Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ketubot 10:4), the Rambam explains that this oath differs from the oath that all widows take before collecting from an estate, as mentioned in Chapter 16, Halachah 4, and must be taken even when the wives are not obligated to take that oath. The woman must take this oath for the other widows, stating that she did not collect any money fromtheir husband’s estate previously. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:16), however, states that the first widow takes an oath to the second, the second to the third, the third to the fourth, and the fourth to the heirs.

This procedure is followed even if doing so prevents one of the wives from collecting all that is due her. Indeed, even if there is nothing left for her at all, this order should be followed.

This ruling follows the opinion of ben Nanas in the above-mentioned mishnah. It involves a reversal of opinion for the Rambam, who, in his Commentary to the Mishnah favored the view of the other Sages.

If one of the wives or creditors did not wait for the formal deposition of the estate’s property, but took possession of some of the movable property on his or her own initiative, they are allowed to retain possession. For in contrast to landed property, the ownership of movable property is not a matter of public knowledge. Hence a creditor does not know whether another creditor preceded him, and therefore no creditor is given the right to collect his due from such property.
As reflected in the rulings of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 102:2), this ruling applies only when the movable property was not acquired together with and via the acquisition of landed property (kinyan agav). In the latter situation, the ownership of the movable property also becomes public knowledge, and therefore the order in which the liens were established is significant.
The Rama quotes the opinion of the Mordechai, who states that, in the latter instance, if one of the widows seizes possession of the property, it should be expropriated from her.

For it was money that he gave him.

For a woman relies on the fact that she will ultimately be able to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from the landed property in her husband’s estate (Ketubot 86a).

See Chapter 16, Halachah 7.

See the notes on Halachah 3 with regard to a kinyan agav.

The term nichsei tzon barzel refers to property that the woman brought to the household, for which the husband obligated himself to pay a fixed value. In this instance, since the woman, like a creditor, gave up something of value, she is considered on a higher level of precedence than usual.

This pattern is also followed in the allocation of a person’s holdings when they are not sufficient to pay the debts he owes, as explained in Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh, Chapter 20. The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s approach and follows the minority view that the Rambam cites in that source, which maintains that the money should be divided proportionately. The Rambam’s view is followed by most other Rishonim (Rashi, Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, the Rashba and Rabbenu Asher) and is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:18).

Bava Batra 174b explains that the guarantor is not serious about his commitment. He feels that the couple needs only a small push to get married, and that is his intent, rather than making a serious financial commitment. Even a contractual act, which in other contexts serves as an indication of seriousness of purpose, is not sufficient in this instance.

As can be deduced from the Rambam’s wording, the Maggid Mishneh states that if a person guarantees a woman’s nedunyah (the goods she brought to the household), his commitment is binding. For in this instance, the woman did give up something of value.

In this instance as well, the Ra’avad and the Tur differ and hold the father liable, even when he did not affirm his commitment with a contractual act. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 102:6) follows the Rambam’s view, while the Rama cites that of the Ra’avad.

Moreover, this vow must be taken al da’at rabbim, based on the judgement of the public, and it thus cannot be nullified (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 102:7).

I.e., after the woman collected the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from him.

The woman may not collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from the property while it is the possession of the Temple treasury. After it is redeemed, however, she may collect her due from the property. The person who redeems the property must, however, be advised that the property is on lien to a woman’s ketubah. (See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 18:7; Hilchot Arachin VaCharamin 7:14-15.)

I.e., the woman will collect her husband’s property because it is on lien on her ketubah. Afterwards, she will remarry her husband, and he will be able to use his property, because of his rights as the woman’s husband.

The sale is valid, however, until the woman seeks to claim the property. If, by contrast, the husband sells property that belonged to the woman or property from which she was designated to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, the sale is nullified immediately (Maggid Mishneh). (See Hilchot Mechirah 30:3.)

Note the Rama (Even HaEzer 90:17), who states that if the woman received money from the purchaser, her commitment is binding.

I.e., the woman is saying that her commitment was not sincere and was made only to satisfy her husband.

Since she entered into the agreement with the purchaser before her husband made the sale, she cannot excuse herself by saying that she made her statements only to please her husband.

The Maggid Mishneh questions the reason for this phrase. When this law is cited in the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 90:17), this phrase is omitted. Nevertheless, based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ketubot 10:5), the Ma’aseh Rokeach maintains that, according to the Rambam, a sale must have been nullified in order for the woman’s commitment to be binding later on.

A three-way compromise would obviously be most desirable. Nevertheless, any compromise between two of the three parties that causes one to renounce his right to expropriate the property is sufficient to stop the cycle (Chelkat Mechokek 100:26).

Our Sages understood that the necessity to pursue judicial proceedings is a cause of hardship and embarrassment for women. They felt that rather than subject his wife to such distress, any husband would willingly grant her the right to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah by selling his property without appearing in court (Ketubot 97b).
Therefore, rather than require her to take the matter to a formal court, they enabled her to resolve the issue by having the property evaluated by three acquaintances who possess the qualities mentioned above. Although these men would not be considered capable of participating in an ordinary court, an exception was made in this case. If, however, the widow has already remarried, she is required to undergo the ordinary judicial procedure.

I.e., should the property be expropriated by a creditor of the deceased, his heirs must reimburse the purchaser.

With regard to a divorcee, by contrast, our Sages (op. cit.) felt that her ex-husband would not be disturbed by her being subjected to hardship when this is necessary to protect his own interests.
Although there are Rishonim who maintain that the provision made for a widow also applies to a divorcee, the Rambam’s ruling is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 103:3).

See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 12:8,10, which explains that public announcements that a property will be sold are made daily for thirty days (or on Mondays and Thursdays, for a period of sixty days).

I.e., without the participation of a formal court.

I.e., without even the participation of the three acquaintances mentioned in the previous halachah.

Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 103:1) appears to favor the Rambam’s view, it does mention other opinions that differ.

It would appear that the Rambam requires her merely to take the oath required of all widows before collecting the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. In this instance, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 103:4) requires the woman to take an additional oath, stating that she did not sell the property for less than its worth.

The Maggid Mishneh and Chelkat Mechokek 103:11 state that, according to the Rambam, if the woman has the property evaluated by three trustworthy men who are knowledgeable with regard to the value of property, she is allowed to take the property as her own. Other opinions differ and maintain that this is possible only when the property is evaluated by a proper Rabbinical court.

When selling the property, the woman is considered to be the agent of the heirs, and the profit belongs to them and not to her (Ketubot 98b).

In this instance, the woman must accept the loss herself, because she took property that was worth the full value of her ketubah.

For she has no right to sell any property that is worth more than her ketubah.

The requirement of a ketubah was instituted so that the husband will not consider divorce a light matter, because of the severity of the financial obligation that will result. This remains true even if the woman does not receive the money herself.

As reflected in the continuation of the Rambam’s words, the woman must first take the oaths required of her as if she herself were to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

I.e., her rights to support, medical attention and the like.

Chapter 19, Halachah 2.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that the woman is not entitled to her subsistence even during her husband’s lifetime, while they remain married. (Note Chapter 10, Halachah 10, which states that if a woman waives her ketubah in favor of her husband, he must write her a new ketubah.) The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:9) quotes the opinion that even during the husband’s lifetime, he is not required to support his wife, but appears to favor the view of other Rishonim (Rashi, the Ramban and the Rashba), who grant a woman the right to support during her husband’s lifetime in such a situation.
See also Chapter 19, Halachah 12, which discusses another consequence of a woman’s waiver of her ketubah in favor of her husband.

In contrast to their role with regard to marriage and divorce, in financial matters witnesses are necessary only to confirm what happened. Their presence does not make a transaction or a commitment binding, nor hinder it from becoming so. (See Hilchot Mechirah 5:9.)

See Hilchot Mechirah 5:11-13.

Rashi (Gittin 35a) states that as long as the widow does not contemplate remarriage, she is showing honor to her deceased husband, and therefore our Sages ordained that she should receive her subsistence from his estate. However, by demanding payment of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, she indicates that she is seeking to remarry. From that time onward, her deceased husband’s estate is no longer obligated to support her.
The option whether to continue receiving her subsistence or to demand payment of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah is hers. The heirs cannot compel her to receive the money due her by virtue of her ketubah and cease giving her support (Ketubot 95b; Maggid Mishneh).

The Beit Shmuel 93:13 explains that if the woman asks for payment of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, and the heirs refuse to pay her or are unable to do so, she is still entitled to support.

In all these instances, it is considered as if she has already collected the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

In this instance, however, the heirs have the right to pay her the remainder of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, and thus prevent her from continuing to collect her subsistence from the estate. If this provision were not granted, every widow would collect all the money due her by virtue of her ketubah except for the final p’rutah, and continue to receive support (Rabbenu Asher, quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 93:10.).

In the present age, this law applies even when the woman has merely become engaged to a new husband (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 93, as quoted by the Rama, Even HaEzer 93:7).

Even if she has not collected the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

Nevertheless, the dwelling becomes the property of the heirs, and they are also entitled to live there. The widow is, however, granted a place of dignity in the household (Maggid Mishneh; Rama, Even HaEzer 94:1).

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that these funds are granted to the widow, but the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 95:5) follows the Rambam’s ruling.

The heirs may, however, fix a price with the physician for the widow’s treatment, and then she becomes responsible for the financial burden (Ketubot 52b; Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 79:2).

The rationale is, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 4, that the burial of the woman was granted her in return for the husband’s right to inherit her ketubah. If her heirs can collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, they are required to bury her. If not, since the money for her ketubah remains within the husband’s estate, his heirs are responsible for her burial. Although this is the Rambam’s view, the Ra’avad and Rabbenu Nissim do not accept it. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 89:4) mentions the Rambam’s view and states that it was not accepted by the other authorities.

The same laws apply with regard to her husband during his lifetime, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 4.

These tasks are acts of endearment, appropriate only for a wife to her husband.

Although a husband is granted these rights (Chapter 12, Halachah 3), his heirs are not. The husband is granted the rights to the objects his wife finds so that strife will not arise between them. That rationale is not considered with regard to his heirs (Ketubot 96a).
With regard to the rights to her property: as mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachah 4, our Sages associated the rights to a woman’s property with her redemption from captivity. Since the heirs are not obligated to redeem her, they are not entitled to this privilege.

The property that a woman brings to her household belongs to her. Her husband has merely the right to derive benefit from it; he is not the owner. With regard to this property, she is treated like any of the other creditors of the estate, and no oath is required of her.

Nichsei tzon barzel is property that the husband has had evaluated, and it is the value of the article for which he obligates himself or his estate. Nevertheless, if the property itself exists, it is given to the woman. If the property has increased in value, however, the husband - and therefore his heirs - are entitled to the increase.

Although the movable property in her husband’s estate is not under lien for her subsistence, it is not taken away from her if she takes possession of it. As the Kessef Mishneh emphasizes, the above applies with regard to the Talmudic era. As stated in the following halachah, it is customary at present to consider movable property as under lien to all a husband’s obligations.
There are some Rishonim who differ with the Rambam and equate the provisions for the widow’s subsistence with the collection of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. (See the following halachah.) The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:20) follows the Rambam’s view.

I.e., a sum that will last far longer than thirty days — the length of time for which the court sells property to provide her with her subsistence — or perhaps more than the worth of the woman’s entire ketubah.

Instead, it must be returned to the heirs. Tosafot (Ketubot 96a) explains the distinction between a woman's taking possession of movable property to collect for her subsistence and the collection of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah as follows. Our Sages ordained that a woman may collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from property that had belonged to her husband and was sold. Therefore, it is likely that the woman will ultimately receive her due. As such, she is required to return the movable property. With regard to her subsistence, however, no such provision was made. Hence, she is given an alternative, to take possession of movable property.

K’nesset HaGedolah explains that, contrary to the standard published texts of the Mishneh Torah, Halachah 12 begins here. This is not a continuation of the previous halachah, because there is a difference with regard to the laws governing movable property between the practices of the Talmudic age and those of the present era.

For if the heirs sell it, the woman has no claim to the proceeds of the sale, nor may she expropriate the property from the purchasers. Similarly, if the heirs destroy the movable property, she has no claim against them. From an ethical perspective, however, the heirs are enjoined not to sell this movable property.

The Chelkat Mechokek 93:36 states that if a specific clause was included in the ketubah regarding this matter, although the widow cannot nullify the sale she has a right to receive her subsistence from its proceeds.

The Rashba states that if a clause was added to the ketubah specifically stating that the woman has the right to collect her subsistence from movable property after her husband’s death, then she is allowed to expropriate the landed property from the purchasers (Maggid Mishneh; Rama, Even HaEzer 93:21).

Our translation is based on manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed texts substitute ‘‘movable property’’ for ‘‘claim for support.’’ Apparently, this version reached the Ra’avad who objects and states — as is the halachah — that the principle applies with regard to landed property as well.

I.e., her husband died childless, and he had a brother who is commanded to marry his widow.

This time period is granted in order to determine whether the woman had conceived with her husband before he died. If three months pass without pregnancy becoming noticeable, we can assume that a child was not conceived.

Until she gives birth or miscarries, she is not entitled to remarry, lest she become bound by the obligation of yibbum. Since it is because of her husband that she may not remarry, his estate is required to provide for her (Rashi, Yevamot 41b).

The Maggid Mishneh states that the latter two clauses — that the yavam became sick or that he lived overseas — apply also only if the yavam had previously appeared in court. If, however, he has never appeared in court, he is not under any obligation.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 160:1) follows the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that the yavam is obligated to support her in the latter instances only when he consented to marry her. If he desired to perform chalitzah, he is under no obligation to her.

There is no need for her to take an oath that the yavam had not given her property. Since they have not established a relationship, there is no basis for such suspicions (Ketubot 107b).

Who should not perform the mitzvah of yibbum until he attains majority.

Since he is forbidden to marry her, he is not required to support her. Nor is she entitled to support from her husband’s estate. Yevamot 41b says that it is as if she is penalized from heaven.

The Rambam is referring to statements made by a dying man with regard to the allocation of his property. If these statements are observed by witnesses, they are binding. This practice, referred to as a matnat sh’chiv me’ra (the oral will of a dying man) is described in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:2).

I.e., since it is possible that the woman will suffer a loss, she has the right to protest. If, however, she remained silent, we assume that she accepted her husband’s decision.

The reference is to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who ruled this way in a responsum. His opinion is favored also by the Ra’avad, the Ramban, the Rashba and Rabbenu Asher. Ketubot 105a states that the woman should take an oath ‘‘at the end and not at the beginning.’’ They explain that this refers to a woman whose husband has died. The woman should take the oath when she comes to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, and not when she comes asking for support. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:19) appears to favor this view, and the Rama states that it should be followed.

See Chapter 12, Halachah 16.

Rav Yosef Migash.

They interpret Ketubot (loc. cit.) to be referring to a woman whose husband traveled overseas. She should not take an oath at the outset — i.e., when she comes to collect her subsistence — but rather at the end, if her husband comes and requires this of her. See Chapter 12, Halachah 21.
The dissenting authorities refute this interpretation, explaining that it is far more reasonable to require an oath of a woman when her husband is alive than after his death, for after his death it is very likely that the woman will soon take an oath to collect her ketubah.

In contrast to the sale of property so that the woman can collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (Chapter 17, Halachah 13), in this instance the sale need not be publicized. The rationale is that the woman needs the money for her subsistence immediately and should not be required to wait.

Rabbenu Chanan’el and the Ramban differ with the Rambam on this point. Although their opinion is also mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:25), it appears that the Rambam’s opinion is favored.

In this manner, a large amount of property is sold. If a smaller amount were sold, the parcel of land would be too small to fetch a proper price.

I.e., the purchaser gives the widow only enough money to support herself for thirty days at a time. The rationale is that if she remarries or seeks to collect her ketubah, she is no longer entitled to receive support for her subsistence. Since there is the possibility that this will happen at any given time, she is given support for only a limited period of time. In the event that she remarries, the remainder of the money left from the sale is given to the heirs (Rashi, Ketubot 97a).

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this is simply proper advice for the woman. For she
can sell all the land necessary to provide her with the money due her by virtue of her
ketubah at one time, while to collect her subsistence she must sell the land in small parcels.
If she chooses, however, she may take the latter alternative.

Since the heirs are orphans, the court is obligated to look after their interests. Therefore, it is obligated to ensure that the woman’s earnings are given to them.

In all these cases, the widow is no longer entitled to receive support from her deceased husband’s estate, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 18.

In this instance, since the probability is that the woman would not have been given a document recording her ketubah, the fact that she does not have such a document in her possession is not considered detrimental to her position.

See Chapter 16, Halachah 31.

See Hilchot Gerushin 12:1.

Since her status is questionable, she is not entitled to support. For this is granted only to a man’s wife and not to his divorcee.

Since divorce is dependent on the husband’s initiative, as long as a woman’s status is in question — and for that reason she may not marry another person — he is required to continue to support her (Rashi, Ketubot 97b).

Ketubot 96a mentions two years and three years, stating that the difference is between a rich widow (who can afford to wait) and a poor one; alternatively, between a brash widow (who is not embarrassed to appear in court) and a modest one (who will hesitate before coming). The Rambam does not mention the second opinion at all (although generally, when the Talmud mentions two opinions, he rules according to the second opinion), nor does the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:14). Rabbenu Asher and the Chelkat Mechokek 93:26, however, do mention the latter opinion.

The Rashba maintains that if, however, the woman took property as security, or if she borrowed money to be repaid with the money she will receive for her support, she is still entitled to receive the money retroactively. This opinion is cited by the Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (op. cit.).

As long as she has not remarried, the property of her husband’s estate is considered under lien to her and in her possession. Hence, she is given this privilege.

For once she remarries, the property is considered to be in the possession of the heirs. Hence, they are given this privilege.

The same law applies if the widow demanded payment of the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, but did not demand payment for the additional amount.

See Halachah 1

This and the laws that follow are relevant only in situations where a man has children from two different wives and he did not divorce the wives before their death. When a man’s wives die before he does, he inherits their nedunyah and is not required to pay them the money due them by virtue of their ketubot. Nevertheless, our Sages ordained that a woman’s children should benefit from her investment in the household and the commitment made to her. Hence, before the father’s estate is divided among all the heirs, the children of each of his wives are entitled to receive the monies mentioned above.

Note the statements of the Rama (Even HaEzer 111:16), who states that this practice is not followed in the present age. The rationale is that the practice was instituted in the Talmudic era to encourage a father to give his daughter a generous nedunyah. (For because of this practice, he can be assured that the money he gives will remain within his family.) In the present age, however, this encouragement is not necessary, for it has become customary for parents to endow their daughters generously before marriage.

As the Rambam stated in Chapter 16, Halachah 7, the children’s inheritance of the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah applies only when there is enough landed property remaining in the estate to pay for both ketubot.

I.e., once the woman took the oath required of her, the money due her by virtue of her ketubah is considered to be justly hers. Her children then inherit her property.

In this instance, they are entitled to inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah even if the estate is not large enough to allow for the division of the inheritance according to Scriptural Law afterwards (Ketubot 91a; Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 111:8).

Since the woman did not take the oath required of a widow, there is room to suspect that her husband already gave her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, or that she took possession of it herself. Therefore, her sons are not entitled to collect her ketubah.

Nor are the sons entitled to inherit the money due their mothers by virtue of their ketubot based on the provision mentioned above, because this is applicable only when the woman dies in her husband’s lifetime.

The sons of the widow who did not take the oath are not entitled to inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah.

See Chapter 21, Halachah 18, which states that the daughters are granted this right even when their father divorced their mother before his death, and they took up residence with their mother.

Once the daughter is consecrated by a husband, her support is no longer the responsibility of her father’s estate. (See also Halachah 15.)

During a man’s lifetime, he is required only to provide his daughters with their sustenance until the age of six (Chapter 12, Halachah 14). After his death, however, they are entitled to support until the age of twelve and a half.

From the Rambam’s wording, it would appear that he maintains that a girl forfeits her right to support if she becomes consecrated while she is a minor. This ruling is not universally accepted by the Rishonim. The Maggid Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Chananel and the Rashba as saying that she does not forfeit this right in such an instance. The Tur (Even HaEzer 112) mentions a third view: that if she consecrates herself, she forfeits her support, but if her brothers are involved in her consecration, she is still entitled to support. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 112:3) quotes the Rambam’s view, while the Rama mentions the other opinions.

Although during his lifetime, her father is entitled to her earnings and the objects she discovers, this right is not given to his sons. The rationale is that the father would prefer for his daughter to receive her own earnings than to have them given to his sons.

Although a widow is not required to take an oath when collecting her support, this is because she is required to take an oath when she collects the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. Therefore, one might think that a daughter would be required to take such an oath. Indeed, the Beit Shmuel 112:15, based on the statements of Tosafot, requires that such an oath be taken.

The Ra’avad and the Maggid Mishneh question the Rambam’s ruling with regard to the support the man’s daughters receive for their sustenance. They maintain that this support is not dependent on whether the mother receives the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (and therefore, the waiver of that payment has no effect). The Rambam’s opinion appears to be based on his statements in Chapter 17, Halachah 19, in which he states that a woman who waives payment of her ketubah forgoes all the provisions of her ketubah. The Shulchan Aruch does not mention this issue and the Rama (Even HaEzer 112:1) cites the opinion of the Ra’avad.

The rationale is that the obligation took effect at the time of his marriage and he is incapable of negating it at a later time.

An oral will refers to a person’s disposition of his property verbally before his death. As explained in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, Chapter 8, our Sages ordain that such a disposition of property is acceptable.

Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:8. (See also Hilchot Nachalot 8:9.)

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam with regard to the rights of a person’s sons and daughters. Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 111:17) follows the Rambam’s view.

This ruling has been contested by other authorities on several grounds. First, the Ra’avad challenges the Rambam, asking: how is it possible for a girl who nullifies her marriage through mi’un to have a child? By definition, mi’un is possible when a girl is a k’tanah, a minor (see Chapter 4, Halachah 7), and while she is a minor it is impossible for her to conceive a child. He explains that Ketubot 53b is speaking about a girl who leaves her husband through mi’un — she is entitled to return to her deceased father’s home and receive support for her sustenance.
Second, the Maggid Mishneh accepts the fact that a girl can conceive a child while a minor, but asks: Since the mother nullifies the marriage through mi’un, it is as if her husband had never had any obligations to her at all. Her ketubah and all of its provisions are nullified entirely. Why then is his estate liable for the support of his daughter after his death? See the Beit Shmuel 112:11 for a possible explanation.

When a man dies childless, his brother (the yavam) inherits his entire estate, and that estate is responsible for the ketubah of the yevamah (the widow who is married by the yavam). If a yevamah bears a girl, the deceased brother’s estate is not liable for the girl’s support after her father’s (the yavam’s) death, for she is not the daughter of the deceased brother. Nor is the yavam’s estate responsible for her support, for he never gave a ketubah to the yevamah.

Since the mother’s marriage is forbidden, our Sages did not grant her a ketubah.

Who was born before the couple entered the phase of nisu’in (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.). Since the ketubah takes effect only after nisu’in, this daughter is not entitled to support.

The term anusah refers to a virgin who was raped. The rapist is required to marry her and is forbidden to divorce her (Deuteronomy 22:28). Since he is forbidden to divorce her, she is not granted a ketubah.

The Beit Shmuel 112:6 interprets the Rambam’s wording as implying that after the girl reaches the age of bagrut, she is required to support herself.
The Beit Shmuel also mentions that other Rishonim interpret Ketubot 53b, the source for this halachah, differently. According to their interpretation, the husband is not liable for the girl’s support. If the husband desires, continues the Beit Shmuel, he may rely on this opinion.

It is as if he had made a commitment to support her when he consecrated her.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 112:4) cites the Rambam’s view. The Rama differs, however, citing the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who maintains that from the time a girl becomes consecrated after her father’s death, and onward, she is not entitled to support from his estate.

The estate is given to them and they may use it as they see fit. They are, however, forbidden to sell the property except in an extreme situation — e.g., to use the proceeds to redeem captives (Rama, Even HaEzer 112:11). Moreover, if the court sees that the sons are spending lavishly and abusing the resources of the estate, they should set aside the daughters’ portion.

They are entrusted to a guardian appointed by the court.

For it is more common for males to beg for alms than for females to do so (Ketubot 67a).

The Rama (Even HaEzer 112:12) states that according to the custom to include within the ketubah a clause stating that the obligations of the estate are binding on movable property as well, the estate is considered to be meager and the support for the daughters is set aside.

I.e., the property should remain in the possession of the sons, and they must continue to provide for their sisters’ sustenance. It is not expropriated from the sons and given to a guardian.

The Maggid Mishneh mentions a difference of opinion with regard to the interpretation of the word ‘‘afterwards.’’ Rashi (Ketubot 91a) maintains that this means ‘‘after the man’s death, but before the matter is brought to the court and a guardian appointed.’’ Others (Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and the Rashba) maintain that even after a guardian is appointed, the property can be given to the heirs if its value increases.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 112:14) quotes the Rambam’s wording without relating to this issue. The Rama mentions the latter view.

The opinion of Tosafot, et al. is that even if the property has been entrusted to a guardian, if it is sold by the heirs the sale is binding. The Rama (loc. cit.), however, appears to follow the view that the sale is binding only before the property has been entrusted to a guardian.
According to Rabbenu Asher, the daughters have no lien on the money received from the sale. Although Rav Hai Gaon differs, it appears that Rabbenu Asher’s view is favored (Chelkat Mechokek 112:30).

See Chapter 23, Halachah 17.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 112:15) states that the payment of the money due the widow by virtue of her ketubah is, however, considered in determining whether the estate is ample or not.

This ruling entitles the sons to derive their sustenance from the estate together with the daughters until the funds are depleted.

According to the Rambam, the property set aside for the widow’s support should be given to a third party and he should follow the guidelines set in Chapter 18, Halachah 21 (Maggid Mishneh)
There are opinions that maintain that property is set aside for the widow’s support only when there is a son and a daughter, and the estate is too meager to support both of them. In that instance, since property is being set aside for the daughters’ support, and the widow takes precedence over the daughters, property is also set aside for her. When property is not required to be set aside for the daughters, it is not set aside for the widow’s support either. Instead, she, the daughters and the sons, all derive their sustenance from the estate together.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:4) mentions both opinions, and the Beit Shmuel 93:9 states that the latter view is favored by most authorities. This difference of opinion also leads to another (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 112:15): Does the obligation to support the widow cause the estate to be considered meager or not? According to the Rambam it does, but according to the other authorities, it does not.