Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Since the man has already established a connection with this woman, but has not acquired the rights due him by virtue of the ketubah, any provision that he makes regarding those rights is binding.

Since the bond of marriage has already been consummated, the husband has already acquired all the rights to which he is entitled. Therefore, a verbal statement is not sufficient, and an official act of contract is necessary to forgo those rights. (See Ketubot 83a, which compares this to the absolution of a partnership agreement.)

Moreover, the husband is not entitled to any benefit that accrues from the money his wife receives from the sale (Rama, Even HaEzer 92:1).

A husband has three rights with regard to his wife’s property: to receive the benefits that accrue from it, to veto any sales or presents, and to inherit it in the event of his wife’s death. Since the wording of the provision in the document the husband gave his wife is not specific, he is given the benefit of the doubt and is considered to have waived the least valuable of the rights he has: the veto power over his wife’s sales and gifts (Rashi, Ketubot 83b).

The rationale is that before nisu’in, a deed of contract is not necessary to uphold any sale or gift that a woman may make. Since the husband took an additional step and carried out an act of contract, we assume that he did so with the intent of enhancing his wife’s position and waiving all rights he has to her property (Kessef Mishneh).
This is the Rambam’s interpretation of the above passage. The Ra’avad and Rabbenu Asher advance a different interpretation. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 92:3) quotes both opinions, but appears to favor that of the Rambam.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that it is imperative that the benefits from the land be converted into financial resources and be used to purchase other property. Rabbenu Asher and others do not accept this position and maintain that the woman has the right to use the benefits that accrue from the land as she desires. If, however, she decides to use them to purchase property, her husband is entitled to the benefits that accrue from that property. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 94:4) quotes the Rambam’s view, while the Rama follows that of Rabbenu Asher.

If, however, the provision is made before the woman is consecrated, it is also of no consequence. For until a connection between the man and the woman is established, his statements regarding her property are of no consequence whatsoever.

See Chapter 12, Halachah 9.

And affirms his provision with an act of contract (Maggid Mishneh).

Nor does he have the right to veto a sale (Chelkat Mechokek 92:17).

I.e., at home, on his table.

This bundle must be worth at least a dinar (Chelkat Mechokek 88:12).

If the wife denies his claim and states that she is sure that he spent less, her claim is accepted provided she supports it with an oath (Rama, Even HaEzer 88:7; Beit Shmuel 88:17).

See Chapter 14, Halachah 8.

As reflected by the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ketubot 8:6), this applies only when the increment to the property exceeds the expenses. If the expenses exceed the increment, all he receives is the increment. (See Beit Shmuel 88:18, who quotes other authorities who differ.)

See Chapter 4, Halachah 8.

If the husband were not given consideration for his expenses and the increment he brought to the woman’s property, he would seek only his own benefit and would deplete the property’s value by failing to fertilize it and constantly sowing crops. This is unlikely to happen if he is given a sharecropper’s allocation. In such an instance, he is likely to say: ‘‘it is possible that the marriage will continue, and so it is to my benefit to maintain the field’s value. Even if the marriage does not continue, I will be justly reimbursed for my work.’’

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 88:10) explains that the option is the husband’s. He may choose to receive a sharecropper’s allocation, or he may desire to leave the property without making a reckoning, as is done in the case when his wife is past the age of majority.

In this instance, the woman collects the greater sum when she collects her due.

In Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 6:17, the Rambam adds several dimensions to this statement:
a) the person making the commitment must own the items he promises. If he does not own them, his commitment is not binding, for a person cannot transfer an entity that does not yet exist.
b) The commitment is not binding on property that has been sold. For only transactions that are formalized by a written deed are binding on the purchasers of property. Moreover, since this commitment can be formalized by the spoken word alone, even if it is later recorded in a written document, it is not binding on the purchasers. If, however, a formal deed of transfer is composed, it must be honored by the purchasers (Maggid Mishneh, Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah). See also Halachah 18.
c) The transaction is not effective until the marriage takes place.

In general, a business agreement must be formalized by a contractual act (a kinyan), and a verbal commitment is not sufficient. An exception is made in this instance because of the happiness and closeness engendered by the marriage relationship (Ketubot 102b).

If, by contrast, a man or a woman makes a commitment for his or her own marriage, the commitment is binding without a contractual act, even if it is a second marriage that is involved.

I.e., nisu’in, the second stage of marriage, as well as erusin, the first stage, must be completed before the present is binding.

For it is her father who is making the financial commitment, not she.

I.e., the husband must take one of these two options. He cannot leave the woman consecrated (in which case she cannot marry someone else), but not married.
This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 52:1). The Rama states that if the woman has the financial means to meet the commitment, she must do so.

See Chapter 14, Halachot 8 and 12.

Generally, such commitments are not binding, for the commitment does not have a specific scope. In most situations, only when a definite sum is mentioned is the commitment obligatory. (Even HaEzer, ch. 114.)

Hilchot Mechirah 11:15-17.

Needless to say, he is obligated to support his divorcee’s daughter if his divorcee does not remarry. There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if the husband is required to provide his divorcee’s daughter with the full measure of support she requires, or he is merely obligated to give her the amount of money it would cost for him to support her in his own home. (See Shulchan Aruch and Rama, Even HaEzer 114:6.)

As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 13, even if this commitment was recorded in a document, as long as a formal deed is not composed, the purchasers are not under any obligation.

A woman who does not have female physical characteristics and cannot conceive children.

See Chapter 15, Halachah 7.

The Rambam does not explicitly mention that the woman is not entitled to receive her sustenance during her husband’s lifetime. This is taken for granted. Since their marriage is forbidden, our Sages did not bind their relationship by any of the guidelines they instituted to preserve harmony and peace in marriage. Even after his lifetime, she is not entitled to receive her sustenance.

In contrast to the previous and subsequent halachot, the Rambam does not mention divorce in this instance. The Noda B’Yhudah (Even HaEzer, Vol. II, Responsum 80) explains that the Rambam’s wording leads to the following hypothesis: Since the husband was not aware of the woman’s physical condition (if she was an aylonit), or the prohibition forbidding relations (if she was forbidden to him), he entered the marriage under mistaken premises. Hence, the marriage is not binding at all and no divorce is necessary. The couple must, however, be forced to separate.
The Noda B’Yhudah, however, rejects this hypothesis and maintains that the kiddushinare binding in such instances and a divorce is required.

Even though her husband is not obligated to redeem her from captivity — and the right to benefit from the produce is associated with that obligation — he is not required to return the produce. This is a penalty that our Sages imposed upon the woman (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 115:1).

A woman with whom he is forbidden to engage in relations because of Rabbinic decree. (See Chapter 1, Halachah 6.)

For the relationship is undesirable and our Sages wish that it be terminated.

This extra amount is granted by the husband on his own volition because of the satisfaction generated by physical intimacy. It is not a requirement of the Sages (Rashi, Ketubot 101a).

Note the contrast to Halachah 6.

During the husband’s lifetime, however, they are not entitled to support, for the court desires that the relationship be terminated (Maggid Mishneh).

The Rambam’s rationale is that although the husband is not liable for his wife’s support while the couple are living together, this is only because the Sages desired to rend apart the couple’s relationship. In principle, he should be liable, for she is entitled to a ketubah and the conditions of the ketubah. Therefore, in an instance where the couple are separating, and the woman demands payment for her support while her husband was abroad, he should be held liable.

This point is also the subject of a difference of opinion among the Rabbis and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) follows the view of the authorities who differ with the Rambam and do not hold the husband liable.

Our Sages instituted the marriage of a minor for her own benefit. If she does not desire to continue the marriage, it is she who suffers the consequences.

This additional amount was granted to the woman in consideration of the physical pleasure she gives her husband. Since he received that pleasure and knew that the woman had the right to terminate the relationship, he is liable for this amount.

For at the time, he had permission to use her property and benefit from it.

Even if the entire dowry is not intact, the woman takes the part that is intact. The remaining laws apply only to that portion of the dowry that no longer exists or that is unfit for use.

The rationale for this ruling is that, with the exception of the sh’niyot, the women mentioned in this halachah are all entitled to a ketubah. As a result, the same laws that apply to other women with regard to their dowries apply to them as well. With regard to a sh’niyah, even though she is not entitled to a ketubah, our Sages imposed penalties on both her and her husband and required them to suffer a loss (Commentary to the Mishnah, Yevamot 9:3).

Although he accepted responsibility for them, his acceptance was made under false premises. Hence, just as the marriage contract is not binding, so too, his acceptance of responsibility is not binding.

Therefore, he is held responsible for any loss that took place.

The rationale is that the court gave him the right to use this property and according to the conditions they established, he is liable only if he divorces her.

Even if an object was lost because of the husband’s negligence, he is not held liable (Chelkat Mechokek 115:20).

See the following halachah for a definition of this term.

See Halachah 12 for a definition of this term.

See Halachah 15 for a definition of this term.

Numbers 5:18 states that as part of the process of causing a sotah distress, her hair is uncovered. From this, Ketubot 72a derives the concept that a married Jewish woman’s hair should always be covered. Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 21:2) prohibits a married woman from walking in the public domain with uncovered hair.
Although this custom was not practiced conscientiously in many European communities even within the religious population, our Torah authorities have always called for its observance. The failure of a woman to cover her hair is considered adequate grounds for divorce.
It must, however, be emphasized that a husband who married a woman who he knew would not cover her hair cannot later divorce her on the grounds that she fails to do so, without making full settlement of his obligations according to the marriage contract.

I.e., prohibitions of Rabbinic origin as well as those explicit in the Torah.

E.g., she wore clothes customarily worn when she was a niddah. In the present age, it is not customary for women to wear special clothes while they are in the niddah state.

The previous halachah spoke of her going out to a public place with her hair totally uncovered. This halachah mentioned the covering of her hair, but not according to the accepted norms of modesty.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ketubot 7:4), the Rambam mentions wearing a rose or perfume in the same manner as worn by wanton gentile women.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 115:4) states that this applies when she does so frequently, implying that if she did so on one particular occasion, she is not placed in this category. (See Beit Shmuel 115:11.)

The Rama (loc. cit.) follows more stringent opinions that state that even if she curses his father outside her husband’s presence, or if she curses her husband himself to his face, she is placed in this category.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Shabbat 10:4). Rashi (Bava Kama 72b) interprets this term as referring to underwear. Based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Megillah 4:1), which explains that this practice was instituted after a woman was raped by a monkey, it would appear that the intent is a chastity belt.

And he is therefore not required to pay her ketubah.

See Halachah 16.

Why would wet spittle be found on the canopy? Obviously, someone was lying face up on the bed and could not turn to either side. This indicates that the woman had just been involved in sexual relations (Rashi, Yevamot 24b).

Our translation is based on the additions of the Rama (Even HaEzer 11:1).

A woman who acts in this manner is considered to have committed adultery, and there is no need for a warning in such an instance.

As mentioned in Halachah 18, the court does not compel a man to divorce his wife unless two witnesses testify that she willingly committed adultery. Nevertheless, in the situations mentioned above, it is clear that our Sages desired that the woman be divorced. Moreover, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 115:4) states that it is a mitzvah to divorce such a woman.
The Rama adds that even though in most cases we follow the enactment of Rabbenu Gershom, who forbade divorcing a woman against her will, in this instance an exception is made. Even if the woman does not consent to the divorce, her husband may divorce her.

Nor is she entitled to any of the provisions of the ketubah while they remain married, as stated above (Halachah 10). Note, however, the Chelkat Mechokek 115:18, who states that if the couple remain married, and afterwards the woman repents and begins conducting herself modestly, her husband is obligated to write a new ketubah for her.

When a married woman has committed adultery, she is forbidden to engage in sexual relations with her husband in the future. (Similarly, she is forbidden to engage in relations with the adulterer.) Since her husband either saw the matter himself or heard it from a person upon whom he relies, he is bound by this prohibition.

Since he has no binding evidence that she committed adultery that will be accepted by a court, she cannot be forced to forgo her claim for the money he is obligated to pay her.

The Rambam compares this to a situation in which a creditor desires to collect a debt supported by a promissory note, and the debtor states: ‘‘I have paid the note.’’ Although the creditor is allowed to collect the debt, he must take an oath first.

I.e., his claim is not definite.

I.e., if she is obligated to take another oath before collecting the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, her husband may also require her to take the oath concerning adultery.

The husband need not divorce her, and he may continue engaging in marital relations with her without worrying that he is transgressing the prohibition mentioned in the previous halachah.

In cases of monetary law, we follow the principle that the statements of the principal himself are equal to those of 100 witnesses. Since she admitted committing adultery, she must suffer the financial consequences.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 11:12), the Rambam explains that when the husband says, ‘‘I do not believe her,’’ he is still permitted to engage in relations with her. We do not, however, say: ‘‘If you believe her, pay her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah,’’ for we divide his statements (palg’nin dibburo), and apply them in one context, but not in another. This explanation has, however, aroused questions in certain commentaries.

E.g., two couples were married at the same time and the women unwittingly went into the wrong marriage chambers, and each thought that she was with her own spouse (Yevamot 33b).

Ketubot 51b relates that in Babylonia there was a time when robber bands would frequently abduct women from their homes.

Chapter 17, Halachot 1 and 7; Chapter 18, Halachah 1. This prohibition is a result of the extra dimension of sanctity conveyed upon a priest and is not a reflection of the woman’s lack of virtue.

With regard to the priest’s prohibition against relations with these women, Leviticus 21:8 states: ‘‘And you shall make him holy.’’ Yevamot 88b implies that the intent is that he should be forced to make himself holy, even if that involves compelling him against his will.

See the explanation in Halachah 18. The reason this woman is entitled to the money due her by virtue of her ketubah is that she did not commit adultery willingly.

Hilchot Sotah 1:2 explains this as the amount of time it takes to roast an egg and swallowit. In quantitative terms, the more stringent of the contemporary authorities have estimated this as 35 seconds.

This phrase is borrowed from Numbers 5:18. Hilchot Sotah 3:10 explains that the term is used because a bitter-flavored substance was added to the water.

Chapter 1, Halachah 2. Although there is no evidence that the woman actually committed adultery, since she was warned by her husband and violated his warning, the burden of proof is upon her. It is only through drinking the waters given a sotah that she can vindicate herself.

The Rambam is explaining why the woman is forced to forfeit her ketubah, although there is no conclusive proof of adultery. She knew about the prohibition against entering into privacy with the said individual and violated it willingly. Hence, she is required to suffer the consequences.

The Kessef Mishneh questions why the Rambam mentions ‘‘the present age.’’ Seemingly, in the time of the Temple as well, a similar problem would arise — if the warning was not given in the presence of witnesses, the waters given a sotah could not be used to test the woman’s faithfulness.

See Halachah 17 and notes.

The husband is not required to pay his wife the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, because their marriage agreement is considered to be a mekach ta’ut, an agreement entered into under false premises. For he did not expect to marry a woman bound by such vows. Nevertheless, since the husband did not make an explicit statement to this effect when he consecrated the woman — he is required to divorce her formally.

These vows are considered ‘‘the oppression of the soul.’’ When a woman is bound by these restrictions, she will be depressed, and she will not be pleasant company for her husband. Hence, he is entitled to divorce her.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 7. In the instance described in the present halachah, a divorce is necessary because the husband did not make an explicit statement of intent.

The intent is epileptic fits that follow a set pattern. At these times the woman will not go out in public, and her affliction will therefore not be known.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 117:5) follows the Rambam’s rulings. Rabbenu Asher follows the other opinion that the Rambam mentioned. It is also cited by the Rama (loc. cit.).

E.g., a blemish on her face that her prospective husband obviously must have seen.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 117:8) quotes opinions that maintain that if the father issues a definite claim, the burden of proof is on the husband.

The Rambam’s wording literally means ‘‘his field became flooded.’’ The intent is that the woman had already become his wife, and her suffering the blemish is his loss.

The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that, as evident from the rationale the Rambam gives, what is important is that the couple engage in relations. For then we may assume that the husband looked at his wife’s body first. The Rambam mentions waiting several days only to show that even if he waited — and thus it would appear that there is some basis to his claim — his words are disregarded.

The Rambam is obviously using a euphemism. The intent is that a husband will not enter into relations until he has looked at his wife’s body.

The Maggid Mishneh notes the similarity to the laws regarding a husband’s claim that his wife was not a virgin, as mentioned in Chapter 11, Halachah 15.

In that source (Chapter 4, Halachah 16), the Rambam states that the woman must insert a cloth into her vagina before relations and inspect it to make sure that there is no sign of bleeding. Similarly, after relations, both she and her husband must wipe themselves with cloths and check whether there is any sign of bleeding.
The Rambam’s opinion is not accepted by all other authorities. Although his view is mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 186:2), the Shulchan Aruch favors the view that requires such an inspection only on the first three occasions of intercourse after marriage.

Since the inspection was made directly after relations, we assume that she menstruated in the midst of the relations. It is forbidden to continue relations in such a situation.

Although there are authorities who maintain that she is entitled to the additional amount, the Rambam (and similarly, the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 117:1) frees the husband of the obligation. The rationale is that in contrast to an aylonit, he is forbidden to have relations with her. And in contrast to a sh’niyah, he could not have known that this condition existed beforehand. Hence, he is not obligated at all.

The recurrence of this phenomenon on three consecutive occasions is considered to be a chazakah, causing us to presume that the woman will continue to experience menstrual bleeding in the midst of relations. Hence, these relations are forbidden.

I.e., the husband might consider his divorce as if it were made conditionally — i.e., that if her condition heals, it is not effective. For this reason, it is made clear that he may never marry her again.

For the sexual experience is different with each man, and it is possible that she will not menstruate in the midst of relations with another man. If, however, this occurs three times, with three different men, she is no longer permitted to marry.

Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 4:21.

Since there was no difficulty at the time of marriage, it is the husband who bears the burden of the loss. (See Halachah 4.)

If, however, he becomes blinded in both eyes, or both his hands are cut off, he is compelled to divorce his wife (Rama, Even HaEzer 154:4).

As explained in Chapter 14, Halachah 8, above.

If, before marriage, his prospective bride knew that he had these difficulties, or was involved in these professions and married him nevertheless, they are not considered to be grounds for divorce (Rama, Even HaEzer 154:1).

All these professions cause a man to have a foul odor.

Although divorce proceedings must be commenced by the man, in these and certain other situations the court compels a man to commence these proceedings.

Here, the intent is not leprosy as described in the Torah (tzara’at), but rather the illness that is referred to as leprosy in contemporary terms.

I.e., pay this money from her deceased husband’s estate.

This verse is lacking in all manuscript copies and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. It appears to be a printer’s addition so that the text will conclude on a positive note. (The connection to the previous subject is based on the exegesis of the verse in Ketubot 50a.)
We find several halachot of the Mishneh Torah in which the Rambam concludes with a thought whose relevance goes beyond that of the laws that he outlined in that work, and others like this text, that conclude with the final relevant law without adding such thoughts.