Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

As is the case regarding all mitzvot whose fulfillment is associated with a specific time.

See the commentary on the above halachah for a definition of these terms and their status. Note Halachah 13 regarding their recitation of a blessing.

See the commentary on Chapter 2, Halachot 1 and ·3.

Sukkah 28b offers two definitions of this term:
a) a child who does not need his mother to help him after he relieves himself;
b) a child who does not wake up.in the night and call out: “Mommy! Mommy!”
Nevertheless, based on Eruvin 82a, the Rambam provided us with a more definite guideline ...

According to Rashi (Berachot 48a) and the Ramban (Milchamot Hashem, Berachot 20b ), there is no obligation incumbent on the child himself. The child’s father is obligated to educate him. If he has no father, the obligation falls on his mother and on the local Rabbinic court (Terumat Hadeshen 99).
Tosafot (Berachot 48a) differs and explains that the Sages placed the obligation on the minor himself. From the Rambam’s phraseology, it appears that he accepts this view.
Support for this premise can be derived from the Rambam’s decision in Hilchot Berachot 5:15-16, which states that an adult who ate a small meal can fulfill his obligation by listening to a child reciting the grace after meals (for both are obligated by virtue of Rabbinic decree). Though others object on the grounds that the child himself is not obligated in the mitzvah, the Rambam states that such a practice is acceptable.

The Rambam mentions the same concept in Hilchot Tzitzit 3:9, Hilchot Berachot 5:1, and Hilchot Lulav 7:19.

Since the latter’s performance of a mitzvah—tending to the sick—does not enable them to perform the mitzvah of dwelling in the sukkah, they are absolved from the obligation (See Sukkah 25a, 26a.) However, this leniency is granted only during the time the sick person requires their assistance (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 640:7).

who is free from the obligation to perform all mitzvot, even those as severe as the Sabbath or Yom Kippur;

or any other minor illness (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, Sukkah 2:4).
This leniency is granted because of one of the basic principles related to the mitzvah of sukkah. Leviticus 23:42 states: “You shall dwell in sukkot” (בסכת תשבו) On that verse, Sukkah 26a comments: תשבו כעין תדורו—i.e., dwelling in the sukkah is comparable to living in one’s own home. Thus, a person is not required to dwell in a sukkah under circumstances which would cause him to leave his own home.
Since a person who is sick would seek the most comfortable lodgings possible and would not camp outside, he is not obligated to do so to fulfill the mitzvah of sukkah (Rabbenu Manoach).

Sukkah 26a relates that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was granted permission to sleep outside the sukkah for this purpose.
The Torah’s prohibitions are suspended not only when a person’s life is in danger, but also when a particular limb might be lost. Though this premise is accepted by the Rambam (see Hilchot Shabbat 2:4), it does not appear that he is referring to it here. Rather, it seems that he means a minor ailment comparable to a headache. See also Tosafot (Sukkah, ibid.).

based on the principle of תשבו כעין תדורו, as explained above. Just as a person would seek out a comfortable permanent dwelling, he is obligated to dwell only in a sukkah which does not cause him unpleasantness.
Rabbenu Manoach states that this leniency does not apply on the first night of Sukkot, on which there is a binding obligation to eat in the sukkah. (See Halachah 6.) The Ramah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 640:4) quotes this statement as halachah.

Some earlier texts of the Mishneh Torah stated that leniency was also granted to such a person’s attendants, but that is surely a printing error (Rabbenu Manoach).

The Tur, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 640:4), and the Ramah emphasize that this law applies only when the discomfort is an unexpected occurrence. However, a sukkah which is constructed in a place where the discomfort will surely come is considered to be unfit to dwell in and is unacceptable for the performance of the mitzvah.

In the seven days of mourning following the burial of a father, mother, wife, brother, sister, son, or daughter.

Sukkah 25b explains that a mourner (אבל) is obligated to fulfill all the mitzvot. Nevertheless, one might suppose that just as a person who is uncomfortable is freed from the obligation of sukkah, a mourner would also be absolved. Therefore, the Talmud includes a special teaching to emphasize the mourner’s obligation, explaining that one is absolved only for discomfort which comes from external factors. In this case, the mourner brings discomfort upon himself. He should compose himself and concentrate his attention on the mitzvah.
Nevertheless, Shulchan Aruch .HaRav (640:13) writes that if dwelling in a sukkah will cause a mourner more discomfort than dwelling in his home, he is allowed to choose the latter alternative.

Because he is involved in the mitzvah of marriage.

In Hilchot Zechiyah Umatanah, Chapter 7, the Rambam described the custom of שושבינות (attending a groom).

They are absolved of the mitzvah only while they are involved in the mitzvah of celebrating together with the bride and groom, however, when they leave, they are obligated. Furthermore, there are many authorities who require that the meals served the groom and his attendants be served in a sukkah. (See Mishnah Berurah 640:33.)

It must be emphasized that the wedding must have taken place during the four days between Yom Kippur and Sukkot. Weddings are not held during the Ten Days of Repentance, nor on Chol Hamo’ed.

e.g., to study Torah, to gree a Sage under whom one studied Torah, or to redeem captives (Rashi, Sukkah 25a).

Rashi (Sukkah 25a, 26a) states that this applies even when they are lodging overnight. Since, at night they are also involved with thinking about how to fulfill the mitzvah, they are still considered as occupied with the perforrnance of a mitzvah and are not required to seek out a sukkah. An example of this principle quoted by the Talmud supports this interpretation:
When Rav Chisda and Rabbah bar Rav Huna would attend [the lecture delivered] at the home of the exilarch on the
Sabbath of the festival, they would sleep along the river banks of Sura. They explained: “We are emissaries involved in
a mitzvah” (Sukkah 26a).
Though these Sages were visiting a city which served as a center of Jewish life and surely could have found a sukkah to lodge in, they did not see the necessity for doing so. (See also Sukkah 10b.)
Nevertheless, Tosafot, Sukkah 10b, interprets the passage differently and explains that leniency is granted these emissaries only when dwelling in the sukkah would in some way prevent them from carrying out the mitzvah which they set out to perform. If it is possible to do both—perform the mitzvah they set out to do and fulfill the mitzvah of sukkah—one must endeavor to do so.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam shares Rashi’s view. However, the final halachic position followed by most Ashkenazic authorities is closer to Tosafot’s position: i.e., these emissaries are not obligated to trouble themselves to find a sukkah. However, if there is a ~ukkah available, they should make use of it. Nevertheless, if sleeping in the sukkah would prevent them from getting proper rest, and thus hold them back from fulfilling their mitzvah in a proper manner, they are not required to sleep in a sukkah (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 640:18; Mishnah Berurah 640:38).
(Abstractly, it is possible to differentiate between the two positions as follows. According to Rashi, there is no obligation of sukkah incumbent on this person whatsoever. In contrast, Tosafot would maintain that the person is obligated to perform the mitzvah. However, at all times he is bound by another commitment which takes precedence.)

i.e., while they are,traveling. Tosafot, Sukkah 26a explains that this concept is derived from the principle: תשבו כעין תדורו—i.e., dwelling in the sukkah is comparable to living in one’s own home. Since a person will occasionally leave his home on a journey, he is also entitled to leave his sukkah.

if they lodge in a settled place (Tosafot, ibid.).

i.e., while traveling

if they lodge in a settled area.

when they are on duty.

when they are replaced by their colleagues. Conversely, ...

who spend their entire day guarding the produce (Rashi, Sukkah 26a)

Sukkah, ibid., explains that based on this principle, the leniency is granted only to watchmen charged with guarding an entire orchard or farm. However, if a watchman is charged with guarding produce which is collected in one place, he is capable of fulfilling the mitzvah and discharging his duty. Hence, he is obligated to construct a sukkah there.

performing all the activities mentioned in this halachah and Halachot 6-9.

These statements and the Rambam’s introduction to these halachot imply that each moment a person dwells in the sukkah throughout the seven days of the festival, he fulfills a mitzvah. (Accordingly, a blessing is recited whenever one makes use of the sukkah [Halachah 12]. See Halachah 7.)

Sukkah 43a derives this concept by drawing an analogy הרזג( )חוש to the seven days of preparation for the dedication of the Sanctuary. Thus, just as the priests were required to stay in the Sanctuary for seven days—day and night—similarly, the mitzvah of sukkah must be observed in the same manner.

following the principle of תשבו כעין תדורו mentioned above.

This statement is a quote from the Mishnah, Sukkah 2:8. In his commentary on that Mishnah, the Rambam defines קבע as “of primary importance and a constant practice.”

Doing so is a sign of honor and respect for the mitzvah.

Obviously, during the meal one’s plates must be in the sukkah. The Rambam’s intent is that after the meal there is no necessity to keep one’s plates in the sukkah, because they are not attractive and are generally stored in pantries outside the home. In contrast, it is customary in many communities not to bring pots into the sukkah, even while eating (Mishnah Berurah 639:5). [Needless to say, plates that must be washed must be removed from the sukkah.]
The printed (as opposed to certain manuscripts) text of Rashi (Sukkah 29a) also shares the Rambam’s interpretation. Tosafot explains the passage slightly differently, rendering “utensils used for food” as “utensils used in the preparation of food”—i.e., pots and pans.

i.e., the source of light

even when it is not burning, since it is attractive.

Lest it cause a fire.

I.e., a meal of bread or food prepared from the five species of grain.

The B’nei Binyamin explains that this expression includes the Sabbath and festivals, thus excluding the opinions which maintain that any meal of bread eaten on the Sabbath or festivals is significant and cannot be considered ‘as a snack. See the commentary of Rabbi Akiva Eiger.

even of bread, .outside the sukkah.
Sukkah 26a defines “a snack” as “what the students will eat before they enter the study sessions.” ln his commentary on the Mishnah, Sukkah 2:4, the Rambam explains it as “a small amount, [eaten] without considering it as a meal, in order to satisfy one’s hunger [temporarily], until one can complete eating afterwards.”
Rabbenu Manoach explains that though there is no prohibition involved, it is not desirable to eat even a snack of bread outside the sukkah.

Approximately 56 cubic centimeters according to Shiurei Torah and, in this instance, 41 cubic centimeters according to the Chazon Ish.

The Mishnah (ibid.) relates that less than a k’beitzah of bread was brought once to Rabbi Tzadok and he ate it outside the sukkah.

The Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 639:2) restricts the leniency to a k’beitzah (approximately 56 cubic centimeters according to Shiurei Torah and, in this instance, 41 cubic centimeters according to the Chazon Ish) alone (See Tosafot, Yoma 79a.) The same principles are also applied to cooked foods made from the five species of grain.

In contrast to eating, where there is a difference between a fixed meal and a snack, no such difference exists regarding sleep. At times, even a rest of a few moments can have a major effect on a person. (See Sukkah 26a; Jerusalem Talmud, Sukkah 2:5.)
At present, there are many communities where leniency is taken in this regard. In some climates, the cold will cause everyone to consider sleeping in the sukkah as uncomfortable and, hence; they are freed of that obligation. Furthermore, in many communities, there is also a danger involved. In addition, if a husband would sleep in a sukkah, he would deprive his wife of some of the happiness and satisfaction that should accompany a festival. (See Ramah, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 639:2.)
Nevertheless, many authorities explain that these leniencies apply only at night, but during the day one is obligated to sleep in the sukkah.

or any other beverage, including wine (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 639:2), outside the sukkah.. There is a difference of opinion among the later halachic authorities if this decision also applies when one sits down to a party centering on drinking wint: עבוק(. ומצע )תותשל Some (the Bach and Shulchan Aruch HaRav 639:12) require that such drinking be carried out in a sukkah. However, others (the Vilna Gaon and the Mishnah Berurah 639:13) are more lenient.

for these do not constitute a significant meal.
Sukkah 27a relates that Rabbi Elazar ben Shamu’a ate dates and grapes outside the sukkah, because “fruit does not require a sukkah.”
Rabbenu Manoach and some other commentaries maintain that this leniency applies only to fruit. In contrast, meat, fish, cheese, and other substantial foods which form the basis of a meal must be eaten in a sukkah. While many later halachic authorities do not accept this view, some maintain that one should not sit down with company to a meal of such foods outside a sukkah. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 639: 11; Mishnah Berurah 639:15.)

To exemplify this principle, the Mishnah (ibid.) quotes the following:
Once they brought a cooked dish for Rabban Yochanan ben
Zakkai to taste, and two dates and a pitcher of water for
Rabban Gamliel. They said: “Take them up to the sukkah.”
Sukkah 26b explains that often our Sages counselled against accepting extra stringencies upon oneself, lest one take pride in one’s piety. However, in this instance they make no such reservations.

Sukkah 27a draws an analogy between the first night of Sukkot and the first night of Pesach. Just as eating a k’zayit of matzah on the fifteenth of Nisan is a mitzvah, so too, each Jewish male is required to eat in the sukkah on the fifteenth of Tishre.

28 cubic centimeters according to Shiurei Torah, and 48 cubic centimeters according to the Chazon Ish. This is the minimum amount required by the Torah in all mitzvot that involve eating.

The difference in the requirement between the first night and the remaining days has other ramifications. As mentioned in Halachah 2, a person who is uncomfortable in the sukkah is freed from his obligation. However, this leniency applies only on the first night after the mitzvah of eating a k’zayit has been fulfilled (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 639:3).

including bread, or according to some authorities, other hearty foods, as mentioned above

which may be eaten ...

The Lechem Yehudah explains that the Rambam is speaking only from the perspective of the mitzvah of sukkah. However, one is obligated to eat three meals on the Sabbath as an expression of the mitzvah of honoring the Sabbath and taking pleasure in its celebration. (See Hilchot Shabbat 30:9.) Similarly, · one is required to eat festive meals on the first day of Sukkot in honor of the holiday. These meals must be eaten in the sukkah.

The Rambam’s intent is that, as explained in Hilchot Chametz U’matzah 6:1, after the first night of the festival a person is not obligated to eat matzah and may subsist on other foods. Similarly, on Sukkot, one may eat foods that do not require consumption within a sukkah.

The Mishnah (Sukkah 2:6) records a difference of opinion on this matter between the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel. In this instance, the halachah follows the School of Shammai.

The Mishnah (ibid.) continues:
An incident occurred when the elders of the School of Shammai and the elders of the School of Hillel went to
visit Rabbi Yochanan ben Hachoroni and found him sitting with his head and the majority of his body in the
sukkah while his table was in his house ...
The elders of the School of Shammai told him: “If this has been your practice, you have never fulfilled the
mitzvah of sukkah.”
Rabbenu Nissim questions how the Sages’ decree can negate the fulfillment of a mitzvah, and thus explains the last phrase to mean: “You have never fulfilled the mitzvah as desired by our Sages.” However, Tosafot, Sukkah 3a explains that the Sages’ decree is powerful enough to nullify the person’s actions entirely, and it is considered as if he never fulfilled the mitzvah at all.

i.e., a sukkah larger than seven handbreadths by seven handbreadths. There are Geonim who explain that the halachah follows the School of Shammai only in a small sukkah. In a large sukkah, the School of Hillel’s opinion is accepted, and permission is granted to eat in this fashion. Nevertheless, based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Sukkah 2:8), it appears there is no difference between the two. Accordingly, the Rambam and Rav Yitzchak Alfasi adopt the more stringent position in both cases. The. Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 634:4) accepts this view.

Since the person must regard his sukkah as his home throughout the festival, in addition to eating and sleeping, he must perform all his other day-to-day functions inside of it. Hence, he should also read in the sukkah.

Sukkah explains that any time it is necessary to study a concept in depth, one should do so outside the sukkah...

while he studies. The Magen Avraham 639:13 adds a further reason to study at home: the difficulty in bringing one’s texts back and forth from the sukkah. The Magen Avraham explains that this matter also depends on the individual person. If he is as comfortable studying in the sukkah as studying at home, he is obligated to do so.

At a time when he is unable to pray in the synagogue (Magen Avraham 639:14).

depending on where he will be able to concentrate more.

The descent of rain on Sukkot implies that our actions are not desired by God. The Mishnah (Sukkah 2:8) compares the matter to a servant who came to serve his master drink and the latter poured the pitcher in his face.
Tzafenat Paneach explains that there is a fundamental difference between this law and the case of a person who is uncomfortable while in the sukkah. In the latter instance, in essence, the person is obligated to fulfill the mitzvah. However, because of his discomfort, his obligation is temporarily waived. In contrast, when rain descends it is impossible to fulfill the mitzvah at all, because the sukkah is not fit to dwell in. Hence, there is no obligation whatsoever.
There is a practical difference between these two abstract positions regarding the question whether a person is obligated to eat in the sukkah on the first night of the holiday even when it rains. (See the commentary on Halachah 7.) According to the Tzafenat Paneach, under these circumstances there is no mitzvah which one is required to fulfill. Thus, one may eat at home. In contrast, most authorities do not differentiate between rain and other uncomfortable situations. Thus, since eating in the sukkah on that night is a binding obligation, they require a person to fulfill the mitzvah.
There is a further aspect to this concept. The Maharil explains that a person who eats in a sukkah when he is not obligated to do so is a simple person and receives no reward for his “piety.” On this basis, in many communities, people make no effort to stay in the sukkah when it rains. In contrast, there are some communities where people will continue to eat in the sukkah despite pouring rain.
What is the difference between these two approaches? The first approach follows the perspective that, during the rain, there is no mitzvah to dwell in the sukkah whatsoever. Hence, there is no need to strain oneself to remain there. In contrast, the second perspective does not differentiate between rain and any other uncomfortable circumstances, but maintains that, in essence, dwelling in the sukkah is a mitzvah even under such circumstances. Accordingly, they remain in the sukkah, because while they are involved in fulfilling God’s will they do not feel even the slightest trace of discomfort.

The Maharil writes that when a person is forced to Ieave the sukkah because of rain, he should depart with humility rather than with anger.

We need not wait until the food actually spoils. As soon as enough rain descends to spoil the food, one is free to enter one’s home (Ramah, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 639:5).

i.e., a dish made from bean meal, which spoils quickly (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, Sukkah 2:8).

to finish his meal ...

This phrase is set off by brackets because it is most likely a printing error. It is not easily understood, nor is it found in the manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah or in the quotation of this halachah in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 639:6).

However, after he concludes eating he must return to the sukkah.

The Ramah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 639:7) emphasizes that even the slightest amount of rain is sufficient to free one from the obligation of sleeping in the sukkah.

The same law applies if it was raining when he desired to go to sleep, and hence, he never slept in the sukkah at all (Mishnah Berurah 639:39).

even if he wakes up in the middle of the night and it is no longer raining, he is not required to move to the sukkah.

The Maggid Mishneh and Rabbenu Manoach note that the Rambam’s choice of phraseology implies that the person cannot sleep his normal measure, but must rise at dawn to return to the sukkah. They are not stringent and allow the person to remain sleeping at home until he wakes up. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 639:7) quotes the Rambam’s statements verbatim. However, the Ramah includes this leniency.

lest he require it later during the day.

Keeping one’s utensils in the sukkah is included in the mitzvah of dwelling within it, as mentioned in Halachah 5. Nevertheless, one is allowed to take them home to prepare them for use on Shemini Atzeret as a sign of deference to that holiday. (See Sukkah 4:7.)

i.e., if he used his home as a sukkah, and thus must continue to remain there on Shemini Atzeret (see Sukkah 48a) ...

by opening up [a portion of s’chach]

To make the sukkah, or at least a significant portion of it, unfit for use. This safeguards against the violation of the command of בַּל תּוֹסִיף (Deuteronomy 13:1), which forbids adding to the mitzvot of the Torah. The Ramah adds that this requirement applies only when one desires to eat in the sukkah on Shemini Atzeret in Eretz Yisrael. Once that holiday passes, one may eat in a sukkah without making any changes.

even if he has removed his utensils or taken away part of the s’chach...

Note the commentary on Halachah 7, which explains the difference between this law and the rules governing the blessing recited before eating matzah.

The Rambam maintains that by sitting or doing any other activity which one would perform in one’s home in the sukkah, one fulfills the mitzvah. Hence, the blessing is recited before one performs the mitzvah, as required by Hilchot Berachot 1 l :2.
The Maggid Mishneh questions why the blessing is not recited before one enters the sukkah, noting that the interpretation of the command בשיל הנדסב is “to dwell in the sukkah,” not “to sit in the sukkah.” However, the Taz 643:2 explains that merely passing through the sukkah is not part of the mitzvah. Rather, one must perform an activity that reflects “dwelling.” Hence, the blessing is not recited until one sits down, because previously it is not obvious that one wants to perform a significant activity in the sukkah.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s decision, maintaining that one should recite the blessing only before partaking of a meal in the sukkah. This reflects the decision of the Ashkenazic authorities, who maintain that though the .performance of all one’s activities in the sukkah is a mitzvah, it is not customary to recite the blessing except when eating. When reciting the blessing on tbat occasion, one should intend to include all other activities. (See Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 639:8.)

The Maggid Mishneh states that there is no limit to the number of times one recites the blessing each day. Nevertheless, if one left the sukkah for a brief interval or left with the intent of performing an activity which would improve the sukkah, that departure is not considered an interruption and no blessing is required upon orte’s return.

i.e. shehecheyanu

as did Rav Kahana (Sukkah 46a).

for the festival

The Ramah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 643:2) states that kiddush may be recited while sitting.

Though one might presume that shehecheyanu would be recited first, since it is more frequent, precedence is given to leishev basukkah, because it is “the mitzvah of the day” (Rabbenu Manoach).

On the second night, it is Ashkenazic custom to recite to the blessing shehecheyanu before the blessing leishev basukkah, since on that occasion the blessing is associated with the celebration of the festival and not the mitzvah of sukkah. (See Bnei Binyamin.)

Rav Kapach notes that most of the manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah state רבי “the great men of’ and not רבני, “the Rabbis of.”

The Ra’avad objects and comments that even in Spain such a custom was not followed.

in the Diaspora and in certain places in Eretz Yisrael (Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh, Chapter 9)

because originally, the messengers sent by the Sanhedrin could not reach there in time to notify them when the holiday should be celebrated. Hence, even now, when we follow the fixed calendar, we continue to follow this custom. (See Hilchot Kiddush Hachodesh, Chapters 3 and 5.)

In deference to the possibility· that the festival could have begun on the second day and the seven days should be counted from then.
The commandment לב ףיםות (Deuteronomy 13:1) forbids adding to the mitzvot ofthe Torah. Indeed, in Halachot 11 and 14, we find certain safeguards instituted because of this commandment. Nevertheless, dwelling in the sukkah on the eighth day does not constitute a violation of this commandment, because the time when the mitzvah is to be performed has already passed. Placing a fifth passage in one’s tefillin during the day violates this commandment, because we are obligated to perform the mitzvah at this time. However, once the seven days of Sukkot pass, there is no mitzvah associated with the sukkah whatsoever (Rosh Hashanah 28b ).
Nevertheless, many Ashkenazic authorities would carry out additional safeguards regarding this matter. For example, the Tur relates (though he opposes this practice himself) that some follow the custom of eating in the Sukkah only on the day of Shemini Atzeret, but not the night. Many of the Rabbis who would sleep in the Sukkah throughout the festival refrain from doing so on Shemini Atzeret. (See K’tav Sofer, Responsum 120.)

As its name implies, Shemini Atzeret is the eighth day of Sukkot. However, it also has certain aspects in which it is considered a holiday in its own right (Sukkah 48a).

because as the Rambam explains, a blessing is not recited when a mitzvah is performed only because of a doubt.
Sukkah 47a relates that “Rav Huna bar Bizna and all the great Sages of the generation dwelled in a sukkah on the eighth day—which might have been the seventh day—[ of the festival], but did not recite a blessing.”

See Chapter 2, Halachah 1 for a definition of these terms and these individuals’ status.

i.e., they are required to perform the mitzvah because of the doubt concerning their status: maybe they are to be considered men.

This follows the rationale that when there is a doubt concerning one’s obligation in matters required by the Torah itself, one must follow the more stringent view. However, regarding obligations of a Rabbinic nature, one may opt towards leniency. Since the mitzvah is required by the Torah, even a person in doubt must perform it. However, the blessing is a Rabbinic requirement; hence, there is no necessity in reciting it. Furthermore, by reciting the blessing when one is not required, one uses God’s name in vain.
This perspective is not accepted by all authorities. As explained in the commentary on Chapter 2, Halachah 1, the Ashkenazic practice is to allow women and others who are not obligated in the performance of a mitzvah to recite a blessing when fulfilling it.
The above applies only regarding the doubts concerning the obligations of a tumtum and an androgynous. However, on Shemini Atzeret, when there is a doubt concerning the obligation of the entire Jewish people even the Ashkenazic authorities would agree that a blessing should not be recited.

This halachah, like the previous one, describes the law in the Diaspora, where the holidays are celebrated for two days.

from the sukkah and bring them home, where he will eat on Simchat Torah

desires to continue eating in the sukkah on Simchat Torah,

Safeguards adopted to differentiate between eating in the sukkah as required, and eating there afterwards.

As mentioned in Halachah 5, a candelabra should not be brought into a small sukkah for Sukkot.
It must be noted that thc: Rambam changes the text of Sukkah 48a, which states: “light his lamp there.” (See Kessef Mishneh, Halachah 5.)

which are generally kept outside the sukkah, as explained in Halachah 5.

the sukkah

As suggested in Halachah 11.

Sukkah 27b explains that not only a person whose sukkah fell down in the middle of the festival should reconstruct it, but even one who never built a sukkah at all is entitled to do so.

The literal translation of Deuteronomy 16:13 is: “Make the Sukkot festival for seven days.” Sukkah 27b interprets this verse to mean that a sukkah may be built during the seven days of the festival.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Sukkah 2:7) explains that Rabbi Eleazar wanted to forbid a person who purposely did not build a sukkah from doing so during the festival, as a punishment for his failure to prepare for the festival. However, the Sages did not accept that premise.
A sukkah may not be constructed on the first day of the festival, even if the walls are already built and all that is necessary is to spread s’chach over it. However, even though certain types of work are forbidden on Chol Hamo’ed, there is no prohibition in this instance (Bi’ur Halachah 637).

See Halachah 11.

e.g., for use as a toothpick. This prohibition applies even in the event the sukkah falls. Also, in contrast to the decorations, as mentioned in the following halachah, this prohibition cannot be nullified by making a condition that one desires to use them for one’s own purposes (Ramah, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 638: 1).

Sukkah 9a derives the prohibition against using the wood of the sukkah for other purposes throughout Sukkot from Leviticus 23:34: “The Sukkot festival shall be seven days unto God.” The latter term is used also regarding the Chaggigah offering sacrificed on the festival. Thus, its use in this context implies that the entities which enable us to celebrate the Sukkot festival must be consecrated “unto God” like those sacrifices.
The reason why the wood of the sukkah may not be used on the eighth day is explained below.

Rabbenu Asher differs and explains that the essential element of the sukkah is its s’chach. Hence, the prohibition applies only to the s’chach and not to the sukkah walls. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 638:1) quotes the Rambam’s opinion. However, the Taz (638:1) explains that the prohibition against using the walls is only Rabbinic in nature.
Rav Chayim Soloveitchik explains that though the word sukkah as used by the Torah refers to the s’chach and not to the walls, a different principle is involved in this instance. The Torah teaches us that all the entities which enable us to fulfill the mitzvah of sukkah may not be used for other purposes. Since the sukkah walls also serve that purpose, because a sukkah is not kosher without walls, they are also included in that prohibition.

Note the contrast to the etrog in Chapter 7, Halachah 27.

However, if the sukkah falls, it may be rebuilt using the same wood. Furthermore, the wood used for s’chach may be used for the walls and vice versa.

Muktzeh literally means “set aside.” In this context, it refers to objects which may not be used for mundane purposes.

Beyn hash’mashot is the period between sunset and the emergence of three stars.

Hilchot Shabbat 25:10 states: “Any utensil which is, forbidden to be moved during beyn hash’mashot is forbidden to be moved throughout the entire Sabbath, even after the factor that caused its prohibition has passed.”

even if they fall (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 638:2). As mentioned in the commentary on Halachot 17 and 18, the sukkah decorations are not considered an independent entity, but rather as part of the sukkah itself. Furthermore, employing articles used to decorate a mitzvah for other purposes demonstrates lack of respect for the mitzvah (Rabbenu Nissim, Beitzah). Hence, the same restrictions that apply to the sukkah apply to it.

as is the sukkah itself.

Rabbenu Manoach questions what the law would be if the condition were made after the decorations were hung but before the holiday commences.

Everything depends on the status of the decorations at the time the festival begins. If they are not considered part of the sukkah at that time, the “sanctity of the sukkah” does not affect them throughout the festival (Sukkah 10b).

In contrast to the walls or s’chach, in this instance the condition has an effect. It is possible for a sukkah to exist without decorations, but not without walls (Rabbenu Manoach).

The Tzafenat Paneach questions whether or not the tree from which the lulav is taken must actually produce dates.

Thus, if the leaves spread out and were later bound together by human activity, it is not acceptable (Ramah, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 645:2).

Periodically, the date palm sprouts forth new branches. Initially they are closed, and as time passes they spread out to a fanlike shape. The Torah requires that they be used for the lulav while they are still in their initial state.
This obligation is derived from the fact that the Torah spells the word כפת, without a ו, implying that the date branch should appear to be a single entity (Sukkah 32a).
There is a homiletic aspect to using the lulav while its leaves are closed. Vayikra Rabbah 30: 12 emphasizes how the mitzvah of lulav and etrog expresses the unity and oneness which pervade the Jewish people. Not only is this unity expressed by the combination of the four species into a single mitzvah, it is reflected in each of the species themselves. Thus, the lulav is used while its leaves are together as one, before they separate into distinct entities.

Here, too, our Sages have emphasized the homiletic lesson to be derived from this shape. Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur are days of judgement. The lulav can be considered as the Jews’ scepter of victory, acknowledging that they have prevailed (Medrash Tanchumah, Emor).

Sukkah 35a explains that this term is used to refer to the etrog its unique quality that the taste of the tree itself resembles the taste of the fruit. Alternatively, the word הָדָר can be interpreted to mean “which dwells,” and thus refer to the etrog, which can grow on the tree for an entire year and longer.

Leviticus, ibid.

thus, covering the branch

on the same level.
Our translation follows the interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh, who requires that the three leaves be on the same level over the entire length of the myrtle. However, other opinions interpret the Rambam’s words to mean that a myrtle may be used if the leaves of merely one ring are on the same level. The Kessef Mishneh (and similarly, the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 646:5) maintain that a myrtle is kosher if the leaves grow properly over three handbreadths (its minimum size), or at least the majority of that distance.

but rather from a different species of tree. Hence, it can never be used in the lulav ( Or Sameach ).

since its leaves do not grow in the normal pattern.

Leviticus, ibid.

That species is defined as follows:

I.e., it comes to a point, rather than being rounded (Sukkah 33b).

rather than jagged (Sukkah ibid.).

However, the use of that name is not meant to be exclusive ...

for the fulfillment of this mitzvah.

i.e., its edge.is very jagged, with large protrusions

but white (Sukkah 34a).

for it is not considered to be merely a different type of willow, but rather another species entirely.

is also extended

The Mishnah Berurah 647:6 mentions that willows are frequently picked by young children who are not learned and may mistake a non-kosher species for a kosher one. Hence, the purchaser should carefully examine the willows before purchasing them.

Indeed, in his introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam uses the definitions of the four species as examples of how the oral tradition is explained in the Talmud:
The explanations which we have received from Moses are not cont’ested at all. Throughout all the ages, from Moses’ time until the present, we have not heard of a dispute started by a Sage whether ... the expression “a fruit from a beautiful tree” refers to the etrog. Nor have we heard of a dispute that the “covered tree” refers to the myrtle ...
Concerning these and the like, it has been said: “The entire Torah, [both the mitzvot] in general, and all their particulars were given to Moses on Mount Sinai.” Though the tradition was received and there is no dispute about it, one can also derive these definitions through the accepted processes of exegesis.
Thus, when the Talmud debates and discusses a concept and offers a suggestion ... that perhaps, “the fruit of the beautiful tree” is a pomegranate ... [and does not resolve the matter] until they bring proof from the exegesis of the verse ... , one should notconclude that the matter was left in doubt until this point of exegesis was discovered.
Rather, from the time of Joshua onward, we saw that the etrog was the species taken with the lulav and there is no debate about that. They were merely investigating how they could find support from the Torah for the interpretation that had been transmitted.

In contrast to putting on the head tefillin and the arm tefillin, which are considered to be two mitzvot. Here, taking all four species is considered to be a single mitzvah ...

therefore, ...

of the species ...

and only then is the mitzvah performed. Nevertheless, as explained in Halachah 6, the species need not be bound together; it is sufficient to take them one after the other.
This statement is taken from the Mishnah, Menachot 3:6, which includes the four species of the lulav in a long list of mitzvot in which all the particular elements that make up the mitzvah are required for its performance to be acceptable.

Since the lulav is the tallest of all the species, the entire mitzvah is referred to by this name (Sukkah 37b ).

doing so violates the commandment בל תגרע (Deuteronomy 13:1), which forbids diminishing the Torah’s commandments.

doing so violates the commandment בל תוסיף (Deuteronomy 13:1), which forbids adding to the Torah’s commandments.

e.g., a tzaftzefah for the willow, or a lemon for the etrog

Rather, the mitzvah cannot be fulfilled at all. Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 651: 12) recommends taking the species that are available, as a remembrance of the mitzvah. However, in such circumstances, a blessing should not be recited.

Sukkah 11 b explains that binding the three species together is considered more attractive than taking them each individually. Thus, taking the species in this manner conforms to the general directive requiring us to perform the mitzvot in the most esthetically appealing manner possible.
Sukkah 34b mentions an exegetic teaching that explains why the etrog is not bound together with the other species.

for the blessings should always be recited before the performance of the mitzvot.

Our translation follows the commentary of the Kessef Mishneh, who notes that in Hilchot Berachot 11:15, the Rambam states that if one recites the blessing before taking the lulav in his hand, he should conclude the blessing ... v’tzivanu litol lulav. The blessing should be concluded ... v’tzivanu al netilal lulav only if one has already taken the lulav in his hands.

As mentioned in the previous halachah and commentary, since the lulav is the tallest of all the species, its name is used to refer to the entire mitzvah.

Since three of the four species are bound together, they are held in the hand which the Torah considers of greater prominence (Sukkah 37b).

Sukkah 45b derives this concept from Exodus 26:15, which states: “upright beams of acacia wood.” Implied is that all mitzvot fulfilled with agricultural products must be performed while they are in an upright position. (See also Halachah 9.)

Even though the etrog hangs from the tree with the pitam downwards, its “upright” position is when the pitam faces upward (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 651:12).

Sukkah 11 b states that it is a mitzvah סt bind the three species together, but one may fulfill the mitzvah even when one has not done so
This law is accepted as halachah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 651:12). The preference of the Rabbis for binding the species together is so great that if one has not bound them together before the beginning of the festival, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 651:1) recommends binding them together with a loop on the holiday rather than taking each one individually.

as explained in the previous halachah.

Sukkah 34b derives this concept from the fact that Leviticus 23:40 writes כפת without a ו, implying a single entity, as mentioned in the commentary no Halachah 1.

because the above verse mentions “a fruit (singular) from the beautiful tree” (Sukkah, ibid.).

because the above verse states “willows of the brook,” using the plural, and thus two are required (ibid.)

The above verse uses three words ףנע, ץע תרכע each word implying the addition of another branch (Rashi, Sukkah, ibid. ).

Some editions of the Mishneh Torah also add “and willow.” However, most of the manuscripts and texts of the Mishneh Torah omit that phrase. Furthermore, in one of his- responsa, the Rambam states that since the Talmud mentions adding only myrtles, it is improper to add any of the other species.

The latter statement can be understood to be an explanation of the former. In contrast to the other species, the myrtle is considered an adornment of the mitzvah. Since the extra myrtle branches are viewed as adornments, they are not considered to be an intervening substance separating the person from the mitzvah (See the commentary on Halachah 11.) Nor is including them considered to be adding to the mitzvah (and thus, a violation of לב(. ףיםרת (See also Rabbenu Nissim and the Rashba, Vol. 1, Responsum 535.)
There are some authorities who allow additional myrtle branches to be included even though they do not meet the requirement of having all three leaves on the same level However, others do not accept this leniency (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 651:15).

because they are not considered to be “adornments”.

The Ra’avad objects to this statement, arguing that the adding to the numbers of the other species does not nullify the performance of the mitzvah. Rav Avraham, the Rambam’s son, writes that, based on Sanhedrin 88b, the Rambam amended his own manuscript copy of the Mishneh Torah to state “it does not nullify it” (Birkat Avraham 31).

The Mishnah Berurah 650:8 states that if the species are smaller than the minimum limits established, they may not be used throughout the festival. Though certain leniencies are granted after the first day, they do not apply regarding this matter.

A handbreadth is 8 centimeters according to Shiurei Torah (32 centimeters total), and 9.6 centimeters according to the Chazon Ish (38.4 centimeters total).

Menachot 42a states that a lulav has a minimum length, but no maximum length.

I.e., what is measured is its center stem from its base until the portion which separates into two twin leaves that cling to each other.

i.e., its full length.

24 centimeters according to Shiurei Torah, and 28.8 according to Chazon Ish.

The latter principle is derived from the laws of the lulav.

Sukkah 33a states:
If most of [the myrtle’s] leaves dried out, but three fresh leaves remain, it is kosher.
Rav Chisda said: “Provided they are at the top of each branch.”
The Rambam maintains that the same principles can also be applied to the willow.
[Note the commentary on Halachah 8:5, which mentions certain relevant principles. Indeed, in general, this clause appears to be more closely related to the principles mentioned in the following chapter, where the Rambam mentions the characteristics that disqualify the various species, rather than in this chapter, where he relates the fundamental requirements of each one. Based on Sukkah 34a, which relates that myrtles which are not dry (a factor still common in maily Diaspora communities today) are very difficult to find, we can interpret this as an almost parenthetical expression teaching that freshness is not among the fundamental requirements for a myrtle.]

The Rambam maintains that regardless of the length of the myrtles and the willows, the shidrah of the lulav must extend beyond them an additional handbreadth, so that it can be shaken. The Shulchan Aruch does not require adherence to the Rambam’s view. Nevertheless, it is accepted without question by Shulchan Aruch HaRav 650:2.

57.6 cubic centimeters according to Shiurei Torah; 100 cubic centimeters according to the Chazon Ish.

Sukkah 36b relates that Rabbi Akiva came to synagogue with an etrog so large he had to sling it over his shoulder. (This is not out of the question, because, as mentioned above, an etrog is capable of remaining on its tree for an entire year and can attain quite a large size.)

as described in Halachah 6.

lifting up each of the four species individually. However, a person must have all four species before him when he fulfills the mitzvah.

Although, in Halachah 6, the Rambam suggested holding the lulav together with the myrtle and willows together in his right hand and the etrog in his left, this is the most desirable way of fulfilling the mitzvah. However, even if a person does not lift up the species in this manner ...

Rabbenu Chanan’el does not accept this decision. He interprets Sukkah 42a, “If he lifted it up in an opposite manner, he did not fulfill his obligation,” as referring to such a circumstance. Nevertheless, the Rambam (and similarly, most halachic authorities, including the Ramah, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 651:3) interpret that statement as referring to lifting them up opposite to their natural pattern of growth.

See Halachah 6 and the commentary on it.

For this reason, it is customary in many communities to hold the etrog upside down before reciting the blessing, and then to turn it right side up after the blessing has been recited.

holding the etrog together with the lulav (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 651:11).
In the Beit Yosef, Rav Yosef Karo quotes the following story from the Recanti. The latter dreamed that he saw a particular pious individual writing God’s name with a space separating the last ח from the first three letters. He could not comprehend the dream at all until the next day, when he saw that individual holding his etrog separate from his lulav (Mishnah Berurah 651:21).

The Ari suggests that one should face the east and pass the lulav back and forth in the following order; first to the south; then to the north, then east, up, down, and to the west (Mishnah Berurah 651:20). Sukkah 37b relates that shaking the lulav in all directions prevents unfavorable winds.
When shaking the lulav downward, one should not turn it upside down, for this is opposite its natural pattern of growth. (See Ramah, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 651:9.)

note the following halachah for a more detailed description of these movements.

once in each direction

while the lulav is extended outward i: that particular direction.

while holding the lulav close to oneself The Ramah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 651:9) explains that passing the lula back and forth is itself considered to be shaking it. Hence, rather than shake the lula three times while it is extended, one must shake it as one extends it and brings it back and repeat that process a total of three times in each direction.

Thus, one will hav shaken the lulav a total of 36 times.

Rabbenu Manoach states that the lulav was also passe back and forth and shaken at the time the blessing is recited. This is our custom a present,

which is recited in its entirety on each day of the Sukkot festival.

Tosafot, Sukkah 37b explains the derivation of this practice as follows:
Chronicles 16:33 states: “Then all the trees of the forest will rejoice.” The following verse (ibid. 34) states “Hodu Lado-nai ... ,” and the subsequent verse: “Let them say Hoshi’eynu ....”·
The rejoicing of the trees—the shaking of the lulav—is thus associated with the verse “Hodu...” and the verse “Ana Ado-nai hoshi’ah na.”

lt is customary to repeat this verse when reciting the Hallel. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 651 :8) relates that the lulav is passed back and forth both times the verse is recited.

However, one should not delay the performance of the mitzvah unnecessarily. Indeed, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 652:2) forbids eating before fulfilling the mitzvah.

Megillah 20b derives this concept from Leviticus 23:40: “On the first day take .... “ We may infer: “the lulav is to be taken by day, and not by night.”

The Mishnah (Sukkah 3:8) relates that the inhabitants of Jerusalem would wrap their lulavim together with golden cords.

Though we are commanded to take the lulav, that does not necessarily imply actually holding the lulav in one’s hands, because ...

i.e., holding another substance in which the lulav is contained is still considered to be holding the lulav ...

Between one’s hands and the lulav.

Sukkah 42a explains that this is unbecoming to the mitzvah.

The Mishnah Berurah 651:31 states that this applies even if tlie container in which one placed the species is made of silver or gold.

i.e., a substance which does not contribute to the lulav’s attractiveness

between the various species. Taking the lulav in this manner is not acceptable. The Ramah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 651:1) notes that the myrtle branches are frequently bound together with a cord. This must be removed before using them to fulfill the mitzvah.

I.e., if the myrtle leaves fall off and collect between the lulav and the myrtle branches.

This principle applies in many different contexts. (See also Hilchot P’sulei Hamukdashin 1:21 and Hilchot Ma’aseh Hakorbanot 19:5.)

i.e., using substances other than the three species used in the lulav

the substance used to bind it is not considered to be significant. Therefore, using a different substance is not considered as adding a new entity to the mitzvah. However, if the binding were required, as one opinion (Sukkah 6b) maintains, it would be forbidden to use a different substance.

i.e., even outside Jerusalem

i.e., whether or not the Temple is standing

See Halachah 16. See also the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Sukkah 4:2).

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sukkah 3:10), the Rambam states that the term שדקם refers to Jerusalem in its totality, not only the Temple Mount. Thus, the Jerusalem Talmud (Sukkah 3:11) states:
“And you shall rejoice before God, your Lord, seven days”—in Jerusalem.
(See also the commentary on Halachah 2:8.)

neither in Jerusalem (where taking the lulav is a mitzvah according to the Torah) nor outside the holy city (where taking the lulav is a Rabbinic decree, as stated in Halachah 15).

instituted by the Rabbis (Sukkah 43a)

See Chapter 2, Halachah 6.

Taking the lulav on the first day was obviously a matter of great importance. Hence, the Sages did not feel that the fear that perhaps a person might carry the lulav in the public domain was sufficient reason to nullify the mitzvah. In contrast, on the subsequent days the mitzvah is not considered to be so severe a matter. Hence, the mitzvah could be nullified in Jerusalem as well.
The Rabbis question why the Sages differentiated between the lulav and the shofar, and (as explained in Halachah 2:6), nullified the mitzvah of hearing the shofar when Rosh Hashanah fell on the Sabbath. As explained in our commentary on that halachah, in Rabbenu Nissim’s commentary on the tractate of Sukkah, he states that this decree was instituted only because in most Jewish communities, the people were not aware of the date the court had established for Rosh Hashanah. (Note the details of the explanation there.)

Thus, while the Temple was standing, the lulav would not be taken outside Jerusalem during the subsequent days of the festival.

Sukkah 41a explains the source for the establishment of remembrances for the Temple practices:
[Jeremiah 30:17] states: ‘”1 will restore health to you. l will heal you of your wounds,” says God. ‘Because they called you an outcast. Zion, for whom no one cares. “’
The verse states “for whom no one cares,” implying that a show of our care is required.
On this basis, Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai established a number of practices in remembrance of the Temple practices.

but only once a day (Ramah, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 651:5).

As mentioned in the commentary on Halachah 6, the Rambam explains in Hilchot Berachot 11: 15 that it is preferable to conclude the blessing, litol lulav. The Kessef Mishneh maintains that the Rambam’s present statement is only a reference to his previous one, and not a reversal of his opinion. Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 651:5) and all later authoritie’s recommend reciting al netilat lulav.

In Hilchot Berachot 11:3, the Rambam writes that a blessing should be recited before the performance of a Rabbinic commandment. It is appropriate to say v’tzivanu (and He commanded us) because the commandment to follow the Sages includes the observance of all their enactments.

The Tosefta, Rosh Hashanah 2:7, states this concept explicitly. lt is also obvious from Beitzah 5b, which explains that “when in the near future, the Temple will be rebuilt,” difficulties may arise from following Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai’s decree.

and the day when a new month began was established through the testimony of witnesses who saw the new moon.

I.e., the city of Jerusalem.

as stated above in Halachah 13.

throughout Eretz Yisrael and the Diaspora

the fifteenth of Tishre

As mentioned in Hilchot Kiddush Hachodesh, Chapter 3, after receiving testimony of the new moon, Sanhedrin would send messengers to all Jewish communities to inform them when each new month had begun. The communities which received this information before the Sukkot festival celebrated the holidays for only one day. They would be allowed to take the lulav when the first day of Sukkot fell on the Sabbath.

and were not informed of the day on which Rosh Hashanah had fallen, would celebrate two days. Therefore, they ...

whether or not the day was, in fact, Sukkot

i.e., had they known for sure that the holiday began on this day, they would have taken the lulav. However, since they were not sure of that fact, the Sages did not want to risk the possible violation of the Sabbath laws.

Even though the new moon was still sanctified according to the testimony of witnesses. (That practice continued several hundred years after the destruction of the Temple—Hilchot Kiddush Hachodesh 5:3.)

And thus knew that they were certainly obligated to perform the mitzvah.

for the reasons mentioned in Halachah 13.

The Sages did not want confusion to arise because of a difference in local custom. Accordingly, they were willing to decree that many Jews forego the performance of a mitzvah from the Torah, in order to establish uniformity throughout the Jewish people.

and the people in the distant communities could not take the lulav when the first day fell on the Sabbath because of the doubt involved

i.e., while the Temple was standing, the difference in practice between the people living in places where the date of the month was known and those where it was not known could be explained because everyone knew that the lulav was taken on the first day in the Temple. However, when the Temple was destroyed, there was no point of distiqction, and the Sages established a totally uniform practice.
The Lechem Mishneh questions why Sages did not institute the celebration of the second day of each festival in Eretz Yisrael as well. If their desire for uniformity of observance was so great, why did they not establish a single practice in this regard as well?
He explains that the Sages were more reluctant to exercise their authority when they had to establish a new practice םוק( )השעו—celebrating an additional day as a festival—than when all that was necessary was to have the people refrain from the performance of a mitzvah בש(, לעו )השעת as in the case of the lulav.
Another concept can be derived from this halachah. The Hebrew word translated as Temple—שדקם—is used by the Rambam to refer to the entire city of Jerusalem. Thus, we can infer from the statement “there is no longer a “ שדקם that this distinction is conferred on the holy city only while the Temple is standing.

See Chapter 5 of Hilchot Kiddush Hachodesh.

or in Jerusalem

when the obligation to do so is from the Torah itself.,

As mentioned regarding the celebration of the second day of a festival (Beitzah 4b; Hilchot Kiddush Hachodesh 5:5), according to Torah law this practice should not be followed. Nevertheless, as a mark of respect for established custom, the practice is continued.

in Halachah 13,

I.e., the lulav, like the shofar and the sukkah, is a positive commandment whose observance is restricted to a specific time. Accordingly, women and slaves are under no obligation. (See Halachot 2:1 and 6:1.)

according to the instructions of our Sages (Rabbenu Manoach). (See Halachot 9 and 10.)

See the note on Halachah 6: 1.

Note the specific instructions in Halachah 8:10 regarding a child’s performance of the mitzvah on the first day of the festival.

i.e., a commandment that has the status of Torah law even though there is no explicit commandment to that effect in the Torah.

There is another totally different mitzvah performed with the willow.

as described in the following halachot.
Rashi and Tosafot, (Sukkah 43b) explain that the mitzvah of the willow branch was only performed by the priests for only they were allowed to approach the Temple altar where the branches were arranged. However, from halachah 22, it appears that the Rambam does not share this opinion.
Sukkah 44a, b also mentions that outside the Temple there was a custom of established in the time of the prophets requiring the taking of the willow by all Jews. (See also Hilchot Berachot 11:16.)

even if after using for the lulav, he detaches it and takes it by itself (Sukkah 44b, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 664:6).

It is preferable to fulfill the mitzvah by using a branch with at least three fresh leaves. However, if no such branches are available, one may fulfill his obligation by using a branch with a single leaf (ibid. ).

from Motza, a small town slightly west of Jerusalem (Sukkah 45a).

From this fact, Rashi and Tosafot conclude that the willows were taken by priests only because Israelites were not allowed to approach the Temple altar.

These willow branches were eleven cubits high and were placed on the base of the altar.
Afterwards, they would be taken by the people, as stated in the following halachah.
Rabbenu Manoach maintains that the priests would take the willow branches and give them to the people because Israelites were not allowed to approach the altar, as above. However, he notes that Rav Yitzchak ibn Giat’s description of the mitzvah could be interpreted to mean that the Israelites themselves were permitted to approach the altar on this occasion.

as an expression of happiness (Tosafot, Sukkah, ibid.). The shofar was also sounded in connection with the communal sacrifices and other rites carried out in the Temple.

on the Sabbath, since the mitzvah of lulav was negated on such an occasion (Halachah 13). Indeed, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sukkah 4:3), the Rambam writes that the reason the mitzvah of taking the willow on the Sabbath was negated was so that people would not extend the leniency and take the lulav as well.

The seventh day of Sukkot falls on the Sabbath only when Rosh Hashanah is celebrated on Sunday. Since the Sages attempted to prevent the latter occurrence (Hilchot Kiddush Hachodesh 7:7)—indeed, it is impossible according to today’s fixed calendar—it was rare that the seventh day of Sukkot would fall on the Sabbath.

and the willows were taken as during the week. Though the mitzvah of lulav would not be performed on such an occasion, an exception was made regarding the willows, in order ...

Since the willows were placed near the altar by the priests, and the performance of the mitzvah was under the supervision of the court, there was no need to worry about people carrying willows in the public domain (Sukkah 43b).
ln a related context, Sukkah 43b relates that the followers of Boethus, who did not respect the Oral Law, once tried to prevent the people from following the mitzvah of the willow branches on the Sabbath. Indeed, precisely because the source for the mitzvah is the oral tradition alone, the Sages made a point of allowing it to be observed on the Sabbath at least under such circumstances (Rabbenu Manoach).
The actual performance of the mitzvah on the Sabbath is described in the following halachah.

Some commentaries explain that the golden vessels were used as an expression of respect for the mitzvah. However, the Ma’aseh Rokeach explains that, in comparison to containers made of other metals, golden ones are more beneficial in preserving the willows’ freshness.

Note the commentary on the previous halachah.

The Maggid Mishneh’s text of the Mishneh Torah reacls: “it is not explicitly [an obligation] from the Torah.” Accordingly, he and the other commentators debated whether the Rambam considers a halachah conveyed by Moses from Mt. Sinai a.s a Torah obligation or not. In Hilchot Tum’at Meit 2:10, the Rambam specifically states that a halachah conveyed by tradition has the power of Torah law.

as is the lulav (Halachah 15).

Hoshanah Rabbah.

At present, it is customary to take five.

The Zohar mentions this practice

According to Kabbalah, the custom is to hit the ground five times.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sukkah 4:3), the Rambam writes: “The willow is a halachah conveyed by Moses .... It was a custom of the prophets to take it without a blessing.”
However, in Hilchot Berachot 11:15, he writes:
Every practice which is a custom—even if it a custom of the prophets (e.g., taking the willow on the seventh day of the festival) ...—[does not require] the recitation of a blessing.
lt is possible to reconcile the two statements as follows: A blessing was never recited upon taking the willow in the Temple (though it could have been), because of the custom of the prophets mentioned in his Commentary on the Mishnah. There was never any reason to recite a blessing over taking the willow outside the Temple because it was only a custom.

in the Temple

There is a question if this practice was carried out only by the priests, or by Israelites as well.

Sukkah 43b mentions an opinion that states that the people would walk around the altar carrying the willow branch, but concludes as the Rambam does. (See also Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 664:4.)

Many manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah state “Please, God, save us” twice, repeating that verse as is our custom in the recitation of Hallel.

The Yalkut Shimoni notes that this recalls the miracle of the conquest of Jericho.

From Hilchot Tefillah 11:3, it appears that in addition to the main ark of the synagogue, there was a small movable ark that was positioned in the center of the synagogue. The present custom is to hold the Torah scrolls on the reader’s platform in the center of the synagogue. This is also mentioned in the Yalkut Shimoni: “The chazan stands as an angel of God, holding the Torah scroll in his arm.”

once, and seven times on Hoshanah Rabbah.

As an expression of the dearness with which the people regarded the mitzvah.

Even though one should not ordinarily hold any objects in one’s hands while praying, lest one’s concentration be distracted, since holding the lulav is a mitzvah dear to a Jew’s heart, it will not become a distraction.

for there is no difficulty in carrying the lulav while fulfilling those mitzvot.

We fear that a person’s involvement in his studies will prevent him from showing proper attention to the lulav, and perhaps he will drop it (Rashi, Sukkah, ibid.).

See Halachot 13 and 14. At present, it is forbidden to carry the lulav on the Sabbath (Ramah, Orach Chayim 558:2).

Though she was not required to fulfill the mitzvah herself, no prohibition was instituted against her carrying the lulav.

In order to keep the lulav and the other species fresh.

This was not considered a violation of the Sabbath laws which prevent causing any agricultural growth. However, it was forbidden to add to the water or change it on the Sabbath because of the trouble involved.

but not change it.

though there are certain restrictions against work

Indeed, it is proper to do so to keep the lulav fresh (Rabbenu Manoach).

As explained in Chapter 6, Halachah 15, with regard to the s’chach of a sukkah: after it has been set aside for use as a mitzvah, it may not be used for mundane purposes throughout the holiday.

in contrast to the etrog, mentioned in the second clause.

The prohibition appli~s even on the Sabbath, when the lulav is not taken (Mishnah Berurah 653:2).

An etrog is primarily used for eating. Thus, its being set aside for use for the mitzvah causes that function to be prohibited. However, smelling it is a secondary function that is not included in that prohibition. Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 653:1) recommends refraining from smelling the etrog, because of the doubt regarding the proper blessing to recite. The Mishnah Berurah (653:3) states that with the exception of the time when the lulav is being taken, one may smell the etrog (and recite the appropriate blessing; see Hilchot Berachot 9:1) throughout the holiday.

even if it has become unacceptable for use in performing the mitzvah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 665:1).

The Mishnah (Sukkah 4:6) relates that despite this prohibition, after the mitzvah was fulfilled on the seventh day of Sukkot the children would eat their etrogim.

ln contrast, the s’chach of the sukkah might not be used for a mundane purpose on the eighth day either (Chapter 6, Halachah 15). Rabbenu Manoach explains the difference, relating that—should one desire to eat—the sukkah must also be used beyn hash’mashot—the period between sunset and the appearance of three stars—while the lulav would not be taken during that time.

because of the previously established custom, even though there is no question regarding the dates of the holidays because of the fixed calendar we use, as explained in the commentary on Halachah 18.

The Maggid Mishneh notes the contrast between the mitzvot of lulav and of the sukkah, which, as mentioned in Chapter 6, Halachah 13, must be fulfilled on the eighth day of the festival. He differentiates between the two, noting that it is a mitzvah from the Torah to dwell in the sukkah for all seven days of the holiday. Therefore, because of the doubt, that mitzvah was also observed on the eighth day. In contrast, outside of Jerusalem there was never a mitzvah from the Torah to take the lulav for seven days. Hence, that mitzvah need not be observed on the eighth day.
The Kessef Mishneh adds a further point. It is forbidden to carry the lulav for no purpose on the eighth day, the holiday of Shemini Atzeret. No such prohibition applies regarding the use of the sukkah.

However, it is permitted on the ninth day, Simchat Torah (Shulchan Aruch, ibid.).
In contrast, at present, the use of the s’chach is forbidden on the ninth day.

The Kessef Mishneh advises amending the text to read “on the seventh day.” In either case, the intent is the same—because it was forbidden by law on the seventh day, that prohibition was observed on the eighth day as well, because of the doubt involved.

i.e., during the time when the calendar was established according to the testimony of witnesses, and word of the sanctification of the new moon could not reach the people in the outlying communities in time for the celebration of·the holiday, as mentioned in the commentary on Halachah 16.

more precisely, even on the night after it was used, for the etrog was set aside only for that day alone.

The etrog is described as ירפ ץע רדח (the fruit of the beautiful tree). Sukkah 31a explains that an analogy is established among the various species, and all of them must be “beautiful.” Fruit or branches that are dried out do not fit the latter description.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 645:5, 646:7) defines “drying out” as losing all its green and fading to a whitish color. The Ramah mentions an even more lenient opinion.

לזג—armed robbery or the like

הכננ—petty theft and the like. Though in other areas there are differences between these two categories of theft, in this context the same laws apply.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sukkah 3: 1 ), the Rambam explains that any of the species which are stolen may not be used for the mitzvah, because a sin may not serve as the medium with which a mitzvah will be performed )הרצמ האבה(. הריבעב (See also Hilchot Chametz U’matzah 6:7; Hilchot Issurei Mizbe’ach 5:7, 5:9.)
Sukkah 29b-30a mentions this reason, but also a second explanation: because, as stated in Halachah 10, on the first day of the festival a person must own the four species he uses for the mitzvah. (See the commentary on Halachah 9 for a further discussion of this matter.)

According to the first reason, the owner’s despair over the recovery of his article has no effect on the thiefs potential to use it for a mitzvah. Even according to the second opinion, the despair over recovering the article is not sufficient to allow the thief to use it, as is obvious from Hilchot Gezeilah 2:1, where the Rambam writes:
A stolen article whose form has not changed ... even though its owner has despaired of its recovery ... must be returned to its owner.
Thus, the article is not considered to belong to the thief, and he may not use it to fulfill the mitzvah. However, if the thief performed a deed which changed the appearance of the lulav or any of the other species, he is considered to have acquired it and may fulfill the mitzvah with it. Nevertheless, he should not recite a blessing before performing the mitzvah with such a lulav (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 649:1).

a tree which is worshiped as a deity. lt is also forbidden to be used for the mitzvah, on the basis of the principle that a sin may not serve as the medium with which a mitzvah will be performed הדצמ( האכה )הריכעכ (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, ibid.).

The commentaries on Sukkah 31b explain that this refers to an ashera that entered a Jew›s possession before it was nullified, or an ashera that was worshiped by a Jew. In these instances, the nullification of the ashera will not cause it to be pe ו:mitted for use; rather, it must be totally destroyed. Hence, it is considered to have no size at all, and, therefore, may not be used for the mitzvah (Maggid Mishneh). (See also the Commentary on Chapter 1, Halachah 3.)
Alternatively, since the ashera itself was worshiped, it may no longer be used for a mitzvah. A parallel can be found in Hilchot Tzitzit 1: 11, which relates that the wool of a sheep that was worshiped may not be used for tzitzit, although that wool does not become prohibited.

All the property of an apostate city must be destroyed. Therefore, any of the four species that come from such a city is considered to have no size at all, and, thus, is unacceptable for use in the mitzvah. (See also the commentary on Chapter 1, Halachah 3.)

but was not worshiped itself (Rabbenu Manoach); i.e., it grew in a garden of the temple of an idol. However, the Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 649:3) explains that it applies even when the tree itself was worshiped.

Because of its connection with idol worship, such an article is considered to be disgusting, and it is improper to fulfill the mitzvah with it (Rabbenu Manoach). However ...

provided the tree had belonged to a gentile and the latter had nullified its connection with idol worship before it came into the Jew’s possession. Alternatively, on any day ofthe festival but the first, one may take it even before its connection with idol worship was nullified. Since the possibility exists that it can be nullified, it is not ו:;onsidered to be a nonexistent entity. (See also the commentary on Chapter 1, Halachah 3.)

Sukkah 31a explains that as long as the species have some moisture left to them, they are not disqualified for use.

Sukkah 32b relates that the inhabitants of the large cities would bequeath their lulavim to their descendants as part of their estate. Obviously, the lulavim would have dried out during this time.

for only the lulav was mentioned in that passage.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that even a dried out lulav is not acceptable. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 645:5) follows the Ra’avad’s view.

These laws apply only to an etrog, because the agricultural prohibitions mentioned in this halachah apply only to fruit and not to mere branches (Rabbenu Manoach).

For the first three years of a tree’s growth, one is forbidden to benefit from its produce.

Terumah refers to the portion of produce which must be separated and given to a priest (Numbers 18:12). If the terumah becomes ritually impure, it is no longer permitted to be eaten and must be destroyed.

Produce from Eretz Yisrael from which the agricultural requirements—Terumah, Ma’aser Rishon (the first tithe), and Ma’aser Sheni (the second tithe)—have not been separated. Tevel is also unfit to be eaten, and thus, it may not be used for the mitzvah.

Produce concerning which there is doubt whether or not the tithes have been separated.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam states «he can consecrate all his property to the Temple.» In practice, there is no difference between the two.

See Hilchot Ma’aser 10:11. Since there is a possibility of his being allowed to eat the etrog, he may use it for the mitzvah (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, ibid.).

In the first, second, fourth, and fifth years of the seven-year agricultural cycle, the second tithe had to be taken to Jerusalem and eaten there in a state of ritual purity (Deuteronomy 14:22-27).
The Rambam maintains that one can use an etrog of ma’ aser sheni for the mitzvah only while in Jerusalem, since that is the only place that it is permitted to be eaten (Commentary on the Mishnah, ibid.). However, Rabbenu Nissim and others differ and allow such an etrog to be used for the mitzvah in other places as well. They maintain that though we are not allowed to benefit from ma’aser sheni outside Jerusalem, the fulfillment of mitzvot is not an act of personal benefit.

which was undesirable. From Leviticus 11:34, our Sages learned that produce does not become subject to contracting ritual impurity until it comes into contact with water. Since the lulav was generally placed in water (see Chapter 7, Halachah 25), when it was taken together with the etrog it would probably make the etrog wet, and thus cause it to become subject to contracting ritual impurity.

for there is no inherent difficulty with such an etrog.

According to the Maggid Mishneh and Rabbenu Manoach, this
refers to the center leaf that extends outward from the shidrah, and not the shidrah itself.
Rabbenu Asher and the Ra’avad explain that this refers to the majority of the lulav’s
leaves, and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 645:6) quotes their opinion. However,
the Ramah quotes the Maggid Mishneh’s statements.

because such a lulav is not “beautiful” (:רדה Jerusalem Talmud, Sukkah 3:1). All the other factors mentioned in this halachah disqualify a lulav for the same reason.

Sukkah 31b, 32a states: A lulav which is split is kosher; [but] if it is like a fork, it is not. The commentaries explain that the Talmud refers to a shape like a tuning fork, where the two ends are distant from each other. The commentaries explain that such a separation can disqualify a lulav even if the majority of leaves are not split in this manner, and hence, the principles mentioned in the following halachah would not apply.

i.e., the shidrah would be bent toward a person facing it

Sukkah (ibid.) states: If it is bent like a scythe, it is unacceptable. The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that the bend must be severe (as described by the examples given by the Talmud and the Rambam). However, a slight curve will not disqualify a lulav.

the shidrah bending away from a person facing it

and this can be considered as a ‘’beautiful” lulav (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 645:19). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 645:9) differentiates between when the shidrah bends gradually and when it is bent over to the extent that its tip points downward. In the latter case, even if it is bent backwards, the lulav is unacceptable.

Sukkah (ibid.) questions whether such a lulav is kosher or not and leaves the matter unresolved. Hence, we follow the more stringent view (Rav Yitzchak Alfasi).

i.e., the. leaves are still firm and pointed upward (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, Sukkah 3:1).

However, the most proper way ot performing the mitzvah is to use a lulav whose leaves are not separated at all (Maggid Mishneh).

even if they are bound together against the lulav. This applies only if the majority of the lulav’s leaves have opened up in this fashion (Ramah, Orach Chayim 645:2).

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam maintains that the lulav is not acceptable only if the majority of the leaves are split. However, others (Rashi, Tosafot) explain that this law refers to the middle leaf alone. If the majority of that leaf is split, the lulav is unacceptable. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 645:3) quotes the Rambam’s opinion, while the Ramah favors that of Rashi and Tosafot.

i.e., there is no difference if the lulav’s lack of a tiyomet is a natural phenomenon or is brought about through human activity; in all cases it is unacceptable.

This is the tzinei har habarzel mentioned in the Mishnah (Sukkah 3:1). Sukkah 32b relates that such lulavim grow at the entrance to Gehinnom.

Since the shidrah is not covered, this is not considered to be “beautiful” (Mishnah Berurah 645:20).

Since the myrtle branch is covered by its leaves, the fact that its top is cut off is not noticeable (Rabbenu Manoach).
Though the Mishnah (Sukkah 3:2) states that such a myrtle is unacceptable, the Talmud (Sukkah 34b) states that the halachah follows Rabbi Tarfon, whose opinion is quoted by the Rambam in this halachah.
ln his commentary on this halachah, the Ra’avad states:
For a number of years, the spirit of prophecy has been present in our chamber of study, and we have determined that [such a myrtle] is not acceptable.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 646:10) quotes the Rambam’s opinion. However, the Ramah writes that it is proper to adhere to the Ra’avad’s view if possible. However, he quotes Rabbenu Nissim, who maintains that the top of a myrtle is only considered to be “cut off’ when the top of the branch is broken. The leaves’ falling off is not considered of significance.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this refers to an Egyptian myrtle, which has seven leaves in each row. Rabbenu Manoach explains that this clause refers to the entire myrtle branch, stating that even though ‘most of its leaves have fallen off, as long as it has one full row of leaves covering the branch (at its top, as in Chapter 7, Halachah 8), it is kosher.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 646:4) quotes the Maggid Mishneh’s statements as halachah. In contrast, Rabbenu Manoach’s interpretation is not accepted. Halachah 5 (ibid.) states that the majority of the length of the myrtle branch must be covered with leaves. However, if that condition is met, the myrtle is kosher even if the leaves at its top have fallen off.

for their color is the same as the leaves of the myrtle.

since the berries are a different color from that of the leaves ...

since this is not considered to be “beautiful” (Rashi, Sukkah 33b ).

so that there would be more leaves than berries,

- i.e., the number of black or red berries

i.e., on the first day of the festival, when the restrictions against work apply

And this may not be done on a holiday. (See Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 4:8.)

which is permitted. Sukkah 33b states that permission is granted, provided only that one has another myrtle to use for the mitzvah. Otherwise, it is forbidden to eat the berries, because through one’s activity one will definitely make the myrtle fit for use. Hence, even though one’s act was motivated by another intention as well, it is forbidden. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 646:13.)
The Maggid Mishneh quotes a slightly different version of the text, substituting “or if they were removed by another person” for the phrase “removed them one by one.” Authentic Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah follow the Maggid Mishneh’s text.

despite the fact that it was made fit for use on the holiday.

The Rambam maintains that the laws pertaining to the willow parallel those governing a myrtle. However, even many of the Sages who accept the Rambam’s opinion regarding the myrtle disagree with regard to the willow. They explain that such a myrtle is acceptable because its leaves cover the branch’s severed top. This concept does not apply with regard to a willow. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 647:2) also states that such a willow is unacceptable.

i.e., they are hanging down limply from the branch (Maggid Mishneh)

for this is not beautiful. Rabbenu Aharon Halevi interprets the Hebrew וצרפנ as “split.” The Shulchan Aruch HaRav 647:6 quotes both of these opinions as halachah.

even though none of the etrog’s substance is missing

This is the literal translation of the term . שלופמ Nevertheless, Rabbenu Asher interprets that term differently, explaining that the etrog is unacceptable if the hole reaches the etrog’s seed chamber. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 648:3) quotes both opinions. Regarding halachah l’ma’aseh, the authorities recommend heeding Rabbenu Asher’s opinion. However, they state that when it is difficult to find a kosher etrog, the Rambam’s opinion may be relied upon.

i.e., even if it was perforated with a thin needle

This and the other factors mentioned in this halachah disqualify an etrog for use because it is not “beautiful.”
The Ra’avad objects to this statement and maintains that some of the etrog’s substance must also be lacking for it to be deemed unacceptable. The difference between these two opinions depends on a difference in the text of the Mishnah (Sukkah 3:6). The Rambam’s,text reads:
If [ an etrog] was perforated, peeled, cracked, or lacking even the slightest amount of its substance, it is
unacceptable.
ln contrast, the Ra’avad’s text read:
If [an etrog] was perforated, peeled, cracked: when it lacks even the slightest amount of its substance, it is
unacceptable.
The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 2) follow’s the Rambam’s view. The Ramah writes that when it is difficult to find another kosher etrog, one may rely on the Ra’avad’s view.

A silver coin from the Talmudic period, four barley corns in size.

e.g., the hole was made by plunging an awl into the etrog (Rashi, Sukkah 36a).

Here, too, the Ra’avad differs and maintains that as long as none of the etrog’s substance is lacking, it is kosher.

The Ra’avad differs arid maintains that an isar of the etrog’s substance must be missing. In this and in the previous case, the same decisions of the Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah mentioned above apply.

The Maggid Mishneh differentiates between the stem of the pitam and its tip from which its flower grew, maintaining that only the removal of the former disqualifies the etrog for use. The Ramah (ibid. 7) quotes this opinion as halachah. However, he suggests trying to use an etrog whose pitam is entirely complete.

However, there is no difficulty in using an etrog whose pitam falls off naturally, at an early stage of its development, as is true with regard to many etrogim (Rabbenu Mano’ach; Ramah, ibid.).

However, if only part of the stem is cut off and the portion attached to the etrog remains, it is kosher (Ramah, ibid. 8).

The term תיזזח is generally used to refer to human skin ailments—e.g., boils or warts. In this context, it refers to bumps which protrude above the etrog›s surface. However, the commentaries disqualify an etrog only if the bumps grow naturally from the etrog itself. However, if they are caused by external factors—e.g., thorns—the etrog is not disqualified.

The Ra’avad asks why both the numbers two and three are mentioned. In response, the Mishneh Lamelech quotes many examples of the use of similar terminology throughout the Talmud. lt must be noted that the Rambam, in his commentary on the Mishnah (ibid.), and the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (648:19) mention only two places.

because it looks spotty (Sukkah 35b ).

i.e., as long as there is no place for an additional bump between the two, it is considered to be one place (Shulchan Arucli HaRav, ibid.).

The Magen Avraham 648:13 also disqualifies an etrog if there is a line of bumps that covers the majority of the etrog’s circumference from any point on its surface.

See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, ibid.

because a blemish on the pitam is very obvious and unattractive. Sukkah (ibid.) states: “if a bump grows on the etrog›s nose, it is not acceptable.” The Rambam interprets “nose” as referring to the pitam. However, Rabbenu Asher and others explain that it refers to the portion of the etrog which begins to narrow as it approaches the pitam. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 9) accepts the latter view.

i.e, only the outer coating of the peel was removed and the thick, white inner peel is not yet revealed. Should this peel be revealed, the etrog is considered as though it has lost some of its substance (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, ibid.).

fqr the attractiveness of the etrog will begin to decrease without any possibility of its returning to its original state (Levush 586:6)

the peel could have regenerated itself if it had remained connected to the tree (Levush, ibid.). Therefore, ...

Tosafot, Sukkah 36a maintains that at least a portion of the original peel equivalent to a sela (a large silver coin) must remain. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 6) follows the Rambam’s opinion.

i.e., water fell on it after being detached from the tree and it became inflated (Rabbenu Manoach, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 648:15).

i.e., it produces a foul odor because it is infested with worms (Rabbenu Manoach).
Based on Sukkah 36b, the Ba’al Halachot Gedolot writes that “inflated” and “decaying” etrogim are disqualified only when the blemish is externally visible. However, if the blemish is only internal, they are kosher. (See Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 4) and commentaries.)

The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 15) defines “pickled” as “placed in vinegar.” However, the Magen Avraham (648:22) maintains that “pickled” should be interpreted according to its definition in the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah (105:1-2). Thus, if an etrog has been soaked in water or in any other liquid for more than 24 hours straight, it is considered to be “pickled” and disqualified for use. One should take care regarding this matter when soaking etrogim to preserve their freshness.

thoroughly on a fire or in boiling water (Rabbenu Manoach).

i.e., a mixture of any two or more colors. When the different color is concentrated in only one place, the etrog is not disqualified unless that color covers more than half the etrog›s surface area. However, if there is more than one spot of different colors, it is disqualified regardless of their size (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 16).

The Hebrew word קרוי refers to two different colors: dark green and yellow. lnitially, the etrog, like most citrus fruit, is dark green. As it matures, it turns yellowish.

It is not considered “beautiful” because its natural form was changed (Rabbenu Manoach).

This is kosher because the etrogim grew naturally in this way. ln this instance, when performing the mitzvah, a person should hold both etrogim in his hands. Though the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 20) accepts this decision, there are other authorities who differ. Hence, it is preferable to use another etrog (Mishnah Berurah 648:63).

Sukkah 3lb mentions etrogim which are small and green as being not fully ripe. However, since the Rambam mentioned those factors previously, it appears that here the intent is different and refers to a fruit that is not yet ready to be eaten, even though it is as large as an egg and has begun to turn yellow. (See also Sukkah 36a.)

Rashi (Sukkah 36a) states that if such an etrog is brought to a place where etrogim of a normal color grow, it may not be used.

even in Africa, where etrogim of this color grow 11aturally (Rashi, Sukkah 34b ).
There are two different explanations for the leniencies mentioned in the following halachah:
a) The mitzvah of the four species is derived from Leviticus 23:40: “On the first day, take for yourself the fruit of a beautiful tree ... “ From the phrase “for yourself,” we learn that a person must own the species he uses for the mitzvah. From the word “beautiful,” we learn that the species must fit that description.
Rav Yosef Karo (Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 649) explains that these requirements apply only “on the first day.” According to this explanation, these leniencies would also apply on the later days even in Jerusalem, where it is a Torah commandment to take the lulav on the later days (Chapter 7, Halachah 13).
Others. explain that, as mentioned in Chapter 7, Halachot 13 and 15, at preseilt, taking the lulav is a commandment from the Torah only on the first day of the Sukkot. On the subsequent days, the commandment is Rabbinic in origin, instituted to recall the Temple practice. Hence, greater leniency can be taken, because only a Rabbinic ordinance is involved.

Sukkah 36b relates that Rabbi Chanina would eat from an etrog and then use it for the mitzvah. Though an etrog which is lacking even the slightest amount of its substance may not be used (Halachah 7), he still fulfilled his obligation with it. From this incident, our Sages concluded that, on the later days, even such an etrog is kosher.
According to the Rambam’s opinion, the same applies to all other physical blemishes on the species. Since there is no greater blemish than an etrog which is bitten into, none of the requirements for “beauty” must be observed on the later days.
Nevertheless, Tosafot, Sukkah 29b and Rabbenu Asher maintain that this leniency applies only to etrogim which are lacking in substance. All the species which were disqualified because they are not “beautiful” may not be used on the later days as well. Though the Shulchan Aruch 649:5 quotes the Rambam, the Magen Avraham (649:17) and the Taz (649:9) quote the other view.

The Pri Megadim explains that even according to the Rambam, a blessing should not be recited when performing the mitzvah in this fashion.

As mentioned in the commentary on Halachah l, there are two explanations why a stolen lulav may not be used on the first day:
a) a sin may not serve as the medium with which a mitzvah will be performed )הוצם האבה(; הריבעב
b) as stated in Haiachah 10, on the first day of the festival a person must own the four species he uses for the mitzvah.
The commentaries explain that the Rambam follows the Iatter rationale. However, those who follow the first opinion (the Ra’avad, the Ramban, Rabbenu Asher) forbid the use of stolen species on the later days as well. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) quotes the Rambam, while the Ramah follows the other view.
[Though the above explanation is frequently used, it is difficult to accept. First, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sukkah 3:1), the Rambqm mentions the reason of הרצמ. האבה הריבעב Also, in Hilchot Chametz U’matzah 6:1 and in Hilchot lssurei Mizbe’ach 5:1 and 5:9, he forbids the use of stolen articles for the performance of a commandment. In addition, he has not yet mentioned the halachah requiring one to own the lulav used on the first day.
The Taz (649:15) clarifies the matter slightly further by explaining that since taking the lulav on the second day is only a Rabbinic commandment, using a stolen lulav is allowed even though it is a הוצם.[ האבה הריבעב

The literal translation of the Rambam’s words are “from the second holiday,” implying that these leniencies are granted even in the Diaspora, where the second day is celebrated as a holiday. Though all the laws of the holiday apply on the second day as well as the first, this applies only to the laws of the holiday itself. In contrast, in other contexts, since we follow a fixed calendar and know that the holidays fall on their appropriate dates, the restrictions applying to the first day do not apply on the subsequent days (Maggid Mishneh).
Rabbenu Asher differs and-maintains that all the restrictions that apply to the lulav on the first day must also be observed on the ‘second day as well. The Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 649:5) writes that all the species disqualified on the first day may be taken on the second day, but a blessing should not be recited.

Chol Hamo’ed, when all opinions agree that ...

mentioned in Halachah 1

as mentioned in Halachah 2

The Maggid Mishneh mentions that all the species disqualified for use because they were not of the required size or because they were of a similar, bui different, species may not be used on the later days of the festival.

lt appears from the Rambam’s statements that even in Jerusalem, where Torah law requires that the mitzvah be fulfilled for all seven days of the festival, the obligation to own the lulav applies only on the first day.

As explained in the commentary on the previous halachah, the Biblical source for the mitzvah of taking the four species, Leviticus 23:40, states: “On the first day, take for yourself the fruit of a beautiful tree ... “ The phrase “for yourself’ implies that a person must own the species he uses for the mitzvah (Sukkah 41b).
As mentioned in Chapter 5, Halachah 25, a borrowed sukkah may be used on the holiday. Though Deuteronomy 16:13 states “Celebrate the Sukkot holiday for yourself for seven days.” In this context, only a stolen sukkah is disqualified and a borrowed sukkah is permitted (Sukkah 27b).
Since in both cases, the source for the exclusion is the same phrase, one might ask why the laws pertaining to each are different. Many explain that since, as explained in the commentary to that halachah, the Torah includes a special verse to teach us that a borrowed sukkah is permitted, the scope of the exclusion implied by “for yourself’ is limited.
The Shulchan Aruch HaRav 637:3 explains that since the person owning the sukkah grants his colleague the use of it, the borrowed sukkah can be considered “as his own.” Since a person has to treat a sukkah as his permanent dwelling for the seven days of the holiday, it follows that the sukkah was lent for that purpose. Thus, while a person is using it, he may consider it “as his own,” i.e., just like his own dwelling. See Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 19.

Though there are certain restrictions against the transfer of property on a holiday, it is permitted to give a colleague a present (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, Sukkah 3: 11 ).

The use of the Hebrew term לע תנמ frees one from certain obligations in phrasing the terms of the conditional agreement. (See Hilchot Zechiyah Umatanah 3:8.)

There are authorities who require that the owner specifically state that he is giving the lulav to his colleague on the condition that the latter return it. However, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 658:5) states that even if the owner gives a colleague a lulav without making such a statement, it is assumed that the lulav was given subject to this condition.

See Hilchot Zechiyah Umatanah 3:9.

i.e., by failing to fulfill the condition under which the present was given, the recipient nullifies the legal transfer of ownership. Thus, although he was in physical possession of the article, it did not belong to him. Hence, it is considered to be stolen and, thus, not eligible to be used for the mitzvah (Sukkah, ibid.).

before all the adults who desire to use it have fulfilled the mitzvah (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 6)

The definition of the term “minor” in this context has been the subject of debate among the Rabbis. From the Rambam’s phraseology, it appears that he includes all minors in this category. However, Rabbenu Nissim writes that a child of six or seven. can transfer property and, hence, his return of the lulav is valid.
Support for Rabbenu Nissim’s position is brought from the Jerusalem Talmud (Sukkah 3:10), which relates that Rav Nachman bar Ya’akov gave his etrog as a present to his son and told him: “When you take possession of it and fulfill the mitzvah, return it to me.” Nevertheless, the passage does not serve as conclusive proof, because the possibility exists that his son had already reached majority. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 6) follows the Rambam’s view.

which are given to him by others who consciously desire that the minor acquire the property, in contrast to ownerless articles, which he cannot acquire accord,ing to Torah law (Maggid Mishneh, Hilchot Zechiyah Umatanah 4:7).

The transfer of the ownership of an article requires a conscious decision. Torah law maintains that a child lacks intellectual maturity ,) תעד ( and thus is incapable of making such a decision.

i.e., although he has physically returned the article, the child still remains the legal owner.
The Machaneh Ephraim (Hilchot Meshichah) notes that according to Rabbinic law, a child can transfer property that he owns to another. Thus, the Rambam’s statements seem to imply that any of the four species that are acquired only according to Rabbinic law may not be used for this mitzvah.

The verse quoted above includes all the four species, and not only the lulav. Therefore ...

considered to be the owner of the species in its entirety. Therefore, neither is ...

Bava Batra 137b relates that the requirement of owning a lulav includes not only having a share in it but rather owning it entirely.

The principles mentioned in the previous halachah regarding giving a lulav as a present also apply to giving a share of it as a present.
The Maggid Mishneh mentions a very frequent application of this concept: a lulav and etrog purchased by a synagogue for the use of all of its members. He quotes the Rashba, who explains that since the etrog was purchased with the intent that it be used by each member of that community, implicit in their agreement is that, on the first day, it will belong to each individual entirely at the time he uses it to fulfill the mitzvah.
The Ramah (Orach Chayim 648:7) quotes-this statement as halachah. However, the Magen Avraham 648:10 raises questions concerning it and suggests that each member of the community should grant his colleague his share as a present.

This is the case mentioned in Bava Batra (ibid.), from which the above principle is derived. In such an instance, the estate is considered to be the mutual property of all the brothers concerned.

it is considered to be his own. Hence, ...

and require that an equal division of the property be made before it was used, he cannot be considered to be the full owner of the etrog. Hence, ...

The above principles apply only when the funds of the estate were used to purchase a number of etrogim. Since many fruits of the same species were purchased with the money from the estate, it is possible that the other brothers will not object to one brother’s taking an etrog for his own use. However, if the money of the estate was used to buy a number of different species of fruit—e.g., ...

we assume that the brothers would desire to have the property formally divided before using it. Hence, they are all considered to be mutual owners of the fruit. Thus, ...

as Deuteronomy 16:14 teaches: “And you shall rejoice on your festivals.” Though that verse is mentioned with regard to Sukkot, Deuteronomy 16:11 states with regard to Shavuot: “and you shall rejoice before God,” and Rosh Hashanah 4b explains that an analogy is established to include Pesach as well.

The Rambam’s words present a question: The Mishnah (Sukkah 5: 1) refers to this celebration as Simchat Beit Hasho’evah, connecting it with the drawing of water for the water libation. (See Hilchot Tmidim Umusajim 10:6-10.) Indeed, the Talmud (Sukkah 50b; see also the Rambam’s commentary on the above-mentioned Mishnah) emphasizes that connection, quoting Isaiah 12:3: “And you shall draw water with happiness.” However, here, the Rambam makes no mention of that water at all!
We are forced to say that the Rambam views the verse from Isaiah as a mere asmachtah (an allusion from the Bible with which our Sages connected a verse to an independent concept) and that the celebration came about because of the unique nature of the Sukkot festival. Though this celebration was associated with the water libation, the latter is not the source for the practice. Indeed, the choice of the name Simchat Beit HaSho’evah (the celebration of the house of drawing the water) and not Simchat Hasho’evah (the celebration of the drawing of the water) allows for such an interpretation. (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. XVII).

i.e., in the Temple

Although this verse is used to derive the requirement of taking the lulav in Jerusalem for each of the seven days of the festival (Chapter 7, Halachal 13), its simple meaning remains.
Nevertheless, this charge is not considered to be an independent commandment, but rather an extension (and an intensification) of the mitzvah of celebrating on the festivals. Thus, in Sefer Hamitzvot (Positive Commandment 54), the Rambam describes that mitzvah and explains that it includes “to celebrate with musical instruments and to dance in the Temple .... This is Simchat Beit Hasho’evah.”
This explanation resolves another question: Mo’ed Kattan 8b teaches that one celebration spould not be interposed upon another. For this reason, weddings are not held during the festivals so that the wedding celebrations should not clash with those of the festival.
Thus, were one to consider the celebration of Simchat Beit Hasho’evah as associated with the water offering, one might ask why the Sages instituted such a celebration which might appear to overshadow the celebration of the festival itself. However, the above explanation resolves this difficulty as well, for as stated above, the Simchat Beit Hasho’evah celebration is an extension of the festival celebrations and not an independent matter. (See Likkutei Sichot, ibid.)

Two reasons are given why the courtyard was not set up during the festival itself:
a) It involved construction, which is forbidden on Chol Hamo’ed (Knesset Hagedolah)
b) Preparing the courtyard before the festival would allow the celebrations to begin immediately after the departure of the festival (Kinat Eliyahu).

in the open courtyard before the entrance to the Temple courtyard proper. This was called Ezrat Nashim—the women’s courtyard—because in contrast to the Temple courtyard, women were allowed to enter the Ezrat Nashim even when they were not offering sacrifices. The Rambam describes the Ezrat Nashim in Hilchot Beit Habechirah 5:1.

Originally, the men and the women would stand in separate sections on the same level. However, the Sages feared that, particularly during a time of celebration, such closeness might lead to frivolous interaction between the sexes, and decided to have a balcony constructed for the women (Sukkah 51b).

Since, as explained in the following halachah, the celebration was not held on the first night of the festival.

Sukkah 53a quotes Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananyah as saying: “While we were celebrating at Simchat Beit Hasho’evah, our eyes saw no sleep.”

The Mishnah (Sukkah 5:1-2) states: Whoever has not seen Simchat Beit Hasho’evah has never seen rejoicing in his life! ...
There were golden candelabras .... There was not a courtyard in Jerusalem that was not illuminated with the light of Beit Hasho’evah.
The pious and men of stature would dance before them with torches of fire in their hands and recite songs of praise. The Levites would play the harps, lutes, cymbals, and all other types of instruments on the steps ... leading down from the Israelites’ courtyard.

Indeed, from the Mishnah (Sukkah 5:1), which states: “The flute for five or six days; this was the flute of Beit Hasho’evah,” it appears that this was the major element of the celebration.

See the quote from the Mishnah above.

Note the following halachah and commentary.

Since, as explained above, the celebration involved musical instruments, it would not be held on the first night of the festival (or on the Sabbath), when playing such instruments is forbidden (Hilchot Shabbat 23:4).
The celebration is an extension of a Torah commandment, while the above prohibition is only Rabbinic in nature. Furthermore, it was held in the Temple, where Rabbinic prohibitions of this nature were usually suspended ןיא, תובש )שדקמב Pesachim 65a). Nevertheless, since there is no specific Torah obligation to celebrate in this manner, the celebrations were suspended because of the Rabbinic prohibition (Likkutei Sichot, ibid.).

for the experience of genuine Torah happiness is a fundamental and necessary element of our service of God, as explained in the following halachah.

Though they would attend, as mentioned in the final clause of the halachah

for it was only their celebration that could inspire the people with spiritual feeling.

Sukkah 53a relates how Hillel the Elder would rejoice at Simchat Beit Hasho’evah. Other Sages would also participate. For example, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would juggle eight torches of fire and bow down so low he could kiss the ground. The Jerusalem Talmud (Sukkah 5:3) relates how Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzedek would perform unique feats of jumping.

deriving joy from this passive participation.

By mentioning this concept at the conclusion—but as part—of the these halachot, the Rambam emphasizes how the celebration of the festivals is not just an isolated experience, but rather is intended to influence the totality of our service of God. The rejoicing of the festival of Sukkot enables us to appreciate true happiness in all aspects of our Torah service.

This verse comes after the full description of the curses and retribution which God will visit upon the Jewish people for their sins. From the Rambam’s statements, it appears that it is the lack of happiness in the service of God, and not the sins themselves, which brought about this punishment.
The Ari, Rabbi Yitzchak Luria, explains that even though the punishment comes for the sins, had the Jewish people served God with true joy and happiness, that happiness would have caused Him to overlook those transgressions, regardless of how serious they were. In contrast, a lack of happiness in the performance of the mitzvot demonstrates a deficiency in the person’s awareness of the connection to God established thereby.

for he is concerned with himself, rather than with God.

i.e., God, in whose presence we are at every moment.

Transcending his self-consciousness and committing himself to God totally, without any restrictions.

his ability to open himself up to God allows him to serve as a medium for the expression of His greatness, and thus, his own personal prestige rises, because, as our Sages commented: “A king’s servant is like a king.”

See Hilchot Teshuvah, Chapter 10.

The mention of David’s position further emphasizes the concept explained. Alternatively, a king has a connection to each of his subjects. Thus, mentioning the example of the king of Israel emphasizes how each Jew has a potential to achieve this rung of service.

When Michal, Saul’s daughter, witnessed David’s recklessness and total lack of inhibitions, she reproved him for conduct unbefitting a king. David answered her sharply, explaining that it is precisely this ability to give oneself totally over to Godliness which characterizes a Jewish monarch and makes him fit to lead the people in the service of God.