Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The qualifications the Rambam mentions here make a distinction between mammon, a financial claim, for which one is liable for a sh‘vuat hapikadon, and k’nas, a fine, for which one is not liable, as stated in the following halachah.

The term literally means “an oath concerning an entrusted object.” Its meaning in a halachic context is explained in this and the subsequent halachot.
If one takes such an oath falsely, he is liable to pay an additional fifth of the principal and bring a guilt offering as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 9.

With regard to other oaths, it is necessary for the person to answer Amen as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 1. Nevertheless, a sh‘vuat hapikadon is a unique instance, as the Rambam continues to explain.

If, however, he remains silent in response to the oath administered by the plaintiff, he is not liable even if he had denied his claim beforehand (Radbaz).

A fine. In Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:8, the Rambam defines a fine as an instance where a person pays more or less than the monetary value of the damage he caused.

See Hilchot Genevah 1:5. See also Chapter 8, Halachot 1-3, for illustrations of this concept.

For he is taking a false oath regarding his past activity.

In contrast to movable property which can be concealed.

In contrast to movable property where possession may determine ownership in a situation of doubt, with regard to landed property, a person must display proof of ownership. See also Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 5:1; Hilchot Gezeilah 8:14; 9:1.

See Hilchot To ‘en V’Nit’an, loc. cit.

Instead, they only serve as proof of an obligation (ibid.).

Note the contrast to an oath concerning testimony (Chapter 9, Halachah 6-7). The gloss of the Torah Temimah to the prooftext explains that since the verse speaks of “deny[ing] his [ obligation to] a colleague,” he is liable whether his colleague demands an oath of him or not.

See Hilchot Shluchim 3:5, 7. See the Lechem Mishneh who emphasizes that the principal must have given the agent power of attorney to require an oath of the defendant. If, however, he merely gave the agent the authority to prosecute the claim, he may not require him to take an oath.

For an oath can be taken in any language. Sotah 33a derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 5: 1.

Neither is one who takes such a false oath liable for lashes for taking a false sh ‘vuat bitui.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 9, which explains that one is liable for a sacrifice whether he transgressed willingly or inadvertently. As stated in the notes to Chapter 1, Halachah 8, one is not liable for lashes either because the transgression does not involve a deed, or because financial compensation must be given and a person is not held liable both for financial restitution and lashes.

Note the contrast to an oath concerning testimony, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah

He is also liable to pay an additional fifth of the principal for each false oath, as stated in Halachah 15.
Since his response included all of them in one statement, it is considered only as one oath.

Since he addressed each one individually, each statement is considered as an independent oath.

Since his response included all of these items in one statement, it is considered only as one oath.

In this instance, were they to have been considered individually, he would be exempt, for since each of the claims are less than a p'rutah, they are not significant individually. Nevertheless, since he included them in one statement, the sum is totaled as one and he is liable.

Since he mentioned each item individually, each statement is considered as an independent oath and it is necessary that each claim concern the worth of a p ‘rutah.

Although they are different species of grain, since he included them all in one statement, he is liable only once. Even though buckwheat is a subspecies of wheat, since it is mentioned individually, he is liable for it individually (Radbaz).

I.e., this combines the principles stated in Halachot 10 and 12.

Similarly, he is liable for a guilt offering for each oath as stated in Halachah 9.

It says chamishitav rather than chamishoto.

This figure can be explained as follows: The principal is four. He must pay an additional three, for each fifth is one fifth of the new total and not one fifth of the original principal (Chapter 11, Halachah 20). He is not, however, required to pay more than one for the second and third oaths, for one is required to pay one fifth of the principal and not a fifth of the fifths (Radbaz).

This principle is also reflected in Hilchot To ‘en V’Nit’an 3:1 and Hilchot Sanhedrin 11. In Hilchot Shekalim 1 :3, the Rambam defines a p‘rutah as half a barleycorn of silver. Shiurei Torah defines this as 1140th of a gram of silver.

For such an oath concerns a financially significant claim and this does not. The Sifra derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 5:26.

For he took a false oath, as in Halachot 2-3.

In which instance, he is obligated to pay five times the value of the ox (Exodus 21:37).

Hilchot Genevah 1 :5. See also Chapter 7, Halachah 2 above.

In which instance, the owner of the ox is liable to pay a fine of 30 shekalim to the owner of the servant (Exodus 21:32).

In which instance, the owner is required to free the servant (Exodus 21:26-27).

For in these instances, the person is not paying the worth of the damage, but an arbitrary amount that could be either more or less.

For he is denying a financial claim. The fact that it also includes a fine is not significant.

I.e., a virgin girl between the ages of three and twelve and a half (Hilchot Na'arah Betulah1:1).

As explained in Hilchot Na'arah Betulah 2:1-2, a person who seduces a girl is required to pay a fine of 50 silver pieces, as stated in Exodus 22:15, for the embarrassment he causes her, and the damages due to her reduction in her value. A rapist must also pay for the pain he causes. The embarrassment and the damages are considered as financial obligations.

For that is a fine.

For the damages (more particularly, the unemployment assessment, the medical fees, and the allocation for embarrassment) he must pay his colleague for the wound are considered as a financial obligation and not as a fine (see Hilchot Chovel UMazik 5:7; Hilchot To’en V’Nitan 1:16).

Here as well, the damages one ox causes another are considered as a financial obligation. This applies with regard to an ox that has been distinguished as one which gores. If an ox is not known to have such a tendency, the half-payment for the damages that it causes is considered as a fine (see Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:8).

Since he would not have been liable had he told the truth, the fact that he took a false oath does not obligate him for a sh ‘vuat hapikadon.

He is not liable in cases involving death or other losses due to forces beyond his control.

Hilchot Sechirut I :2; Hilchot Sheilah Ufikadon I: I.

On his own volition; he is under no obligation to do so.

I.e., even if it dies or is destroyed by forces beyond his control.

Since he reduces his liability through his statements, he is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon.

Hilchot Sheilah UFikadon 1: 1.

He is, however, liable for a sh ‘vuat bitui since he took a false oath.

For he told the owner to take his ox.

This applies even if he admits owing a portion of the debt to the other partner. Since he denied part of the debt, he is liable.

I.e., he admitted the entire debt, but said that he owed it only to one person and not to both partners.

Chapter 7, Halachot 2-3.

The Radbaz notes that this statement is seemingly redundant; it is made more than ten times in this and the previous chapter. He explains that it would appear that taking a false sh ‘vuat hapikadon is more severe than taking a false sh ‘vuat bitui, yet the punishment for a false sh ‘vuat bitui, lashes, is more severe than that for a false sh ‘vuat hapikadon, bringing a sacrifice. Hence, it is necessary for the Rambam to state the point explicitly each time.

And thus there is room to say that he is not liable for a sh ‘vuat hapikadon, as indicated by Halachah 7.

I.e., it will be disqualified through the process of cross-examination.

And thus be prevented from testifying.

I.e., because his denial has an immediate - and perhaps long-term - effect, he is liable.

This excludes instances when an oath is not made in response to the plaintiffs demands, as stated in Halachah 7. And it excludes an instance when the matter was observed by two pairs of witnesses, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 15.

This excludes a fine, because in that instance, the defendant does not become liable until he denies the obligation and the witnesses refute his denial. With regard to monetary claims, by contrast, once the witnesses testify, the defendant is liable regardless of whether he admits or disputes his liability. See Halachah 4.

Halachah 3 explains that this phrase excludes promissory notes, landed property, and servants.

This term literally means “the oath [concerning] testimony.” As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 12, a person who takes this oath falsely is liable to bring an adjustable guilt offering.

As reflected by Halachah 10, when the oath is administered by the plaintiff and the witnesses do not answer Amen, the oath must be administered in court. If, however, the witnesses take the oath on their own accord or they answer Amen, they are liable even if this takes places outside a court, provided the denial takes place within a court, as stated in the following halachah (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh; see also Chapter 10, Halachah 7 arid notes).

I.e., in court. See Halachah 10 and notes where this concept is discussed.

E.g., he demanded that they testify that he was a priest or a Levite (Chapter 10, Halachah 3).

Leviticus 5:21-22; see the explanations in Chapter 7, Halachah 4, and notes.

In contrast to promissory notes.

See Hilchat Nizkei Mammon 2:8.

For a theft.

For the theft and slaughter or sale of a sheep or a cow.

For this must be paid even if he admits stealing himself.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 3, and notes.

This applies to a person who has been given power of attorney (see Chapter 7, Halachah 6). If he has not been given formal power of attorney, even if he is an agent acting on behalf of the’ principal, the oath he administers is not of consequence (Rabbi Akiva Eiger).

As the Rambam writes in his Commentary to Mishnah (Sh ‘vuot 4:12), Leviticus 5:1 states “If he does not tell” but the word “not” is written lamed vav alef This implies both lamed alef”not,” and lamed vav “to him.” Implied is that he must say no to him, i.e., in response to his demand.

This can also be derived through the process of exegesis mentioned above. One can infer that the witnesses he must say no to him, to the plaintiff himself

I.e., at the time the oath was administered, they did not have knowledge of testimony concerning the plaintiff, but afterwards they observed the matter under investigation.

From the exegesis of the prooftext cited above, Sh ‘vuot 35a understands that the verse is speaking, not of people in general, but of persons singled out to serve as witnesses.

Although he spoke to the group as a whole, the oath was directed to each of the persons individually.
Rabbenu Nissim mentions another concept related to this ruling. A plaintiff may administer an oath to a person even when he is not certain that the person in fact knows testimony concerning him.

Since they did not take the oath or answer Amen, they are not liable unless the oath is administered in the presence of a court, as stated in Halachah 1.

For their denial must be made in a court of law, as stated in Halachah 2.

Or includes God’s name in any of the other expressions (Radbaz).

See Chapter 2, Halachot 2-4.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 7. This applies even if they answer Amen to the oath (Jerusalem Talmud, Sotah 7:1).

All of these points have been discussed in the previous halachot.

Although the Rambam’s position is shared by many other Rishonim, there are others (e.g., Rashi, Sh ‘vuot 25b), who differ and maintain that since the oath involves testimony, one is never liable for a sh ‘vuat bitui even when he is not liable for a sh ‘vuat ha ‘edut. See Halachah 18 and notes.

Sh ‘vuot 30a notes that with regard to all the other types of oaths, the Torah uses the expression “and it became concealed from him,” but it does not use that expression with regard to a sh ‘vuat ha ‘edut. Implied is that even if the matter is not concealed, i.e., he transgresses deliberately, he is liable for a sacrifice. The Radbaz questions - without resolving - why the Torah gives the person a lesser punishment - a sacrifice instead of lashes, when he purposefully violates this transgression.

The same passage mentions both a sh'vuat haedut and a sh'vuat bitui. This verse teaches that one can be held liable for only one of these types of oaths. This also applies with regard to the other false oaths for which the Torah holds one liable. One can be held liable only for one.

Because they included all the obligations in a single statement. Note the parallel to this and the subsequent laws in Chapter 7, Halachot 10-14.

For they singled out each object individually.

Although they are different species of grain, since he included them all in one statement, he is liable only once.

For a sh'vuat haedut involves a situation when the witnesses refuse to testify.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 1, and notes.

Hence he is totally absolved from liability.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that one could raise a question based on Sh ‘vuot 25b. From that passage, it would appear that this and the concept stated in Halachah 14 are conflicting positions and one cannot accept both as halacbah. Nevertheless, he explains that it is only in the preliminary stage of the Talmud’s argument that the positions appear conflicting. After the Talmud cites the teaching derived from the prooftext, “for one of these,” the two rulings can be reconciled. He cites other Rishonim who interpret the passage in this manner.

For he is taking an oath regard a specific activity which he performed or did not perform in the past. Since it has both a positive and negative dimension, he is liable. The fact that this oath does not have a future dimension - for if one takes an oath that he will not testify, he is negating a mitzvah, and hence, it is an oath in vain (Chapter 5, Halachah 15) and not a sh ‘vuat bitui - does not prevent one from being liable for the oath referring to the past.

For a sh‘vuat ha ‘edut involves only the future.