Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

I.e., the woman had been consecrated or wed, but before she and her husband engaged in marital relations, she was either widowed or divorced.

Even if there are witnesses to the fact that her husband died directly after they entered the chuppah (Ketubot 11a).

The rationale is that even if a woman engaged in intimate relations before the age of three, her hymen will grow back, as stated in Halachah 3, based on Ketubot 11b.

Literally, ‘‘one struck by a piece of wood,’’ a woman who claims that she did not have hymeneal bleeding at the time of her first intimate experience, because she had previously been ‘‘struck by a piece of wood’’ and caused to bleed at that time. As mentioned in Halachah 10, the term is used to refer to any woman who claims that her failure to have hymeneal bleeding resulted from causes other than intercourse.

Although one might think that the marriage would be annulled, because the husband was operating under a misconception (mekach ta’ut), Ketubot 11b rules that this is not so. As long as she had not engaged in intimate relations previously, their marriage is binding.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 67:4) follows the ruling of Tosafot, Ketubot 11b, who explain that this law applies only when the woman’s hymen remains intact despite these relations.

This point is necessary to mention because of the factors stated in Halachah 12.

Ketubot 36b explains that we are afraid that such a woman might have suffered hymeneal bleeding from causes other than intercourse, but will not have noticed the fact.

Rashi (Ketubot 36a) explains that since an aylonit is considered a bogeret, this point must be clarified, as it must with regard to a bogeret. The above ruling applies only when the husband was aware that the woman was an aylonit. If he was not aware of that fact, the woman is not entitled to a ketubah at all, as explained in Chapter 24, Halachah 2.

Even if she was a virgin at the time of their original marriage, she is not a virgin at present.

I.e., a marriage between a mentally and/or emotionally challenged man and an ordinary woman will constantly be pained by strife and will not last. (Yevamot 112b).

This refers to a girl who has been orphaned of her father or who was divorced after being wed. The Torah — and not our Sages — gives a father the right to consecrate his daughter before she becomes a na’arah.

If the girl remains unmarried, the prohibitions against relations with her are not as severe and the Sages feared that they would not be upheld. If she were allowed to marry, the prohibition against adultery would be respected and she would be treated differently. Moreover, her husband will guard against her association with other men.

I.e., only the fundamental requirements of the ketubah, but not any additional amount that the youth added to the marriage contract, unless he renews that commitment after he reaches majority. Otherwise, that commitment — like any commitment made by aminor — is of no substance. Moreover, he is obligated for the fundamental requirement of the ketubah only when he engaged in marital relations with his wife after he attained majority. If not, the marriage — and thus the marriage contract — is of no consequence.
With regard to the fundamental requirements of the ketubah, the Rambam writes in his Commentary to the Mishnah(Ketubot 9:8) that she is entitled to either 200 or 100 zuz, depending on her status at the time of the wedding.

Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that the laws applying to a convert are the same as those applying to a minor. Both opinions are alluded to by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 67:11). (See the Beit Shmuel 67:12, which explains the Rambam’s position: Even if a convert made a commitment of more than 100 zuz to his wife, any sum above 100 zuz is considered to be an addition to the ketubah and is therefore no longer binding when the convert accepts his new status as a Jew.)

I.e., even a woman who was widowed after the wedding, before engaging in relations with her husband. Even though her second husband marries her under the impression that she is a virgin, there is no possibility of issuing such a claim against her.

The obligation to grant a virgin bride a ketubah of 200 zuz is Rabbinic in origin. At the same time that our Sages instituted that obligation, they granted the husband a safeguard: that his word would be accepted with regard to a claim denying the woman’s virginity. In these instances, since the woman was not granted the additional money, the safeguard provided by the Sages also does not apply (Maggid Mishneh).

We suspect that the groom had relations with her and later forgot the matter (Rashi, Ketubot 9b). See also note 30.

As stated in the following halachot, unless there are other factors that support the woman’s position, as will be explained, the husband’s claim is accepted. We assume that the husband would not go to the time and expense of preparing a wedding feast and then mar the celebration by denying his wife’s virginity unless the claim were true (Ketubot 10a).

Unless there are witnesses who can testify that the woman engaged in relations previously, the only question before the court is the amount of the woman’s ketubah. She is permitted to remain married to her husband, because there is no proof that she willingly engaged in intimate relations with another person after she was consecrated. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 18:10.)
An exception to the above is a woman married to a priest. Issuing a claim questioning her virginity places the entire foundation of their marriage in doubt.

I.e., the husband claims that he has entered into a mekach ta’ut, an agreement based on false premises. He had desired to marry a virgin, and he was not prepared to marry a woman who had had relations with another man. Therefore, he desires to have the marriage annulled entirely.

I.e., he is not certain that she had engaged in relations with another man. In all matters of Torah law, whenever one person has a claim that is absolute (bari, in this instance the woman’s claim that her hymen was damaged by factors other than intercourse) and one that is not absolute (shema, the man’s claim), the claim that is absolute is accepted.

Since she was raped against her will, she is not forced to suffer a loss and is entitled to the full amount of the ketubah.

The intent is not that witnesses should observe the couple engaging in relations. This is forbidden, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 16. Instead, the intent is that they should inspect the sheet before and after the couple engage in relations for signs of hymeneal bleeding.

Other authorities (and their opinion is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 68:6) state: ‘‘Maybe you did not enter gently?’’ — i.e., because of the husband’s hurry to complete the intimate act, he did not feel the tightness.
The Rama (loc. cit.) quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that the claim: ‘‘I discovered an open passageway,’’ can be made only by a man who has been married before. If he was not married before, he would not have the experience to know the difference between virginal tightness and a non-virgin’s state.

The Ramban and the Rashba state that the claim that the woman’s vaginal channel was open can be made only in an instance in which the sheet on which the couple had relations was lost. If, however, the sheet is available, it should be inspected. If it has signs of blood, she is considered a virgin; and if not, she is not. This opinion is mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), but does not appear to have been accepted.

See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 15:2, where the Rambam states that he had available texts of the Talmud that were almost 500 years old. These would have been written approximately 200 years after the time of the Talmud’s composition.

The Rambam’s ruling is substantiated by our text of the Talmud (Ketubot 36b) and the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 68:3). The differing opinion mentioned by the Rambam is that of Rabbenu Chanan’el.

Based on this rationale, the Maggid Mishneh mentions opinions that state that the man’s word is accepted only when he prepared the wedding feast. If he did not, the woman’s word is accepted.

We assume that the couple had relations and he discovered her to be a virgin. The fact that he issued a claim against her afterwards stemmed from discontent for other reasons, without any connection to her personal state.

Although there are authorities (among them Rabbenu Asher) who offer reasons why the husband’s word should be accepted in this instance as well, the prevailing view (and the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 68:8) follows the Rambam’s decision. The rationale is that the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract is a Rabbinic injunction, and the same authority that obligated the husband to meet this requirement rescinded it when he lodged a claim denying her virginity. The additional amount, by contrast, is a present to which the husband voluntarily obligated himself, and that obligation may be nullified only if it is proven that it was made under false premises.

See Hilchot Sh’vuot 11:8, which states that such an oath is administered while the person is holding a Torah scroll. Significantly, the Rambam’s ruling here represents a change of mind from his statements in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ketubot 1:3), where he states that in such a situation the woman is required to take merely a sh’vuat hesset, a less severe oath.

I.e., the situation is analogous to a person who holds a promissory note and may be asked to take an oath that it is valid before he can collect it, as explained in Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 14:2-3.

Chapter 10, Halachah 10.

These ten responsibilities and four privileges are all explained in detail in the chapters that follow, through Chapter 23.

These requirements are mentioned in Exodus 21:10. The verse forbids a husband from denying his wife these rights. Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 262) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 46) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Note the commentary of the Ramban on Exodus (loc. cit.), which interprets sha’arah and kesutah as also referring to conjugal rights and maintains that the obligation to provide a wife with her subsistence and with garments is Rabbinic. Most authorities, however, follow the Rambam’s understanding.

The Ra’avad and others maintain that the husband’s right to inherit his wife’s property stems from Scriptural Law. The matter is the subject of a difference of opinion between our Sages (Ketubot 83b), and there is no explicit resolution of the question in the Talmud. Rav Kapach maintains that the early manuscripts of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ketubot 9:1; Bava Batra 8:1) indicate that the Rambam himself originally subscribed to the view mentioned by the Ra’avad and changed his mind later in life. (See also Halachah 9.)

With regard to the other two matters that are linked the husband’s obligation to redeem her and to bury her, the woman does not have this option. Although this arrangement was instituted for the woman’s benefit, our Sages did not give her a choice regarding these matters, because they desired to ensure that the woman would not be forced to remain in captivity among the gentiles and that she would be buried (Shulchan Aruch and Rama, Even HaEzer 69:5).

Our Sages instituted this arrangement for the woman’s benefit, since a woman’s income could not ordinarily provide for her subsistence. Accordingly, the option of whether or not to forego the arrangement is in the woman’s hands. If a woman can earn more than her subsistence, she is also entitled to forego the above arrangement.
Even in such a situation, the woman is still responsible for taking care of the household tasks (Maggid Mishneh).

The husband may, however, tell his wife: ‘‘Endeavor to earn your subsistence, and I will compensate for whatever deficiency remains’’ (Rama, Even HaEzer 69:4).

I.e., although the t’na’ei ketubah are Rabbinic in origin, and the obligation to provide for the woman’s subsistence is Scriptural, since the linkage of it with her wages is Rabbinic, the obligation is considered to be part of the t’na’ei ketubah.

I.e., they are obligations that apply universally and are not dependent on the consent of a particular couple.

The principle upon which this statement is based is that any stipulation to which both parties agree that concerns monetary rights — even those that are granted to a person by Scriptural Law — is binding (Kiddushin 19b). For a person has the option to waive his right to property or privileges that justly belong to him (Rashi, loc. cit.). Therefore, a woman may waive even the rights to her subsistence or clothing that Scriptural Law itself grants her.

Instead, the failure to provide a woman with conjugal rights is considered to cause her physical anguish (Rashi, loc. cit.). Although the Mordechai maintains that conjugal rights can also be considered monetary matters, for it is possible to give a woman enough money that she would be willing to forego her rights, the Rambam’s view is accepted by most authorities.

I.e., the woman writes a receipt for part of the sum on her ketubah.

Although this is a situation that concerns financial matters, our Sages desired that the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract be a binding institution, and therefore did not allow any modification of this obligation. Hence, the stipulation is nullified.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 66:9) states that even though the man’s stipulations are of no consequence, the sexual relations he conducts with his wife are considered promiscuous, because she may be unaware of the law and not know the amount due her.

A different ruling applies if the stipulation is made between erusin and nisu’in, as explained in Chapter 23, Halachah 6.

See Hilchot Nachalot 6:1.

For a woman is obligated to eat three meals on the Sabbath as a man is (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 291:6)
Note the slight difference between the Rambam’s statements here and those in Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 9:13..

A me’ah is one sixth of a dinar (Kiddushin 12a).

The Beit Shmuel 70:7 states that if he can provide her with bread, even if he cannot provide her with other food, he is not obligated to divorce her. (See, however, Chelkat Mechokek 70:12.)
The Chatam Sofer (Even HaEzer, Responsum 131) states that the Rambam’s words imply that if the husband cannot support his wife from his own earnings, he is compelled to divorce her, even if she herself has the means to provide herself with subsistence.

The rationale is that since he cannot provide her with subsistence, he is obligated to give her the opportunity to find another husband who can.

I.e., even in a separate dwelling (Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Ketubot 5:9).

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam states that this prerogative may in no way infringe on the husband’s obligation to provide his wife with conjugal rights. In addition, he must share the Friday night meal with her, implying that this is for the sake of communication, not only as preparation for marital relations, as understood by some commentaries.
Note the Rama (Even HaEzer 70:2), who objects to the Rambam’s ruling, and states that a man is given this prerogative only if his wife consents.

Note Mishneh LaMelech and the Dagul MeRevavah (Even HaEzer 70), which state that this applies only when the woman purchased her food at a lower price than was originally estimated. If, however, she starved herself and consumed less than was allotted her, she, and not her husband, is entitled to the remainder.

Food that is terumah may not be eaten if it contracts ritual impurity, nor may it be eaten by a person who is himself ritually impure.

Rabbenu Nissim maintains that this obligation is incumbent on a father according to Scriptural Law, as an extension of his obligation to provide for his wife. Rabbenu Asher, however, maintains that the father’s obligation is independent of the marriage bond. Even if he fathers children outside marriage, he is liable for their support.

The obligation to provide for one’s children’s subsistence until majority was one of the enactments instituted by the Sanhedrin after this body was relocated in Usha in the Galilee after the destruction of Jerusalem. At that time, several enactments were passed to direct the functioning of the Jewish community in this new phase. (See Ketubot 49b.)
Today, most Rabbinic authorities maintain that because of changes in the socio-economic system, it is proper for a father to continue supporting his children well past the age of Bar or Bat Mitzvah.

As evident from Halachah 17, this applies only when the father is present. The Rambam maintains that a person’s property may not be expropriated for this purpose outside his presence.

See Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 10:16, which states:
Although he is not obligated, when a person provides subsistence for his older sons and daughters, so that the males can study the Torah and the females will follow the straight path, ... it is an act of charity, and indeed, a great act of charity.
And Chapter 7, Halachah 10, of that source, states:
When a person does not desire to give charity, ... the court compels him, and administers stripes for rebellious conduct until he meets the assessment made for him. [Moreover,] when he is present, his property is expropriated [for this purpose].

The Rama (Even HaEzer 70:5) quotes opinions that state that this ruling applies only when the husband left home in an atmosphere of peace. In such a situation, we can be sure that he has provided for his family. If, however, he left home annoyed with his wife, it is plausible to assume that he did not provide for her needs.

I.e., after three months, or after she approaches the court. If she waits longer than three months, she is not given any payment for the previous period (Rama, ibid.).

Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that the court should consider the amount the woman can earn when deciding on the size of her allotment. His rationale is that before expropriating a person’s property, we should try to act in his interests. Although many authorities speak in favor of Rabbenu Asher’s logic, they rule according to the Rambam’s decision. (See Chelkat Mechokek 70:20.)
The Avnei Milu’im 70:3 explains the Rambam’s position, stating that the husband is granted the right to his wife’s earnings only when he provides for her subsistence willingly. When he forces her to approach the court to receive her subsistence, he has no claim on her earnings.

There is a debate among the authorities whether or not she must consult experts with regard to the evaluation of the object. (See Chelkat Mechokek 70:21.)

Generally, when property is sold by the court, it is necessary that a public announcement be made informing people of the sale to attract customers and assure competitive bidding. (See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 22:6.) In this instance, no such requirement is made, in order that the woman will not have to wait to receive the funds she requires.

See Chapter 16, Halachah 4.

Whenever a person is required to take an oath, the plaintiff can obligate him to take an oath on another claim. In this instance, since the woman is obligated to take an oath to her husband’s heirs to collect the money due her for her ketubah, she can be required to take an additional oath regarding the sale of his property for her subsistence.

We do not expropriate his property and provide for his children as an act of charity, because it is possible that he is giving charity in the place to which he has journeyed.

The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam’s wording appears to imply that no provision is made for his older children, even when he has the means to support them. The Maggid Mishneh, however, refers to Hilchot Nachalot 11:11, which states that when a person who has means loses control of his faculties, the court levels an assessment for charity on his estate. Accordingly, it would appear that if the man has the means to give charity, his property is expropriated to pay for his children’s subsistence, even if they are over six.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 71) states that in such an instance, the court should expropriate funds for the subsistence of the person’s older children even if the person’s estate is not large enough for an assessment for charity to be leveled against it. The rationale is that we assume that, like the majority of people, this person would also desire to support his children. The Chelkat Mechokek 71:6 maintains that the Shulchan Aruch follows this view, and not that of the Rambam.

See Chapter 17, Halachah 19.

Rabbenu Asher and others do not accept the Rambam’s distinction, and maintain that the court should also protect the interests of a person who is in another country and cannot defend himself. Nevertheless, in his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro defends the Rambam’s decision, explaining that in contrast to an heir, the husband has the potential to take his claim to court when he returns. In his Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 70:5), he quotes the Rambam’s ruling. This ruling is also accepted by the later authorities.

See Halachah 2.

Since the heir himself was not aware of the details of his benefactor’s affairs, he cannot necessarily advance claims in his own interests. Therefore, the court acts to protect them. (See Bava Batra 23a.)

The Rama (Even HaEzer 70:8) states that the benefactor must lodge a claim against the wife, who in turn must lodge a claim against her husband.

Although the husband is obligated to pay for his wife’s subsistence, our Sages rule that when a person pays a debt on behalf of a colleague without being instructed to do so, the debtor is not at all obligated to his patron.

Although our Sages associated a woman’s earnings with her subsistence, they made this association for the woman’s sake and gave her the prerogative of accepting or declining such a request. In a responsum, the Rambam writes that if it is not logical to assume that she could earn the funds required for her subsistence, she does not forfeit her rights, unless she explicitly consents to her husband’s stipulation.

I.e., a less severe oath instituted by the Rabbis. (See Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:3.)

She, however, does not have the opportunity of paying the debt until she is divorced or becomes widowed, because all her property is under lien to her husband and he is entitled to her earnings.

Since it was movable property and not landed property that was sold, the oath that the woman is required to take is more lenient than that mentioned in the previous halachah The rationale is that had she desired to lie, she could have claimed that the goods were stolen or lost.

I.e., she cannot demand reimbursement for the difference between her earnings and the amount she would ordinarily be entitled to for her subsistence (Chelkat Mechokek 70:41). If she earned more than her subsistence, the additional funds belong to her, not to her husband (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 70:11).

Based on Ketubot 59b, Rabbenu Asher and Rabbenu Nissim object to the Rambam’s ruling. Since the husband is liable to provide for his wife’s subsistence, the vow he takes cannot override that obligation, except in specific instances. In both his Kessef Mishneh and his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 235:2), Rav Yosef Caro follows these views.

After thirty days, the matter will become public knowledge and the woman will suffer ridicule. Therefore, her husband is obligated to divorce (Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Ketubot 7:1).

The Mishnah (Ketubot, op. cit.) states that her husband should appoint a person to provide for her. As the Talmud explains (Ketubot 71a), this does not mean that he should appoint this person as an agent, for this is forbidden by his vow. Instead, he should say, ‘‘Whoever provides for my wife will not suffer a loss.’’

As the Maggid Mishneh explains, this refers to a situation in which the husband took a vow that if his wife partakes of a particular species of produce, she will be forbidden to benefit from his property (or according to the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 235:3, that marital intimacy between them will be forbidden). If, however, the husband takes a vow that his wife may not eat a particular type of produce, that vow is nullified. For a person cannot take a vow to restrict the actions of another person.

For, as Numbers 30:8-9 relates, a husband has the right to nullify or uphold the vows his wife takes.

As Rav Yosef Caro mentions in both the Kessef Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), other opinions require the husband to divorce his wife in such a situation.

For a zuz was only one eighth pure silver.

See Halachah 5.

I.e., the obligation to provide one’s wife with household goods and a dwelling stems from Scriptural Law and is not merely a Rabbinic ordinance.

I.e., a man is obligated to provide his wife with the clothes appropriate for a woman of her social standing (or his social standing, if he is of higher social standing than she) in the country in which they dwell.

For she should be given the opportunity to marry a man who can provide her with her basic necessities.

Similarly, if he is capable of giving charity, he should provide for his sons and daughters above the age of six, as explained in Chapter 12, Halachah 15 (Chelkat Mechokek 73:5).

See Chapter 12, Halachah 16.

Rashi, Ketubot 48a, explains the difference between the two instances. When the husband left on the journey, he decided to leave his wife without adornments. Hence, we may not expropriate the money for them from his property. When, by contrast, a man loses his mental faculties, the court attempts to support the man’s wife as her husband would have liked to. And we assume that he would have preferred that his wife have ornaments to adorn herself.

See the notes on Chapter 12, Halachah 24.

A poor woman does not wear ornaments very frequently and will not feel deprived if she does not adorn herself for a year. A rich woman, by contrast, cannot bear not to wear ornaments for such an extended period.

This law is based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Ketubot 7:4). The standard printed text of that source, however, has a slightly different version, stating ‘‘three months’’ instead of three days.

These rulings were dependent on the socio-economic conditions prevalent in the Talmudic period. If the norms are different in other societies, the rulings also change.

The Maggid Mishneh states that the husband is given thirty days to consider absolving his vow. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 74:3) states he must divorce her immediately. If the husband makes the vow dependent on marital relations, he is given a week to consider the matter (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit. 74:3).

Note the slight deviation between the wording chosen by the Rambam and that employed by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).

While the spirit of the Rambam’s words is appreciated, in most communities, the norm is for women to leave their homes far more frequently.

For it is customary for a daughter to visit her parents during the festivals.

Based on the views of the Ra’avad and others, the Rama (Even HaEzer 74:10) explains that the woman’s rights are different from her husband’s. Since the dwelling belongs to him, he may invite his mother and sisters. Nevertheless, efforts should be made to mediate between them and his wife. If necessary, a man or a woman should be placed in the home to see who is the cause of the difficulty.

Avot 1:7.

See Hilchot De’ot 6:1, where the Rambam emphasizes the importance of eschewing an undesirable environment and dwelling in a favorable one.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 75:1) states that it is a difference in language that divides one land from another. The Rivash (Responsum 177) states that the determining factor is the government of the land. This matter is discussed by the later authorities, particularly in light of the emergence of large countries comprising many times the area of Eretz Yisrael in the Talmudic period. Many commentaries define a land as a place inhabited by people who speak the same language and are governed by the same authority. Even that is common today.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ketubot 13:10). The contemporary translation of medinah as ‘‘state’’ or ‘‘country’’ is not appropriate in this context.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 75:1) quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Tam (Ketubot 110b), which states that when the two come from different lands and the marriage is held in one of these lands, the place where the couple marries determines their future dwelling. If, however, they each come from a different land from that in which the marriage is held, the woman may compel her husband to live in her native land. See also the opinion of Terumat HaDeshen (Responsum 416, quoted by the Rama, loc. cit.), which states that if the man cannot earn a livelihood in the locale in which he is living, he may compel his wife to follow him to any place where he can.

Our text follows the version found in many manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah and that which is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 75:1). The standard published version states ‘‘she’’ instead of ‘‘he.’’

I.e., the neighborhood and its scenery.

The Rambam appears to be saying that the woman must dress and present herself in an appropriate way in an attractive setting, and she might not desire to make such an effort. Rashi (Ketubot 110b) explains that the change in lifestyle may cause illness.

Our translation is based on the Bayit Chadash (Even HaEzer 75), which states that the woman may compel her husband to make such a move. Note, however, the Chelkat Mechokek 75:12, which states that this interpretation need not be accepted.

As reflected in Hilchot Melachim, Chapter 5, the Rambam does not consider living in Eretz Yisrael a mitzvah [in contrast to the view of the Ramban (Hosafot l’Sefer HaMitzvot, positive mitzvah 4) and others, who do]. Nevertheless, he states (Hilchot Melachim 5:12): ‘‘At all times... a person should dwell in Eretz Yisrael... rather than in the Diaspora.’’
The commentaries interpret the expression ‘‘At all times’’ to include even the present age. Tosafot, Ketubot 110b, explains that because we are unsure how to fulfill the agricultural laws of Eretz Yisrael, there is no obligation to live there in the present age. Others explain that because of the dangers that exist in Eretz Yisrael, there is no obligation. (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 75:5.)As reflected in this ruling and in one of his responsa, the Rambam negates those views and advocates living in Eretz Yisrael, even in the present age.

See Hilchot Melachim 5:9, which states that it is forbidden to leave Eretz Yisrael for the purpose of settling in the Diaspora, unless there is a famine of extreme severity. Even then, abandoning the land is not considered desirable. In Hilchot Melachim 5:12, he states: ‘‘Whoever leaves [Eretz Yisrael] for the Diaspora is considered as though he worships idols.’’

As mentioned above, there are opinions that maintain that in the present age, there is no obligation to dwell in Eretz Yisrael. According to these views, this ruling does not apply. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 75:4-5) also mentions the opposing view, it appears to follow the opinion stated by the Rambam. Nevertheless, many Ashkenazic authorities maintain (see Ba’er Heteiv 75:19) that at present one may not divorce a woman without paying her the money due her for her ketubah because she does not desire to move to Eretz Yisrael. Although the Pitchei Teshuvah 75:7 speaks extensively about the positive value of living in Eretz Yisrael in the present age, it mentions another factor — the difficulty of earning a living in Eretz Yisrael — and states that unless one is assured of being able to sustain himself through work — as opposed to receiving charity — one may not compel one’s family to relocate.

There are opinions (Mordechai, at the conclusion of Ketubot) that maintain that in the present age, when there is no Temple, there is no difference between Jerusalem and other cities in Eretz Yisrael. Nevertheless, the fact that this law is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 75:4), a text that deals only with laws applicable at present, appears to imply that the Rambam’s ruling should be applied in the present age as well.