Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Even though honey is more valuable than wine, the kiddushin are not binding, because the stipulation was not fulfilled, and it is possible that the woman indeed desired wine rather than honey. Similarly, with regard to the sets that follow, Kiddushin (48b ff) explains reasons why it is possible to say that the woman favored either of the alternatives, and she is therefore not consecrated unless the stipulation that is made is met.

Who, like bastards, are forbidden to marry into the Jewish people. (See the notes on Chapter 1, Halachah 7.)

Animal feces were used in the processing of leather, and thus leather craftsmen were known for their unpleasant odor.

I.e., he maintains two homes.

A compendium of halachic exegesis of the Book of Leviticus, composed by Rav, a student of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi, who compiled the Mishnah. Rav was the leader of the first generation of Amoraim in Babylonia.

A compendium of the halachic exegesis of the Books of Numbers and Deuteronomy, composed by Rav.

A collection of teachings intended to ‘‘explain the Mishnah and expound upon concepts that would require much effort to be derived from the Mishnah.’’ Rabbi Chiyya was one of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi’s primary disciples.

Students of Rabbi Akiva, renowned for their scholarship in their youth. Their promising futures were effaced after they entered a mystical experience together with their master. (See Chaggigah 14b.)

The commander of King Saul’s armies.

Yoav ben Tz’ruyah, the commander of King David’s armies.

Who was renowned for his wealth. Each year he would give 12,000 calves as the tithes of his herd (Shabbat 54b). Another version of the text also mentions Elazar ben Chersom whose wealth is described in Yoma 35b.

The doubt exists only because we cannot be aware of what is happening within the person’s heart or mind. If we could be sure that he had repented within his heart, he is considered a righteous man, regardless of his previous conduct. This demonstrates the power of teshuvah, how one thought of repentance can transform one’s spiritual level from one extreme to the other.

In general, a person is not punished for a sin unless he commits a deed. The worship of false gods is different. (See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 2:6, which states: ‘‘Whoever accepts a false god as true, even when he does not actually worship it, disgraces and blasphemes [God’s] glorious and awesome name.’’ See also Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 2:1, 3.)

Since he did not explicitly state the matter as a stipulation, his misconception does not cause the kiddushin to be nullified.

Since all the women were included in the same statement without differentiating between any of them, none is consecrated.
The Maggid Mishneh notes that Kiddushin 51a equates this law with the following ruling: When one person tells another, ‘‘You and this animal will acquire this object,’’ the person acquires half. The correspondence is explained as follows. Although the animal is not fit to acquire the property, the person still acquires the half. Similarly, although some of the women are not fit to be consecrated, the others are, and they should be consecrated.
On this basis, the Maggid Mishneh asks: Since in Hilchot Mechirah 22:12, the Rambam rules that the person acquires the property although the animal does not, seemingly he should agree that the women who are fit to be married should be consecrated. In resolution, he explains that monetary laws are governed by different principles from marital laws, and therefore there is no contradiction between the two rulings.
Because of this contradiction, although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 41:4) mentions the Rambam’s opinion, it also mentions a view that states that the women who are not related are consecrated. It concludes that because of the conflicting opinions, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. The same applies with regard to the law mentioned in the second portion of this halachah.

Since the man was not specific as to which of the sisters he was consecrating, there is no way to determine which of them was intended. [Even if the man specifies his intent afterwards, his word is not accepted (Rama, Even HaEzer 37:16).] Therefore, there is doubt as to the status of both of the women.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 37:16) states that this rule applies even when the man consecrating the daughters was engaged to one of them. Since he did not specify his intent at the time of the kiddushin, all the daughters require a divorce.

In the previous instance, the man was not able to marry either of the women he consecrated, because they were related and it is forbidden to marry one’s divorcee’s mother, sister or daughter.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 35:11) quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Nissim, who maintains that if the relatives state that they were never consecrated and the man marries the woman, they are permitted to remain married.

If the girls are below the age of bagrut, their father has the privilege of consecrating them. If they are above the age of bagrut, it is possible that they appointed him as an agent to receive their kiddushin. Note, however, the following halachah.

For perhaps the brother who died was her betrothed.

A girl between the ages of twelve and twelve and a half, who has manifested signs of physical maturity.

A Na’arah is a girl between the ages of twelve and twelve and a half, who has manifested signs of physical maturity. A Bogeret is a girl past the age of twelve and a half, who has manifested signs of physical maturity.

Kiddushin 51b explains the rationale for this ruling. A person will not abandon a mitzvah for which he is responsible (the consecration of his younger daughter) to fulfill a mitzvah for which he is not responsible (the consecration of his elder daughter).

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 37:15) states that this law applies only when the daughter who is above bagrut does not specify the identity of a man she desires to marry. If, however, she makes such a specification, and the above situation occurs with regard to this individual, she also requires a divorce.

I.e., none of them has reached the age of bagrut (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 37). (See Beit Shmuel 37:42.)

Although the Hebrew words gedolah and katanah can mean both ‘‘older’’ and ‘‘oldest’’ and ‘‘younger’’ and ‘‘youngest’’ respectively, in this context the man’s intent is clear, and the intent is the oldest and the youngest.

Kiddushin 64a derives this concept from Deuteronomy 22:16, ‘‘I gave my daughter to this man,’’ the verse that teaches that the father has the prerogative of consecrating his daughter until she becomes a bogeret. From ‘‘I gave my daughter,’’ we learn that because of her father’s words, the woman is forbidden to marry anyone but her intended. From ‘‘this man,’’ we learn that he can clarify the identity of the intended.

The rationale is that since the prohibition comes on the basis of her father’s statements, the license to marry is also granted on that basis.

I.e., not only may he free the girl of the prohibition by divorcing her, he may consummate the marriage if he desires. We do not suspect that he is making this statement merely because he is attracted to the woman (Kiddushin 63b). The man is given this prerogative because we assume that he would not lie, lest the father protest and deny his claim.

He must, however, consecrate the woman again (Rashba; Rama, Even HaEzer 37:22).

The Rashba states that this ruling applies even if the marriage was not yet consummated. As long as the license for the marriage was granted, the third person’s claims do not cause it to be rescinded. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 37:23) quotes both views, but appears to favor that of the Rambam.

If, however, he consummates the marriage and the couple live together as man and wife, we do not force them to separate because of the suspicions mentioned (Rashba; Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 37:24).

I.e., the relatives he would be forbidden to marry if she were his wife. Since according to his statements they are man and wife, he must uphold any prohibitions that such a relationship would bring about.

For she denies the matter.

I.e., those who are not forbidden to him because of his statements regarding her mother. Since he does not acknowledge the consecration of the daughter, he is not bound by the mother’s statements.

For the mother’s statements are not binding for the daughter. Although Scriptural Law gives a father the prerogative to make binding statements regarding his daughter’s status, a mother’s statements do not have this power even according to Rabbinic Law (Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Kiddushin 3:11).

Chapter 4, Halachah 6.

Once the man divorces the woman, he is forbidden to marry her close relatives. Nevertheless, this is not considered a significant loss, since there are many other women he could marry. And yet, because of this factor, he cannot be compelled to divorce the woman (Maggid Mishneh; Rama, Even HaEzer 48:6). Others [Rabbenu Eliyahu Mizrachi and the Maharshal (Responsum 25)] differ and maintain that since he divorced the woman only as a favor to her, he is not forbidden to marry her relatives.

I.e., without being asked to by others.

The Maggid Mishneh notes that there are several points that require clarification with regard to the Rambam’s statements. As stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 11, a man is not ordinarily obligated to pay a marriage contract until the second stage of the marriage (nisu’in). If merely kiddushin were given, he is not under such an obligation. It is only when he wrote the woman a ketubah and gave it together with the kiddushin, that he is obligated.
This, however, raises a question: If he wrote the woman a ketubah, how can he deny the kiddushin? The Maggid Mishneh explains that this law applies only in a place where it is customary to write the ketubah before the kiddushin are given. Because in most instances there is no obligation to give a ketubah after kiddushin, the Shulchan Aruch does not mention this law at all (Chelkat Mechokek 48:2).

See Hilchot Mechirah 7:10.

The Ra’avad maintains that the man must always appoint an agent in the presence of witnesses. He therefore interprets the phrase huchzak hashaliach to mean that the appointment of the agent was public knowledge.

As in Halachah 15.

For his agent states that he did not consecrate the woman on behalf of the principal.

The Maggid Mishneh states that even though the woman is considered to be consecrated to the principal, the agent is still forbidden to marry the woman’s relatives. The Rama (Even HaEzer 35:15) quotes this ruling.
Rabbenu Asher does not accept the Rambam’s ruling, stating that if the agent explicitly states that he did not consecrate the woman on behalf of the principal, there is no way that the kiddushin can be binding.

Because of the doubt, he is not required to pay each of them the sum required by the marriage contract.

Because he violated our Sages’ instructions not to consecrate with intimate relations.

The Beit Shmuel 49:2 questions why this ruling differs from the ruling delivered (Hilchot Gezeilah 4:9) when a man says that he stole from one of five people and does not know from whom he stole. In such an instance, although the thief is required to reimburse each of the five, this is only when each of the recipients takes an oath that the money was stolen from him. The Beit Shmuel leaves the question unresolved.

For, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 11, a man is not ordinarily required to pay the money due because of a marriage contract until nisu’in, the second stage of the marriage relationship. If the woman has merely been consecrated, this obligation is not incumbent upon him unless he wrote a marriage contract for her.

The Ra’avad states that there is no need for the marriage contract to have been written. If the man made a verbal agreement to that effect when consecrating the woman, he is obligated. The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam would also accept the Ra’avad’s law, and was merely giving one of several possible settings in which the law stated could be applied.

As the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 46:1) states, the woman is bound by the same rules as all those whose status of their kiddushin is in doubt. She may not marry any one other than the man to whom the report says she is consecrated, but before she may consummate the marriage with him, she must be consecrated again.

I.e., it is possible for many rumors to be spread. When is credence given to a rumor? When it can be substantiated in court with testimony, as mentioned below. (See Rashi, Gittin 99b.)

In this part of the halachah (in contrast to its beginning), the Rambam does not mention that the witnesses state to whom the woman was consecrated. The later authorities (Chelkat Mechokek 46:1; Beit Shmuel 46:1) maintain that this information must also be stated; otherwise the woman is not considered to be consecrated.

I.e., according to the Rambam, it is sufficient for two witnesses to hear from one person who originally heard the report from another person. The Rashba and Rabbenu Asher maintain that unless a report is spread by at least two individuals, it cannot be substantiated in court. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 46:2) quotes the Rambam’s view and the Rama quotes the other opinions.

I.e., there is a question whether the kiddushin were worth a p’rutah, or the youth consecrating her had reached the age of majority.

If the first man does not divorce her, the second is not allowed to consummate the marriage. If he does not heed this ruling and marries her before she receives a divorce, the Rabbis ruled that the woman is forbidden to him, and he is required to divorce her (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 46:5).

This is forbidden, as explained in Hilchot Gerushin 11:12.

I.e., although the presents are worth more than a p’rutah, they themselves do not establish a bond of kiddushin, because they are not given with that intent. Nevertheless, the fact that the presents were given indicates that there is a possibility that kiddushin had been given previously.

Since there are a number of men who send presents after consecrating, we suspect that perhaps this person also followed that practice.Although rulings of Torah law are ordinarily determined by the practice of the majority, an exception is made in this case, because of the severity of the laws of marriage and divorce (Tosafot, Kiddushin 50b), or because this majority practice is not fixed and may change at the whim of the people (Rabbenu Nissim).

I.e., the marriage contract, like the gifts mentioned in the previous halachah, are a sign that perhaps the woman was consecrated (Maggid Mishneh).

In this instance, the testimony of one witness is not accepted when the woman denies his statements. If her words were not true, she would not dare to contradict the witness’s testimony (Maggid Mishneh).

The Rambam’s ruling appears to be based on the rationale that since the woman has a witness who supports her, we suspect that she might contradict the other witness even when she is not telling the truth (Maggid Mishneh).
This rationale is not accepted by the Ra’avad and other authorities, who object to the Rambam’s ruling. They maintain that since the woman’s statements are accepted when she has no support, surely they should be accepted when they are supported by another witness. They explain that Ketubot 23a, the source for this halachah, is referring to an instance when a man threw kiddushin to a woman, one witness claims that the kiddushin were closer to the woman (and hence, she was consecrated), the other claims that they were closer to the man (and thus she was not consecrated), and the woman herself does not know. This is the view accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 47:3).

Ketubot 22a gives an example of a rationale that the Sages accepted. A very attractive woman at first said that she was consecrated, and afterwards accepted kiddushin. When asked to account for her behavior, she explained that her suitors were originally not worthy people, and she therefore wanted nothing to do with them. When a worthy suitor came, she was happy to accept his offer.

Note the ruling of the Rama (Even HaEzer 47:4), who states that this law applies only when the woman says ‘‘I was consecrated,’’ but does not state to whom. If she mentions the name of a person who she claims to have consecrated her, her retraction is not accepted even when the rationale she offers appears to have substance.

Indeed, the two are forbidden to remain in privacy together. For the prohibition against yichud, being alone with a woman other than one’s wife, applies until the marriage is consummated (Rama, Even HaEzer 55:1).

This is alluded to by the wording of the blessing recited before consecrating a woman (Chapter 3, Halachah 24), which praises God ‘‘Who has forbidden the arusot to us, and permitted to us those who are married by [the rites of] chuppah and kiddushin’’ (Kessef Mishneh).

Popularly, the term chuppah is understood to refer to the wedding canopy. Nevertheless, the common practice is to follow the Rambam’s view as well. For this reason, after the ceremony under the wedding canopy, the bride and groom go to a private room, the cheder yichud. This constitutes the halachic definition of chuppah.

In Jewish law, marriage is a two-stage process involving erusin and nisu’in. Erusin (also referred to as kiddushin) is the stage that causes a woman to be designated as a man’s wife and causes her to be forbidden to other men. It is not until nisu’in, however, that the couple begins living together as man and wife. At present, nisu’in follows directly after erusin; under the wedding canopy the groom consecrates the bride, and afterwards they go to a private room.

I.e., all the privileges and obligations of the ketubah (marriage contract) apply. He alone nullifies her vows, and if he is a priest, should his wife die, he must become impure when burying her.

This ruling is not accepted by Rabbenu Asher and other authorities. They maintain that a chuppah conducted with a niddah is binding, despite the fact that the couple are forbidden to engage in intimate relations. (See Tur and Shulchan Aruch 61:1.) At present, every effort is made to schedule a wedding so that the woman will not be in the niddah state at that time. If, however, that is not possible, the wedding is held and is considered binding, despite the woman’s condition.

This applied when the wedding celebrations were held in the groom’s home. The intent is that the blessings be recited before the complete establishment of the marriage bond.

Rashi (Ketubot 7b) explains that this blessing is in praise of the creation of Adam, the first man.
In Hilchot Berachot 10:11, where the text of the wedding blessings is mentioned, this blessing precedes the blessing ‘‘Who has created all things for His glory.’’ The order mentioned in these halachot is the sequence in which these blessings are recited today. It appears more appropriate, particularly according to Rashi’s commentary (ibid.), which explains that the blessing ‘‘Who has created all things...’’ is not directly connected to the wedding itself, but rather is recited in appreciation of the guests who have come to celebrate together with the new couple.

Despite the fact that this blessing follows two (or three) blessings that begin with ‘‘Blessed...’’ it also begins with ‘‘Blessed....’’ Among the explanations offered is that the first blessings are short, and if the phrase ‘‘Blessed...’’ were not mentioned, they would appear to be a single blessing (Tosafot, Ketubot, ibid.).

Rashi (ibid.) interprets this as a reference to the creation of woman, who was created from man (‘‘his own self’’), and gives him the potential for reproduction (‘‘a structure that will last for all time’’).

‘‘The barren one’’ refers to Jerusalem. Psalms 137:6 states: ‘‘Let my tongue cleave to my palate if I do not place Jerusalem above my highest joy.’’ Thus, at the height of the wedding celebration, we recall the holy city and pray that it be rebuilt.

This is a prayer that the bride and groom enjoy the happiness experienced by Adam and Eve before the first sin.

Cf. Jeremiah 33:11. This blessing joins our wishes for the happiness of the particular couple with our hope for the Messianic redemption and the rebuilding of Jerusalem. The ultimate marriage relationship is the bond between God and the Jewish people, which will be realized in the Messianic age. Thus, the two themes, marriage and redemption, share an intrinsic link.

Rashi, Ketubot 8a, explains the difference between the last two blessings. The fifth of the blessings concludes with a request that the bride and groom enjoy a lifetime of happiness and success together. The sixth and final blessing concludes with a request that they find happiness in each other and that their wedding joy be extended throughout their lives. Alternatively, the final blessing is a blessing for the Jewish people as a whole, who find fulfillment in married life.

These seven blessings are also recited after grace at the festive meals held during the seven days of celebration after a couple’s marriage. (See Hilchot Berachot 2:9-11.)

Ketubot 7b derives this from Ruth 4:2, ‘‘And he took ten men from the elders of the city,’’ which is interpreted to refer to the marriage between Boaz and Ruth.
In the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. III, Chapter 49, the Rambam explains that our Sages required ten men to be present to publicize all weddings, so that a man will live together with a woman only after their marriage has become public knowledge. Their intent was to make it socially unacceptable for couples to live together without marriage.

As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 2, although all efforts are made not to schedule a marriage when the woman is in the niddah state, if this is unavoidable the wedding may be held and the blessings recited. Nevertheless, the consummation of the marriage is possible only when the woman is purified.

This is the sum of money required for a person to support himself for one year (Bertinuro, Pe’ah 8:8).

This point is a matter of debate, for there are certain opinions (among them that of Rabbenu Tam) that maintain that the obligation to pay the fundamental requirement of the ketubah stems from Scriptural Law. Support for the latter opinion may be drawn from the wording commonly used in most Ashkenazic ketubot ‘‘200 silver zuz that are rightfully yours [as required by] the Torah.’’ [Significantly, even the text of the ketubah in the standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah (Hilchot Yibbum VaChalitzah 4:34) includes this phrase. Nevertheless, many authorities maintain that this is a printer’s addition and not the Rambam’s own words.]
Most authorities (including Rabbenu Asher) agree that the obligation to pay the fundamental requirement of the ketubah is Rabbinic in origin. Nevertheless, the abovementioned phrase is traditionally included in the ketubah to teach us the value of the silver to which we are referring, as is explained in the notes on the following halachah.

I.e., when the man understands that divorcing his wife will cost him a significant sum of money, he will think twice before doing so.

The Ashkenazic authorities (even those who agree with the Rambam with regard to the Rabbinic origin of the fundamental requirement of the ketubah) differ with him regarding the value the man is required to pay [Tur, Rama (Even HaEzer 66:6)]. According to these authorities, our Sages ordained that a man pay his virgin bride 200 zuz of pure silver. With regard to a bride who is not a virgin, however, they differ and maintain that the obligation is 100 zuz of the Talmudic period. In practice, however, the custom is to give such a bride half the sum given to a virgin (Beit Shmuel 66:14).

Chapter 1, Halachah 12. According to most authorities, the equivalent of a dinar in contemporary measure is 4.8 grams. According to Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi (Piskei Siddur), it is 5.1 grams.

I.e., a kinyan chalifin, in which the recipient gives the seller a handkerchief and thus reaffirms his commitment. After this act, the transaction is binding. (See Hilchot Mechirah 5:5.)

Implied by the Rambam’s wording is that this is only a temporary measure, and that a ketubah must be composed at the earliest possible opportunity. (See Rama, Even HaEzer 66:2.)

I.e., he does not have to give her the full value of her original ketubah. He must, however, give her a ketubah in which he obligates himself for the minimal amount required by our Sages. Note the Beit Shmuel 66:10, who questions whether he must write the ketubah for 100 or 200 zuz.

I.e., she sells the rights to her ketubah to a purchaser for a price below its face value. Should her husband die or divorce her, the purchaser receives the full value of the ketubah. If the woman dies before her husband, the purchaser does not receive anything.

I.e., after a marriage has been consummated, a woman may collect her due even from property that has been sold, for all her husband’s property is on lien to her ketubah. Before the marriage bond is consummated, however, she does not have this right (Ketubot 43b).
Rabbenu Asher and Rabbenu Nissim differ with the Rambam in this regard and maintain that the woman should be able to collect her ketubah from property that has been sold as well. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 55:6) follows the Rambam’s view.

Ketubot 54b explains that the additional amount was granted the woman in consideration of the couple’s intimate relationship.

In this matter as well, Rabbenu Asher differs with the Rambam and maintains that a woman is entitled to a ketubah from erusin onward. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) quotes the Rambam’s view. Although the Rama mentions Rabbenu Asher’s opinion, he states that it is customary to follow the Rambam’s ruling.

Halachah 11.

Hilchot Eivel 1:1 states that Moses ordained the seven days of mourning and the seven days of wedding celebrations for the Jewish people.

During these days, it is customary for the friends and family of the bride and groom to host them at celebrations referred to as sheva berachot (‘‘seven blessings’’) for the seven wedding blessings recited after the meal at these celebrations, as explained in Hilchot Berachot, Chapter 2.

The Maggid Mishneh states that if the groom was not married previously, he should celebrate with his bride for seven days even when she had been married before. He draws support from Hilchot Berachot 2:9, which states that in such an instance the seven wedding blessings are recited for the week following the wedding.

See Halachah 14, which explains the source for this ruling.

Even during Chol Hamo’ed, the intermediate days of a festival (Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 7:16).

The mourning customs of that day do not prevent one from consecrating a wife. The rationale: another man may consecrate the woman instead of him (Jerusalem Talmud, Ketubot 1:1).

Although many of the early Sephardi authorities object, the Shulchan Aruch (Even Ha- Ezer 64:3, based on the ruling of the Tur) states that in the present age, it is customary to hold weddings on Friday, provided the groom spends three days preparing for the wedding feast.
(A wedding may be held on Sunday or Monday. The fact that the Sabbath is interposed in between does not mean that three days were not spent in preparation for the wedding.)

With regard to weddings on the Sabbath, there is an additional reason for the prohibition. A wedding involves a kinyan, the acquisition of the rights of the marriage contract, and it is forbidden to make a kinyan on the Sabbath (Hilchot Shabbat 23:14).

Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov.

This subject is discussed in detail in the following chapter.

Our Sages desired that he take the matter to court so the matter be investigated, lest the bride had in fact committed adultery (for in the Talmudic age, erusin preceded nisu’in). If the wedding were held on another day, our Sages feared that in the time the husband was waiting for the court to hold sessions, his wife would soothe his anger (Rashi, Ketubot 2a).

Since the wedding blessings are recited for only one day when both the bride and the groom have been married before, our Sages feared that the man would ignore his wife on the day following their wedding and immediately return to work. To prevent this, they suggested that the wedding be held on Thursday. For the husband will not consider going to work on Friday and the Sabbath (ibid.).

I.e., if the husband forces the bride to agree, the wedding is binding.

Instead, the father should wait until his daughter comes of age and willingly agrees to marry her spouse. (See Chapter 3, Halachah 19.)

I.e., to buy garments and jewelry (Ketubot 57b).

I.e., even if she is not yet a bogeret. The Maggid Mishneh and others explain that the Rambam is referring to a widow who is consecrated. (Therefore, she is given only 30 days, for she had already prepared herself for her first marriage.) He uses the term ‘‘non-virgin’’ to exclude a bride who had previously been widowed after consecration, but had never wed.

I.e., to prepare for the wedding celebrations and to prepare a home and furnishings.

The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam’s wording implies that everything depends on the woman’s status. If she would be given twelve months to prepare herself, her husband is given that amount of time. The Jerusalem Talmud (Ketubot 5:3) states that it is his status that is the determining factor: if he has never been married, he is given twelve months. If he is a widower, he is given thirty days. The Tur (Even HaEzer 56) follows that position.

See Halachah 14. With regard to this and the other examples that follow, the rationale is that since he is prevented by forces beyond his control from wedding her, he is not liable. Note the Rama (Even HaEzer 56:3), who states that if the man voluntarily delays the wedding and thus, becomes obligated to support his arusah, he must continue to support her even if she falls ill, and the wedding must be postponed because of her illness.

See Halachah 2.