Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Note Chapter 7, Halachah 1, which states that one may establish an eruv t’chumin by actually going on Friday afternoon to the location one desires to establish as one’s place for the Sabbath. The possibility of depositing food was instituted by our Sages to expedite the process of establishing an eruv t’chumin, by allowing a person to have an agent deposit food for him.

See Halachah 5 regarding both these factors.

In his introduction to these halachot, the Maggid Mishneh questions why two seemingly separate concepts, eruv chatzerot and eruv t’chumin, are considered to be part of the same mitzvah and are described together. He explains that since both are Rabbinic ordinances that involve placing food in a specific place so that the place will be considered to be one’s base for the Sabbath, they can be considered to be a single mitzvah.

A cubit is 48 centimeters according to Shiurei Torah and 57.6 centimeters according to the Chazon Ish.

A person is always allowed to proceed 2000 cubits in all directions from the place where he spends the Sabbath. (See Hilchot Shabbat 27:1.)

The Rambam’s statements here parallel his statements in Hilchot Shabbat 27:5, which explain that if a person’s Sabbath limits end within a private domain, he is not entitled to proceed to the end of the domain. If, however, that domain is included within his 2000 cubits, it is considered to be only four cubits.
The Ramah (Orach Chayim 408:1) quotes the view ofthe Tur, theHagahot Maimoniot, and other Ashkenazic authorities, who differ and maintain that one is allowed to proceed to the end of the private domain, even if it is further than 2000 cubits from one’s eruv t’chumin. The Mishnah Berurah 408: 12 mentions that many authorities support this ruling. See note 8.

The Maggid Mishneh (in his gloss on this halachah and on Hilchot Shabbat 27:5) mentions the fact that when one establishes the Sabbath limits of a city, an imaginary square is constructed around the furthermost points in the city’s area, and the Sabbath limits are calculated from that square. Thus, it is possible that land that is outside the city’s urban limits may still be within the square from which its Sabbath limits are calculated.
Although a leniency is used in the calculation of the city’s Sabbath limits, and these outlying areas are considered to be part of the city proper, this leniency is not turned into a stringency. If a person’s 2000 cubits end beyond the city’s urban area, but not beyond these outlying areas, the city is considered to be included within his Sabbath limits, and thus only four cubits in length. This concept is quoted by the Ramah (Orach Chayim 408:1).

As mentioned above, the Tur and the Ramah (Orach Chayim 408:1) differ with the Rambam on this point and allow a person to walk throughout the entire city where his house is located, provided he sleeps in his home (Mishnah Berurah 408: 11 ).

The rationale for this decision can be explained as follows: As explained in Hilchot Shabbat 27:l, the prohibition against proceeding more than 2000 cubits from one’s place of residence on the Sabbath is derived from the verse (Exodus 16:29): “No man should leave his place on the seventh day.” The term “his place” refers to the private domain in which he is located, regardless if it be a house, a city, or any other location.
By making an eruv t’chumin, a person redefines the location of “his place” on the Sabbath. Even if he is not located at that place at the commencement of the Sabbath or shortly thereafter, the location where he deposits his eruv is considered to be “his place” for this Sabbath. Therefore, if that location is a private domain, that entire domain is considered to be “his place,” and the calculation of his Sabbath limits begins from its boundaries.

If his acts had been considered significant, he would have decreased his Sabbath limits, and not increased them. For without the eruv, he would be allowed to proceed two thousand cubits from the city limits. This follows the Rambam’s conception, in contrast to that of the Tur mentioned above.

In Hilchot Shabbat 27:5 (see also note 6), it is explained that the Sabbath limits of a city are calculated from an imaginary square that may include several uninhabited areas in the city's periphery. If the eruv is placed in these outlying areas, it is as if it were placed in the city proper.

Since the eruv is beyond his Sabbath limits, i.e., over 2000 cubits from the city’s periphery, he may not reach it during beyn hash’mashot, the time when the acquisition of the eruv takes effect (Mishnah Berurah 408:30). Therefore, the eruv is not valid. Instead, his Sabbath limits are defined from his home (Ramah, Orach Chayim 408:4).

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as saying that this applies only when one establishes one’s eruv by using food. If, however, one actually walks to a place beyond a city’s boundaries beyn hash’mashot, and in this manner establishes this location as one’s place for the Sabbath, it is acceptable even if one’s intent is not associated with a mitzvah. Although this view is not accepted by all authorities, the Mishnah Berurah 415:1 rules that in a pressing situation, one may rely on the more lenient view.

The expression “a purpose associated with a mitzvah” is used in a very extended sense in this context. As an example, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 415:1) mentions a desire to take a stroll in a pleasant orchard.

E.g., to proceed toward the end of one’s Sabbath limits, so that one will be closer to a destination to which one desires to travel for business purposes after the Sabbath.

Although this is a matter of disagreement among the Rabbis, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 415:1) follows the Rambam’s view.
It must be emphasized that the “fear” mentioned by the Rambam refers to a situation when there is not an obvious danger to the person’s life. Were that to be the case, he would be allowed to proceed beyond the 2000 cubits even if he had not established an eruv, for a threat to life takes precedence over the observance of all the Torah’s laws with the exception of idol worship, sexual immorality, and murder.

In contrast to an eruv chatzerot, for which bread alone may be used, all foods may used for an eruv t’chumin and a shituf, with the exception of water, salt, and mushrooms (Chapter 1, Halachah 8).

See Chapter 1, Halachah 9. There is, however, a distinction. Regarding a shituf, even when there are thousands of inhabitants involved, it is necessary to provide two meals only for eighteen people. In contrast, regarding an eruv t’chumin, food must be set aside for every person who desires to use the eruv.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 10.

This does not mean the person's home, or the place where he is standing beyn hash'mashot, but rather the place where he would partake of his eruv. There are times when it is impossible for him to partake of the eruv in the domain in which it is located—to cite the example given by the Mishnah, Eruvin 3:3: the eruv was placed in a tree more than ten handbreadths above the ground. In such instances, since it is not permissible to carry the eruv from the place where it was deposited to the place where the person would partake of it, the eruv is not valid.

This is the time when the Sabbath commences, and it is at this hour that the eruv must be established.

See Hilchot Shabbat 24:10.

And, as mentioned in Halachah 6, it is only in situations such as these that it is permissible to establish an eruv t’chumin.

If, however, he must perform a labor forbidden by the Torah to obtain the eruv, it is not valid. (See Chapter 1, Halachah 22.)

Although Rabbinic prohibitions are not normally enforced beyn hash'mashot when a mitzvah is involved, our Sages maintained their decree in this instance. For one might think that the reed has already been detached, and it is likely that one might break it (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 3:3).

Provided that they are not implanted in.the public domain and there is not a basket, four handbreadths by four handbreadths, at their top (Mishnah Berurah 409:14).

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, noting that the matter is the subject of a difference of opinion between our Sages (Eruvin 45a): Rabbi Eliezer maintains that a person is considered to be located in the midst of the four cubits he is granted. Therefore, as the Rambam states here, he is granted only two cubits in either direction. Rabbi Yehudah differs and maintains that he is granted four cubits in either direction. It is Rabbi Yehudah’s view that is accepted as halacl1ah.
The Maggid Mishneh notes that in Hilchot Shabbat 12:15 and 27:11, the Rambam follows Rabbi Yehudah’s view. There is, the Maggid Mishneh maintains, a difference between the ruling regarding the laws of carrying and the ruling regarding the Sabbath limits. His distinction is explained by the Radbaz (Vol. VI, Responsum 2237), who states that for an eruv t’chumin to be effective a person must be able to reach it while standing within the Sabbath limits. If the eruv is within two cubits of the Sabbath limits, the person can bend over and reach it. If it is further away, he would have to leave his Sabbath limits to reach it. Hence, it is not valid.
The Ra’avad’s decision is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 409:5).

Halachah 5.

As explained in the previous halachah.

lmpure terumah may not be eaten.

If it is valid at this time, what happens to it afterwards is of no consequence (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 3:4).

Since the eruv was acceptable when deposited, it is granted a chezkat kiyyum—i.e., we assume that the status quo remained the same and that it remained acceptable until immediately before the difficulty was discovered (ibid. ).
(Although the Rambam mentions this concept in his Commentary on the Mishnah, his ruling in the following halachah implies that he does not accept this as a hard and fast rule.)

They both empowered him to act as a shaliach (agent) and establish an eruv for them.

This situation represents a paradox: If beyn hash’mashot is considered to be before the commencement of the Sabbath, the eruv that was eaten beyn hash’mashot is not valid. If beyn hash’mashot is considered to be after the commencement of the Sabbath, the eruv that was established beyn hash’mashot is not valid.

If, however, the eruv that was established beyn hash’mashot was eaten beyn hash’mashot, it is not valid. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 393:3.)

Beyn hash'mashot is the period between sunset and the appearance of three stars. There is a question if this period is considered to be part of the day or part of the night. See Hilchot Shabbat 5:4.

This ruling (based on Shabbat 34a) reflects a difference of opinion among the Rabbis. As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, most authorities maintain that an eruv t’chumin (in contrast to an eruv chatzerot) is acceptable when there is a doubt involved, only because it possesses a chezkat kiyyum—i.e., we knew that it was acceptable beforehand, and we presume that its status remained the same until we know otherwise. (See also Halachah 15.)
Therefore, other authorities (Rabbenu Chanan’el, Rabbenu Tam, Rashba) interpret this law as referring to an eruv chatzerot. There a chezkat kiyyum is not necessary, for an eruv chatzerot is only a Rabbinic institution (in contrast to an eruv t’chumin, which involves a prohibition that has its source in the Torah itself).
Nevertheless, it is possible to justify the Rambam’s decision, for the prohibition against going beyond two thousand cubits is Rabbinic in origin (Hilchot Shabbat 27:1). Accordingly, since we are sure that the food set aside for the eruv can be eaten before the commencement of the Sabbath, and the doubt is merely whether the eruv was made at the proper time, the question concerns a matter of Rabbinic law. Therefore, we follow the principle, “Whenever there is a doubt concerning a point of Rabbinic law, the more lenient opinion is followed.”
The Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 415:3) quotes both views (although the Rambam’s appears to be favored). The Mishnah Berurah 415:11 favors the other view.

Although at the outset, an eruv chatzerot may be established beyn hash’mashot (see Chapter l, Halachah 21), the laws regarding an eruv t’chumin are more severe (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 2:6).

Although the stones are muktzeh and removing them on the Sabbath would be forbidden, since a mitzvah is involved there is no prohibition against removing them beyn hash’mashot.

For the eruv was valid at the time it was established; what happens afterwards is of no consequence. (See also Chapter 1, Halachah 21.)

As mentioned above, it is forbidden to partake of terumah if it is ritually impure. In this instance, however, there is a doubt and we do not know if, in fact, the terumah has contracted ritual impurity or not.

With this phrase, the Rambam clarifies his position with regard to a question asked by many authorities based on the situation described in Halachah 13. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, many authorities maintain that an eruv is considered acceptable when there is a doubt regarding its validity only when it possesses a chezkat kiyyum. As proof, they point to this law, which appears to indicate that the eruv is not considered acceptable because it was never known to be valid. The Rambam explains that the reason why the eruv is not acceptable in this instance is not that it lacks a chezkat kiyyum, but because it may never be eaten. Because of the doubt involved, it is forbidden to partake of this loaf (Noda BiY’hudah, Yoreh De’ah, Vol. I, Responsum 65).

Although there is a pure loaf there, since we do not know which loaf it is, the meal is not fit to be eaten.

We are not certain that the sanctity with which it had been endowed has departed until nightfall. At that time, it is too late to establish an eruv.

Food from which terumah and/or the other agricultural requirements were not separated.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 22.

This ruling is the subject of a debate among our Sages (Eruvin 26b). The Rambam follows the more stringent view. Although other authorities accept the more lenient ruling, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 409:1) cites the Rambam’s decision. (See Be’ur Halachah.)

The difficulty is not in the actual placement of the eruv beyn hash’mashot, for the placement of an eruv is a mitzvah and the mitzvot were not given for our personal benefit. The difficulty arises afterwards. Since the person desires that the eruv be maintained in the cemetery, he is deriving benefit from it. Hence, it is forbidden to establish an eruv in this manner (Eruvin 31a; Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 3: 1).
(See the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger, who asks why the eruv is unacceptable. Although it is forbidden to derive benefit from the cemetery in this manner, the fact that a person violates this prohibition should not invalidate his eruv.)

A field or yard that was plowed despite the fact that a grave was located there. Our Sages considered it to be impure ground (Hilchot Tum’at Meit 10:1).

A compartment carried by other people or animals. Since there is a board below him, he does not contract ritual impurity when he passes above a grave or a corpse (tum'at ohel).

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (ibid.). Others explain that this refers to blowing away any chips of bone.

In contrast to an eruv chatzerot, the equivalent of two meals is required for every participant in the eruv, regardless of the number of the participants. The rationale is that through depositing the eruv, the person establishes the place in which he has deposited it as his “place” for the Sabbath. This must be done for every person participating in the eruv (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 8:1).

Note the parallel to Chapter 1, Halachah 17.

As in Chapter 1, Halachah 20.

In contrast to an eruv chatzerot, which, in most circumstances, is considered to be a benefit to a person unless he explicitly objects, an eruv chatzerot is dependent on the person’s consent. For by extending his Sabbath boundaries in one direction, it reduces them in the other direction.

The Mishnah Berurah 413:6 cites opinions that state that it is acceptable if one received notification beyn hash’mashot.

Eruvin 82a, explains that thisis dependent on the principle of b’reirah—i.e., when a person decides to rely on the eruv, retroactively, it is considered that this was his original intent.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 20

In contrast to a storekeeper or a baker, we assume a private person will fulfill the request made of him.
Generally, our Sages ordained that even when a purchaser has already paid for the item he purchased, the transaction is not finalized until he draws the item he purchased after him [(meshichah), Hilchot Mechirah 3:1]. In this instance, they allowed leniency, accepting the Torah’s ruling that a sale is finalized by the purchaser’s payment of money.

For it is possible that the storekeeper will forget and not have another person acquire a share in the eruv.

Since the person makes an explicit statement, we assume that the storekeeper will remember to do so.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that, in contrast to a transaction made with money, a transaction made by exchanging articles is completed at the moment of the exchange. (See Hilchot Mechirah 5:1.) Therefore, the bread belongs to the person and can be used for the eruv.
Based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah cited previously, Rav Kapach offers a different interpretation: that since he will have to appraise the utensil or sell it, the storekeeper will remember to establish the eruv.

Children below the age of majority do not have an independent halachic status.

Canaanite servants are obligated to fulfill all the negative commandments of the Torah (including the obligation to keep the Sabbath limits). They are not, however, granted any independent decision-making capacity, and instead are considered as their owner’s property.

The Shulchan Aruch 414: 1 states that this ruling applies even if they do not depend on their father or master for their sustenance.

All these individuals possess the halachic right to make their own decisions, and their relationship with their father, master, or husband is no different from that between two other individuals.

Since there is a high probability that these individuals will desire to rely on this eruv, there is no need for them to express their consent. The failure to object is sufficient. The Mishnah Berurah 414:4 adds a further leniency. Even if they were not notified about the eruv until after nightfall, since it can be assumed that they will desire to rely on the eruv, it is acceptable.

In other halachic contexts as well (see Hilchot Sukkah 6:1), a child is considered to be dependent on his mother until the age of six. (See the Mishnah Berurah 414:7, which cites other opinions that require a separate eruv to be established for a child below the age of six.)

And having charged the agent with this mission, he can rely on the agent to have deposited the eruv. He need not check to see if he has, in fact, done so (Eruvin 32b ).

These individuals are not considered to be responsible for their actions and may not serve as agents. There is, however, a difference regarding an eruv chatzerot, for in that context, all that is necessary is that they collect the food.

I.e., a Sadducee or a Samaritan (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 3:2). Needless to say, a gentile may not serve in this capacity, for he can never serve as an agent.

The only reason it is necessary for him to watch is so that he knows that the eruv has in fact reached his agent (Eruvin, ibid. ).

The Maggid Mishneh explains that since this is a question of Rabbinic law, the principle of b’reirah is employed. This means that retroactively, it is considered that the decision made by the agent expressed the intent of the person who charged him with establishing the eruv.

Even if they did not know the direction in which the eruv was established until after nightfall (Maggid Mishneh, Mishnah Berurah 409:52).

Because the agent did not carry out the instructions given to him. These rulings apply regardless of whether the agent establishes the eruv with food belonging to him or with food belonging to the person who sent him (Mishnah Berurah 409:53).

Chapter 1, Halachah 16. The very same blessing is recited for an eruv t’chumin. See also the notes on that halachah, which explain why a blessing is recited before the performance of a Rabbinic commandment.

Note the Ra’avad, who objects to the recitation of a blessing for this mitzvah, for in contrast to other Rabbinic mitzvot, the institution of an eruv t’chumin does not introduce any new practice. Even an eruv chatzerot makes one conscious of the prohibition against carrying in a public domain. An eruv t’chumin, by contrast, merely grants a person a leniency.
The Maggid Mishneh explains the rationale for the Rambam’s ruling. In practice, as stated in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 415:4), the custom is to recite a blessing.

Note the Mishnah Berurah 415:15, which states that if a person fails to make a statement of this nature, the eruv is not acceptable. As mentioned in the notes on the following chapter, this applies, however, only when one has deposited food for the eruv, and not when one has actually walked there oneself.
See also the Mishnah Berurah 415:16, which mentions that in his statement the person should specify that he is establishing the eruv for the following day, or for all the Sabbaths of the coming year.

As mentioned in Halachah 9, there is no need to make an explicit statement. lt is sufficient to make a mental resolve.

This point is the subject of a difference of opinion among our Sages (Eruvin 4:9). Rabbi Meir maintains that the fundamental provision for establishing an eruv t’chumin involves depositing food. An allowance was made, however, for a poor person who could not afford to deposit food; he was permitted to establish an eruv by actually going to the desired place.
Rabbi Yehudah differs and states that the fundamental provision involves actually being at the place. Our Sages granted a leniency to a rich man, however, and allowed him to employ an agent to deposit food. As the Rambam states, the halachah follows Rabbi Yehudah.

I.e., the person could not reach the intended place before nightfall if he continued at his present pace, but could reach it if he ran with all his might. We do not require him to make this effort, and allow him to establish the eruv by intent and continue walking at his normal pace (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 409:11).

I.e., if at the outset he was at home, but was simply too lax about establishing an eruv. (See Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:13.)

See Halachot 5-7.

The Rambam’s ruling implies that the person’s intent is of no consequence whatsoever, and his “place” for the Sabbath is the place where he is standing at nightfall.
The Ra’avad differs regarding the instance when there are more than two thousand cubits between the person and the location he intended to be his “Sabbath place.” The person’s intent establishes that location as his “Sabbath place.” Since there are more than two thousand cubits between the person and his “place,” he is compared to one who has gone beyond his Sabbath limits and is entitled to walk only within a square of four cubits. (See Hilchot Shabbat 27:11.)
Although the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:11) mentions both views, it appears to favor that of the Ra’avad. The Be’ur Halachah notes that the Ra’avad’s views are shared by the Rashba, Rabbenu Asher, and many others. Hence, he suggests that it be followed.

I.e., 5000 square cubits.

I.e., there is no difference between it and an ordinary private domain.

Because ofits size, and the fact that it was not enclosed for the purpose ofhabitation, our Sages feared that it might become confused with a private domain. Hence, they applied more stringent rules. (See Hilchot Shabbat, Chapter 16.)

From the Rambam’s wording in Hilchot Shabbat 27:4, the Maggid Mishneh infers that if the person stands within a large private domain that was not enclosed for the purpose of habitation on Friday and establishes it as his “Sabbath place,” he may walk throughout its entire area and two thousand cubits in all directions. This opinion is not accepted by the Rashba and other authorities, and it is their view that is cited by the Shulchan Aruch 396:2.

Based on their interpretation of Eruvin 49b, the Ra’avad, the Rashba, Rabbenu Asher, and others differ with the Rambam’s ruling in this instance. Rather than totally ignore the person’s intent, these authorities maintain that he is allowed to consider the distant location as his “Sabbath place.” There is, however, a restriction. Since he did not specify his place, he is penalized according to the size of the location.
To cite the example mentioned in the following halachah: a person desires to establish a tree as his “Sabbath place.” He does not specify his place and there are 20 cubits under the tree. According to the Rambam, his intent is ignored entirely, and his Sabbath limits are measured from the place where he is standing at nightfall. According to the other authorities, his “Sabbath place” is considered to be the tree, and it is from there that his Sabbath limits are measured. Nevertheless, because he did not specify his desired location, instead of being granted two thousand cubits in all directions, he is granted only 1980 cubits [i.e., 2000 minus 20 (the size of the area under the tree)].
The Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 409: 1 1) mentions both views, but appears to favor that of the other authorities. The Eliyahu Rabba states that the view of the other authorities should be followed. The Be’ur Halachah, by contrast, states that consideration should also be given to the Rambam’s view.

We are not concerned with which of the eight cubits the person will use while under the tree, for all these eight cubits are within the person’s Sabbath limits. The question is which four of these eight cubits will be considered to be one’s “Sabbath place” regarding the determination of the Sabbath limits. For this, the precise determinatiסn of’ one’s “Sabbath place” is the matter of focus (See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 4:7.)

I.e., regardless of the side from which one measures the two thousand cubits of the Sabbath limits, a portion of the four cubits that a person is granted will be included in the four cubits from which the Sabbath limits are measured. This must be so, for there are less than eight cubits under the tree (ibid. ).

See Halachah 2. However, Rashi (Eruvin 52a), Rabbenu Yehonatan, the Rashba and many other authorities maintain that the leniency mentioned in Halachah 2 applies only when a person is on a journey, but not when the entire purpose for his setting out is to deposit an eruv. Their views are cited in the Mishnah Berurah 410:2.

Halachah 2.

Eruvin 52a relates that Rav Yehudah bar Ishtata brought Rav Natan bar Oshaya a basket of fruit for the Sabbath. Although it was late on Friday afternoon, Rav Y ehudah turned to leave so that he could establish an eruv t’chumin to enable himself to return home on the following day. Rav Natan let him descend a single step and then told him to stay.

Rashi (Eruvin 52a) and other authorities differ, and state that this leniency applies only when a person has two homes whose Sabbath limits are adjoining. In this instance, it is clear that even though a colleague prevailed upon him to return, his intent was to establish his “Sabbath place” at the desired location so that he could proceed to his other home.
When, however, a person does not own a home in the adjoining area, and a colleague is able to prevail upon him to return, he is not able to establish a “Sabbath place” in a distant location, unless he makes an explicit statement to that effect. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 410:2) quotes the Rambam’s view, while the Mishnah Berurah 410:7 mentions the other opinions.

This applies even if during beyn hash’mashot they are at the homes of their hosts (Mishnah Berurah 409:39).

This principle is based on the following concept: Since an eruv t’chumin establishes a particular location as a person’s place for the Sabbath, only one such place can be established, and not two.

As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, this halachah is dependent on the concept that in cases of Rabbinic law, the principle of b’reirah applies. Thus, retroactively it is considered that at the. commencement of the Sabbath, the person had the intent of establishing an eruv in the direction that he was eventually required to proceed.

See Tzafenat Paneach (in his gloss on Hilchot Shabbat 27:l), who states that the Rambam considers the limits on travel on the holidays and on Yom Kippur as Rabbinic in origin. In support, he cites the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Sanhedrin, Chapter 19, regarding the negative commandments punishable by lashing: “A person who goes beyond the [Sabbath] limits on the Sabbath, a person who performs a forbidden labor on a holiday.”

The liability incurred by the violator is somewhat different. A person who willfully performs any of the Sabbath labors is liable for execution, while one who violates a forbidden labor on Yom Kippur is liable only for karet. (See Hilchot Sh’vitat Asor 1:2.)

See Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 1:4, which states that since the prohibition against the forbidden labor of transferring articles was lifted on the holidays regarding the preparation of food, it was lifted entirely.

See Maggid Mishneh and the Mishnah Berurah 416:31, which mention opinions that see a benefit in the establishment of eruvin in courtyards on the holidays as well.

Although for a single Sabbath one may not establish eruvin in two opposite directions, this rule does not apply when the Sabbath and a holiday follow one another. The Sabbath and the holidays represent two different expressions of holiness (Eruvin 38b). Therefore, the location defined as one’s “place”—and thus an eruv established—for one does not necessarily apply regarding the other. Similarly, regarding the two days of the holidays observed in the diaspora: in essence, the holidays were to be observed for only one day. The observance of a second day was instituted only because of uncertainty regarding the calendar. Therefore, the two days are also considered to be separate entities.

This also involves a redefinition of one’s place. Instead of its being considered to be the location of the eruv, it is considered to be one’s home.

Since these two days were observed as a holiday even in Eretz Yisrael when the moon was sanctified on the basis of the testimony of witnesses (Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh 5:7), they are considered to be a single expression of holiness. Eruvin 39b refers to them as "one long day," and the halachic requirements that apply to one day apply also to the other.

See the notes on Halachah 8 with regard to whether or not it is necessary for the eruv to remain in its place for both nights of the holiday.

The food deposited for the eruv must exist at beyn hash’mashot and be fit to eat. This is particularly important in the summer months, when it is possible that the eruv has become stale or has been eaten by vermin (Mishnah Berurah 416:9).

Ordinarily, a person must establish his eruv before nightfall. Nevertheless, since he made a stipulation beforehand, we rely on the principle of b'reirah, and we say that retroactively it is considered to be as if he decided to rely on the eruv before nightfall (Maggid Mishneh).

For other examples of the Rambam’s rulings concerning this matter, see Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 5:20, Hilchot Terumah 1:21, Hilchot Ma’aser 7:1, and Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 4:15.

If the eruv is not accessible—even if it is present in its designated location—it is not acceptable, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachot 8 and 12.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the removal of the eruv is merely a suggestion offered, lest a person leave the eruv in its place, and it be destroyed by vermin or the like. In a place where the eruv will surely be preserved, there is no point in removing it. Needless to say, on the Sabbath, when it is forbidden to carry, and it is forbidden to remove the eruv, this suggestion does not apply.
If one leaves the eruv in the designated place and there is a possibility that it will be destroyed, one is required to go to that place on the following day to check that it still exists (Mishnah Berurah 416:14).

The Be'ur Halachah 416 asks: Since it is possible to establish the eruv by walking to the designated location (as stated in the following halachah), of what value is it that the person carried the food with him? The Be'ur Halachah explains that in this instance, we are speaking about a person who has an agent establish the eruv for him. Therefore, it is necessary for him to use food.

The eruv must be deposited in the same location; otherwise, this is forbidden. Were one to change either the location (or the food used for the eruv), one would have been considered as either preparing on the Sabbath for a holiday, or on a holiday for the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 416:2).

There is no obligation to eat it. The Rambam’s intent is merely that from this time onward, there is no obligation that the eruv remain intact (Mishneh Berurah 416:15).

The Rambam’s statement implies that on Rosh HaShanah, it is necessary to establish an eruv only on the first night of the holiday. Even if the eruv is consumed before the beginning ofthe second day, it is acceptable,just as it would be acceptable for the entire Sabbath, even if it had been consumed after beyn hash’mashot.
The Ra’avad objects to this ruling. He maintains that the distinction of the two days of Rosh HaShanah as a single “extended” day applies only as a stringency, but not as a leniency. Therefore, the eruv established before the first night must remain in its place on the second night as well.
The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s view, bringing supports that indicate that our Sages’ definition of these two days as “one long day” brings about a leniency as well as a stringency. The Mishnah Berurah 416:11 follows the Rambam’s ruling.

He may not establish the eruv by depositing food, for this would involve the performance of an activity on either the Sabbath or the holiday for the benefit of the other. As mentioned, it is forbidden to prepare on the Sabbath for a holiday or on a holiday for the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 416:2).

He may not make a verbal statement, for this would be considered to be preparation for the coming day (ibid. ).

Since he uses the same loaf, he is not considered to be performing a new activity; this location had already been established as his “place,” and he is merely perpetuating the existing situation. If he brought a different loaf, it would be considered to be preparing for the coming day (ibid. ).

According to the fixed calendar we follow at present, it is impossible for Yom Kippur to fall on either Sunday or Friday. (See Rosh HaShanah 20a.)

This expression implies a ruling for which the Rambam has no explicit source in the Talmud, but which he arrived at through a process of deduction.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger explains that this also implies a leniency. As indicated by the conclusion of Halachah 8, there is no need to establish an eruv on the second day.

The rationale is that all the prohibitions that apply on the Sabbath also apply on Yom Kippur (Maggid Mishneh).

In Halachah 5.

Note the gloss of the Sefer HaKovetz on Halachah 5, which discusses whether the law in this halachah applies only with regard to a holiday and a Sabbath that follow consecutively, or also with regard to the two days of a holiday that are observed in the diaspora. The Magen Avraham 416:3 rules that the restrictions apply with regard to the two days observed in the diaspora as well.

See Chapter 6, Halachah 4.

For it is forbidden to prepare for the Sabbath on a holiday.

In Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 6:14-15, when discussing the establishment of an eruv tavshilin and other similar matters, the Rambam states that in the present era, we may not make such a conditional arrangement. This leniency was granted only in the era when the establishment of the calendar was dependent on the testimony of witnesses, and the second day of a holiday was observed because of a doubt concerning the day on which the holiday should be celebrated. At present, there is no such doubt, and the second day is celebrated because of a Rabbinic decree requiring us to preserve the previous custom. (See Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh 5:5.)
Other authorities (see the gloss of the Ra’avad on Hilchot .Sh’vitat Yom Tov) take issue with the Rambam on this point; it is their view that is accepted as halachah in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 393:1).

Beitzah 17a explains why a distinction is made. By establishing an eruv t'chumin, a person designates a place as his home for the Sabbath, and our Sages would not permit this to be done on a holiday. In contrast, the establishment of an eruv chatzerot negates one's ownership. Therefore, greater leniency is shown.

Note the Birkei Yosef (Orach Chayim 528), which states that a blessing should not be recited.

The Mishnah Berurah 393:6 suggests using the same loaf of bread. Otherwise, it would be necessary to keep both loaves until the Sabbath.