Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

I.e., Rosh HaShanah, the first ofTishrei, which is the seventh month when counting from Nisan. Significantly, the name Rosh HaShanah is not mentioned in the Torah at all.

Our interpretation of the words מלאכת עבודה as “servile labor” is based on the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on Halachah 5. There he interprets it as referring to tasks that a person would hire a servant to do rather than perform himself.
In his commentary on the Torah (Leviticus 23:7), the Ramban explains that with the expression “servile labor,” the Torah intends to distinguish between work performed to prepare food (which he terms “gratifying labor”) and the other forms of labor. According to the Ramban, the Torah never forbade the performance of the activities included in the labors necessary for the preparation of food. Any restrictions placed on them are Rabbinic in nature.
The Ramban’s conception is also reflected in the statements of Rashi (Beitzah 12a), who interprets the Talmud’s ruling (see Halachah 4), “Since [these labors] were permitted for the sake [of preparing food], they are permitted even when [they are performed] without such an intent,” as meaning that, according to the Torah, there is no prohibition against performing these labors at all.
Tosafot (Beitzah, loc. cit.) differs and explains that for the performance of a labor to be allowed by the Torah, it must in some way contribute to the pleasure of the holiday. Otherwise, it is forbidden. According to this conception, all the thirty-nine labors forbidden on the Sabbath are prohibited on the holidays as well. There is, however, special dispensation to perform these labors when doing so will increase our holiday pleasure.
The Maggid Mishneh interprets the Rambam’s citation of the expression “servile labor” as an indication that he follows the perspective shared by Rashi and the Ramban. Other authorities (e.g., the Lechem Mishneh and the Pri Chadash) do not agree with the Maggid Mishneh’s interpretation and explain that the Rambam favors the other position. [See also the Chemdat Yisrael, who explains that the Rambam’s statements in Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 328) do not concur with the Maggid Mishneh’s conception of the Rambam’s position.] Note the treatment of this subject in the Or Sameach and in Likkutei Sichot, Vol. XI. (See also the notes on Halachah 4.)

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandments 159-160, 162-163, 166-167) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvot 297, 300, 308, 310, 318, 321) include these six in the reckoning of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

Note Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 159), which in addition to the term shabbaton, “day of rest,” also mentions the phrase mikra kodesh, “holy convocation,” as indicating that one is commanded to sanctify the day by ceasing to perform labor.

I.e., any of the 28 of the 39 labors forbidden on the Sabbath that do not involve the preparation of food. (See Hilchot Shabbat 7:1.)

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandments 323-326, 328-329) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvot 298,301,309,311,319 and 323) include these six in the reckoning of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

This is the minimum punishment given for the violation of a negative commandment that involves a deed.

Pesachim 48a, moreover, states that even if a person is given separate warnings for each forbidden labor, each activity is not considered to be a separate violation.

The Rambam is referring to the ruling (Hilchot Shabbat 7:7-8) that requires a person who performs activities that fall into two different categories of forbidden labor on the Sabbath to bring two different sin offerings. The performance of an activity from each category of forbidden labor is considered to be a separate violation. Such a distinction does not apply with regard to the performance of forbidden labors on the holidays.

The Maggid Mishneh explains the Rambam’s position as follows: All the labors forbidden on the Sabbath that involve preparation of food are not prohibited on the holidays. In addition, there are two forbidden labors, kindling a flame and transferring articles, which do not necessarily involve the preparation of food. Nevertheless, since they are sometimes necessary for the preparation of food, they are permitted without any restriction.
Other authorities (e.g., Pri Chadash, Pri Megadim) interpret the Rambam’s statements as meaning that, with the exception of these two labors, even the forbidden labors involved with the preparation of food are permitted only for that purpose. If, however, one performs one of these labors for other reasons—e.g., one cooks food solely to give to animals—one is liable. Moreover, if one performs a forbidden labor that is not usually involved in the preparation of food for the purpose of preparing food, one is liable.
There is a third interpretation, that of the Mabit. (In his Responsum 124, however, he follows the second view.) According to the view he expresses in Kiryat Sefer, even if one performs a forbidden labor (that is not usually involved in the preparation of food) for the purpose of preparing food, one is not liable. As proof, he cites the example of making cheese, an act that the Rambam (Hilchot Shabbat 10:13) considers a derivative of the forbidden labor of building. Nevertheless, making cheese on a holiday is not considered a violation of a forbidden labor and is forbidden only as a sh’vut.

The reason for these two exceptions is as follows: Both are often involved in the preparation of food. Alternatively, the transfer of articles is considered “an inferior labor” (Tosafot, Beitzah 12a), and Exodus 35:3: “Do not kindle fire ... on the Sabbath day,” is interpreted also as an exclusion, indicating that kindling fire is forbidden on the Sabbath, but not on holidays.

As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 1, Tosafot requires that the activity bring a person some pleasure. This view is also reflected in the Ra’avad’s gloss.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Ra’avad as stating that this prohibition has its source in the Torah itself. lndeed, the Jerusalem Talmud (Beitzah 1:10) and certain passages in the Babylonian Talmud (Shabbat 95a; Chaggigah 18a) support this view. Nevertheless, most later authorities accept the Rambam’s view that the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin.

The Ra’avad gives a different rationale: that the extra effort involved in the performance of these activities is out of place on a holiday.

The Ra’avad differs with the extent of the leniency granted by the Rambam, restricting it to sending containers and food. He also differs regarding the rationale, explaining that sending the articles on the holiday is a greater expression of honor and respect. The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the later authorities.

All these labors, although necessary for the preparation of food, are not intended for the preparation of a particular cooked dish or loaf of bread. Rather, one performs these activities for several days in advance. Therefore, our Sages desired that these activities should not be performed on the festival itself.
It must be noted that these forbidden labors are specifically mentioned in the passage from the Jerusalem Talmud cited above, which states that the prohibition against performing such activities stems from the Torah itself.

The Rambam’s rationale depends on the concept of freshness. Food that is not fresh loses a certain amount of its flavor. The Ra’avad questions this principle, noting that produce harvested today is also fresher and tastier than produce harvested on the day before. Several authorities offer different observations to counter the Ra’avad’s thesis.

See Tz’ror HaChayim, which mentions various opinions concerning whether this prohibition has its origin in the Torah itself or in Rabbinic decree. In conclusion, he favors the opinion that the prohibition is Scriptural in origin. (See also Halachah 15.) The doubt exists only with regard to the Rambam’s position. Tosafot and others maintain that the prohibition is Scriptural in origin (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 503:1).

If, however, one cooked food on a holiday with the intent of eating it on the following day, many authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 503:13) allow the food to be eaten after the holiday. (See also Halachah 11 and notes.)

The reason is that the meat is tastier when cooked with many pieces together (Maggid Mishneh ).

This gives us a second rationale for the leniency of preparing a larger quantity of food than one needs immediately: when, as in the instance mentioned, there is no extra work involved in preparing a large quantity as compared to a small quantity. If either of these two rationales applies, leniency may be taken and the extra amount prepared.
Once, however, the water is left to boil, an additional amount may not be added (Ramah, Orach Chayim 103:2).

Rabbenu Yonah explains that this applied in Talmudic times, when the ovens were small. In such an instance, a large number of loaves were placed in the oven at the same time, and it took longer for them to bake, producing a better flavor. If, as was the case with regard to the larger ovens used in the medieval period, adding to the number of loaves does not increase the flavor, it is forbidden to do so. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 507:6.)

The salting is intended to drain off the blood so that it is permitted to cook the meat, as stated in Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot, Chapter 6.

Here, also, the leniency is granted because there is no additional difficulty in salting the other pieces. Alternatively, the leniency is allowed so that the remainder of the meat will not spoil. Compare to Chapter 3, Halachah 4.

As explained in Chapter 6, just as it is forbidden to prepare food on a holiday for a weekday that follows, our Sages forbade preparing food on a holiday for a Sabbath that follows directly after the holiday, or for the second day of the holiday itself. Nevertheless, as explained in that chapter, our Sages did provide the leniency of establishing an eruv tavshilin.

I.e., invite guests although he knows that they will .not come, or prepare a large quantity of food when one knows that one will be unable to eat it all, and then use the remainder for the following day.
Shulchan Aruch HaRav 503:7 notes that it has become common practice to cook a meal for the night of the second day of a holiday on the afternoon of the first day, relying on the leniency that one will taste some of the food. He criticizes this practice and explains that women should be taught to discontinue it and prepare the food before the commencement of the holiday.

He and the members of his family may not partake of it; other Jews, however, are not restricted (Mishnah Berurah 527:79).

The rationale for this stringency is that the example shown by a person with guile might be copied by others, while few will emulate brazen transgression. Moreover, even with regard to the person himself, if he were not punished, a person who acts with guile would never really appreciate the seriousness of his transgression, and would repeat it. When, however, a person willfully violates the Sages’ decree, he will not be able to rationalize his conduct. Hence, there is the possibility he will recognize his error (Rashi, Beitzah 17b; Mishnah Berurah 527:78).

We are speaking about an instance where the person has already eaten, and hence would not ordinarily consider slaughtering the animal. Nevertheless, because it is dangerously ill, he fears that it will die before the conclusion of the holiday. Our Sages were fearful that he would slaughter the animal regardless, rather than suffer the loss of having it die without ritual slaughter. They therefore established directives that would allow slaughter in most instances (Maggid Mishneh; Rashi, Beitzah 25a). (See also Chapter 6, Halachah 10.)

Although the Rambam’s wording might be interpreted as indicating that it is necessary to eat at least this amount of meat, the Maggid Mishneh and the later halachic authorities (Shulchan Aruch Harav 498: 11; Mishnah Berurah 498:34) explain that it is not necessary to partake of the meat on the holiday.

See the Mishnah Berurah 512:2, which states that a Jew who worships false gods or desecrates the Sabbath is considered like a gentile in this regard.

The Rambam’s citation of a verse from the Torah as a proof-text for this prohibition is interpreted as an indication that he follows the position (see the notes on Halachot 1 and 4) that the labors necessary to prepare food are forbidden by the Torah on the holiday unless one is preparing food for a Jew. As mentioned, others consider the prohibitions to be Rabbinic in origin.

This rationale is not applicable on the Sabbath, for then it is not permitted to cook at all.

I.e., as long as a portion of the loaf can be given to a baby, one is not cooking solely for the gentiles.
The Maggid Mishneh notes that many (e.g., Tur, Orach Chayim 512) have objected to the Rambam’s ruling, based on Beitzah 21a, which appears to establish a correlation between the permission to bake bread for these soldiers and the laws mentioned in the previous halachah regarding inviting gentiles as guests. It appears from that passage that the Sages who forbid inviting guests also forbid baking bread for the soldiers, for the same principle is involved: one is cooking additional food for a gentile.
The Maggid Mishneh, however, explains that there is no contradiction and that the two views can be reconciled. The Jew can be considered to be baking for the sake of the child. For if he did not bake for the soldiers, they would not allow him to bake for the child.
The Rishon LeTzion amplifies the difference between the two situations, explaining that because the person is not baking solely for the gentiles, the prohibition against doing so is merely Rabbinic in origin and can be waived with regard to baking for a gentile army, since the person could suffer substantial financial loss if he refused. In contrast, when inviting guests, one does so on one’s own volition, with no loss involved.
As emphasized by Shulchan Aruch HaRav 512:6, this leniency was granted only in this situation, because of the risk of confrontation with the military authorities. One should not apply it to other circumstances. (See also Mishnah Berurah 512:15.)

Here also, since one is not baking solely for the dogs, one may bake the bread on a holiday. Although one is adding to the loaf one is baking for the dogs, since it would be possible to satisfy them by giving them meat, it appears that the shepherds are baking the loaf because they want to partake of it themselves (Maggid Mishneh).
As emphasized by the Mishnah Berurah 512:22, this leniency applies even when one has no other food immediately available for the dogs.

The Rambam’s wording appears to indicate that although the activity is forbidden by the Torah, punishment is not given, because it is possible that his activity might ultimately serve a permitted purpose.

The Maggid Mishneh states that anointing oneself is mentioned because it is often necessary to heat oil used to anoint oneself. Anointing oneself with cold oil for pleasure is permitted even on the Sabbath (Hilchot Shabbat 21:23).

The Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Beitzah 2:5) explains that the Hebrew לכאי has the connotation of all physical pleasure, not necessarily merely eating or drinking. Note the explanation in Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 187.(See also the Yereim, section 113.)

The Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 3:3) appears to indicate that the prohibition has its source in the Torah itself. Although Tosafot (Shabbat 39b) accept this view, Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and the Rashba differ and maintain that this prohibition is a Rabbinical decree.

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Shabbat 22:2, our Sages instituted restrictions against bathing on the Sabbath because the attendants would heat up the water on the Sabbath and claim that they had done so on the preceding day. On holidays, although the rules are more lenient, certain restrictions remain. For a discussion concerning the laws of ritual immersion on a holiday, see the notes on Hilchot Shabbat 23:8.

Based on the position of Tosafot mentioned previously, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 511:2) forbids washing one’s entire body on a holiday as a safeguard, even when the water was heated before the commencement of the holiday. The subsequent Ashkenazic authorities accepted the Ramah’s ruling, but were slightly more lenient and allowed washing one’s entire body, portion by portion. Greater leniency is, however, shown with regard to washing a baby.

See Hilchot Shabbat, loc. cit.

See Hilchot Shabbat, Chapters 21-23, which list activities forbidden by the Sages for every category of forbidden labor.

See Hilchot Shabbat, Chapters 25 and 26.

The term muktzeh as popularly used with regard to the Sabbath prohibitions is not a precise application of the term. Muktzeh literally means “set aside.” As used in the context here, it applies to articles that a person did not intend to use on a holiday. Rather, he “set them aside” to be used in the future.
As the Rambam explains in the following halachah, on the Sabbath it is not necessary to have a specific intention to use an object on the Sabbath. As long as there is no reason that prevents one from using it on that day—e.g., the prohibitions mentioned in Hilchot Shabbat, Chapters 25 and 26—one may carry it on the Sabbath.

The Ra’avad differs and states that there are authorities who maintain that articles that are muktzeh are permitted to be carried on holidays. The Rambam’s view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 495:4), while the Tur and the Ramah cite the more lenient view. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 495:13 states that although it is customary to follow the more lenient view, it would be preferable to follow the more stringent ruling.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 5.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 9.

The preparation we are speaking about here is preparation through natural means, and not preparation accomplished by man through performance of labor. As mentioned previously in the chapter, it is forbidden to perform any activities on a holiday that involve the preparation of food for the days that follow. (See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Beitzah 1: 1.)

Based on Pesachim 47a, several Rabbis (Ramban; Shulchan Aruch HaRav 513:1; Mishnah Berurah 513:1) maintain that the prohibition against nolad is Scriptural in origin.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), by contrast, the Rambam explicitly states that it is a Rabbinic decree. Nevertheless, since the Commentary on the Mishnah was not widely studied, different perspectives about the Rambam’s view have been offered, including that of the Minchat Chinuch (Mitzvah 295), who states that the Rambam would require a person to be punished by lashes for eating such an egg.

If the chicken is not set aside to be eaten on the holiday, the egg is forbidden regardless, because of the prohibition against muktzeh (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit. ).

There is no prohibition against eating an egg laid on a weekday that follows a holiday or on a Sunday. Since weekday meals are not significant, we are not concerned that a holiday or a Sabbath prepares for them.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 513:1) state: “lt is forbidden to touch it.” Although the prohibition is ordinarily against moving muktzeh, and touching it is permitted, the prohibition is made more severe in the present instance because an egg is round, and even the slightest’ touch is likely to cause it to roll.

Generally, when a forbidden substance becomes mixed with a permitted substance, the presence of the forbidden substance is considered inconsequential (and the mixture permitted) when the taste of the forbidden substance can no longer be recognized, or when it is mixed with more than sixty times its weight of permitted food.
More stringent rulings are made, however, with regard to a forbidden substance that will ultimately become permitted (davar sheyesh lo matirin). The rationale is that since the entire mixture will be permitted within a short time, there is no reason to seek leniencies and partake of it while a portion (although inconsequential) is forbidden (Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot, chapter 15).

The decrees our Sages instituted were meant to serve as safeguards, and a safeguard is necessary only when a situation occurs frequently.

See Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh 5:5, which explains that in the time when the calendar was established on the basis of the testimony of witnesses, the observance of the second day of a holiday in the distant diaspora was necessary because of a doubt regarding the days on which the holidays were to be celebrated. Nevertheless, in the present era, when we use a fixed calendar, the observance of the second day of a holiday in the diaspora is merely a custom. (See also Chapter 6, Halachah 14.)

As explained in Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh 5:7, even when the calendar was established on the basis of the testimony of witnesses, Rosh HaShanah was generally observed for two days throughout Eretz Yisrael. Since it is forbidden to travel beyond 2000 cubits on a holiday, only those living in the immediate vicinity of Jerusalem had the possibility of knowing whether or not the new month had been sanctified.

The word “even” has attracted the attention ofthe commentaries for, as mentioned in Halachah 24, the observance of the second day of Rosh HaShanah is more severe than that of the second day of other holidays. The Lechem Mishneh explains that the intent is that even the observance of the second day of Rosh HaShanah does not warrant a more severe punishment.

See Hilchot Talmud Torah, Chapters 6 and 7.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 496:1) quotes the Tur, who states “If [the violator] is a Torah scholar, we do not punish him so severely as to place him under a ban of ostracism. He is to be beaten.” (See Sha’ar HaTziyun 496:5, which focuses on the difference between these two rulings.)

See Chapter 6, Halachah 17.

There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether only the actual burial and those activities that involve performance of a forbidden labor must be performed by gentiles, or whether this involves all activities associated with the burial, including the ritual purification of the body, dressing it in shrouds and the like.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that all activities associated with the burial must be performed by a gentile. The Hagahot Maimoniot, by contrast, maintain that any activity that does not actually involve a forbidden labor should be performed by a Jew. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 526:1) follows this view.

Rashi (Shabbat 139b) and the Baal Halachot Gedolot explain that the leniency of allowing gentiles to bury a Jew on a holiday was instituted as a token of respect for the human body, the repository of the soul. If the body were left unburied, it would decompose and become an aspersion to the dignity of mankind. Therefore, they maintain that if the corpse is not likely to decompose, it should not be buried by gentiles.
Rabbenu Asher and others differ and maintain that the mitzvah of burying the corpse on the day the person dies is the source for this ruling (see Hilchot Sanhedrin 15:8). Therefore, even when the body is not likely to decompose, it should be buried on the first day. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. 526:1) follows this view.

The Tur and the Ramah (loc. cit. :4) mention a custom practiced by Rabbenu Tam, which equates the first and second days of a holiday in this regard. The Ramah agrees to this custom when it is possible to find a gentile to perform these labors, but maintains that if it is impossible to perform these labors, they should be performed by Jews.
In practice at present, in some observant communities burials are conducted on the holidays. Nevertheless, the prevailing custom at large—particularly when burying the dead might lead to the unnecessary violation of the laws of the holidays by some—is to postpone the burial until the following day.

Originally, the observance of the holidays for two days came as a result of doubt: If the first day was actually the holiday, the second day was an ordinary day. Conversely, if the second day was actually the holiday, the first day was an ordinary day. Therefore, they were considered to be two different expressions of holiness. (See Chapter 6, Halachah 12.)

The Ramah ( Orach Chayim 496:2) interprets this as referring to an irritation that does not involve any danger. As such, tending to it by a Jew is forbidden on the first day of a holiday. On the second day, because it brings a person relief from pain, leniency is shown. The same law applies to all other remedies of this nature.

Since they were universally observed, even within Eretz Yisrael.

I.e., all instances of nolad.

Since one could not know whether the chick would be hatched on the holiday itself or not, there is no way one could designate it as food. Hence, it falls into the category of muktzeh. Indeed, even the more lenient opinions that allow muktzeh to be used on a holiday forbid slaughtering such a chick, since before it was hatched it was not useful for any purpose whatsoever (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 513:19; Mishnah Berurah 513:36).

This applies only when we know that the calf has undergone a full period of gestation. If not, it is forbidden to be slaughtered on the day it was born (Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 4:4).

For the slaughter of the mother also causes the calf to be permitted (lbid. 5:13-14).

The Rambam is employing the wording of the Mishnah, Beitzah 5:6. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (based on Beitzah 40a), the Rambam explains that this refers to animals that graze outside the city limits from the spring until the beginning of the rainy season. This interpretation also changes the definition of animals that “retum and spend the night inside the city,” to refer to those that return to the city occasionally. These definitions are reflected in the decisions of Shulchan Aruch HaRav 498:5 and the Mishnah Berurah 498:12,14.

This refers to a firstbom animal, which is consecrated by birth. Alternatively, the intent is the tenth animal after a herd has been tithed. These animals may not be offered as a sacrifice, because the Temple is destroyed. The law is that the firstbom must be given to a priest, who may not slaughter it until it acquires a permanent blemish. The tithed animal may be kept by its owner, who may slaughter it after it acquires a blemish. The designation of a blemish as permanent or not must be made by a sage trained in this field.

The Rambam maintains that even if the animal had acquired the blemish before the holiday, it must be inspected before the holiday, and not on the holiday itself (Maggid Mishneh).

For until birth, the animal could have been eaten by slaughtering its mother.

The animal may not be checked by an experienced sage to see whether the blemish is permanent or not. This restriction is an extension of the Rabbinic safeguard mentioned in the previous halachah.

As such, moving the animal is forbidden. Therefore, the only alternative is to wait until the conclusion of the holiday and in the interim, to feed the animal while it is in the cistern.

As Leviticus 22:28 states, it is forbidden to slaughter both a cow and its calf on the same day. Thus, it would seem that we could take only one out of the cistem, and the other would be considered muktzeh.

From the wording chosen: by the Rambam, it appears that it is necessary to slaughter one of the animals. The Maggid Mishneh cites a passage from the Jerusalem Talmud (Beitzah 3:4), from which one might infer that this is not necessary, but he also cites the opinion of the Rashba, who recommends slaughtering one of the animals.

See Hilchot Shabbat 21:9-10 for other examples of leniencies granted by our Sages in consideration of the suffering endured by an animal. See also the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Beitzah 3:4), which states that consideration of the suffering endured by an animal is a Scriptural obligation.

Although this phrase appears in the standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah, we have placed it in brackets, because a) it is omitted from many authoritative manuscripts and early printings, and b) it does not fit the Rambam’s statements regarding the subject in Hilchot Shechitah 9:19.
One might justify the inclusion of the bracketed phrase by explaining that according to the Rambam, the possibility that the animal may not be kosher does not disqualify its slaughter on the festival. Nevertheless, the prevailing opinion (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 498:8) is that we are allowed.to slaughter an animal on a festival only when it is likely to be kosher.

See Hilchot Shechitah 9:9,17, where the Rambam states that an animal that falls from a roof and is unable to walk afterwards must be inspected after it was slaughtered to see whether any of its vital inner organs were crushed.

In the Talmudic era, basins were built into the facades of homes for doves to nest.

The Maggid Mishneh states that there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis regarding whether this law refers to large doves that are able to fly, or to small doves that are unable to do so.
The more stringent view maintains that since the doves are able to fly away, they must be snared, and this labor is forbidden. The more lenient view maintains that since the doves have nested in these places, great effort is not required to snare them, and this is permitted on a holiday. From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that he subscribes to the more lenient view. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 497:9) follows the more stringent opinion.

As a rationale for this stringency, the Maggid Mishneh explains that the doves will be permitted for eating on the following day with סn restrictions. Therefore, we are required to wait until then to partake of them, as explained in Chapter 1, Halachah 20.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Beitzah 1:3), the Rambam explains two reasons for this restriction:
a) It is possible that this entire group is made up of new doves that came from afar;
b) Even if two of the doves were the ones designated on the previous day, the entire group is forbidden because they were joined by a third dove who is not distinguished from them.

It is an accepted principle that doves will not waddle further than 50 cubits. Even within these 50 cubits, they will not walk on a diagonal.

The Ra’avad explains that this restriction also applies to fish in small ponds. Since fish cannot always be seen easily and are difficult to snare even in a small pond, greater stringency is applied with regard to them. His opinion is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 497:1).

It would appear that the reason that snaring is forbidden is not the fact that it is one of the 39 forbidden labors, for it is necessary for the preparation of food. Rather, it is forbidden as a result of the Rabbinic prohibition against muktzeh (Meiri, P’nei Yehoshua, Beitzah 23b).

This leniency does not apply when the animals make their home more than 70 cubits beyond the city limits (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:8), for then a person would not be likely to have these animals in mind for his holiday meals.

This ruling depends on the principle mentioned in Halachah 6, that whenever there is doubt whether or not an article had been designated for use on a holiday, it is forbidden.

As explained by the Ramah (Orach Chayim 497:5), Shulchan Aruch HaRav 497:1 and the Mishnah Berurah 497:14, this refers to a narrow waterway that has been dammed at both ends. Hence, there is no difficulty in catching the fish, and they can be considered to be designated before the commencement of the holiday.

We do not say that since the building was closed before the commencement of the holiday, the produce is no longer considered designated for use. There are authorities (Rashba, Rabbenu Asher) who follow a more stringent view, and maintain that the produce is permitted only when it appeared that the building would open. Nevertheless, according to the Rambam (as well as Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and the Ramban), the fact that it is located in a closed building does not alter the status of the produce. When, as in the instance described, it is possible to take it, doing so is permitted. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 518:9) quotes the Rambam’s ruling.

The Mishnah (Beitzah 4:7) mentions this instance with regard to the Sabbath. Since the Rambam maintains that the prohibitions against muktzeh do not apply on the Sabbath, he cites these laws with regard to the holidays.

The Sabbatical year is mentioned because there is no obligation to tithe in that year. In other years, the produce would not be considered to be designated for use until it had been tithed, and it is not customary to tithe fruit that has been set out to dry until it is fully dried. (See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Beitzah, loc. cit.)

I.e., the person must make a mark on the ground to designate the area from which he desires to take produce. ln Halachah 5, the Rambam does not require a person to perform a deed while designating doves to be eaten (thus negating the opinion of the School of Shammai). In this instance, however, since people do not generally eat fruit left out to dry until it is completely dry, it is necessary for him to perform a deed to clarify his intent. The Ramah (495:4) differs and does not require that a deed be performed even in this instance.

The same laws apply with regard to gentile merchants who desire to sell produce or other types of food on a holiday.

When this type of produce is still growing in the ground, there is the possibility that the gentile harvested it on the holiday itself.

There are two reasons why these foods are prohibited:
a) because a Jew may not have a gentile perform forbidden labors on the Jew’s behalf on a holiday,
b) because the food he brings is muktzeh.

There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if, in the diaspora, an object that became forbidden for these reasons on the first day of a holiday is permitted to be used on the second day or not. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 515:1) allows it to be used on the second day of the holiday after one waits enough time to perform the forbidden labor. The Ramah requires the person for whom the gentile brought the produce to wait until after the conclusion of the holiday. ln times of need, however, he enables the produce to be used by the person’s guests on the second day.

This safeguard ensures that one will derive no benefit at all from the gentile’s activity, nor ask him to perform such a labor again.

Although such food is also forbidden to all the members of the household of the person for whom it was brought.

Beitzah 4b explains that the restrictions applying to an entity that will become permitted at a later date do not apply with regard to this wood, since the benefit one receives from the wood comes after it has been consumed by the flames. It is permitted to add the larger quantity of permitted wood because we are allowed to nullify the existence of a prohibited entity if the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin. (See also Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 15:26.)
Rabbenu Nissim states that this leniency is granted only when there is also some permitted wood in the oven. If not, one may not nullify the prohibited wood. His opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 507:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 507:7).

This refers to straw or wood that has been set aside to be sold.

This refers to wood that has been set aside to be used for construction (Rashi, Beitzah 31b).

Before the holiday the beam was part of a building, and only on the holiday itself did the possibility of its being used for other purposes arise. Therefore, it is considered to be nolad.

If, however, it is still possible to use the pieces to perform the task originally performed with the utensil, the pieces are still permitted to be used for kindling or for any other purpose (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 501:11; Mishnah Berurah 501:29).

Although the utensil existed beforehand, no one considered using it for kindling while it was intact. Only when it became broken was it considered to be fit for kindling. Hence, it is considered to be nolad.

If a person desires to use an intact utensil for kindling, there is no difficulty. Since the utensil is intact, carrying it is permitted.

Because the possibility of using them for kindling arose only on the holiday, they are considered to be nolad.

For it is uncommon to use nut shells for any significant purpose. See Hilchot Shabbat 25:6,12.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 501:7) quotes the former version as halachah.

Wood is not fit for kindling until it dries out. (See Chapter 4, Halachah 11.)

We may not, however, take wood that is used for the walls themselves, for by doing so we would be destroying a building (Beitzah 30b ).

We have translated the term sukkah as hut, because this law applies throughout the year, not only to the sukkot constructed on the holiday of that name. (See Kessef Mishneh; Mishnah Berurah 518:38.)

From the Rambam’s mention of this law in the chapter dealing with the subject of muktzeh, it would appear that he considers muktzeh as the rationale for this restriction as well. Other authorities have offered other rationales; among them, that collecting wood in the field is forbidden because it is a mundane activity unfit for the sacred atmosphere of the holidays. Alternatively, it resembles the forbidden labor of me’ amer, collecting sheaves (Mishnah Berurah 501: 11 ).

Several later authorities (Rav Shlomo Luria; Shulchan Aruch HaRav 501:7) are more stringent, and rule that since it is usual to collect wood from a field, doing so on a holiday bears too close a resemblance to the forbidden labor of me’ amer. Hence, this leniency is allowed only in an open courtyard.

I.e., it is forbidden if the wood is scattered in a courtyard, or the courtyard is beyond the Sabbath limits or lacks a fence with a gate.

In this instance as well, it appears that the Rambam considers this restriction as an outgrowth of the prohibition against muktzeh. Since it is possible that they will become dispersed, one does not rely on their remaining in their place.
Other authorities explain that the restriction is a safeguard against performing the forbidden labor of me’amer. (See Mishnah Berurah 501:18,20.)

Even if they are dispersed. By placing the heavy utensil upon them, the person indicated his intent that the leaves be used for kindling. This leniency is not accepted by the authorities who explain that the restriction is a safeguard against performing the forbidden labor of me'amer.

I.e., since it was ill, the person considered the likelihood that it would die. Even before the holiday began, he had it in mind to feed the carcass to his dogs.

A consecrated animal that dies may not be used for any mundane purposes; its corpse must be buried. Therefore, even if it was sick on the day before the holiday, it may not be moved on the holiday (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Beitzah 3:5).

Terumah that becomes impure must be given to a priest, who can use it for kindling or feed it to his animals. Nevertheless, it is forbidden to perform either of these activities on a holiday. Hence, the impure terumah may not be used that day, and thus becomes muktzeh (Rashi, Beitzah 27b).

This applies even to living creatures for which the person is required to provide food. The restriction involves placing the food directly before the animals. It is permitted to place it far from the usual place, for this departure from the norm will remind one not to pick up the animals (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 497:5; Mishnah Berurah 497:5).

For this reason, this prohibition does not apply to feeding non-kosher animals (Maggid Mishneh).

As mentioned in the first halachah of the following chapter, earth was necessary for covering the blood of fowl and wild beasts that were slaughtered. In Talmudic times, when the homes had earthen floors, earth was also used to cover spills, excrement, and other filth. Since the earth was not flattened, we do not say that the person brought it in to use as part on the floor. Instead, we allow him to use it for other purposes

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:15) states that, after the fact ,)דיענדנ( if one has already slaughtered a fowl or beast, it is preferable to use even cold ash, rather than negate the mitzvah of covering the blood.

The Rambam’s statements should not be interpreted as license to, in fact, implant a shaft in the ground and pull it out on the holiday. The Rambam (as is his source, the Mishnah, Beitzah 1:2) is speaking after the fact )דיעבדב(—i.e., the person has already uprooted the earth and is questioning whether or not he may use it. This ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:14).

If the earth is powdery, uprooting it from the ground is not considered to be digging a hole (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Beitzah 1:2). This powdery earth can—in contrast to clods of earth—be used to cover the blood.

Crumbling the earth is a derivative of the forbidden labor of grinding.

See the final halachah of the previous chapter.

In contrast to a behemah -a domesticated animal—(e.g. a cow, sheep, or goat), when a fowl or wild animal (e.g., a deer) is slaughtered, its blood must be covered with earth. (See Hilchot Shechitah, Chapter 14.)

See the notes on the final halachah of the previous chapter, which touch on this issue.

Most authorities consider this to be referring to an animal that is a crossbreed between a goat and a deer.

The Ramah (Orach Chayim 498:18) states that this ruling applies only when the person slaughtered this animal in a corner. If, however, he slaughtered it in the middle of a courtyard and earth has been prepared and is available, it is permitted to cover its blood on the holiday, just as it is permitted to remove an unpleasant object from sight.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bikkurim 2:9), the Rambam writes that it is forbidden to take this earth, because there is a doubt regarding the animal’s classification. This can be interpreted as an indication that even if earth was prepared for use, it may be carried only for a valid reason.

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 7:3, we are forbidden to eat only the fat of cows, sheep, and goats. The fat of all other kosher animals and beasts is permitted. Since the animal in question could be considered to be a goat, it is forbidden to eat its fat.

Although it is necessary to cover the blood of the beast or fowl, it is not necessary to cover the blood of the domestic animal.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 498:36 and the Mishnah Berurah 498:103 explain that “one shovelful” need not be interpreted literally. The intent is that one would not have to engage in any additional effort to cover the extra blood coming from the animal.

This is the key to the leniency. Since one would normally cut the wool away with shears, pulling it away by hand represents a departure from one’s ordinary procedure and is therefore permitted.

See Hilchot Shabbat 11 :5.

A hide from an animal slaughtered on a holiday, in contrast to the hide of an animal slaughtered before the holiday began (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 499:3).

By the people’s treading on it, the tanning process will begin, and it will not spoil.

Similarly, one is permitted to place it in the shade or in a cool place so that it will not spoil (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 499:3; Mishnah Berurah 499:4).

Because of the fear that its hide will spoil. Our Sages feared that this financial loss would deter a person from slaughtering an animal on the holiday.

The Rambam describes the difference between the manner in which meat is salted for cooking and for roasting in Hilchot Ma’ achalot Asurot 6: 12.

Shulchan Aruch Harav 499:10 permits the fats to be carried to a cool shady place, lest their loss prevent the person from slaughtering.

To cut the meat in such a way that it will be easier for a customer to carry it home (Rashi, Beitzah 28a).

To distinguish meat purchased by one customer from that purchased by another (ibid.).

Although the School of Shammai forbids this, the halachah follows the School of Hillel, which rules that baking such a loaf is permitted (Beitzah 22b ). The rationale is that a loaf tastes better when cooked in an oven which is full.

Numbers 15:20 requires us to separate a portion of dough and give it to the priest as challah. This offering is governed by the rules pertaining to terumah and hence may not be eaten when either the dough or the person partaking of it is impure. In such an instance, it must be burned.

On a holiday, one may, however, bring a priest challah that had been separated before the holiday (Chapter 4, Halachah 26; Ramah, Orach Chayim 506:3). The Ramah also mentions that in the present age, in the diaspora, dough that has been kneaded before the holiday is permitted to be baked on the holiday, and a small portion of bread is left over, from which challah will be separated on the following day.

lt is ordinarily forbidden to separate the consecrated articles that are due the priests on a holiday (Chapter 4, Halachah 26). Nevertheless, an exception was made in this instance, to allow people the option of eating fresh bread on a holiday.

This is the ruling that must be followed in the prese1_1t age, for we are all ritually impure, and convey ritual impurity to the dough.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 19:5.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 2.

The Noda Biy’hudah (Vol. 11, Orach Chayim, Responsum 96) notes that according to Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim, loc. cit., it is also forbidden to burn certain sacrificial meats that became disqualified—e.g., piggul and notar—at night. The Rambam does not mention such a restriction, however, with regard to consecrated articles that become impure.
There are, nevertheless, other authorities who differ and forbid the burning at night of consecrated articles that have become impure. (See Be’ur Halachah 506 and the sources mentioned there.)

Our translation follows the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Beitzah 4:5). Beitzah 32b and the Shulchan Aruch ( Otach Chayim 507:4) speak of an instance where a brick or part of the lime covering of the oven wall fell and disturbed the cooking process.

By hand (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit.), seemingly implying that it is forbidden to use a utensil unless necessary.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this is permitted even though in the process one will extinguish the coals. Although Chapter 4, Halachah 2, states that it is forbidden to extinguish a fire on a holiday, it is possible to explain that a distinction can be made in this instance, for by extinguishing the flame it becomes possible to cook.

This follows the Rambam’s position (Hilchot Shabbat 8:16) that one is not liable for mixing clay if one uses ashes. The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam both in Hilchot Shabbat and in this halachah. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:7) follows the Rambam’s view.

Contact with cold water after being heated will seal the walls of an earthenware oven.

These prohibitions are instituted because these tasks are mundane matters that are not directly associated with the preparation of food on a holiday.

All the commentaries see this as a reference to the Mishnah (Beitzah 4:7), which forbids heating “tiles.” They question why the Rambam deviated from the wording used there.

This refers to a cauldron used during the Talmudic period, made of heavy copper. It was made up of two receptacles, the upper one for water, and the lower one for the coals used to heat the water (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 3:3). Since the cauldron is large and remains hot for a very long time, one might think that its use would be forbidden on a holiday, lest one create the impression that one is preparing hot water for the day following the holiday (Maggid Mishneh).

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachot 5-7, our Sages forbade the performance of any labors on a holiday even for the sake of the preparation of food, if it is possible to perform these labors before the holiday begins.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 504:1) states that this is forbidden because it is a mundane activity that is inappropriate for a holiday. Others explain that, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 7, grinding is forbidden on a holiday.

The Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 504:3) states that at present, we are unaware which is considered a small grinder and which a large grinder. Therefore, it is forbidden to use all grinders.

Although he accepts the law stated by the Rambam, the Ra’avad differs with the rationale, and explains that in Eretz Yisrael it was always customary to use a small grinder. Therefore, employing one on a holiday is not considered to be a deviation from the norm.

Although there are opinions that permit removing the pebble or the sliver by hand, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 506:4 and the Mishnah Berurah 506:12 forbid removing it by hand, and require that the flour be sifted again.

If, however, the flour had not been sifted on the previous day, it may not be sifted on the holiday (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 506:2). It is, however, permissible to have a gentile sift the flour, provided he deviates from the ordinary practice (Ramah).

Our translation of these terms is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Keilim 16:3). Most other authorities follow different interpretations.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that since it is customary to prepare a large quantity using these utensils, it appears as if the person were preparing on the holiday for the weekdays that follow.

I.e., one is thus separating the waste matter from the food.

And thus it is likely to be easier to separate the small amount of waste matter, than to separate all the food.

When the waste matter is thin and difficult to separate.

Which our Rabbis prohibited on a holiday, even when it is performed for the purpose of preparing food.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 20:2), the Rambam explains that when raw eggs are mixed with coarse foods, they cause the lighter matter to rise above the heavier, coarse matter. Thus, mixing the egg with the mustard will cause the dregs of the mustard to be separated.

If, however, one does not use the filter for another purpose, one may not use it to filter wine afterwards.