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Ketubot 52b states that an allusion to this concept can be found in Jeremiah 29:6: ‘‘Give your daughters to men.’’ Our Sages ask ‘‘Is it possible for a father to initiate marriage proceedings?’’ And they explain that the intent of the verse is that a man should provide his daughter with a dowry attractive enough for a man to desire her.

I.e., 50 zuz, as stated in Chapter 13, Halachah 1.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that one tenth is the average, but that if a man is known to be generous, his daughter may be given more than a tenth. The Rama (Even HaEzer 113:1) mentions the opinion of certain authorities who maintain that a girl should never be given more than a tenth of the estate, but states that the common practice is not to follow this view.

The dowry is given to the daughter only when she prepares to marry, not beforehand. Nevertheless, she is given a tenth of the value of the estate at the time of her father’s death, regardless of its present value (Maggid Mishneh; Rama, Even HaEzer 113:4).

I.e., even according to the Sages who ordained that the payment of the money due a woman by virtue of her ketubah may come from movable property (Chapter 16, Halachah 8), the payment of the dowry is from landed property alone.

Based on the wording of Halachah 12, the Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam’s opinion is that the movable property in the estate is not included in the calculation of the size of the estate on which the amount of the dowry is based. Rav Moshe HaCohen and Rabbenu Asher differ, emphasizing that although the dowry allotment is not collected from movable property, the movable property is included in this appraisal. Both authorities agree, however, that if an assessment is made of the amount that the father would have given his daughter, that assessment includes the movable property in the estate.

This refers to rent due the father for landed property that was uncollected at the time of his death. The Rama (loc. cit.) states that if the heirs have already collected the rental fee, they are not obligated to give it to their sister.

That she has not received any of the estate.

Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 14:1, 19:1.

The rationale is that it is known that a girl is entitled to receive a dowry, and the purchasers of the property of the estate should have taken precautions before buying the property.

Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 18:1.

Ketubot 69a explains that the rationale for this ruling is that the daughter has received a far larger portion of the estate than she could have hoped for.

The Rambam’s opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 113:8). The

The provisions of the ketubah — e.g., the support of the daughters — become binding at the time of the marriage, and the man’s statements have no effect regarding them (Chapter 19, Halachah 13). The dowry, by contrast, is a gift that we assume a man would make. Therefore if he explicitly states that he does not desire that it be made, his wishes are heeded.

Chapter 19, Halachah 21.

The Chelkat Mechokek 113:17 and the Beit Shmuel 113:16 state that the same ruling applies with regard to the daughters. I.e., if there are older daughters who wish to collect their dowry and marry, and younger daughters who still have to receive support from the estate, the younger daughters are entitled to object to the property being given to their sisters. The rationale is that the support for the widow and for the daughters is considered to be a debt owed by the estate, while their dowry is considered to be a debt owed by the heirs.

Once the widow has remarried or received payment for her ketubah, the daughter is entitled to inherit the tenth of the estate that should have been given to her. Even when she has already married, her brothers are required to give her these funds from the remainder of the estate.

At times a woman’s husband is considered to be a purchaser of the property he inherits from his wife, and at times an heir. If he were considered to be a purchaser, he would be entitled to take possession of the dowry due his wife, for a widow is not entitled to collect her support from property that has been sold. Nevertheless, in this instance, out of consideration for the widow, our Sages considered him like an heir and thus enabled the widow to continue receiving her sustenance (Bava Batra 139b).

The Maggid Mishneh cites this phrase as proof that the tenth of the estate set aside as a dowry is expropriated from landed property alone.

See the following halachah.

And thus the fact that she did not object at the time of the marriage is not significant. The Maggid Mishneh adds that even if the girl did not object immediately at the time she reached majority, she is entitled to object afterwards. This decision is quoted by the Rama (Even HaEzer 113:7).

Rabbenu Asher writes that a girl who reached the age of bagrut in her father’s lifetime is not entitled to a dowry from her brothers. The later Ashkenazic authorities (see Beit Shmuel 113:19) state, however, that this ruling is not applied.

Chapter 19, Halachah 10.

Hence, she is ashamed to come to them with this request (Ketubot 68b).

Implied is that once a bogeret marries without demanding her dowry, she has forfeited it even though her brothers continue to provide her with her sustenance (Maggid Mishneh). In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro writes that if the brothers of a na’arah continue to provide her with her sustenance after marriage, she does not forfeit her dowry, even if she does not protest. Although his wording in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 113:7) is slightly problematic, the later authorities explain that this is his intent. A source for both the statements of the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh can be seen in the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ketubot 6:6).

We assume that the father’s intent was that the money should be entrusted to a third party only until after her marriage (Rashi, Ketubot 69b).

For it is a mitzvah to carry out the directives of a person who dies, even if he was healthy at the time he gave these directives (Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:5).

We assume that the father’s intent was to safeguard his daughter and her husband against wasting the funds intended for them.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 54:1) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Rama refers to this ruling in Choshen HaMishpat 252:2, which states that this applies only if the funds were specifically entrusted to the third party for this purpose by the deceased at the time he made this statement. If they came into his possession afterwards, the concept that it is a mitzvah to carry out the directives of a person who dies does not apply.

Ketubot 47a states that since a woman’s husband supports her, he might object if she were granted ownership over the items that she discovers.

As mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachah 4, in exchange for the obligation incumbent on the man to support his wife, our Sages granted him the right to the income she generates.

There are two interpretations of ‘‘more than would be expected of her’’: a) that she worked overtime, more hours than common custom requires, b) that she performed several tasks at one time.

There are authorities who differ with the Rambam and maintain that a woman is entitled to keep the additional amount she earns. The Bayit Chadash (Even HaEzer 80) states that it is not Ashkenazic custom to require a woman to give her husband any of her additional earnings.

Literally, ‘‘he is.’’ Many manuscript copies and early printings of the Mishneh Torah state ‘‘he and she are,’’ instead of ‘‘he is.’’

Hence, rather than compel a woman to follow a course of conduct that will lead to wanton behavior, Ketubot 59b requires the husband to divorce his wife.

The commentaries discuss whether the intent is to make her husband’s bed or to make all the beds in the house. The difference is with regard to a rich woman, who could have maids perform household services. She is, nevertheless, obligated to make her husband’s bed as a reflection of their personal closeness. The question is whether this applies to making the other beds in the house. Ketubot 61a uses the expression ‘‘makes the bed for him,’’ indicating that the emphasis is on the husband’s bed.

I.e., they are a reflection of their personal closeness.

I.e., the animal on which he rides.

Alternatively, guards the flour (Tur, Even HaEzer 80).

The commentaries mention the importance of selecting a Jewish nursemaid. For milk that comes from non-kosher food will breed undesirable tendencies in the son’s character.

The Rambam does not mention washing her husband, because his wife is forbidden to touch him while in the niddah state. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 11:18-19.)

The Chelkat Mechokek 80:29 states that based on the Jerusalem Talmud, this law applies even when she breaks household articles while she is not in the midst of her household chores.

While he accepts the Rambam’s ruling, the Ra’avad offers a different rationale. The commentaries, however, justify the Rambam’s view.

Rav Kapach emphasizes that the Rambam’s intent is not that the husband should beat his wife himself, but that he should bring her to the court, which should administer corporal punishment if they see fit.
The Ra’avad objects to this ruling, explaining that it is unheard of to compel a woman by corporal punishment. Instead, her support should be cut back until she accepts her household duties. The Rashba offers other options — to place her under a ban of ostracism or to sell her ketubah and use the proceeds to hire a maid.
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 80:15) mentions that the woman is compelled to perform her tasks, but omits reference to the means of compuls-ion employed. The Rama quotes the opinion of the Rambam together with that of the Ra’avad and the Rashba, but appears to favor the latter views.

The woman is not required to support her claim with an oath, because a pattern of the husband’s complaining and the woman’s being compelled to take an oath would arise, and peace would not reign within the household (Chelkat Mechokek 80:28).

Although a woman is enjoined not to eat foods that would harm her supply of milk, she is allowed to do so if she feels physical pain, because her needs take priority over those of the child. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro objects to the Rambam’s ruling. In his Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 80:11), he quotes dissenting views together with that of the Rambam, without favoring either view.
Note the Chelkat Mechokek 80:22, who emphasizes that when there is a real danger to the child’s life, and no danger to the mother, the woman must adjust her diet to help the child.

Rabbenu Asher states that she is required to nurse both children, but this view is not accepted by the later authorities.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 80:14) quotes the Tur, which states that a husband may even prevent a woman from nursing her own child who was born to her froma previous husband.

Implied in the marital contract is that the woman will nurse her children. Hence, she may not object.

Rashi (Ketubot 61a) mentions another rationale: having milk without nursing causes pain.

For a father is obligated to pay for his child’s sustenance until the age of six, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 14.

The husband cannot, however, be compelled to pay for a nursemaid if the mother is given custody.

For even a blind child can recognize his mother from her smell and the flavor of her milk.

The pain of separation from his mother could cause the child to undergo travail that might lead to weakness. Rashi (Ketubot 59b) states that it is possible that the infant might reject another nursemaid and hence starve to death.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s decision, explaining that a father is obligated to begin educating his child at an early age, and this is impossible when the child is in the mother’s custody. The Maggid Mishneh refutes that argument, explaining that the amount of teaching that the father is obligated to give the child can be communicated at visits.
It must be emphasized, however, that the Rambam is referring to a situation in which the mother shares the same standards of observance as the father. If that is not the case, and the mother’s observance is lacking, the father should be given the right to custody.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that if a son desires to stay in his mother’s custody, and the mother is willing to support him, he is entitled to do so. (See Chelkat Mechokek 82:9.)

At present, there are many courts that require the father to continue supporting his son, even if he desires to remain with his mother.

For her mother is more prepared to train her to grow up as a woman.
The Rama (Even HaEzer 82:7) states that this law applies only when the court feels that it is in the daughter’s best interests to remain in her mother’s custody. If, however, it appears that the daughter’s interests will be served better when she is in her father’s custody, he is awarded that privilege.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this implies that a woman does not have any responsibility to raise her children. The Ma’aseh Rokeach maintains that if the mother has means, she is required to provide for her children’s support and cannot cast the burden on the community. She need not, however, raise them in her home, lest this deter other men from desiring to marry her. This latter opinion is not, however, mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 82:8) or its commentaries when dealing with this situation.

As explained in Chapter 12, Halachah 3 and notes, this is one of the four privileges our Sages granted a husband as part of the marriage contract. (See also Hilchot Nachalot 1:8.)

The second phase of marriage, nisu’in, does not start until the woman enters the chuppah, and it is only at that time that the marriage contract takes effect. Nevertheless, an exception is made in this instance, as explained in the following halachot and notes.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 57:1) cites the opinion of the Tur and other Ashkenazic authorities, which is that the husband does not have a right to inherit his wife’s dowry until it enters his possession.

Moreover, if the courtyard belongs to the husband, it is assumed that the couple entered for the sake of marriage, even when they do not explicitly state so. This is the view of all authorities, and the Maggid Mishneh explains that it is also shared by the Rambam.

If the courtyard belonged to her, this intent is understood even when it is not explicitly stated.

This law applies even if the widow is still a minor, as reflected in Chapter 3, Halachah 12.

Once she is met by her husband or his agents, however, he is entitled to inherit her estate.

See Chapter 1, Halachot 6 and 7; Chapter 4, Halachah 14.

Or after she becomes divorced or widowed in her father’s lifetime (Chapter 4, Halachot 7 and 8).

The rationale is that she is not entitled to a ketubah (Chapter 11, Halachah 4). Moreover, since she is not responsible for her actions, she has no right to transfer her property.

Although the Ra’avad objects to this ruling, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:3) quotes the Rambam’s view.

Chapter 3, Halachah 13.

See Chapter 14, Halachah 8.

The advantage in the purchaser’s continuing to own the land itself is that if the husband dies before his wife, her sale is binding, and the land becomes the purchaser’s property. From this time onward, he is entitled to benefit from the land as well.
Rabbenu Asher differs with the Rambam on this issue and maintains that the husband has the right to take the property from the purchaser, even during his wife’s lifetime. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:9) follows the Rambam’s view, while the Rama quotes that of Rabbenu Asher.

Even the Rama and Rabbenu Asher accept this ruling.

There is a difference of opinion with regard to this matter among the geonim, but all the later authorities accept this view. The rationale is that the husband’s right to the land supersedes that of the purchaser. The money that the purchaser paid is considered to have become a debt owed him by the woman’s estate and the husband is not required to pay his wife’s debts.

A husband is entitled to any ownerless object discovered by his wife. His claim is not accepted, however, if he states that money that appears to have come from the sale of property came from the discovery of a lost object. There is no need for witnesses to testify that this is the money from the sale. It is sufficient that it appears to be so. If, however, the money has been changed into a different coinage or currency, the husband is not required to return it (Maggid Mishneh).

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ketubot 8:2), the Rambam states that this refers to property located in the bride and groom’s city or the surrounding locale, as opposed to property owned by her in more distant locales. It is questionable, however, if the same geographic restrictions apply in today’s global village.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:11) states that preferably, a woman should not sell this property, because her husband is entitled to inherit it.
The commentaries explain that when the husband knows of his wife’s financial holdings, it is an implicit part of the marriage contract — and perhaps part of his intent in entering into the marriage relationship — that he will inherit this property. When, however, he is unaware of her ownership of property, this motive cannot be given as the reason for his desire to enter this relationship.
It must be added that as soon as the husband becomes aware of this property, it is considered to be part of the woman’s nichsei m’log and is bound by all the laws pertaining to such property (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:12). Moreover, if the woman dies without selling this property, her husband is entitled to inherit it, although he was never aware of his wife’s ownership of it during her lifetime.

The Tur (Even HaEzer 90) states that the woman has the full right to sell any property that she owned before she was consecrated. With regard to property that she acquired after she was consecrated, it is preferable that she not sell it — but if she sells it, the husband has no claim to it.

As explained in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, slightly different rules apply if the woman signed over only a portion of her property.

Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 6:12. It is clearly obvious that the woman’s intent in giving the present is to protect her holdings from being inherited by her husband.

In his gloss on Ketubot 79a, Rabbenu Nissim explains that the Rambam equates this provision with the one mentioned in the previous clause. The only difference between the two is one of tact. The provision in this clause is more gently worded, so that the intent to free the woman’s holdings from her husband is less obvious.

Unlike the Rambam, Rabbenu Asher and other authorities maintain that the woman need not explicitly mention her consent to the present. All that is necessary is that she refrain from nullifying it.

Rabbenu Nissim asks, according to the approach of the Rambam (in contrast to the approach of Rabbenu Asher mentioned in the previous note): If the woman did not explicitly mention her consent to the present before her death, why does her husband have no right to inherit her property? The provision on which the present was based was never fulfilled.
Seemingly, this property can be compared to a woman’s property of which her husband was unaware. As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, the husband has the right to inherit such property, and thus he should also inherit the property mentioned in this clause.
Rabbenu Nissim explains that since the Rambam maintains that a husband’s right to inherit his wife’s property is a Rabbinical ordinance, there is room for leniency when, as in the present case, it is obvious that the woman did not desire her husband to inherit her estate. Obviously motivated by the same question, but unwilling to offer such a resolution, Rav David Arameah explains that the Rambam’s ruling applies in an instance when the woman in fact expressed her consent to the present before her death.

As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 8, preferably a woman should not sell property she acquires after her consecration. One might think that the same principle applies to a yevamah, for she also shares a bond to her yavam. There is, however, a distinction between the two: a woman who is consecrated will most likely be married, while a yevamah may be freed from her obligation through chalitzah. Hence, there are no restrictions placed upon her with regard to the sale of her holdings.

The difference between nichsei m’log and nichsei tzon barzel is that with regard to nichsei m’log, the object itself belongs to the woman, while the property regarded as nichsei tzon barzel is considered to belong to her late husband. He was, however, obligated to pay his wife for the value designated at the time of marriage (Chapter 16, Halachah 1).
Since the nichsei tzon barzel are considered to belong to the yevamah’s late husband’s estate, one might think that the yavam would have a right to them. Hence, it is necessary to clarify that he is given this right only after marriage.

For this property belongs to her outright.

A division is necessary because this property is considered to belong to the yevamah’s late husband, as explained above. Therefore, his heirs have a claim to it. Nevertheless, since he died in his wife’s lifetime and she did not receive payment for this property, her own heirs also have a claim.

I.e., both the essential requirement of the ketubah and any additional amount added by her deceased husband.

For our Sages associated a woman’s burial with the inheritance of her ketubah (Chapter 12, Halachah 14).

Even if the value of the property left by the deceased brother is many times the value of the woman’s ketubah, none of the property may be sold, lest the remaining property be destroyed and the woman have difficulty collecting the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from the purchasers (Ketubot 81b).

I.e., since the produce requires the land, it is considered as if it were landed property, and the money received from the sale has the same status as the landed property mentioned in the previous halachah.

The Maggid Mishneh, the Rivash (Responsa 365 and 366), and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 168:5) emphasize that the law stated by the Rambam applies only when the husband did not follow the suggestion (Chapter 16, Halachah 8) of stating explicitly in the ketubah that the woman may collect from movable property the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. (There are other authorities who differ with the Rambam and maintain that even if the provision is not stated explicitly in the woman’s ketubah, the movable property should be sold and land purchased.)

E.g., he died after he consecrated her, but before he consummated the marriage — in which instance, the woman is obligated to undergo either yibbum or chalitzah, and yet her deceased husband was not obligated to grant her a ketubah.

Since she has no claim to her deceased husband’s property, she is not judged by the laws pertaining to a yevamah, but rather by those pertaining to other women.

If she sells the land to her husband, the sale is rescinded because she can claim that she did not sell it willingly; she did so only to appease her husband (Bava Batra 49b). If she sells the land to others, the sale is rescinded because her husband has a right to benefit from her property, and she cannot take away this right from him without his consent. If, however, the husband agrees to her sale, it is binding, as stated in Hilchot Mechirah 30:3.

With regard to nichsei m’log, it is obvious that the husband’s sale is of no consequence, for the woman owns this type of property. With regard to nichsei tzon barzel, which are considered to be the husband’s property, there are authorities (e.g., the Ra’avad) who differ with the Rambam and maintain that the sale is valid until the time comes when the woman desires to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.
The commentaries support the Rambam’s opinion, explaining that even though the woman has the potential to expropriate the property afterwards by force of law, the sale should be nullified. For women are not comfortable presenting claims in court. If the sale were allowed to remain binding, the only way the woman could receive her due would be by lodging a legal claim. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:13) quotes the Rambam’s view.

If the woman is divorced, she is entitled to this property. Hence, the husband does not have the prerogative of selling it.

The husband is allowed to destroy this property through frequent use. Therefore, the woman does not rely on receiving this property, and thus if he sells it the sale is binding (Maggid Mishneh, gloss on Hilchot Mechirah 30:5; Chelkat Mechokek 90:45).
This is the opinion of the Rambam and Rabbenu Tam, and is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:14). Rabbenu Asher, the Rashba and others differ and maintain that the sale is of no consequence. Their view is quoted by the Rama.

Although both the husband and his wife have a share in the property, since the purchaser dealt with both of them, the sale is binding.

Since this property itself belongs to her, there is no reason for her husband to become upset if she does not desire to sell it to him.

See Chapter 23, Halachah 11; Hilchot Mechirah 30:3.
There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if similar laws apply when a woman waives her claim to property mentioned in her ketubah in favor of her husband. The Ra’avad and Rabbenu Asher maintain that her deed is of consequence, while the Rashba and the Ramban state that it is not. The Maggid Mishneh maintains that the Rambam subscribes to the latter view.

The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that until the woman recants, the transaction is binding. The Beit Meir, however, objects, explaining that the Rambam’s wording in Hilchot Mechirah 30:3 does not indicate such a distinction.

Her husband will pressure her by saying, ‘‘You are either planning my death or considering a divorce. Otherwise, you would not hesitate to sell this property to me’’ (Bava Batra 49b, 50a).

Even if he has a deed or witnesses that testify to the claim, his wife may also negate his claim based on the above rationale.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:16) states that if the woman explicitly accepts responsibility for the field if expropriated from the husband, then the transaction is binding.

Based on the Rambam’s statements in Chapter 17, Halachah 19, it is questionable why witnesses are necessary. See Chelkat Mechokek 90:1, Beit Shmuel 90:6.

A husband is not obligated to pay for nichsei m’log that have been destroyed, lost or stolen, while in such situations, he is obligated to pay the original value for nichsei tzon barzel. Thus, by changing the status of her property, the woman is in effect waiving a financial obligation due her from her husband.
There is reason to say that just as a woman can say that she was forced to give or sell this property to her husband to appease him, she could also say that she was also forced to waive her husband’s obligation in the loss or theft of this property. The Rambam, however, does not accept this rationale. Since this obligation is due only after the husband’s death or divorce, there is nothing pressuring her husband to pay it. If he demands that his wife waive this obligation, she may refuse, asking him: ‘‘Is it because you want to divorce me that you are asking me to waive this obligation?’’ (Maggid Mishneh).

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling. Nevertheless, it is the Rambam’s decision which is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:18).

If, at the outset, the husband sold the rights to benefit from the property for a lump sum, it is possible that all that money would be spent in a short period of time and that afterwards, there would be nothing left for household expenses (Chelkat Mechokek 85:41).

For their value is explicitly stated in the woman’s ketubah and will be returned to her in the event of divorce or her husband’s death.

For money that a woman acquires while married is automatically considered to be nichsei m’log.

In this way, the woman is assured that the principal will remain hers. If the husband desires to use the money for commercial enterprises, he may afterwards sell the right to benefit from the property, as mentioned in the previous halachah.

E.g., people other than her husband. If her husband himself injures her, he is not entitled to benefit from the proceeds of her property, as mentioned in Halachah 28.

Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:15. As stated in that source, the husband also has a right to receive a certain portion of the damages as his own funds to which his wife has no right.

Although in most instances, produce that is still attached to land is considered equivalent to landed property, an exception is made in this case, because the husband is entitled to the benefit that accrues from his wife’s property.

For he is entitled to receive all the benefit from her property throughout the duration of their marriage.

See Hilchot Avadim 9:7, which states that a husband does not have the prerogative of telling a servant: ‘‘Work for me, but I will not provide for your sustenance.’’

The Rambam’s wording implies that the concept of maintaining the honor of one’s household applies only with regard to the children of one’s servants, and not to the offspring of one’s livestock. See the Beit Shmuel 85:38, which quotes a difference of opinion among the Rabbis on this issue.

Bava Batra 51b states that a person who gives a present gives with a generous spirit. Therefore, we may assume that the husband gives the gift to his wife without wanting to restrict her in any way.

The specific wording of the provision that the giver must make is discussed in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 3:13.

The person purchasing the rights to the woman’s ketubah is taking a risk, because it is possible that she will die in her husband’s lifetime and then he will not receive anything.

Our Sages entitled a husband to derive the benefit that would ordinarily accrue from property belonging to his wife — e.g., produce that grows on a field, rent from a home, labor from a servant. They did not grant him rights to benefits that arise from abnormal circumstances.

The Rambam does not mention two other payments that a person who inflicts an injury would ordinarily pay: shevet — reimbursement for the wages that were not earned during the period of convalescence, because the husband is entitled to his wife’s wages — and ripui — payment for the medical treatment required, because a husband is always required to pay for his wife’s medical care.

Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:16.

The husband cannot claim that the funds belonged to him, but since he could not take them from his wife in any other way, he sold the property to her as a ruse.

This ruling depends on the halachah to follow, which states that a woman’s claim is accepted with regard to money found in her possession.

The Rambam’s ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 85:9). The Rama mentions the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that if the husband makes a definite claim that the hidden funds belong to him, his claim is accepted.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Ketubot 6:1) states that a present will be spoken about. Therefore, the woman will be afraid to claim that she was given a present unless the claim was true.

He cannot, however, require his wife to take an oath unless he lodges a definite claim against her (Maggid Mishneh).

If, however, a woman was given responsibility to deal freely with the property belonging to her husband’s household, and she claims that funds discovered in her possession belong to her privately, her claim is not accepted (Bava Batra 52b; Rama, Even HaEzer 85:12).

Although the giving of a present will become public knowledge, the details of the present might not. Therefore, the woman is required to substantiate her statements. Otherwise, we assume that this present was given without any extraordinary conditions (Ma’aseh Rokeach).
The Maggid Mishneh mentions the opinion of the Rashba, who differs and maintains that the woman’s claim is also accepted in this instance as well. This opinion is mentioned by the later authorities.

The rationale is that a woman will not be brazen enough to make false statements in her husband’s presence with regard to a matter that he knows to be true (Maggid Mishneh).

For the likelihood is that the article belongs to the husband, master or father, respectively. It is forbidden to assist a person who takes property that is not his or her own. Moreover, if no one accepts the article for safekeeping, it is likely that it will be returned (Bava Batra 51b).

For there is no proof that the article was stolen.

For even if the article is rightfully hers, he inherits her property.

The entrusted article should not be given to the minor, for it is possible that he will not care for it properly and it will be destroyed (Rashbam, Bava Batra 52a).

In every society, the nature of the type of article purchased depends on the conditions prevalent at that time (Chelkat Mechokek 85:33).

The Hebrew literally means ‘‘whose bark is renewed’’ — i.e., reaping the benefits one year will not prevent them from being reaped in the future.

I.e., in this instance, the goat’s milk is not sold and the money used to purchase property that produces benefit, but rather the goat’s milk is used for the household.

Even if they are worth substantially less than they were originally.

As the Kessef Mishneh emphasizes, at different times and in different countries, other customs have prevailed. It is the prevalent custom in one’s own locale that is binding.

The servants may be compelled to serve the husband; they may not, however, becompelled to serve his second wife (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 85).

For having the woman’s servants serve her husband in his other wife’s home, also elevates the woman’s own standard of living (Ketubot 80b).