Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

And since they are allowed, they are obligated.

For he is not returning it as a favor to him, but instead, in fulfillment of the Torah’s command [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah {Nedarim 4:2)].

Or, in the present age, to charity. This is preferable to destroying it.

I.e., he will be returning it for the sake of the reward and not for the sake of the . mitzvah (ibid.).

For ordinarily the person would pay a reward for the return of the lost article.

Technically, the other person has a share in these places, for they are owned communally. Nevertheless, since each person's individual share is so small, these places are considered as if they are ownerless and not as communal property (see Nedarim 5:4).

I.e., a well built for the pilgrims’ journey to Jerusalem from Babylon for the pilgrimage festivals (ibid.).

For in this instance, each person’s share is greater and more distinct.
The Ramban and the Ran object to the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that this ruling does not apply with regard to an entity like a synagogue that cannot be divided. In such an instance, it is considered as a communal entity and the person who took the vow is allowed to make use of it. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 224:1) quotes both views. See the Lechem Mishneh and the Turei Zahav 224: 1 who elaborate in support of the Rambam’s position.

The leader of the Jewish people. He is mentioned, because it is very unlikely that he will forbid a member of the people from using his property (Nedarim 48a).

I.e., the person acquiring the portion need not know about his acquisition. We follow the principle that a person. can acquire property without his knowledge if it is to his benefit to do so (see Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:2).

In the Talmudic era, it was common that several houses would open up to a courtyard that was the combined property of the homeowners. In this halachah, we are speaking of an instance where two of those homeowners took vows forbidding them to benefit from each other.

See Hilchot Shechenim 2:1 which states that if after the division of a courtyard, each of the homeowners will receive a plot of land four cubits by four cubits as his individual property, the courtyard should be divided if one of the neighbors requests that this be done.

Rabbenu Nissim explains this ruling based on the principle of bereirah, i.e., retroactively, it becomes apparent that when he enters the courtyard, he is entering property that was designated as his. We are forced to accept this definition (even though generally, the principle of bereirah is not followed in questions of Scriptural Law), for there is no alternative in this instance. The person has a right to the courtyard and he cannot be forbidden from using his own property. See the rulings of Siftei Cohen 226:4, Turei Zahav 226: 1.

Whether it cannot be divided or whether it can be divided, but was not divided yet.

Bava Batra 57b relates that partners in a courtyard have the right to prevent each other from performing such activities. Although most partners do not exercise this right, in this instance, by failing to exercise the right, one is providing benefit to the other person (Rabbenu Nissim).

I.e., a courtyard too small for the owners to divide.

His vow imposes unnecessary hardship on the other person who has a legitimate right to the property. Hence, we compel him to sell his share of the courtyard rather than put his colleague in a situation where he might transgress.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 226:2) states that the person who took the vow is forbidden to enter the courtyard. The rationale is that the Rambam’ s understanding is accepted, except that an additional stringency is applied, lest the person remain in the courtyard for other purposes besides entering and departing his home (Siftei Cohen 226: 10).

We do not force him to sell his portion of the courtyard because he is causing difficulty only to himself and he is willing to abide by his prohibition (Radbaz).
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, citing Nedarim 46a as support for his understanding. He mentions that the Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 5:2) appears to support the Rambam’s interpretation, but states that we should abide by the principle that whenever there is a difference of opinion between the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds, the perspective of the Babylonian Talmud should be followed. See the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh who try to reconcile the differences in the positions of the two Talmuds. As mentioned, the Shulchan Aruch follows the Rambam’s understanding, but is even more stringent.

This is speaking about a courtyard that is too small to require division (Radbaz).

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 226: 1) states that this applies only when the other owner of the courtyard needs that person. Otherwise, he is forbidden to enter.

For thus he is suffering a loss every time he deals with them.

For they are suffering a loss every time they deal with him.

As a decree was made with regard to an individual. See Chapter 6, Halachah 16.

I.e., with regard to one individual, there is room for stringency, but this stringency is not required with regard to an entire nation, for there is (Radbaz).

I.e., we do not make a decree like we do with regard to an individual (Siftei Cohen 227:7).

For one of them, either they or he will be benefiting from the sale.

For this is a benefit that he is receiving.

For when a sage releases a vow, it is as if it never existed. Hence, it is as if he were never forbidden to approach the sage. See Chapter 4, Halachah 13, and notes.

Leket refers to crops that drop from a reaper's hand in the field. He is forbidden to pick them up again, but instead must leave them for the poor (Leviticus 19:10). Shichechah refers to crops or bundles forgotten in the field by accident. The harvesters may not return and collect, but must instead leave them for the poor (Deut. 24:19). Pe'ah refers to a corner of the field which must be left unharvested, so that it could be harvested by the poor (Lev. 19:9).

In the third year of the six-year agricultural, instead of taking the second tithe to be eaten in Jerusalem in a state of holiness, it is given to the poor (Deuteronomy 14:28; Hilchot Matnot Aniyim ch. 6). The person who took the vow is allowed to benefit from these crops, because the owner of the field is not considered as giving him anything of his own. Instead, he is fulfilling a mitzvah.

Nedarim 83-84a explains this distinction. When the tithe for the poor is distributed in the granaries, it may be taken by a poor person without asking. The owner does not have the right to decide to whom he will give it. If, however, he has already brought produce from the tithe for the poor home, he has the right to choose to whom to give it.

I.e., the tithes that must be given to the Levites and terumah which must be given to the priests.

Since he. is obligated to give these presents to the priests and Levites, he has no choice in the matter and must make these gifts. Generally, a person is allowed to decide to which Levite and which priest, he desires to give these gifts. In this instance, however, since he forbade all priests from benefiting from his property, there is no one to whom he can give it. Hence his right to decide “is taken from him and any priest or Levite can come and take the portions.

Since the terumah and tithes may be given to others, there is no reason to take away the person’s right to distribute them as he desires, for that right is of financial value (Nedarim 84b).

E.g., those mentioned in the previous halachah. See Siftei Cohen 227:9 and Turei Zahav 227:3 who rule that this concept also applies with regard to charity.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 221:8) is even more lenient and states that he may say: “Anyone who sustains so-and-so will not suffer a loss,” for he is still merely intimating that one should support him. He may not say: “Whoever hears my voice should sustain so-and-so,” for that it a direct command. Nor may he tell one person: “If you sustain so-’and-so, you will not suffer a loss,” for then it appears as if he is appointing him as an agent for this. purpose.

Since the person did not charge the storekeeper with providing -the colleague with food, he is not responsible for the account [Rama (Yoreh De’ah 221:8)]. If he, nevertheless, chooses to pay it, he is not considered to have given benefit to that colleague.

The Kessef Mishneh states that the two instances are not entirely analogous, for the first involves providing the person with food necessary for his livelihood, while the second involves the performance of a task that is important, but not vital for him. Perhaps this is the reason why in the preceding halachah, the Rambam stated: “The person may go to a storekeeper,” i.e., he is permitted to do so as an initial and preferred option. In this halachah, by contrast, he states: “If the person ... approached workers,” i.e., the Rambam is describing a law that applies after the fact, but not initially.

The Radbaz explains that although the previous law was mentioned, it is also necessary to state this law, because it is uncommon for workers to extend credit on money due them. This is, by contrast, a common practice for storekeepers.

Chapter 6, Halachah 4.

I.e., a person who took a vow not to benefit from a person and that person.

Giving a present is not permitted in the situations described in the previous halachot, because there are other alternatives. Hence it is considered as too great a leniency. In this situation, there is no other alternative and therefore it is permitted. See the gloss of Siftei Cohen 221 :52.

Generally, according to Rabbinic Law, there must be three people present when an object is declared ownerless. In this instance, however, since there is no other alternative, we do not require anything more than required by Scriptural Law (Siftei Cohen 221:53).

For then he is not partaking of the property of the person from whom he is forbidden to benefit, but from ownerless property.

For he is obviously making this gift solely so that the other person may partake of it. If it is a large feast, it is obvious that a person is not preparing it for the sake of giving it to a colleague. Nedarim 48b gives as an example, an instance where a person’s father was forbidden to benefit from him. When he made a wedding feast for his son, he tried to employ this tactic to enable his father to attend.

The Kessef Mishneh states that there are opinions that maintain that this law applies only when the statements were made immediately after giving the feast. The wording chosen by the Rambam, however, indicates that the law applies even if he makes the statements later. The interpretation of the Kessef Mishneh is borne out by the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 5:5).

I.e., the giver tells the recipient: “I did not give you the present so that you could consecrate it.”
Nedarim, Zoe. cit., states this principle in continuation of the above story. After the son gave the wedding feast to a colleague so that his father could attend, that colleague consecrated it. When the giver protested, saying that he had not given it to him for that purpose, the recipient complained that he was not going to serve as a medium to allow the first person to break his vow. When the Sages were asked to rule about this situation, they stated the principle mentioned by the Rambam here.

I.e., we do not say that since the first recipient is going to give it to the second, thes_econd acquires it when it is acquired by the first. This is not a situation where the first recipient is acting as an agent for the second. Instead, he acquires it first on his own behalf and then transfers it to the other person.

The first does not acquire it, because it was given to him only on condition that it be transferred to the second. Since that condition was not fulfilled, his own acquisition is not binding (see Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 3:6). The second person does not acquire it, because ownership was never transferred to him.

Ordinarily, whatever a woman acquires is immediately given to her husband’s jurisdiction. While she remains the legal owner, he has the legal right to control it and use the profits as he sees fit. In this instance, this would be forbidden, for the son-in-law is prohibited against benefiting from his father-in-law, as the Rambam states in the conclusion of the halachah.

If he gives her the food itself, it is not necessary to make any stipulations (Radbaz, Siftei Cohen 222: 1 ).

Tosafot Yorn Tov (Nedarim 11 :8) states that Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 3: 13 appears to indicate that the inclusion of this part of the statement is not an absolute necessity. As Jong as he specifies that the present is being given for a specific purpose alone, the husband does not acquire rights to it. Rav Y osef Caro does not accept this option, however, in his Kessef Mishneh and quotes the Rambam’s wording from this halachah in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 222: 1; see Siftei Cohen 222:2).

Since the father has designated the money for a specific purpose, it may be used only for that and thus the son never acquires a right t9 it. The rationale is closely related to the concept of a vow. Just as a vow can determine how property may be used even after it leaves the domain of the person who took the vow, so, too, the father can determine how his property may be used even after it leaves his domain. This ruling teaches that even though it is to the husband’s benefit that his wife eats or is clothed - indeed, he is responsible to provide for these needs of hers - the husband is not considered to have benefited from this present (the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Nedarim 11 :8).

In this instance, even though the specific purpose for which the present was given was not stated at the outset, when the woman decides what she desires to do with the present, retroactively, it is as if it was given for that purpose alone.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam concerning this point, noting that although the law stated in the first clause is accepted by all authorities, the one stated in this clause is the subject of a difference of opinion between the Sages Rav and Shmuel in Nedarim 88b. The Rambam’s ruling follows the opinion of Shmuel although generally, with regard to matters involving the Torah’s prohibitions, the halachah follows that of Rav. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh state that other Rishonim also follow Shmuel’s perspective and give logical support for it. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 222:1) quotes both views without stating which should be followed.

See Hile hot Zechiyah UMatanah 3: 13. The rationale is that the giver does not have the prerogative of negating the rights given the husband by the Rabbis.

Nevertheless, the present is binding. The husband should purchase something that brings income with the money. That article belongs to his wife. He should give the proceeds to charity, since he is not allowed to benefit from them (Radbaz)

He need not seek the release of the oath (Radbaz). This law applies with regard to vows as well.

Even though the father dies or repents after the vow was taken, with his death or repentance, the vow is nullified, because the conditions under which it was taken no longer apply.

If, however, she was ugly at the time the vow was taken, but was made beautiful, the vow takes effect [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 232:6)].

See Chapter 4, Halachah 1, which states that such vows are not binding.

As described in the first two halachot.

I.e., the previous halachah describes an instance where one explicitly stated the condition under which he took the vow. This halachah, by contrast, describes a situation where the condition is not stated, but is self-apparent.

Which would cause them to be forbidden to eat the figs.

And thus the vow was taken in error.

And everyone in the city needs the scribe to compose legal documents for him. Hence, he no longer desires to be forbidden to benefit from him.

And everyone desires to be able to enter the local synagogue.

Hilchot Sh ‘vuot 6:5, 12. As stated there, the vow was not made initially in error, for at the outset, he did not desire that the person become the scribe. Hence, the oath takes effect. The Ra’avad suggests that the statement from Halachah 3: “This does not resemble an instance where the vow was made dependent on a stipulation and that stipulation was not kept” should be included here, for this is a different category of vows than those mentioned in the previous halachot.

The Jerusalem Talmud, Nedarim 1:1 derives this principle based on the exegesis of Numbers 30:3: “He shall do all that he utters from his mouth.” Implied is that everything that he utters must be fulfilled or the vow does not take effect. Rabbenu Nissim gives a logical explanation for this concept. At the outset, his intent was that the vow would be kept in its entirety. If a factor arose that prevented that from talcing place, it is as if the vow was taken in error.

As explained in Halachah 4.

Because the prohibition against them was mentioned in the same vow.

Because the vow was taken against all of the persons together. Hence, it cannot be nullified only in part.

For even when qualifying his statement, he still says that all of the individuals are forbidden, indicating that he did not desire to retract his original statement (Kessef Mishneh). In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 232:8), Rav Yosef Caro appears to follow a slightly different rationale.

I.e., that the prohibition would not include his father.

I.e., forbidden.

The portion of the vow involving vintage wine is nullified, because it was taken in error. And accordingly, the portion involving fresh wine is also nullified, based on the principle stated in the previous halachah.

For he did not seek to nullify his former vow, merely to qualify it, as stated in the conclusion of the previous halachah.

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 218:1) emphasizes that this applies when a person takes a vow on his own initiative. If, however, he takes a vow in response to wording chosen by a colleague, we follow the meaning of that wording.

For it is desirable that a person marry his relatives (see Yevamot 62b).

The Radbaz states that he is even permitted to enter his home at the time of the feast.

For it is no longer the colleague’s house or field (Siftei Cohen 216:10).

As emphasized by the fact that he said: “Your house” and “Your field.”

For in this instance, the vow was not associated with the owner of the property, but with the property itself. Compare to Chapter 5, Halachot 4-5.

As an expression of resentment for the owner’s refusal (Kessef Mishneh).

Since he is accustomed to plowing his field himself, we assume that his vow applied only to his own actions.

Since he is not accustomed to plowing his field himself, we interpret his vow as meaning that he would never have another person plow the field with it.

Although the standard published text of Bava Kama 80a mentions purchasing a house or marrying a woman in Eretz Yisrael, the commentaries [nor the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 219:1)] see no reason why the Holy Land is different from other places in this regard.

By giving me a present in public.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 332:20) states that the person who administered the vow need not explicitly agree to this interpretation. Even if he remains silent, we accept it. The Siftei Cohen 332:46 states that if the person specifically says that he administered the vow so that he would receive honor by having the other person receive a gift from him, his word is accepted and a sage must be approached to have the vow released.

For people seeing that I demur will respect me more.
1. The Rambam’s rationale is that since everything depends on the person’s intent, it is logical to assume that the meaning of his statements follows the usage common at that time and place. See also Halachah 13. One might ask: If so, why in the halachot that follow does the Rambam set out guidelines with regard to vows. The Radbaz (in his gloss to Halachah 13) explains that these guidelines should be followed only in places where there is no clarity regarding the expressions commonly used. 2. I.e., boiled without spices (Rav Avraham MinHaHar). 3. Although the Rambam’s ruling runs contrary to the statements of the Mishnah (Nedarim 6:2), the Rambam relies on the principle that the determinant factor in values is the meaning attached to the terms used by people at that time and in that place. The ShulchanAruch (Yoreh De’ah 217:3) follows the Rambam’s approach.

The Rambam's rationale is that since everything depends on the person's intent, it is logical to assume that the meaning of his statements follows the usage common at that time and place. See also Halachah 13.
One might ask: If so, why in the halachot that follow does the Rambam set out guidelines with regard to vows. The Radbaz (in his gloss to Halachah 13) explains that these guidelines should be followed only in places where there is no clarity regarding the expressions commonly used.

I.e., boiled without spices (Rav Avraham MinHaHar).

Although the Rambam’s ruling runs contrary to the statements of the Mishnah (Nedarim 6:2), the Rambam relies on the principle that the determinant factor in values is the meaning attached to the terms used by people at that time and in that place. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 217:3) follows the Rambam’s approach.

Here too, the Rambam’s ruling runs contrary to the statements of the Mishnah (Nedarim 6:2), because he relies on the principle that the determinant factor in values is the meaning attached to the terms used by people at that time and in that place. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 217:3) again follows the Rambam’s approach.

Since there is a possibility that a prohibition is involved, we must rule stringently.

For corporal punishment is inflicted only when we are certain that a prohibition has been violated.

I.e., he is not certain whether the principal’s intent when telling him to buy meat was to buy fish or not.

For in that locale, it is possible that it is referred to as “meat.”

For they are generally referred to as meat.

For they are not. In the present age, this principle also applies to fish. The Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 217:8) goes further and states that even fowl is not usually implied by the term “meat.”

The commentaries have noted that the Rambam’s ruling is not entirely identical with that of his source (Nedarim 54a). In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Chui/in 8:1), the Rambam explains this difficulty, stating that the meanings of terms used today are different than the meanings used for the same terms in the Talmudic period.

See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 6:1).

This is the implication of the Hebrew term used by the Rambam [Bayit Chadash (Yoreh De’ah 217)].

E.g., porridge (the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.). See also Hilchot Berachot 3:4 which discusses these terms.

See the Rambam’s Commentary to the. Mishnah (Nedarim 6:3).

In the Talmudic and Rabbinic era, most hard cheeses were salted to preserve them.

The term chittim is plural, implying many kernels of grain. Chitah is singular, referring not to a single kernel, but rather to· a single entity made from wheat flour (Rabbenu Nissim, as cited by the Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., wheat, barley, rye, oats, and spelt. Other grains, e.g., rice and millet, are not included.

For in Talmudic terminology, the term green vegetable refers to vegetables that are eaten raw and squash must be cooked.

Since these two species of vegetables are similar, but not identical, the Rambam feels it necessary to make this clarification. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 5:7), he uses the same Arabic term to define the two species but explains that the latter is more commonly grown in Eretz Yisrael.

For through the cooking ,process, it takes on the flavor of the food (see Berachat 39a; Hi/chat Berachat 8:4). In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 5:8), the Rambam maintains that this is the meaning of the first clause of that mishnah. Rashi and others, while accepting this principle, interpret that clause differently.

For there is obviously a difference between the food and the liquid in which it was cooked.

I.e., ground beans (the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.).

For it has the flavor of the groats.

Not only vegetables, but fruit as well [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 217:23)].

Our Rabbis explain that the terms refer to species that have little botanical difference between them. The first term refers to those mushrooms which grow on the earth and the second, to those which grow in trees. The rationale is that, as the Rambam states, these fungi do not have roots. Thus they do not derive their nurture from the earth, but from the atmosphere (see Nedarim 55b; Hi/chat Ma ‘aser Sheni 7:4).

The Hebrew word peirot can also be interpreted as: “benefit accruing from.” Thus these entities could be included in the term. Nevertheless, since this is not the popular usage, they are not included.

The Siftei Cohen 217:31 explains that this applies only when it is possible for a person to abide by this prohibition. If, however, the vow prevents him from eating enough to maintain his wellbeing, it is nullified.

The term kayitz has a specific meaning “fruit harvested by hand,” rather than cut from the tree with a knife. Therefore, it refers to the fig harvest alone (Nedarim 61b).

As stated in Halachah 1. The Radbaz explains that the only reason the Rambam mentioned all the principles in the above and following halachot is to clarify the guidelines set forth by our Sages. They should be followed only in places where there is no clarity regarding the expressions commonly used.

Even though the wine tastes the same as grapes, since it is called by a different name, it is not considered in the same category (Siftei Cohen 216:27). This principle is reflected in all the rulings of this halachah: As long as an entity has a different name, even if its flavor is the same as another entity and even their substance is fundamentally the same, they are considered as different entities with regard to vows.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 6:6), the Rambam explains that these grapes are not fit to be eaten and instead, are used to produce vinegar.

The substances produced by the fruit are considered as being different from the fruit itself.

Although the Torah uses the term honey to refer to date-honey, in common usage, everyone understands the term as referring to bee honey (Siftei Cohen 217:22).

The Siftei Cohen 21 7: 15 states that in the present age, people do not make such a distinction when referring to these vegetables.

I.e., they are not referred to by the name of the substance as it is used without a modifier.

This term refers to a weave from goat’s hair (the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Nedarim 7:3).

This translation is taken from the above source.

This translation is also taken from the above source. The rationale is that none of these fabrics are considered as garments.

A small bed that is placed before a larger bed to use as a stepstool for the larger bed (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Nedarim 7:4).

The area 2000 cubits around the city. See Hilchot Shabbat 27:1-2.

This term refers to homes that are located within 70 cubits of each other on the perimeter of the city. As long as they are within that distance of another home, they are considered as part of the city itself (Hilchot Shabbat 28:1; the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Nedarim, loc. cit.).

Note the parallel to Hilchot Shechenim 6:5 which states that a person who lives in a city for twelve months becomes obligated to pay all the city’s levies.

See the Rama (Yoreh De’ah 217:32) and the Siftei Cohen 217:37 who emphasize that if the common terminology used at present is different, the laws are dependent on the current usages.

This term refers to people who set out on extended journeys, not on short jaunts.

For they do not remain on an ocean journey forever and ultimately, return home.

Even though they cannot see the sun.

For this term is generally used to refer to men, even if they do not have dark hair.

For they are referred to as being “covered-haired” (Rabbeinu Nissim).

For they are referred to as being “uncovered-haired” (ibid.).

This term refers to the people brought by the Assyrians to settle in Samaria after they exiled the Ten Tribes. At first, they converted and observed the rudiments of Judaism. Afterwards, however, they became like gentiles entirely.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 3:8), the Rambam explains that the Samaritans despise Jerusalem and make their pilgrimages to Mount Gerizim instead. The Merkevat HaMishnah explains that since the Samaritans are converts, they do not have a right to a portion in Eretz Yisrael. Hence they are not obligated to ascend to Jerusalem for the pilgrimage festivals (see Hilchot Ma ‘aser Sheni 11: 15).

Although the Jews are also of Noah’s descendants, they are not popularly referred to with that term.

Although actually, both of these nations descended from Abraham, Yishmael being Abraham’s son and Esau, Isaac’s.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 217:40) states that this includes converts.

Thus excluding Yishmael and his descendants.

Thus excluding Esau and his descendants. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 3:11), the Rambam adds another point. In the covenant God made with Abraham bein habetarim, he was told that his descendants would be “strangers in a foreign land” and only Jacob’s descendants - not those of Esau or Yishmael - were subjected to this decree.

This includes both gentiles who circumcise themselves for health reasons and those - like the Arabs - who circumcise themselves for religious reasons. The rationale is that the majority of gentiles are uncircumcised and the person made his statements with the intent of referring to the majority. See the Commentary of Rav Ovadiah of Bartenura to Nedarim, lac. cit.

For when the term Israelite is used, it refers to the entire Jewish people as a collective. As Yoma 66a states: “Are not the priests part of Your nation Israel?”

Even though the Torah at times identifies the priests as Levites (Deuteronomy 17:9, et al), we follow the wording used by people at large (Radbaz).

Although Yevamot 62b states that grandchildren are considered as children, that is not the meaning employed by people at large (Radbaz) .