Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

When two people come before a judge, one soft and one harsh - before he hears their words, or even after he hears their words, but does not know the direction in which the judgment is leaning - he has the license to tell them: "I will not involve myself with you," lest the harsh litigant be held liable and seek vengeance from the judge.

After he hears their words and knows in which direction the judgment is leaning, he does not have the license to tell them: "I will not involve myself with you," as Deuteronomy 1:18 states: "Do not be intimidated by any person." That verse implies that one should not say: "So-and-so is wicked, maybe he will kill my son, set fire to my crops, or cut down my trees." If he was an expert appointed to judge the many, he is obligated to involve himself with them in all circumstances.

Similarly, if a student was sitting before his master and became aware of a factor that would vindicate a poor person and obligate his rich adversary, he transgresses the above commandment if he remains silent. Concerning such matters, Exodus 23:7 states: "Keep distant from words of falsehood."

What is the source which teaches that a judge should not have an underdeveloped student sit before him? It is written: "Keep distant from words of falsehood."

What is the source which teaches that a student who sees his teacher erring with regard to a judgment should not say: "I will wait until he renders judgment. Then I will refute his ruling and then construct a new one so that the judgment will be quoted in my name"? It is written: "Keep distant from words of falsehood."

At the outset, it is a mitzvah to ask the litigants: "Do you desire a judgment or a compromise?" If they desire a compromise, a compromise is negotiated. Any court that continuously negotiates a compromise is praiseworthy. Concerning this approach, Zechariah 8:16 states: Adjudicate a judgment of peace in your gates." Which judgment involves peace? A compromise. Similarly, with regard to King David it is stated: "And David carried out justice and charity for his entire people." When does justice involve charity? When a compromise is made.

When does the above apply? Before a judgment is rendered. Even though the judge has already heard their arguments and knows the direction in which the judgment is heading, it is a mitzvah to negotiate a compromise. Once the judgment is rendered and he declares: "So-and-so, your claim is vindicated; so-and-so, you are liable," he may not negotiate a compromise. Instead, let the judgment pierce the mountain.

Although the litigants agreed to a compromise in court, they have the authority to demand a judgment until they confirm their commitment to the compromise with a kinyan.

A compromise has greater legal power than a judgment. If two ordinary people rendered a judgment, their judgment is not binding and the litigants need not accept it. If, however, such individuals negotiated a compromise and the litigants affirmed their agreement with a kinyan, they may not retract.

After leaving the court, it is forbidden for any of the judges to say: "I was the one who vindicated you or held you liable and my colleagues differed with me. What could I do? They outnumbered me." If he says this, he is among those to whom the words of censure, Proverbs 11:13,: "He proceeds gossiping, revealing secrets" is applied. An incident occurred with regard to one student who revealed the private conversations in the House of Study 22 years later. The court had him removed from the House of Study and denounced him as "a revealer of secrets."

If either of the litigants asks the court to compose a record of the judgment, they write it for him in the following manner: "So-and-so came to this-and-this court with so-and-so, the opposing litigant, claiming this-and-this. He was vindicated" or "...held liable." The record is given to him without it mentioning the names of those who vindicated him or those who held him liable. Instead, it says merely "From the statements of the court of such-and-such, so-and-so was vindicated."

This was the custom of the men of Jerusalem: They would bring the litigants into the court and listen to their statements and claims. They would then bring in the witnesses and listen to their statements. Afterwards, the judges would have all others removed and would debate the matter among themselves until they came to a decision. Afterwards, they would call the litigants in and the judge of the greatest stature declares: "So-and-so, your claim is vindicated; so-and-so, you are liable." In this way, the litigants do no know which judge vindicated him and which judge held him liable.

When a judge knows that a colleague is a robber or a wicked person, it is forbidden for him to sit in judgment with him, as it is stated: "Keep distant from words of falsehood."

This is the practice that would be followed by Jerusalem's men of refined character: They would not sit to participate in a judgment unless they knew who would sit with them. They would not sign a legal document unless they knew who would sign with them. And they would not enter a feast until they knew who would be joining them.

Deuteronomy 16:19 states: "Do not take a bribe." Needless to say, this command applies if the intent is to pervert judgment. The verse is teaching that it is forbidden for a bribe to be given even to vindicate the just and to obligate the one who is liable; the judge transgresses a negative commandment. Such a person is included in the malediction, Deuteronomy 27:25: "Cursed be he who takes a bribe." He is required to return the bribe if he is demanded to by the giver.

Just as the recipient transgresses a negative commandment; so, too, does the giver, as [Leviticus 19:14] states: “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind1.”

Any judge who sits and seeks to amplify his reputation in order to cause the wages of his attendants and scribes to be enhanced is included among those who seek after profit. This is what the sons of Samuel did. Hence I Samuel 8:3 describes them as being "inclined to profit and taking bribery."

The above applies not only to a bribe of money, but a bribe of all things. An incident occurred concerning a judge who stood up in a small boat, as he was crossing a river. A person extended his hand and helped him as he was standing. Later that person came before the judge with a case. The judge told him: "I am unacceptable to serve as a judge for you."

Another incident took place where a person removed a feather of a fowl from a judge's scarf and another person covered some spittle that was lying before the judge and the judge told them: "I am unacceptable to serve as a judge for you." Another incident took place concerning a person who brought one of the presents given to priests to a judge who was a priest. The judge told him: "I am unacceptable to serve as a judge for you."

And another incident took place concerning a sharecropper of a field belonging to a judge who would bring him figs from his field every Friday. Once he came earlier and brought him the figs on Thursday, because he had a judgment over which he desired that the judge preside. The judge told him: "I am unacceptable to serve as a judge for you." This applies although the figs belonged to the judge. Since he brought them earlier than the ordinary time, that favor caused him to be disqualified as a judge.

Whenever a judge borrows an article, he is unacceptable to serve as a judge for the person who lent him the article. When does the above apply? When the judge does not have articles to lend him in return. If, however, the judge possessed articles to lend in return, it is acceptable for him to serve as a judge, for that person will also borrow from him.

Whenever a judge takes a wage for adjudicating a case, his judgments are nullified. This applies only when it is not evident that he is receiving compensation for losing his wages. If, however, he was involved in his profession and two people came to him for a judgment and he told them: "Provide me with a person who will work in stead of me and I will adjudicate your case or pay me for the wages that I will forfeit," this is permitted.

This leniency is permitted provided it is evident that the wage is merely in lieu of his hire, but no more and he takes equal payment from both of the litigants, receiving payment from each one in the presence of the other.

A judge may not adjudicate the case of a friend. This applies even if the person is not a member of his wedding party or one of his more intimate companions. Similarly, he may not adjudicate the case of one he hates. This applies even if the person is not his enemy and one whose misfortune he seeks. Instead, the two litigants must be looked upon equally in the eyes and in the hearts of the judges. If the judge does not know either of them and is not familiar with their deeds, this is the fairest judgment that could be.

Whenever two Torah scholars hate each other, they are forbidden to act as judges together. For this will lead to a contorted judgment. The hatred each one of them bears for the other will cause him to overturn his colleague's words.

A judge should always see himself as if a sword is drawn on his neck and Hell is open before him. He should know Who he is judging, before Whom he is judging, and Who will ultimately exact retribution from him if he deviates from the path of truth, as indicated by Psalms 82:1: "God stands among the congregation of the Almighty." And II Chronicles 19:6 states: "See what you are doing. For you are not judging for man's sake, but for God's."

Whenever a judge does not render a genuinely true judgment, he causes the Divine presence to depart from Israel. Whenever a judge expropriates money from one litigant and gives it to the other unlawfully, God exacts retribution from his life, as Proverbs 22:23 states: "He will exact payment from the soul of one who exacts payment."

Conversely, when a judge adjudicates a case in a genuinely true manner for even one moment, it is as if he has corrected the entire world and he causes the Divine Presence to rest within Israel, as implied by the verse: "God stands among the congregation of the Almighty." If a judge will ask: "Why should involve myself in this difficulty?" He should know that it is written: II Chronicles, loc. cit.: "He is with you in the matter of judgment." Nor should the judge worry about erring. A judge may only base his judgment on what his eyes see.

At the outset, a judge should always look at the litigants as if they were wicked and operate under the presumption that both of them are lying. He should adjudicate according to his perception of the situation. When they depart, having accepted the judgment, he should view them both as righteous, seeing each of them in a favorable light.

A judge may adjudicate cases involving monetary law bases on factors that he is inclined to regard as true and concerning which he feels strongly in his heart are correct even though he does not have proof of the matters. Needless to say, that if he personally knows that a matter is true, he may judge the case according to his knowledge.

What is implied? A person was obligated to take an oath by the court. A person who the judge regards as trustworthy and upon whose word the judge relies tells him that this person is suspect to take a false oath. The judge may reverse the obligation for the oath and place it on the other litigant, allowing him to take an oath and collect his claim because the judge relied on the statements of this person.

Moreover, even if he regards a woman or a servant as trustworthy, should he feel strongly that the matter about which they are speaking is correct, he may rely on their statement and judge accordingly. Needless to say, if he himself knows that a person is suspect to take a false oath, he may judge accordingly.

Similarly, when a promissory note comes before him and a person upon whom he relies - even a woman or a relative - says that it has been repaid, if he trusts his word, he may tell the bearer of the note: "Payment will be required only when an oath is taken." Similarly, if the alleged debtor is also indebted to another person, the judge may have the debtor pay the creditor whose promissory note was not impugned at all and leave the promissory note that was impugned by the person's testimony unpaid. Or he may reject the promissory note and not consider it in judgment if he sees fit.

Similar laws apply if a person comes and claims that he entrusted an article to so-and-so who died and identified the article with extremely precise descriptive marks. If the claimant did not frequent the home of the deceased, and if the judge knows that the deceased did not have the means to own such an article and he firmly believes that the article did not belong to the deceased, the article may be expropriated from the heirs and given to the person provided he has the means to own it and identified it with descriptive marks. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

These matters are solely given over to the heart of the judge to decide according to what he perceives as being a true judgment. Why then did the Torah require two witnesses? Because when two witnesses appear before a judge, he must judge according to their testimony whether or not he knows it to be true.

All of the matters mentioned above are the fundamental standard of law. Nevertheless, when courts which were not fitting - not necessarily courts which were not upright, but even those whose deeds were just, but whose judges were not sufficiently wise and masters of understanding - proliferated, the majority of the courts among the Jewish people agreed not to reverse oaths unless there was clear proof that a litigant was suspect of taking a false oath. Similarly, they agreed not to disqualify a promissory note on the basis of the testimony of a woman or an unacceptable witness, nor accept their testimony with regard to all other judgments, nor to judge according to the inclinations of one's thoughts without firm knowledge.

The rationale for this stringency is to prevent any simple person from saying: "My heart trusts this person's words and my mind relies on this." Similarly, we do not expropriate property from orphans unless there is clear proof. We do not rely on the judge's opinion, the evaluation of the deceased's financial capacity, or that of the claimant. Even though a trustworthy person delivered testimony concerning a certain matter and the mind of the judge was inclined to believe that he was telling the truth, he should hesitate in judgment. He should not reject his testimony. Instead, he should mediate between the litigants until they accept the testimony of the witness or agree to a compromise. Alternatively, the judge may withdraw from the case.

What is the source which teaches that a judge who knows that a claim is contrived should not say: "I will deliver a judgment and the responsibility will lie with the witnesses"? It is written Exodus 23:7: "Keep distant from words of falsehood."

What shall he do? He should question and cross-examine the witnesses exceedingly, following the cross-examination process employed in cases involving capital punishment. If it appears to him according to his understanding that there is no deception, he should deliver a judgment. If, however,

a) he still has hesitations because he feels that deception is involved,

b) he does not rely on the testimony of the witnesses although he cannot disqualify them,

c) he feels that one of the litigants is a deceiver and a beguiler and misled the witnesses even though they are fit to testify and testified honestly, it is only that the litigant led them astray, or

d) that from the things that were said, he feels that there are hidden factors which they do not desire to reveal,

in these and in all similar matters, it is forbidden for him to deliver a ruling. Instead, he should withdraw from this judgment and allow it to be decided by someone whose heart is at peace with the matter. These matters are given over to a person's heart. Concerning these Deuteronomy 1:17 states: "Judgment is God's."

A court has the authority to administer lashes to a person who is not required to receive lashes and to execute a person who is not liable to be executed. This license was not granted to overstep the words of the Torah, but rather to create a fence around the words of the Torah. When the court sees that the people have broken the accepted norms with regard to a matter, they may establish safeguards to strengthen the matter according to what appears necessary to them. All the above applies with regard to establishing directives for the immediate time, and not with regard to the establishment of halachah for all time.

An incident occurred where they had a man lashed for engaging in relations with his wife under a tree. And an incident occurred concerning a person who rode on a horse on the Sabbath in the era of the Greeks and they brought him to the court and had him stoned to death. And an incident occurred and Shimon ben Shetach hung 80 women on one day in Ashkelon. All of the required processes of questioning, cross-examination, and warnings were not followed, nor was the testimony unequivocal. Instead, their execution was a directive for that immediate time according to what he perceived as necessary.

Similarly, at any time, and in any place, a court has the license to give a person lashes if he has a reputation for immorality and people gossip about him, saying that he acts licentiously. This applies provided the rumor is heard continuously, as we explained, and he does not have any known enemies who would spread this unfavorable report. Similarly, a person with such an unsavory reputation may be humiliated and scorn may be heaped on his mother in his presence.

Similarly, at all times, a court has the prerogative to declare money belonging to others as ownerless. It may destroy those funds or give them to whomever they see fit to close any breaches in the faith and to strengthen its observance or to penalize a stubborn and difficult person. The Book of Ezra 10:8 states: "Whoever fails to come in three days according to the advice of the officers and the elders will have all of his property confiscated." From this we learn that when a court declares property ownerless, their declaration is effective.

Similarly, a judge may apply a ban of ostracism or excommunication to a person to whom these measures would not ordinarily be applied according to his perception of what is necessary at that time. He should state that he is ostracizing him or excommunicating him on his own conviction and should publicize his transgression in public. This is indicated by Judges 5:23: "'Curse Meroz,' said the angel of G‑d. 'Curse him. Those who dwell with him are cursed, because they did not come to the aid of God's people.'"

Similarly, a judge may enter into a controversy with a person with whom it is necessary to enter into controversy, cursing him, having him beaten, having his hair pulled out, and compelling him to take an oath to God against his will so that he will not perform or that he did not perform a specific action, as Nechemiah 13:25 states: "I entered into controversy with them; I cursed them; I beat people among them; I tore their hair out, and I made them take an oath to God."

Similarly, he may have a person's hands and feet bound. He may imprison him and have him pushed to the ground and dragged, as Ezra 7:26 states: "Judgment will be speedily administered to him, to be executed, to be uprooted, to be punished by a loss of property, and to be imprisoned."

All of the above measures should be applied according to the judge's perception that it is appropriate that the violator be punished in this manner or the situation at large requires it. All of his deeds should be for the sake of heaven and the honor of people at large should not be light in his eyes. For consideration of their honor overrides the observance of a Rabbinic prohibition. Certainly, this applies with regard to the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob who uphold the Torah of truth. He must take care not to ruin their honor and act only to increase the honor of the Omnipresent. For whenever a person debases the Torah, his person will be degraded for people at large. Conversely, when a person honors the Torah, his person will be honored by people at large. And there is no other honor for the Torah except to follow its statutes and judgments.