Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

In Hilchot Tefillin 1:4, the Rambam describes the process by which ink is made as follows: One collects the vapor of oils, of tar, of wax or the like, [causes it to condense,] and kneads it together with sap from a tree and a drop of honey. It is moistened extensively, crushed until it is formed into flat cakes, dried and then stored. When one desires to write with it, one soaks [the cakes of ink] in gallnut juice or the like and writes with it. Thus, if one attempts to rub it out, he would be able to.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah, Gittin 2:3, the Rambam mentions three Arabic terms for these words. Rav Kapach explains the meaning as follows: sikra refers to red clay that is used for painting. Kumus and kankantum are two similar substances, yellow and green powders, which when mixed with gallnut juice produce a black substance. Other commentaries offer different interpretations.

Our translation of these terms is based on the Aruch, as quoted by the Rama (Even HaEzer 125:2).

The Beit Shmuel 124:1 explains that, a priori, the Rambam allows a get to be written on a substance from which we are forbidden to benefit. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 124:1) differs and follows the opinion of Tosafot, which states that it is only after the fact that such a get is acceptable. The Rama adds that if we are obligated to destroy the substance on which the get was written, the get is void.

The Rambam rules that a get signed by acceptable witnesses is valid even when it was given without witnesses observing the transfer (Chapter 1, Halachah 16). In this instance, however, even he maintains that witnesses must observe the transfer, for it is possible that the signatures of the witnesses on the get could be forged (Chelkat Mechokek 124:2).

The difficulty with a get written on a parchment with erasures is that the text can be erased again and additions or deletions made without making a noticeable difference in the final product. Thus, stipulations could be added to the get, or the signatures of the witnesses altered. Similarly, changes could be made to a get written on any of the other substances that follow.
Another type of legal document written on such parchment would not be acceptable. The laws pertaining to a get are different, for in this instance the purpose of the document is not to serve as proof of the divorce, but instead to bring about the dissolution of the marriage bond. The purpose of other legal documents, by contrast, is to serve as an account of the transactions they record.

As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 6, one may not detach the horn from the cow after the get was written on it, before giving the cow to the woman.

Normally mesirah, transferring the reigns of an animal, is not an acceptable means of acquiring a cow, as stated in Hilchot Mechirah 3:5. Nevertheless, an exception is made in this instance, because the fundamental purpose of this transaction is not to transfer the cow, but to transfer the get (Hafla’ah; see also the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh to Chapter 9, Halachah 3).

As reflected by a comparison to the second clause, this law applies when it is known that the servant belonged to the woman (Beit Shmuel 124:17). (See the notes on the following halachah.)

The commentaries question why the signature of the witnesses is significant, for by tattooing the servant they have committed a transgression that disqualifies them from serving as witnesses.

In this instance, the situation parallels the law described in Chapter 1, Halachah 16, which rules that a get signed by acceptable witnesses is valid when there are no witnesses to its transfer.

See the Chelkat Mechokek 124:19, which states that if there are witnesses to the transfer of the servant, or the husband admits that the servant was given to the woman, the divorce is effective.

See Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 10:1.

Although the article on which the husband has the get written must belong to him, there is no difficulty in this instance, as will be explained.

We assume that the witnesses who signed the get would have signed it only after verifying that the woman gave the tablet to her husband for the purpose of the divorce.

I.e., he hewed out the lines that would normally be written.

I.e., the letter is formed by working around the letter and not on the form of the letter itself.

Without writing.

In this instance, the writing will not remain permanently, but instead will be rubbed out in a short time.

See the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 125:5), which mentions that there are some authorities who rule that etching is acceptable and sketching unacceptable, and others who accept sketching and disqualify etching.

I.e., one may use Rashi script, rather than ordinary Hebrew writing (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 126:1). Indeed, in one of his responsa, the Rambam writes that his teacher, Rav Yosef Migash, preferred having a get written in Rashi script rather than using the letters used in writing a Torah scroll. The universal custom at present, however, is to use the Assyrian script with which Torah scrolls are written [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 126:1)].

I.e., there is no requirement to write it in Hebrew or Aramaic. Nevertheless, for centuries, it has been customary to use the standard Aramaic text quoted by the Rambam later on in this chapter.

In Chapter 1, Halachah 23, the Rambam allows a get to be read for the witnesses. Nevertheless, in this instance the Rambam requires the witnesses to read the get themselves. Since signing in another language is already a departure from the norm, no further leniency is granted (Ma’aseh Rokeach).

Gittin 9:7 gives an example of one witness signing in Greek and the other in Hebrew. Even though the two languages use different characters, and even require writing in different directions, the get is acceptable. Each of the witnesses’ signatures is a separate and independent statement. Therefore, there is no need for the two signatures to be in the same language. The get, by contrast, is a single unit and must be written in one language (Kessef Mishneh).

This ruling is accepted by all authorities. Although the standard text of the get that is universally employed uses both Aramaic and Hebrew, this does not represent a contradiction. Our Sages explain that since both these languages were used at Mount Sinai, they are considered to be a single tongue (Rama, Even HaEzer 126:1).

See Halachah 13 for examples of wording that could create such doubt.

See Hilchot Tefillin 1:19, which states that when a question arises concerning the writing for the parchments of the tefillin, a determination may be made on the basis of the reading of such a child.

See Halachah 13 for examples of steps taken to prevent such confusion from arising.

This basic text was already employed during the Talmudic era. At present, the later authorities in both the Sephardic and Ashkenazic communities have suggested minor emendations to the text quoted by the Rambam. As such, there are two standard gittin employed in Eretz Yisrael today.

This refers to the years dating back to the beginning of Alexander the Great’s kingdom, as mentioned in Chapter 1.

I.e., the city in which he dwells, not the city in which he was born (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 128:2). The Shulchan Aruch continues, stating ‘‘At present, when we are constantly being exiled and must wander, our place of residence is not defined.’’ Instead, if the man is present at the composition of the get, it is written ‘‘who is located at present in this and this place.’’

The Ashkenazi custom is not to employ this phrase and instead to specify all the names by which a person is called (Rama, Even HaEzer 129:1).

The concepts mentioned in the notes above with regard to the husband’s place and names also apply with regard to his wife’s.

Chapter 1, Hilchot 15, 18, et al. In many manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah, the phrases that follow are omitted, leading some to consider them to be the additions of a printer.

Some texts of the Mishneh Torah also include the statement that space should be left between the leg of the heh and its roof. According to that text, לי מהך ‘‘for me, from now on.’’ Diagram

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the get is unacceptable only when the husband protests and maintains that he intentionally had the scribe make such a mistake. If he does not issue such a protest, the get is acceptable. The Maggid Mishneh also mentions that there is a difference if the woman subsequently married on the basis of the get or not, and the Tur states that the get may be disqualified on this basis only if the husband writes it himself, or the scribe writes it in response to his explicit instructions.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 126:22) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, but also mentions that of the Ra’avad and the Tur. An exception, however, is made with regard to writing the three yuddin in the words תצבייין and תהוייין. If only two yuddin are written, the get is acceptable. (See also the Beit Shmuel 126:32.) Diagram

See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 27:8.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 125:19) states that at present it is customary to discard a get with a portion that has been rubbed out, instead of adding this line at the conclusion of the get. If, however, there is no alternative, a get is acceptable with an erasure, even if there is no explanation at the end, for we rely on the witnesses who observe the transfer (Beit Shmuel 125:35).

The Ra’avad states that if the get had been certified by the court, it is acceptable even if it is torn in the above manner. The rationale is that we assume that the get was torn so that the woman would not be able to use it to demand payment of her ketubah a second time. The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 125:20), and the Ra’avad’s clarification is mentioned by the Chelkat Mechokek 125:41.

As reflected by the following halachah, this refers to an instance in which the get was given when it was acceptable, and its condition deteriorated afterwards.

I.e., the disqualifications mentioned in the previous two halachot.

This represents a difference between gittin and other legal documents, as reflected in Halachah 3 and notes (Maggid Mishneh).

The Maggid Mishneh emphasizes that if the get is faded to the point that it cannot be read at the time it is transferred, the fact that the transfer is observed by witnesses is to no avail, and the divorce is void.
He also mentions the opinion of the Rashba, who states that a get that is torn vertically and horizontally before it is given to the woman is not acceptable. He does not, however, accept that decision. His rulings are paralleled by those of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 125:21), which mentions both the Rambam’s and the Rashba’s views, but appears to favor that of the Rambam.

The others, by contrast, are not considered to be divorced, for we have no proof that the woman’s husband in fact gave her this get. (See Gittin 86b.)

I.e., no attention is paid to the witnesses who signed the get. Each of the women received a get that was written in acceptable manner, and whose transfer was observed by witnesses. This is sufficient for a divorce to be acceptable.

For hers is an acceptable get, signed by witnesses. We are not concerned with the fact that the scroll contains other gittin above it.

The get is acceptable only if the date that is stated in the beginning of the get is restated in the individual statement written for each woman. (See Beit Shmuel 130:13.)

If the get is given to both women in the presence of witnesses who observe the transfer, both are divorced (Maggid Mishneh).

Even when there are no witnesses who observe the transfer.

I.e., under the first column, the witness signed ‘‘Ya’akov, the son of,” and in the second column he continued ‘‘Yitzchak, a witness.’’ The second witness did the same. In this instance, the witnesses have signed under the first get. If the witnesses signed their first names under one column, and signed ‘‘the son of so and so’’ in the second column, both gittin would be acceptable. For ‘‘the son of Ya’akov’’ is an acceptable signature.’’ Diagram

I.e., the fact that the names of the fathers of the witnesses are located under the woman’s get does not cause it to be considered a get with false signatures. (See Rama, Even HaEzer 130:8.)

These laws apply even when there are no witnesses who observed the transfer of the scroll. If there are witnesses who observed the transfer of the scroll to the second woman, even the second get is acceptable. If the scroll is in the possession of the woman above whose get the witnesses sign, both the gittin are unacceptable unless there are witnesses who observed their transfer. Diagram

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 130:4) states that the get is pasul, unacceptable. That term implies that it is the Rabbis who disqualified the use of such a get, while according to Scriptural Law it is acceptable.

The fact that the witnesses did not sign in the proper place does not make the get invalid.

And thus a portion of the get that the woman receives would not have been written for her sake. For this reason, even if the get was given in the presence of witnesses who observed the transfer, it is not acceptable unless the witnesses testify that the get was originally written in two columns (Maggid Mishneh).

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 130:3) uses the term pasul, ‘‘unacceptable,’’ meaning that the get was disqualified by Rabbinic decree alone. (See Beit Shmuel 130:4.)

The word ‘‘and’’ (in Hebrew, the letter vav) establishes a connection between the two, and the greeting is not considered to be a separate entity.

In the first instance, even if we were to assume that the intent of the witnesses was to sign on the greeting, that does not disqualify the get. It is acceptable when given in the presence of witnesses. Diagram

See Numbers 21:26, which uses the word miyado — literally, ‘‘from his hand’’ — as meaning ‘‘from his possession.’’ A similar usage is frequent within the Torah and within Talmudic sources.
It must, however, be emphasized that the accepted practice is to place the get in the woman’s hand and not to remain content with depositing it in her courtyard. (See Rama, Even HaEzer 139:14.)

With regard to a courtyard, a point of clarification is necessary. In general, the benefit from a woman’s property belongs to her husband, and whatever is acquired by her property belongs to him. In this instance, however, we say that the acquisition of the bill of the divorce and the right to acquire the articles placed in her property become hers simultaneously.

The Rambam’s wording implies, however, that when the woman returns to her courtyard, the divorce is effective. Rav Meir HaLevi, as quoted by the Tur (Even HaEzer 139) differs and maintains that the woman must be present at the time the get is placed in her courtyard. If she is not present at that time, Rav Meir HaLevi maintains that the divorce is not effective unless the husband waits and tells the woman: ‘‘This is your get,’’ when she picks it up, or the husband must pick it up and give it to her again.
The Rashba submits a third opinion. He maintains that the status of the divorce is doubtful, for perhaps the woman desired the divorce. (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 139:2-3 and commentaries.)

When considering something which is to a person’s advantage — e.g., the acquisition of an ownerless object — a person may perform this act on behalf of a colleague without his knowledge, for our Sages postulated: ‘‘one may act to a person’s advantage outside his presence.’’ The rationale is that the person would probably desire to acquire the object. When, however, a liability is considered, this principle does not apply. Nevertheless, if a woman explicitly states that a get should be placed in her courtyard, the divorce is effective even when she is not standing next to it (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 139).

In many different halachic contexts, three handbreadths of empty space is considered to be a continuation of the nearest significant halachic entity. This principle is referred to by the name l’vud.

Since it will ultimately come to rest within her property, it is considered as though it has already come to rest.

Most other authorities differ with the Rambam on this point and maintain that as soon as the get enters the woman’s possession, the divorce is effective, even though afterwards it is consumed by fire or its writing is wiped away by water, provided the fire or the water was not there before the husband threw the get. [Significantly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Gittin 8:3), the Rambam does not mention the provision that ultimately the get must come to rest.] Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 139:4-5) mentions the Rambam’s view, it is the approach of the other authorities that is favored. Diagram

I.e., immediately, even if the get does not reach the woman’s property. The rationale is that as long as the conditions mentioned in the following halachah are met, it may be assumed that the laws of gravity will prevail and the get will come to rest in the woman’s property. Therefore, even if it is destroyed by a fluke occurrence beforehand, the divorce is effective (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 139:6).

Since he initially threw the get into the fire, it is considered as though it will never come to rest and will never enter the woman’s possession in a complete state.

The phrase set off by parentheses is found in the standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah, but is lacking in many authentic manuscripts and early printings. Eliminating the phrase would imply that there is a difference between the situation described in Halachah 4 and that described in Halachah 3.
This indeed is the Maggid Mishneh’s contention. As he explains, in Halachah 3 the husband is throwing the get against the natural gravitational pattern that prevails within the world, while in Halachah 4 the get is being thrown in a manner that conforms with the pattern of gravity. Therefore, as long as the get was not thrown into fire or water, the divorce is binding as soon as the get enters the woman’s domain.

The commentaries on Gittin 79a explain that this refers to an instance where the top of the reed or the spear is higher than the walls of the courtyard.

For the wind may blow it outside the courtyard.

Since the get will be protected by the walls of the outer courtyard even within the inner courtyard, if it is thrown toward the inner courtyard the divorce is effective after it enters the space of the outer courtyard (Maggid Mishneh).

There are two differences between courtyards and containers located in the husband’s domain: a) With regard to the courtyard, it is sufficient for the get to enter the space of the husband’s courtyard. With regard to a container, by contrast, this is not sufficient. b) Even when a get comes to rest within a container, the divorce is not effective, except in the specific instance mentioned by the Rambam. The rationale for both these differences is that the walls of a courtyard are made primarily for protecting the articles contained within, and in the above instance the walls of the outer courtyard also protect the articles within the inner courtyard. In contrast, the function of the wall of a container is to hold the object it contains (Rashi, Gittin 79b).

The bracketed addition is made on the basis of the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh. There are other commentaries that maintain that the containers are located in the woman’s domain or in a neutral domain. (See Beit Shmuel 139:13 and the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger on those comments.)

The fundamental principle involved here is that a person cannot acquire an object by virtue of its being placed in a container belonging to him, if that container is located in a domain belonging to the giver, unless the giver is not concerned with the presence of the recipient’s container. (See Hilchot Mechirah 4:1.) Diagram

When a container is lying on its side and it does not have a bottom, it will not serve a functional purpose. Therefore, the husband will not be concerned that it is placed in his property.

In this instance, the woman’s container will serve a functional purpose. Therefore, it is likely that the husband will object to its presence on his property.

Rashi (Gittin 77a) explains that a man must assume that a woman will bring such articles with her when she enters a domain. Therefore, the husband’s acceptance of the woman’s presence also implies a willingness to allow her to bring in such articles. Diagram

If, however, the couch belongs to the husband, the divorce is not effective unless the get is given to the woman, even when the woman is sitting on the couch.

Since the couch is ten handbreadths (80 centimeters according to Shiurei Torah, 96 centimeters according to Chazon Ish) high, itis considered to be a separate entity. (See a parallel concept in Hilchot Kri’at Shema 3:9.)

Note the Maggid Mishneh, which explains that in other situations — e.g., a couch belonging to a purchaser that is in the domain of a seller — this concept would not necessarily apply, and the transfer would not be considered effective. (Note Beit Shmuel 139:15.)

If he specified a place, the get would have to be deposited in that place.

For we assume that the place where the woman is standing is the place that she was granted.

Our translation is based on the interpretation of the Rambam’s ruling offered by Rabbenu Nissim. The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam’s rulings, interpreting his approach as implying that if the place where the get comes to rest is within four cubits of the woman, it would appear that the divorce should be effective even if any of these factors applies. And if the place is further removed, the divorce is never effective. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 139:11) rules according to other authorities, who interpret this passage according to the interpretation offered by Rabbenu Nissim. The interpretation of the Rambam’s words offered by the Maggid Mishneh is mentioned as a minority opinion.

Based on the principle of l’vud, three handbreadths is an extension of any given entity. Nevertheless, since, as happened, the get did not come to rest within the woman’s domain, the fact that it passed through it close to the ground is not significant. This same principle is cited in several other contexts — e.g., Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 4:9. See also Hilchot Shabbat 13:16.

The Tur (Even HaEzer 139) maintains that, as appears from Bava Metzia 12a, the matter is the subject of an unresolved Talmudic debate. Hence, the status of the divorce is a matter of doubt. Although the woman may not consider herself to be divorced, she may not continue living with her first husband, and if she was consecrated by another person, he is required to divorce her before she may marry anyone else.

Our translation is based on the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh. The Ra’avad and others interpret Gittin 79b, the source for this halachah, as referring to two roofs belonging to the husband and explain that it teaches a concept similar to that reflected by Halachah 9. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 139:12) mentions the Rambam’s view, it favors the other interpretation.

In certain circumstances, our Sages ordained although a person is standing in property that does not belong to him, the four cubits around him [or her] are considered to be his courtyard, and placing an article within that space is considered to be placing it in his domain. (See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:9.) Therefore, just as the divorce would be effective if the get had come to rest in the woman’s courtyard, so too, it is effective if it comes to rest within four cubits of her.

In this instance, if the woman erred and remarried she is not forced to divorce her second husband. If, however, she remarried when the status of the divorce is in doubt, she may not remain married to her second husband.

The Rambam does not mention an instance where the woman can protect the get but the husband cannot, and yet it is not close enough to her for her to bend down and pick it up. The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam would maintain that in such an instance the status of the divorce is doubtful.
Although with regard to kiddushin, in such an instance the Rambam rules that a marriage bond is established (Hilchot Ishut 4:22), the laws are more stringent with regard to divorce. The Beit Shmuel 139:22 states that most other authorities would differ and would agree that according to Scriptural Law, the divorce is effective in such an instance; it is disqualified only by virtue of Rabbinic decree.

Whenever an area becomes considered to be the ‘‘four cubits’’ belonging to one individual, another person may not acquire an article in that area until the first person departs (Gittin 78a).

I.e., the divorce is effective according to Scriptural Law, because the four cubits in which the woman is standing become her exclusive property.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 138:2) interprets the intent as being that the knot tying the string to the get must be attached in a manner strong enough to allow the get to be pulled back to the husband. If it is tied loosely, the divorce is effective. If, however, it is the woman who prevents the husband from drawing back the get by clasping it within her hand, the divorce is not effective. The Shulchan Aruch does, however, mention another view, which rules the divorce acceptable in such an instance.

Gittin 78b also derives this concept from the description of a divorce in Deuteronomy 24:3: ‘‘And he will write a bill of divorce for her, place it in her hand....’’ As long as the husband can retake possession of the bill of divorce, he has not severed his connection with the woman.

If, however, the husband does snap the string, the Rambam rules the divorce to be effective. Other commentaries differ, explaining that since the giving of the get was not carried out in the proper manner, the get must be given again for the divorce to be acceptable.

Since the servant has an independent will, he is considered to be a courtyard that is not guarded by the woman herself. Also, the conception of a domain as equivalent to a person’s hand applies only when that domain remains still and not when, as in the case of a servant, it moves.
Based on a difference in the version of Gittin 78a, the source for this halachah, the Tur (Even HaEzer 139) and others differ with the Rambam and maintain that it is necessary for the servant to be both bound and asleep for the divorce to be effective. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 139:16) quotes both opinions, the Rambam’s view appears to be favored.

I.e., since the servant was not bound, the Sages disqualified the divorce, lest one give a get to a servant while awake and unbound.

The Rambam’s wording implies that once the servant gives her the get, however, the divorce is effective. It is not necessary for the husband to take the get from the servant and give it to her. As mentioned by the Beit Shmuel 139:29, this point is not accepted by all authorities.

And from that time onward, the husband cannot recant.

That is, when does the requirement for witnesses apply?

See Chapter 1, Halachah 16.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 15.

A divorce is considered to be undesirable and detrimental for a woman. Therefore, an agent cannot be appointed for her without her consent. For an activity that is detrimental to a person cannot be performed on his or her behalf without his will (Gittin 62b).

See Hilchot Ishut 3:15, where the Rambam states: ‘‘For the only purpose witnesses would serve with regard to the agency... is to make known the truth of the matter.’’
The marriage bonds are annulled. According to the Rambam, the distinction between these agents and a sh’liach kabbalah appointed by the woman is that through the acceptance of the get, and ‘‘no matters involving forbidden marital relations [are established if] fewer than two witnesses are present (Yevamot 88a).’’ Since the sh’liach kabbalah is concerned only with receiving the get, his agency involves nothing else but the actual divorce. Hence, witnesses must be present to acknowledge the appointment of this agent. In contrast, the agency of a sh’liach holachah and a sh’liach hava’ah also involves transporting the get, an activity that is merely a preparatory step for the divorce. Hence, witnesses are not required for his appointment.
It must be emphasized that the Ra’avad and others offer a far more straightforward rationale clarifying the distinction between these agents. A sh’liach holachah and a sh’liach hava’ah each carry the get with them. Hence, they need no further proof of their agency. A sh’liach kabbalah, by contrast, does not have possession of the get before the divorce. Hence, his position must be strengthened by having his appointment observed by witnesses.
In practice, it has already become customary for the appointment of a sh’liach holachah to be certified by a written document. There are opinions that differ and require that the appointment of a sh’liach holachah also be observed by witnesses. (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 141:11, 30, 40.)

The Rambam’s statements are intended to negate the opinion of his teacher, Rabbi Yosef Migash, who maintains that a servant may serve as a sh’liach holachah. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:31) quotes both views, but appears to favor the Rambam’s view.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 15, and Hilchot Ishut 3:17.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 141:33) states that a priori, it is proper that the agent not share any family ties with the husband, his wife, or the judges executing the divorce.

It would appear that even if the signatures of the witnesses have not been verified and the acceptability of a get depends on the agents’ statements, these individuals may serve as agents.

That the divorce is unacceptable, but not void.

As can be seen in the various manuscript copies of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Gittin 2:6), the Rambam changed his opinion regarding the acceptance of these individuals as agents when the veracity of the signature on a get has been established. The standard text of the Commentary to the Mishnah states that if the witnesses’ signatures have been verified, the get is acceptable unless the person worships false gods or violates the Sabbath in public. This is also the view of other authorities and is the ruling favored by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:33).

See also Chapter 12, Halachah 17. Based on the objections of the Ra’avad, the Kessef Mishneh modifies the Rambam’s ruling slightly, explaining that the intent is that the woman may not remarry, and not that the get is void. If, however, she does remarry, her second husband is also required to divorce her.
The get she received from her first husband is not void, because it is possible that witnesses will come and verify the signatures on the get. In such an event, the divorce will be effective retroactively. Nevertheless, since those signatures have not been verified as of yet, her second husband must divorce her.
Rav David Arameah explains that the Rambam’s intent is that the get is still viable, but it should be given to another agent to bring about the divorce. Note the Maggid Mishneh and others who question the source for the Rambam’s ruling.

In all these instances, since the agent was not fit to serve in that capacity at the time the agency was delegated to him, it is as if the agency had never been conveyed upon him.

The fact that, in the interim, he was unfit to serve as an agent is of no significance. Note the Or Sameach, who on this basis questions what the law would be if the husband negates the agency and then desires to reestablish it. Must he reappoint the agent or not?

Gittin 63b states that our Sages entertained a hypothesis that this involves a disregard for the honor of the husband, and therefore the divorce should be void, but they did not accept this theory.

And thus, the divorce would be acceptable if a get were placed in her courtyard.

The Ra’avad disagrees with the Rambam and maintains that the rationale is that a minor is never empowered to appoint an agent. And thus, a woman below majority may not appoint a sh’liach hava’ah either. It must be noted that in Hilchot Sh’luchin V’Shutafin 2:2, the Rambam indeed states that in no instance may a minor appoint an agent. See the Lechem Mishneh and Rav Kapach, who emphasize that a special law applies with regard to an agent to receive a get, for he is considered to be the extension of the woman’s hand. Note the Rambam’s wording in Chapter 1, Halachah 1.

Hence, the divorce does not become final when the agent receives the get. It is only when the get reaches the woman’s hand that the divorce takes effect.

I.e., the husband’s statements imply that he is unwilling to give the agent the get in his original capacity, but that he is willing to charge him with a different agency — bringing the woman the get as agent of the husband.
This ruling is not accepted by all authorities. The Rashba and Rabbenu Nissim differ, maintaining that in such an instance, the status of the divorce is in doubt. The Rambam’s opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 140:6), while the other views are cited by the Rama.

With regard to the transfer of a present, the Rambam maintains that the expression ‘‘Give it to him’’ is equivalent to saying ‘‘Acquire it on his behalf’’ (Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:4). Nevertheless, because the husband said ‘‘Bring it to her;’’ it is clear that he desired the agent to serve in the capacity of a sh’liach holachah.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 140:8) explains that the phrase ‘‘in the capacity in which she appointed you’’ is of primary significance here. If the husband does not add that phrase and says merely: ‘‘Bring the get to her,’’ he is appointing the agent to be a sh’liach holachah, and the agent is accepting this appointment by taking the get. Therefore, if the agent delivers the get to the woman, the divorce is effective.

By serving as a sh’liach hava’ah, the agent accepts far more responsibility and difficulty than by serving as a sh’liach kabbalah. If he served as a sh’liach kabbalah, the divorce would be completed after he received the get. As a sh’liach hava’ah, the agent must trouble himself to bring the get to the woman. As such, we assume that since the woman was willing to accept the agent as a sh’liach kabbalah, she is certainly willing to accept him as a sh’liach hava’ah.

With this expression, the woman’s intent is that the agent should begin acting as her agent and hold the get for her. For keeping the get as an entrusted article violates the instructions that her husband gave him (Rabbenu Nissim).

The doubt is whether an agent can begin acting in the capacity of the woman’s agent before he has completed executing the agency with which he was charged by the husband (Gittin 63b).

See Chapter 1, Halachah 16.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 19.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 21.

The Rambam rules that after the fact, a get given in private is acceptable. There are, however, geonim who hold that such a get is unacceptable (Chapter 1, Halachah 16). Since the status of an agent is weaker than that of the husband himself, a second transfer of the get is required in this instance a priori (Maggid Mishneh).

See Halachah 26. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:59) rules that at the outset, a husband should not nullify a get unless either the agent he appointed or his wife is present. Otherwise, it is possible that the woman may receive the get — and marry another man — before receiving notice that her get was nullified.

I.e., people other than the agent. If he nullifies the get in the presence of the agent, no one else need be present.

Note the Rama (Even HaEzer 141:59), who cites an opinion that allows the husband to nullify the get by speaking to two people, one outside the presence of the other.

For the divorce has already taken effect.

In this context, the words ‘‘a very brief time’’ are a loose translation. The Hebrew term toch k’dei dibbur has a very specific meaning: the amount of time necessary to say ‘‘Shalom alecha, rabbi umori.’’

The rationale is that divorcing a wife is a very serious matter and a man would not make such a decision unless he were resolute. Therefore, his change of mind is not considered to be a clarification of his original position (as in certain other instances — e.g., a retraction of a business commitment), but rather an entirely new decision.

The fundamental principle involved is that Torah law depends on a person’s acts and statements, not his feelings. Although it is obvious that the husband desired to nullify the get, since he was not able to take binding action the divorce is valid. (See also Halachah 25.)

See Chapter 9, Halachah 27.

The Ra’avad differs with Rambam and maintains that although a person may nullify the agency of one of the two (or ten), doing so does not nullify the agency of the other(s). Therefore, if they give the woman the get, the divorce is effective. Although the Rambam’s opinion is also mentioned, it is that of the Ra’avad that is favored by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 149:61).

The Rama (Even HaEzer 134:1) states that even when the husband makes statements to two witnesses individually, the objection is binding.

In Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 6, the Rambam explains the details of lodging an objection with regard to a sale. There he explains that when a person is compelled to make a sale against his will, he can nullify the transaction by issuing an objection stating that he was compelled to make this sale. With regard to an objection to a get, other autho-rities (see Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer, Chapter 134) also mention the concept of compulsion. The Rambam, however, omits mention of the subject entirely. As reflected in Halachah 27, our Sages considered lodging an objection to a get in a very negative light.

The situation mentioned by the Rambam in the previous halachah is not merely a theoretical question. In many instances, a husband who was compelled to divorce his wife would seek to have the get nullified so that their marriage could continue. Similarly, apostates and men whose feelings toward their wives have soured have sought to nullify their divorces in order to cause their wives difficulties.

Many of the other commentaries differ with the Rambam concerning this point. Some — e.g., the Rashba — are more stringent, for they maintain that the husband can word his objection to nullify even such a statement. They explain that to insure that the get is not nullified, the husband must also disqualify the testimony of any witness who heard his objections.
Others — e.g., Rabbenu Asher — are more lenient and maintain that all that is necessary is for the husband to say that all objections to the get are nullified. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 134:3) rules according to the Rashba. The Rama maintains that Rabbenu Asher’s ruling is halachically acceptable; however, he counsels following the Rashba’s ruling to eliminate all doubts.

Despite the statements that he had made previously, if the husband nullified the get afterwards, his statements would be effective and the divorce void (Maggid Mishneh).

There are authorities who differ with the Rambam on this point, based on their version of Gittin 32b. According to these authorities, since the get was written according to law, it is always able to be used for a divorce and can never be nullified by the husband. In consideration of the opinion of these authorities, when quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:66), rules that the status of the divorce is in doubt.

The point is that these expressions all indicate that the husband no longer desires to use this get to divorce his wife.

For all the statements quoted above are false. The get is effective; it is the husband who no longer desires to use it.

The Rambam implies that the question is whether the word בָּטֵל implies a future tense — i.e., that his intent is to nullify the get — in which instance the divorce would not be effective. Or whether it implies the past tense, in which case, as in the previous halachah, the husband would be giving us incorrect information.

If, however, the man nullifies the get in the presence of the agent or in the presence of his wife, there is no difficulty.

The primary reason for giving such a get — for the marriage is terminated with the husband’s death regardless — is to free a childless woman from the obligations of yibbum and chalitzah. If the get was given before the husband’s death, these rites are not necessary. Otherwise, they are. With the current advances in record keeping and communication, it is usually possible to eliminate the doubt mentioned in this halachah.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:69) states that this law applies only when a city is surrounded by the army of the ruling authority. If it is surrounded by an army from another country, we no longer operate under the presumption that the husband is alive.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Gittin 3:4), the Rambam defines a ship in distress as follows: ‘‘One that faces a tempest-torn sea that threatens to sink it. The sailors are unable to control its path as they desire.... Nevertheless, all the oars and the other instruments remain intact.’’

This applies regardless of whether the person is being tried by a Jewish court or a gentile court.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam defines this as referring to a ship whose oars, steering mechanism and other navigational tools have been broken, and it is totally at the mercy of the waters. The laws that apply when a ship has sunk are described in Chapter 13, Halachah 16.

The implication is that if the person was sentenced to death by a Jewish court, we presume that the sentence was carried out. (See Hilchot Terumot 9:2.) In contrast, there is a possibility that a gentile court will accept a bribe.

Lest the husband have died already.

For we do not know which came first, the husband’s death or the giving of the get.

Although the husband desires to divorce her, she remains his wife until the get reaches her. Therefore, the husband remains obligated by the marriage contract.