. 5).

Berachot 19b quotes Proverbs 21:30: “There is no wisdom; there is no understanding; and there is no counsel against God” and concludes: “Wherever there is a desecration of God’s name (i.e., the transgression of a prohibition in public), deference is not granted to a master’s honor.’’

I.e., the Torah forbids ignoring the lost object and not trying to return it to its owner (Hilchot Gezeilah Va'Aveidah 11:1). Nevertheless, if the person who discovers the lost object is a Torah scholar and it is compromising to his honor to return it, he is not required to do so (ibid.:13).

A person can waive his colleague's obligation to him with regard to financial matters. Hence, we assume that he would waive return of the article in consideration of the Sages' honor.

I.e., a priest who is ordinarily forbidden to come in contact with the ritual impurity resulting from a human corpse (Hilchot Evel 3:1) must bury a corpse that has no one else to bury it (ibid.:8).

He is commanded to become impure for the burial of all his immediate relatives with the exception of his married sister (Leviticus 21:3).

Berachot, loc. cit.

I.e., one of the 365 prohibitions in the Torah forbids us from deviating from the commands of the Sages [Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 312) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 496), Hilchot Mamrim 1:2].

For it is considered as if he violated only one transgression.

Provided he received a warning each time (Kessef Mishneh ).

Although a person who violates a prohibition without committing a deed is not liable for lashes, there is a difference in this instance, because wearing the garment is considered as committing a deed (Ritba, as quoted by Kessef Mishneh).

It is not considered as if he did not perform a deed when committing this transgression, because as in the previous halachah, wearing the garment itself can be considered a deed. Moreover, when a person dresses a colleague, the person being dressed helps to some degree. That is sufficient a deed to warrant lashes (Kessef Mishneh).

See Hilchot Rotzeach 12:14 which interprets this phrase from Leviticus 19:14 as a prohibition against causing a person who is unaware to commit a spiritually undesirable act.

In one of his Responsa (Klal 2, Responsum 16), Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that there is no prohibition involved other than “placing a stumbling block in front of the blind” and one is not liable for lashes for violating that prohibition since it is of a general scope.
The Radbaz explains that the Rambam considers the prohibition against Kilayim as also applicable to a person dressing a colleague. He questions, however, why the Rambam does not rule in a similar manner in Hilchot Nizirut 5:20.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam concerning this point, maintaining that as long as the priests are in the Temple, it is permitted for them to wear the priestly garments.

See Hilchot K’Lei HaMikdash 8:1, I 1. The Ra’avad questions why the Rambam singles out the sash, other priestly garments (e.g., the choshen and the ephod) also contain kilayim. The Kessef Mishneh states that the Rambam chose to highlight a garment used by an ordinary priest, not one used by the High Priest.

And the observance of a positive commandment supercedes that of a negative commandment.

As stated in Halachah 15, according to Scriptural Law, there is no minimal requirement for the amount of grain one must leave.

I.e., ideally, the mitzvah of pe’ah is fulfilled by leaving a portion of one’s field unharvested and allow the poor to harvest it. See Pe’ah 4: 1.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 12.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 210) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 217) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

I.e., harvests by cutting off produce above its roots.

I.e., harvests by pulling the plant up by its roots.

I.e., he can compensate for his initial failure to fulfill the mitzvah by giving some of the produce already harvested.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 120) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 216) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

As explained in Halachah 9, the term “stranger” refers to a convert to Judaism.

If, however, his crops were destroyed before he harvested them, he is not liable.

Otherwise, he should give the pe’ah. By doing so, he corrects the transgression he performed previously.
The wording used by the Rambam clarifies his approach with regard to a difference of opinion among our Sages (Makkot 16b). Rabbi Yochanan says that for a person to be liable for the transgression of a negative commandment that can be corrected by a positive commandment, he must personally perform an action that prevents the positive commandment from being fulfilled. Resh Lakish differs and maintains that as long as he no longer has the opportunity of fulfilling the mitzvah, he is liable for the transgression. From the wording here, it appears that the Rambam follows the second view.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 1, for more details concerning leket.

The Hebrew terms imply both harvesting with a sickle or reaping by hand.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 211) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 219) include this commandment among the 6 I 3 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 121) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 218) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

I.e., the negative commandment can be corrected by the positive commandment, as stated in the previous halachah.

This term is more specifically defined in Chapter 4, Halachah 15.

This term is more specifically defined in Chapter 4, Halachot 17-18.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 212) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 221) include the prohibition against harvesting underdeveloped clusters of grapes among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 123) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 220) include the commandment to leave them for the poor in that grouping.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 213) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 223) include the prohibition against gathering individual grapes that fall among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 124) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 222) include the commandment to leave them for the poor in that grouping.

More details concerning this mitzvah are found in Chapter 5, Halachah I.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 214) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 593) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 122) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 592) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The prooftext speaks about forgetting “a sheaf in the field.” Nevertheless, the Sifri interprets the word “field” as indicating that standing grain in a field is also included in the prohibition.

One of the ways of harvesting olives is to beat the trees so that the olives fall.

The above translates the halachic construct tovat hana’ah. The intent is that the owner cannot say: “I will give the produce to the poor, but let me choose the poor man to whom I desire to give it.”

For when commanding that these presents be given, the Torah does not use the word “give,” but rather “leave.” Implied is that all the owner can do is leave it; he cannot take it and give it to a person at will ( see Chullin 13 lb).

I.e., and not a non-Jew visiting Eretz Yisrael even if he accepts the Seven Universal Laws Commanded to Noach’s Descendants (ager toshav).

Our translation is based on manuscript copies and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. There is a printing error in the standard published text.

The Radbaz interprets the Rambam’s wording as ~mplying that if gentiles come alone, not in the company of Jews, they should be sent away. Rav Y osef Corcus adds that if there are no Jewish poor, these presents should not be left for the gentile poor.

Even the owner of the field. See the notes to Halachah 134 regarding this issue.

This halachah gives examples that illustrate the general principle stated in the previous halachah.

For as stated in Halachah 14, according to Scriptural Law, this is the only place of consequence for these presents.

From this time onward, the olive-picking season is completed.

The early winter rain which follows the spring rain.

I.e., the Jewish calendar follows the moon, while the secular calendar follows the sun. Although adjustments are made to keep the two in sync, there are years when the Jewish months come earlier in the solar year and others when they come later.

And ordinary people may not.

For the appropriate time has already passed.

For the poor might still consider collecting it.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling, stating that it does not agree with the R:ambam’s source, Pe’ah 7:2. Indeed, in his own Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam offers a different interpretation than here. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s ruling here is dependent on his understanding of the treatment of the subject by the Jerusalem Talmud.

The Aruch HaShulchan interprets this as referring to produce that the poor have walked by several times without picking up.

Since they are ownerless, he acquires them by virtue of their presence in his property.

The boundaries of Eretz Yisrael are outlined in Hilchot Terumah, ch. l .

The emphasis of the terms “your land” and “your field” is land that has an inherent connection with the Jewish people.

This phrase introduces a conclusion developed by the Rambam on the basis of deduction without an explicit source in previous Rabbinic literature.

In this context, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 332: 1) states: “If Jewish poor are not commonly found there, it is not necessary to leave [these presents].” (Significantly, the commentaries cite the Rambam, apparently Halachah 10, as the source.) The Rama continues, stating that on this basis, it is no longer customary to leave these presents, because the likelihood is that they will be taken by gentiles. The statements of the Siftei Cohen 332: 1 imply that this leniency is granted only in the Diaspora and not in Eretz Yisrael. There is, however, a difference of opinion concerning this issue and, in practice, even within the observant community, these mitzvot are not observed today even in Eretz Yisrael. For these reasons, the laws concerning these mitzvot are not included in the Shulchan’ Aruch.

Because it is too small an amount to be significant.

I.e., one can give as much as he desires. This is the intent of the mishnah recited each morning after the Blessings for Torah Study: “These are the matters for which there are no measure: pe’ah, bikkurim, appearing in the Temple, and Torah study,” i.e., just like all the other subjects mentioned in that source, there is no upper limit to how much pe’ah one may leave.