Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

This involves the sanctification of the Sabbath, as explained in the previous chapter.

This involves the prohibition against labor on the Sabbath, as reflected in the first 24 chapters of this text.
ln the Guide for the Perplexed (Vol. 11, Chapter 31), the Rambam explains that the commandment to remember the Sabbath commemorates the Sabbath of creation and the holiness that the Sabbath brings into the world. The commandment to observe the Sabbath reflects the connection to the exodus from Egypt and thus emphasizes the dimension connected with the cessation of labor.

The explanation of these two dimensions is the subject of this final chapter of the Sabbath laws.
The Ramban (in his commentary on Leviticus 23:3) considers the honor of the Sabbath and the delight in it as required by the Torah itself. For the Torah (ibid) describes the Sabbath as a “holy convocation,” and the Sifra explains that that term implies that the day must “be sanctified, honored ... and delighted in.”

This is not an absolute obligation. One who fulfills it receives a reward, but one who does not is not punished (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 260:l; Mishnah Berurah 260:1).

The Rambam’s statements are based on Shabbat 25b. Note the Tur (Orach Chayim 260), which mentions that a person should wash his entire body. The Rambam’s decision is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 260:1), while the Tur’s ruling is quoted by the Ramah.

Shabbat 119a describes Rabbi Chanina as following this practice.

Our text of Shabbat 119a reads “Sabbath, the queen,” and indeed, this analogy is employed extremely frequently. From the Maggid Mishneh’s commentary, it appears that the Rambam’s version of that passage reads, “Sabbath, the king.” According to the kabbalah, the feminine term is more appropriate, because the Sabbath is associated with the sefirah of Malchut, which reflects a feminine dimension.

See also the Sefer Chassidim (quoted in the Mishnah Berurah 262:6), which emphasizes that a person must also endeavor to keep his clothes clean. For example, he should not hold a child until he covers his clothes.

As is the fashion of the wealthy. (See Hilchot De’ot 5:9.)

But not on Friday, so that they will have time to engage in other Sabbath preparations (Magen Avraham 242:3).

Two reasons are given: a) to enter Sabbath with an appetite (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 249:2), b) to allow oneself time for Sabbath preparations (Magen Avraham 249:4).

I.e., one should not arrange to hold a feast on Friday that one would not hold ordinarily during the week (Maggid Mishneh). This includes even feasts associated with a mitzvah (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.). One may, however, hold a feast associated with a mitzvah that should be performed on that day—e.g., a circumcision or the redemption of the first-born (Ramah, loc. cit. ). These feasts should be held as early as possible, and by no means should begin later than 3:00 PM (or the equivalent time according to the principle of “seasonal hours”), as will be explained.
Although the Ra’avad differs with the Rambam regarding this prohibition, the explanation offered above is accepted by most authorities.

This refers to an ordinary meal that one might partake of during the week. Although one is not required to refrain from eating, one should preferably not plan to eat a meal at this time (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

I.e., the prohibition begins nine “seasonal” hours after daybreak. Thus, on a day that begins at 6:00 AM and concludes at 6:00 PM, the time would be 3:00 PM. This time would be later in the summer and earlier in the winter.

I.e., even if the quantity of food the person eats is not great, he should prepare his table as if he is to partake of a distinguished meal.

This refers to the melaveh malkah meal that should be eaten at a table set in the same manner as at all the other Sabbath meals (Mishnah Berurah 300:1).

Note the Nimukei Maharai, which emphasizes that דוננ (“honor”) appears to refer to activities that are performed in preparation for the Sabbath, while גנע (“delight”) to the appreciation of pleasure on the Sabbath itself. Note, however, the Ramah’s gloss on the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 262:1). There the Ramah emphasizes that one should keep one’s table attractively set throughout the entire Sabbath, implying that although honoring the Sabbath begins with preparing for it on Friday, the mitzvah continues throughout the day.

See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the mitzvah of lighting Sabbath lights.

In Talmudic times, people would recline on couches while eating, and this is the intent here. The word הטמ also means “bed,” and the Mishnah Berurah 262:2 writes that it is appropriate that the beds of the house be made before the commencement of the Sabbath.

Shabbat 119b relates that a person returning home from the synagogue is accompanied by two angels, one with positive tendencies and the other with negative tendencies. When they enter the home and see it prepared for the Sabbath, even the angel with negative tendencies is forced to give his blessing that this setting be repeated in the week to come.

I.e., rather than think that involving himself in such activities will be demeaning, he should appreciate that these deeds will enhance his honor. Even if it is possible to have others perform these tasks for one, it is preferable to carry out certain deeds oneself. For there is nothing more honorable than to give honor to the Sabbath. In this context, Rabbenu Chanan’el refers to Kiddushin 41a, “lt is more of a mitzvah [to perform a positive action] oneself, rather than [to charge] an agent [with its performance].”

The examples quoted by the Rambam are taken from the description (Shabbat 119a) of the manner in which certain of the leading Sages of Babylonia would prepare for the Sabbath.

As a source, the commentaries point to Shabbat 118b, which states: “How should one delight in the Sabbath? With a dish of beets, large fish, and garlic heads.”

One should not worry about the expense, for Beitzah 16a teaches that a person’s income is fixed at the beginning of the year, with the exception of the money that he spends to honor the Sabbath and the festivals. A person need not be concerned with the cost of “honoring the Sabbath,” since he will be recompensed for the expense by an increase in his earnings

See the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 242:1), which states that one should earnestly endeavor to provide generously for the Sabbath and, if necessary, minimize one’s expenditures during the week to do so.

Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 242:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 242:3, which state that if possible—even if this entails pawning property—one should borrow to enhance one’s Sabbath meals. One may rest assured that ultimately one will be able to repay these debts. Beitzah 15b states that God promises, “Take a loan on My account. I will repay.”
According to this view, the directive “Make your Sabbaths as weekdays ... “ applies only when a person has no property to pawn and will not be given a loan on any other terms.

Pesachim 113a; Shabbat, loc. cit.

He should not, however, delay his meals for a lengthy period of time, so that he will not experience discomfort on the Sabbath (Magen Avraham 288:12).

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pe’ah 8:7), the Rambam cites Shabbat 117b, which states that this obligation stems from the fact that when describing the manna, Exodus 16:25 mentions the word ,םויה “today,” three times. In the verse, “today” refers to the Sabbath, and its threefold repetition indicates that three meals should be eaten on that day.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that with these words, the Rambam is emphasizing that a person who does not eat his meals at these times does not fulfill the mitzvah of eating three Sabbath meals. Although the Halachot Gedolot maintains that the times when one partakes of these meals is not significant, the Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 291:1) rules according to the concept explained by the Maggid Mishneh.

This directive is addressed, not only to the poor person himself, but to the administrators of the communal charity funds, as reflected in the Rambam’s ruling, Hilchot Matnot Ani’im 7:8.

Since the obligation to eat stems from the command to delight in the Sabbath, it is not applicable to these individuals, who will suffer discomfort from eating further. Note, however, the wording of the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.): “A person who cannot eat at all is not obligated to cause himself discomfort.”

Our translation is based on the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh, which differs with the Tur (Orach Chayim 291) in the interpretation of the Rambam’s words. The Tur maintains that the Rambam requires the recitation of kiddush before the third meal as well. Almost all the commentaries accept the Kessef Mishneh’s view.

The rationale for this ruling is that the obligation to eat three meals is derived from a verse describing the manna, and the manna was described as “bread” (Exodus 16:15).
Although the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:4) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, the Ramah adds in his gloss that there are opinions that maintain that a single complete loaf is sufficient. The Shulchan Aruch continues (loc. cit. :5), mentioning other views that allow one to fulfill his obligation by eating foods other than bread. Although the Shulchan Aruch favors the Rambam’s ruling, the later authorities agree that a person who is unable to eat a third meal of bread may fulfill his obligation by eating other foods (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 291:7).

This obligation stems from the fact that the manna did not descend on the Sabbath, and a double portion of manna descended on the previous day. To commetnorate this lechem mishneh (Exodus 16:22), a double portion of bread is placed on the table on the Sabbath.

Most authorities interpret the Rambam's intent to be that one is obligated to break bread on two complete loaves on the holidays. The Tur interprets the Rambam as requiring one to partake of three meals on the holidays as well.

Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 242:2 and the Mishnah Berurah 242:1, which state that there is no obligation per se to partake of meat, fish, or wine on the Sabbath. The intent is to eat foods that give one pleasure. It has become customary to serve these foods because most people derive pleasure from them.

This reiterates the theme mentioned in Halachah 7, that one should not overextend oneself financially סt provide for the Sabbath. The wording used by the Rambam here also allows us to appreciate the rationale for this ruling: Since the person will be putting himself under undue financial pressure, he will not derive pleasure from this indulgence.

This would prevent one from attending the house of study. (See Gittin 38b, which states that holding a meal at this time will lead to business misfortune.)

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 249:4 and the Mishnah Berurah 249:3, which state that at present, since people usually prepare generously for the Sabbath meals, there is no difficulty in coming unexpectedly if this cannot be avoided. Another related point: Although long distance travel has been greatly facilitated in the present age, one should always plan to arrive several hours before the Sabbath, lest one be held back by forces beyond one’s control.

Note the Radbaz (Vol. IV, Responsum 1266), who quotes the Rashba as stating that this prohibition has its source in the Torah itself.

In one of the Rambam’s responsa, he explains that although prayer and supplication are revered media of divine service, on the Sabbath our service of God is channeled through a higher medium: rest and spiritual pleasure.

In Hilchot Ta’aniot 1:1, the Rambam writes that one of the Torah’s commandments is to cry out to God and sound the trumpets at a time of communal distress. He continues in Halachah 4, stating that our Sages required the community to fast on such occasions. ln addition to drought, the Rambam mentions several other situations in Hilchot Ta’aniot, Chapter 3, which are described as times of communal distress.

This is a restatement of a law mentioned previously in Chapter 2, Halachah 24. Chapter 2 involves questions concerning pikuach nefesh, the threat to life, and that is the reason why exceptions are made in these instances.

Although the army will still be in a state of war, and agitation will thus not have been eliminated entirely, since three days will have passed since the siege began, we can assume that much of the initial confusion and strain will have passed, and the situation will have settled into a routine.

There are many people who get sea-sick on the first days of a journey. After three days have passed, however, they are likely to have grown accustomed to conditions aboard ship.
According to the Rambam, this prohibition applies only to ocean vessels, and not to river-boat traffic. There are, however, different rationales for the requirement to leave three days before the Sabbath. Among them:
a) By traveling on a ship, one goes beyond the Sabbath limits. Although there is an opinion that the Sabbath limits do not apply when one is ten handbreadths above the ground—as a ship usually is above the ocean or river bed—there is, nevertheless, no definitive ruling about the matter. (See Chapter 27, Halachah 3; see Maharik, Responsum 45.)
b) One may be forced to perform forbidden labor on the ship or, at the very least, have a gentile perform forbidden labors on one’s behalf. (See Rivash, Responsum 152.)
With regard to both these matters, these follow the alternate view mentioned above: that within three days of the Sabbath, since the Sabbath preparations have begun, one is not allowed to put oneself into a situation where one will inevitably break the Sabbath laws. If, however, one has put oneself into such a situation before the commencement of the Sabbath preparations, the status is different.
ln two of his responsa, the Rambam explains that the question of whether or not the Sabbath limits apply above ten handbreadths is relevant on dry land, but does not apply to water travel at all. Hence, it does not present a difficulty in the case at hand. His view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 248:2). Although the Ramah mentions objections, the later authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 248:3-4) follow the Rambam’s view
With regard to the performance of work, the Radbaz writes that, according to the Rambam, one may never put oneself into a situation in which one knows that one will inevitably be forced to perform forbidden labors on the Sabbath. (See Be’ur Halachah 248.) The Ramah (Orach Chayim 248:2) and the subsequent Ashkenazic authorities definitely do not accept this position. Moreover. from the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:4), it appears that the Sephardic community also agrees with the other view..

See Chapter 24, Halachah 6 and notes, where this law was originally stated and explained. It is repeated here to emphasize that because there is a mitzvah, the discomfort that will be caused by the journey is overlooked.

Two cities in Lebanon that are not far removed from each other.

For such a short journey is not likely to disturb one's ordinary functioning.

This applies to all people, not merely Torah scholars.

And thus are not prevented from engaging in relations.

Ketubot 62b interprets Psalms 1:3, “who gives its fruit in its season,” as referring to a person who engages in sexual relations on Friday night and not on other occasions. This is the practice of Torah scholars, who generally engage in relations only once a week (Hilchot Ishut 14:1).

For the hymenal blood is considered to be a distinct entity enclosed in the membrane, and thus this situation differs from others in which bleeding is caused (Rashi, Ketubot 7a).
Note the Magen Avraham 339:11, which mentions that witnesses should observe the yichud, the entry into a private chamber, of the bride and groom before the commencement of the Sabbath, so that all the contractual aspects of the marriage will have been completed at that time.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 3:9) derives the equivalence between the Sabbath and the entire Torah from Nechemiah 9:13-14: “On Mount Sinai You descended .... And You gave them straight judgments ... and good statutes and commandments. And You informed them of Your holy Sabbath.” The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Sabbath’s central importance stems from the fact that it is a sign of God’s constant renewal of creation.
Kinat Eliyahu explains the equivalence between the Sabbath and all the other mitzvot as follows: The dynamic spiritual activity of the Sabbath, carried out against a backdrop of rest and material satisfaction, reflects the goal and purpose of the totality of our Torah observance. It is for this reason that our Sages called the Sabbath “a microcosm of the world to come.”

The Rambam is borrowing the wording of Exodus 31:13,17.

This ruling represents more than a moral condemnation. Not only is such a person not acceptable as a witness and ineligible to take an oath in court, but all the restrictions applied with regard to gentiles—e.g., the prohibitions against gentile wine, gentile milk, and gentile bread—are applied to him. Similarly, he may not be counted in a minyan, nor be given any honor in the synagogue. (See Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 72:2.)
Many halachic authorities of the recent era (see Iggerot Moshe, Orach Chayim I, Responsum 33, and other sources) explain that there is room for leniency with regard to certain of these restrictions at present. Nevertheless, the overall attitude must still be one of stringency.
It must, however, be emphasized that the offspring of such Jews have a full portion in their Jewish heritage. Instead of shunning them, we must make every effort to draw them close to their spiritual roots. (See Hilchot Mamrim 3:3.)

Which the Rambam considers to be the ultimate reward, as he writes in Hilchot Teshuvah, Chapter 8.

It is the observance of the Sabbath that is described in the preceding verse in Isaiah, “And you shall call the Sabbath ‘a delight ... ,”’ which makes one worthy of the rewards mentioned in this verse.

Included in this private domain are all the houses located in the courtyard.

See Hilchot Shabbat 17:2,9.

The Maggid Mishneh notes that according to Torah law [op. cit.; see also the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 1:2)], it is permitted to carry within a lane, even though it does not have a pole or a beam. Nevertheless, it is then considered a makom patur and not a private domain.

As obvious from Hilchot Shabbat 17:2,8, a lane is an area enclosed by three walls and into which several courtyards open.

Based on the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Shabbat 17: 10, the Maggid Mishneh and the Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1508) state that the gates ofthe city need not actually be locked at night; it is sufficient that they are able to be locked.

Eruvin 21b states that when King Solomon instituted the requirement for eruvin, a heavenly voice resounded, quoting Proverbs 23:15: “My son, if your heart is wise, My heart will also rejoice.”
Sefer HaMitzvot Gadol asks why this requirement was not instituted in an earlier time, and quotes a letter of Rav Hai Gaon that explains that prior to King Solomon’s era, the Jews were very heavily involved in wars (to conquer the land of Canaan, and then to protect themselves from the Philistines and others). It was not until King Solomon’s time that the land was blessed with peace. Since an army camp is not obligated to heed the restrictions of eruvin (Hilchot Melachim 6:13), the practice was not instituted until the age when peace became the norm in Eretz Yisrael.

These all refer to dwellings that are intended to endure for an extended period (Maggid Mishneh).

This refers to a camp other than an army camp, as mentioned in Note 6.

The Rashba and the Ritba differ from the Rambam on this point and maintain that the travelers in a caravan are required to establish an eruv, and the dwellers of a camp are not. Note the explanation of their difference of opinion in the Be’ur Halachah 366.

As mentioned in Halachah 2, the obligation to establish an eruv was instituted to apply to people living in separate dwellings in a single domain. Since these structures are not enduring by nature, the people are not considered to be living in separate dwellings, and the restriction against carrying is therefore not instituted. (See Mishnah Berurah 366:12.)

See Hilchot Shabbat 14:1 and notes, which discuss the Rambam’s opinion that deserts are a public domain.

The Lechem Mishneh comments that according to this logic, it would be unnecessary to forbid taking articles out from homes to a courtyard. He continues, explaining that this restriction is also necessary so that children who are knowledgeable only about what goes on in their homes and the adjacent courtyard will be aware of the obligation of making an eruv.

In this halachah, the Rambam is clarifying that the distinctions between different domains with regard to the laws of ownership could create confusion with regard to the domains of the Sabbath. As a safeguard, King Solomon instituted the laws of eruvin.
The Tosafot Yom Tov (Eruvin 7:1) maintains that it is the Rambam’s view that a group of houses adjacent to each other without a courtyard does not require an eruv; that is necessary only when there is jointly owned property in the private domain. The Tosafot Yom Tov himself differs from this position and requires an eruv in such a situation. In practice, it is not customary to require an eruv unless there is jointly owned property in the domain.

Eruvin 81a states that this law was instituted to prevent quarrels among neighbors that might arise if one gave a whole loaf and one gave only a portion of a loaf. As stated in Halachah 16, every family in the courtyard gives a whole loaf. (See the notes on that halachah.) The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 366:7) states, however, that if an eruv is established by one person on behalf of others, without collecting flour or loaves of bread from the other inhabitants of the courtyard, it is possible to use a loaf that is not whole.

A large measure of grain, approximately 8 kilogram in contemporary measure.

A small Italian silver coin, weighing four barley corns (Hilchot Shekalim 1:3).

From the Rambam’s wording, it would appear that there is no minimum measure required for the size of the loaf; as long as it is whole, it is sufficient, regardless of how many people dwell in the courtyard. Rav Moshe HaCohen and others differ, interpreting Eruvin 80b as requiring the loaf to be large enough to include a measure the size of a dried fig for each of the inhabitants (as the Rambam states in the following halachah regarding a shituj). It is Rav Moshe HaCohen’s view that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 366:6, 368:3).

I.e., wheat, barley, spelt, oats, and rye.

Based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Sh’vi’it 2:7), we have translated זרוא as rice, and ןחוד as millet. There are, however, different opinions concerning this matter. (See Magen Avraham 208:9; Turei Zahav 208:11.)

For it is not common to make bread from millet.

Rashi (Eruvin 71b) explains the difference between the eruv established in a courtyard and theshituf established in a lane as follows: An eruv is necessary in order to consider all of the dwellings as the mutually-owned property of all the members of the courtyard. Since the establishment of a location as a dwelling is a significant halachic act, it is necessary to use a significant food, bread. In contrast, the shituf joining together different courtyards is a far looser arrangement. Hence, other foods are also acceptable.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 3:1), the Rambam explains that mushrooms and truffies are a very base type of food. Hence, they are not considered acceptable.
In his gloss on the Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 386:5), the Vilna Gaon writes that the exclusion does not apply to cooked mushrooms and truffles, for they are considered foods of high quality. Sefer HaKovetz differs and refutes all the proofs brought by the Vilna Gaon.

By themselves, these are considered to be fit to prepare food, but not to be foods themselves (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit.). When mixed together as brine, they are suitable as a dip.
When quoting this ruling, the Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 386:5) mentions the opinion of Tosafot (loc. cit.) that the brine must also be mixed with oil. Without this, the brine is unfit for use as a dip.

As stated in Hilchot Shabbat 18: 1, one is liable for transferring an amount of food equal to the size of a dried fig from one domain to another. Therefore, this is the size of the measure chosen to establish a shituf. (See Eruvin 80b.)

According to Shiurei Torah, the size of an egg is 57.6 milliliters.; according to the Chazon Ish, it is 100 milliliters.

The principle on which this halachah is based is expressed by Eruvin 29b: “For side dishes [that are eaten together with bread], the minimum measure is the amount [of these dishes] eaten at two meals. For food that is not a side dish, an amount large enough to eat two meals from it.”
In Talmudic times, bread was the staple food that was generally served as the basis for a meal. Smaller quantities of other foods were also eaten at a meal, together with bread as “side dishes.” Accordingly, if the food in question is usually eaten together with bread as a side dish, it is necessary to bring only the quantity that would usually be consumed as a side dish in a meal. If, however, the food is not usually eaten with bread, but instead is itself a staple that can be used as a staple instead of bread, the full amount necessary for two meals is required.

The Rambam gives several examples of the minimum amounts required for side dishes in the following halachah.

In contrast to the cooked wine mentioned in the previous halachah.

See Hilchot Matnot Ani’im 6:8, which mentions this and several of the other measures cited by the Rambam in this halachah as “sufficient to satisfy” a poor man, and therefore fit to be given to him as “the tithe of the poor.” Significantly, there it mentions “ten nuts,” leading the Maggid Mishneh to consider amending the text here.

Raw vegetables are eaten in salads, and cooked vegetables are eaten as foods, but partially cooked vegetables are not eaten at all. The Ra’avad maintains that this restriction applies only to beets, but the Maggid Mishneh explains that the same rationale—and therefore the same ruling—applies to other vegetables as well.

The Rambam defines this and several of the other measures he mentions in the following halachah.

A parasitic plant that grows on shrubs.

A wild plant that is occasionally used for food. Some commentaries reverse the definitions of cuscuta and lichen.

When the leaves grow long, they are called scallions and are edible. Before they grow long, however, they are bitter, and unfit to be used.

The Rambam’s statements are based on the statements ofthe Mishnah (Me’ilah 4:7), which he interprets as referring to both an eruv t’chumim ( an eruv to extend the Sabbath boundaries) and a shituf The Ra’avad differs and maintains that the reference is only to an eruv t’chumim. Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Me’ilah, loc. cit.), the Rambam mentions only an eruv t’chumim, seeming to imply that he originally held the same view as the Ra’avad. The Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 386:4) follows the ruling of the Rambam in this halachah.

Rashi differs and defines a Roman pound as equaling a log, four revi’iot.

A revi'it, the measure on which all the other measures mentioned in this halachah is based, is 86.4 milliliters according to Shiurei Torah, and 150 milliliters according to the Chazon Ish.

See also Hilchot Shekalim 1:3.

Rav Moshe HaCohen objects to the Rambam’s statements, because equal volumes of wine and water are not equal in weight.

In Hilchot Tefillah 15:4, the Rambam defines a revi’it as the volume of an area two fingerbreadths by two fingerbreadths, which is two and seven tenths of a fingerbreadth high.

This refers to an eruv t'chumim, as stated in Halachah 8, an eruv for a courtyard may be established only with bread.

Who may not partake of wine (Numbers 6:3).

Although it may be eaten only by a priest (Leviticus 22:10, Numbers 18:12).
Although this law is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 386:8), Shulchan Aruch HaRav 386:8 and the Mishnah Berurah 386:47 note that in the present age, even the priests are ritually impure, and are therefore forbidden to partake of terumah. Hence, terumah may no longer be used for an eruv.

According to Rabbenu Asher and the Tur ( Orach Chayim 386), the word “partake” is exact. Were a person to vow not to benefit from a food, he would be forbidden from using it for this purpose. (Others differ and maintain that since “the mitzvot were not given for our benefit,” using the food for an eruv does not violate one’s vow.) Shulchan Aruch HaRav, loc. cit., suggests that one should be stringent and follow the Tur’s ruling.

Food from which terumah and the tithes have not been separated, and that is hence forbidden to be eaten.

E.g., produce that grows in containers (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Berachot, loc. cit. ).

This refers to an instance in which the first tithe was separated before terumah. Before it is permitted to partake of the tithe, it is necessary to separate terumah from it (ibid.).

The second tithe may be eaten only in Jerusalem, and consecrated articles may not be used for mundane purposes. These articles may be redeemed and then used for mundane purposes. In this instance, however, we are speaking about a situation where the redemption was improperly performed—e.g., one used uncoined metal (ibid.).

Produce from which we are unsure whether the tithes were separated or not. (See Hilchot Ma'aser 9:1.)

When the second tithe or consecrated articles are being redeemed, it is necessary to add an additional fifth of the article’s value. Nevertheless, once the value of the article itself is paid, even though the additional fifth is still outstanding, the article is considered redeemed and may be used for mundane purposes.

The Ra’avad and Rav Moshe HaCohen differ with the Rambam and state that it was customary to collect a portion of flour from all the houses in the courtyard and then to bake a single loaf from it. Others mention the custom that one person would bake a loaf from his own flour and grant everyone a portion in it. (See Ramah, Orach Chayim 366:6.)

See Halachah 18.

The place where the eruv is stored must be fit to serve as a dwelling. All the examples that the Rambam mentions as acceptable can serve as a dwelling if necessary. By contrast, all those that he mentions as unacceptable are not fit to serve as a dwelling.
The Ramah (loc. cit.:3) states that since, at present, since a shituf is established for a larger area, it is unnecessary to be placed in a dwelling. For this reason, it is permitted—and this is indeed the custom—to place the in the synagogue.

A Greek architectural structure with two or three walls.

For the blessing should be recited before the mitzvah is carried out. The Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 395) states that it is preferable to recite the blessing before one begins gathering the bread or the flour from each household. The later authorities, however, state that one may recite the blessing after completing the collection (Shulchan Aruch Harav 366:18; Mishnah Berurah 366:81).

Even though the mitzvah of establishing an eruv was ordained by our Sages, it is proper to praise God when fulfilling His commandments, because carrying out the decrees of the Sages also fulfills God's commandments (Hilchot Berachot 11:3).

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 366:15) states that one should add “And from the courtyard to the houses and from the houses to the courtyard.”

Eruvin 49a explains that by having the loaf of bread they gave for the eruv located in a house, the other people who join in the eruv show that they have the right to dwell in that house. The perr,on who actually dwells in the house where the eruv is kept, by contrast, does not need any further indication that it is his home.

ln his Commentary on the Mishnah (Gittin 5:8), the Rambam explains that since the person in whose home the eruv is kept benefits (for he does not have to contribute toward it), it is proper to continue offering him this benefit. The commentaries note that this interpretation appears to differ from that of the Talmud ( Gittin 60b ), which states that it should be kept in the original house because of “suspicion.” (According to Rashi, this means the suspicion that will arise when people enter the house where the eruv is usually held, and see that there is no eruv there; according to Tosafot, it is intended to belie the suspicion that the place of the eruv was changed because the person in whose house it was kept stole from it.)

See Halachah 9.

I.e., the governing principle is that the shituf must be kept in a protected place. A courtyard is acceptable for this purpose, because it is the private property of the inhabitants of the houses that adjoin it. The lane itself, however, is public property, and therefore unacceptable.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes geonim who agree with the Rambam, but also other authorities who state that lifting up the container is necessary only when the container belongs to another person and he is granting the inhabitants of the lane the right to use it. To manifest their acquisition, they are required to lift it up a handbreadth above the ground.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo explains that, according to the Rambam, it makes no difference if the container is held in a courtyard or in a home; it should always be lifted a handbreadth above the ground so that it will be obvious. Nevertheless, in his Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 386:9), Rav Karo quotes the other opinion mentioned by the Maggid Mishneh.

One may use the term eruv, which means "joining," since a shituf also involves a joining together of all the courtyards in the lane (Mishnah Berurah 395:2).

The Ramah (loc. cit.) states that one should also add “from the courtyards to the houses” in this statement. (See Halachah 19 and notes.)

The Maggid Mishneh explains that both these containers must be located in the same house. This stipulation is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 366:4).
Commenting on this ruling, the Mishnah Berurah notes that when a shituf is made for an entire community, it should be placed in one synagogue. lt is not proper to divide it and place a portion in each of the community’s synagogues.

Although a lane is a private domain according to the Torah, and one might therefore assume that a single shituf would be sufficient, Eruvin 71b requires that the inhabitants of the courtyards establish eruvin. Otherwise, it is possible that their children will grow up and carry in a courtyard without establishing either a shituf or an eruv because of their ignorance of the matter.

The bread must be a whole loaf, and it must be placed within a house. Otherwise, it is unacceptable for use as an eruv (Mishnah Berurah 387:6).
It is customary to use bread (more particularly, matzah) as a shituf and to place the shituf for the entire community in the synagogue. This creates a slight difficulty, because a synagogue may not be used as a dwelling. The Ramah (366:3, 387:1) uses this as support for his thesis that at present, once a shituf is made, there is no need for the courtyards to make eruvin. (See also Chapter 5, Halachot 13-14.)

Since bread is the staple of our diet, it will be noticed by the children (Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim387).

Provided they are eating within a house (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 366:11).

The Maggid Mishneh states that this law applies regardless of whether the food was owned mutually, or belonged to one person. For, as stated in the following halachah, a person may grant others a portion in his food, and establish an eruv or a shituf on this basis.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo mentions opinions that require the person who receives the food on behalf of the inhabitants of the courtyard or the lane to live there himself, as well. He, however, appears to reject this view and does not mention it in his Shulchan Aruch.

I.e., the person gives the bread or the food to the recipient and asks him to take possession of it on behalf of all the inhabitants of the courtyard or the lane. Afterwards, since they have a share in the food, it is considered as though they had contributed toward the eruv.

In this ruling, the Rambam follows the simple interpretation of the Mishnah (Eruvin 7:6). Tosafot (Eruvin 79b) differs and interprets the words םינזפק and םילודג in terms of financial dependence. םינזפק refers to children dependent on their parents even if they are past the age of majority. םילודג refers to children independent of their parents even if they are below the age of majority.
The Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 366: 10) states that at the outset, it is desirable to satisfy both views. After the fact, as the Ramah states explicitly, as long as a person made an eruv in accordance with either of these opinions, it is acceptable.

Because the financial status of a Hebrew servant is independent of that of his master.

The Hebrew term for this expression (quoted by the Rambam from Eruvin, loc. cit.) is ודיכ םדי—literally, “their hand is like his hand.” Since they have no independent financial status, it is as if the article has never left the possession of its original owner.

Although she is a minor, her status differs from that of the owner’s children, because she is not at home.

This principle applies in several different financial contexts. If a person takes possession of an article on behalf of a colleague, it becomes the latter’s property even though he himself is unaware of the transaction. (See also Chapter 5, Halachot 4 and 23.)

An eruv extending one’s Sabbath boundaries, by contrast, should be established before sunset. (See Chapter 6, Halachah 13.)

The time between sunset and the appearance of three stars.

See Chapter 6, Halachah 14.

Since the requirement to establish an eruv is a Rabbinic institution, we follow the principle: Whenever a doubt arises regarding a question of Rabbinic law, the more lenient option is followed.

This refers to a labor forbidden by the Torah itself. If the act is forbidden merely by Rabbinic law, the eruv is acceptable, for a sh’vut is not forbidden beyn hash’mashot (Maggid Mishneh ). (See Chapter 6, Halachah 10, and Hilchot Shabbat 24: 10.)

The tenth of the tithe, which the Levites must give to the priests.

I.e., it is as if the terumah or the terumat ma'aser had not been separated at all. (See also Chapter 6, Halachah 16.)

Rather than consider a courtyard as being divided into small portions belonging to each of the homeowners, we consider the entire courtyard to be the joint property of all the inhabitants. When one ofthem does not participate in the eruv, this agreement does not apply, and it is forbidden to carry throughout the entire courtyard.
It must be emphasized that this halachah and those that follow apply only in a situation where the person establishing the eruv did not grant all other inhabitants in the city, lane, or courtyard a share, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 20. Today, this granting of a share is standard practice, and so it is unlikely that such situations would arise.

Eruvin 6:3, the source for this halachah, mentions only an accidental oversight. The consensus is that according to the development of the concept in the Gemara, the same rules apply regarding a willful decision.

The subordination (בִּטּוּל in Hebrew) of the ownership of one's domain is a halachic institution devised by our Sages for situations of this nature. It gives the others the formal rights of ownership. After the person has subordinated his ownership, there no longer exists a person with a share in the courtyard who is not participating in the eruv.

Rashi and Rabbenu Asher (Eruvin 79b) maintain that in addition to subordinating the ownership of his share in the courtyard, the person who did not participate in the eruv must lock the door of his home so that he will not be tempted to transgress and take articles out. He may open the door to leave, but must lock it immediately thereafter.
Rav Y osef Karo mentions this view in the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 380:1). Shulchan Aruch HaRav 380:2 states that one may rely on the Rambam’s ruling.

Similarly, they may carry within the courtyard itself. The person who did not participate in the eruv may also carry within the courtyard and to and from the homes of the others, because he is considered as a guest (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 380: 1 ).

Since the guest does not own a share of the domain, his participation or lack of participation in the eruv is of no consequence.

The Turei Zahav 380:1 explains that the Rambam’s intent is that if he merely said “1 subordinate my domain to all of you,” one might interpret his intent as “to most of you.” Therefore, it is necessary to be more specific.
Rashi (Eruvin 26b) differs and maintains that it is sufficient for the person to say, “1 subordinate my domain to all of you,” without explicitly mentioning each person. The Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 380: 1) mentions both opinions. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 380: 1 and the Mishnah Berurah 380:5 state that one may rely on the more lenient view.

Although the heir would not hav~ been able to subordinate the domain before the Sabbath began, should he consent to do so on the Sabbath itself, the eruv is acceptable. (See also Halachah 7.)

This ruling is the subject of a debate between the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel (Eruvin 6:4). The School of Shammai maintains that subordinating one’s domain is comparable to a transfer of property, and therefore requires that it be performed before the commencement of the Sabbath. The School of Hillel differs, explaining that it is considered to be merely the removal of one’s authority, and hence may be performed on the Sabbath itself (Eruvin 71a).

Needless to say, should one have actual guests, the fact that many guests stay in one home does not affect whether or not one is allowed to carry. When, however, we are speaking about guests merely in the halachic sense of the word, many persons are not considered the guests of one individual (Mishnah Berurah 380:18).

Since they did not participate in the eruv, they may not benefit from it. Nor can they be considered to be guests, for the halachic conception of a guest does not apply when more than one individual is involved.

There will still be two individuals who have a share in the courtyard and are not partners in the eruv. Hence, carrying in the courtyard is forbidden.

Note the Ra’avad, who questions why the Rambam does not explain, as does Eruvin 70a, the source for this halachah, that this refers to an instance when a courtyard was shared by three people, two made an eruv, but not the third. On the Sabbath, one of the two who participated in the eruv died, and one of the two remaining desired to subordinate the ownership of his domain to his colleague.

If two adjoining courtyards open up to each other and both open up to the public domain, it is forbidden to carry from one to the other unless an eruv is made. Nevertheless, even if an eruv was not made, the inhabitants of one courtyard (A) may allow the inhabitants of the other (B) to carry within courtyard (A) by subordinating their ownership of their domain. In such an instance, the inhabitants of courtyard (A) may not carry within their domain.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 381:3) explain that this refers to a situation in which a ruin lies between two houses. If an eruv is not made, the two can carry in the area of the ruin by subordinating their rights to each other.

The Magen Avraham 381:1 states that when the person s.ubordinates the ownership of his share of the courtyard, but not his house, this restriction applies only when the person takes an article from his house to the courtyard. If he takes an article from the courtyard to his house—although he is forbidden to do so—his act does not nullify his subordination of the ownership of his property. The rationale is that since he no longer has a share in the courtyard, it can be understood that he desired to remove his property from there. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 381:1 accepts the Magen Avraham’s ruling, while the Mishnah Berurah 381:3 does not.

It appears that the Rambam’s intent is that by carrying, he makes it obvious that he no longer abides by his commitment to subordinate the ownership of his property. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav, loc. cit., which states that the reason why the others are prohibited to carry is that the person’s act shows that his commitment was not genuine at the outset.)

Rashi (Eruvin 61b) states that this rule applies when, after the commencement of the Sabbath, the inhabitants of the courtyard make use of the domain that was subordinated. The Tur and others differ and maintain that even if they make use of the domain before the commencement of the Sabbath, it is acceptable. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 381:1) mentions both views, but appears to favor the Tur. Shulchan Aruch HaRav (loc. cit.) and the Mishnah Berurah (381:6) state that Rashi’s view should be followed. After the fact, however, Shulchan Aruch HaRav maintains that we may rely on the Tur’s ruling.

Eruvin, loc. cit., states that Rabban Gamliel related the following incident: A Sadducee was living in the same lane as his family. One Sabbath, the Sadducee consented to subordinate the ownership of his domain. Rabban Gamliel’s father told him to hurry and take some of their property out to the lane, so that the Sadducee would not be able to nullify his commitment.

As mentioned in Hilchot Shabbat 16:22, a partition erected on the Sabbath itself is considered. valid and establishes an area as a private domain. N evertheless, although according to the Torah one would be allowed to carry in this domain, it is forbidden by Rabbinic law to do so unless an eruv is established. That must be done before the commencement of the Sabbath.

Accordingly, since it was forbidden to carry within this area for a portion of the Sabbath, it remains forbidden for the entire Sabbath.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this refers to a situation in which the original owner joined in an eruv for the Sabbath in question. If the heir lived outside the courtyard and did not participate in theeruv, he causes carrying to be forbidden, because at the commencement of the Sabbath the owner of this dwelling did not participate in the eruv. The Maggid Mishneh also clarifies that, as reflected in Chapter 4, Halachot 1 and 6, this restriction applies only when the heir comes to dwell in the house for the Sabbath. He also notes that, as stated in Halachah 2, the heir may subordinate his ownership of the domain on the Sabbath. These rulings are quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 371:4).

Since it was permitted to carry for a portion of the Sabbath, it is permitted to carry for the entire Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh).

And therefore did not join in the eruv of the courtyard.

The heir’s participation in the eruv for the sake of his own home is also effective regarding the home that he inherits.

For the dwelling inherited by the heir was not included in the eruv at the commencement of the Sabbath.

Upon the death of a convert who has not fathered any children born after his conversion, his property is ownerless and is acquired by the first Jew who takes possession of it (Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 1:6).

Both clauses of the halachah refer to a situation in which the original Jew and the convert had made an eruv previously.

If, however, the convert’s dwelling remains ownerless, the other individual may carry on the Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 271:27).

Since the dwelling was ownerless at the commencement of the Sabbath, there is room for the supposition that one should be allowed to carry throughout the Sabbath. Nevertheless, since it was fit for another person to take possession of it at the commencement of the Sabbath, our Sages considered it to be a separate domain (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 271:4; Mishnah Berurah 271:28).

For, as stated above, once an eruv is considered effective at the beginning of the Sabbath, it remains effective throughout the Sabbath, unless the fence surrounding the domain is opened.

A gentile who accepts the observance of the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants (Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6; Hilchot Melachim 8:10-11).

As reflected by Chapter 5, Halachah 16, this restriction applies only when the two Jews do not share a single dwelling themselves. lt is only when they would require an eruv themselves that the presence of a gentile makes it forbidden to carry. (See Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 382:1.)

And the Sages did not institute decrees governing uncommon situations.

See Hilchot Rotzeach UShemirat HaNefesh 12:7

The Sages made renting the only alternative, because they knew that this would not be easily accepted by the gentiles. They hoped that the difficulty and inconvenience this would cause would prevent Jews from living together with gentiles.

The Rashba mentions, however, that ifthe gentile is renting property from a Jew, it is not necessary to rent the property back from him when establishing an eruv. On the contrary, it is considered an implicit condition of the rental agreement with the gentile that his ownership not prevent the Jews from establishing an eruv. This ruling is quoted by the Ramah ( Orach Chayim 382: 1 ).

The laws applying to the establishment of an eruv in a city inhabited by Jews and gentiles are discussed in Chapter 5, Halachah 23.

The Be’ur Halachah 382 states that the Rambam’s wording implies that the sequence is significant. First, the gentile’s property must be rented, and then the eruv established. If the sequence is reversed, the eruv is not effective. Nevertheless, in conclusion, he writes that with regard to practice, an eruv is acceptable even if the order was reversed.

Sha’ar HaTziyun 382:31 emphasizes that it is not necessary for the individual to act as an agent for the rest of the Jews living in the courtyard. Even if he rents the gentile’s property on his own initiative alone, it is sufficient.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 382:17) mentions another instance when the same ruling applies: when the two Jews share the outer courtyard and the gentile lives in the inner courtyard alone. Since the gentile must pass through the outer courtyard, he is considered to have a share in it that must be rented.

Hence, it is necessary for the Jews to rent it, as reflected in the previous two halachot.

In this instance, either the Jew is living alone in the inner courtyard or he alone is sharing it with the gentile (in which case carrying would be permitted, as stated in Halachah 9).

Although making business agreements including rentals is normally forbidden on the Sabbath (Hilchot Shabbat 23: 12).

Regarding business agreements among Jews, a monetary value worth less than a prutah is insignificant. From Eruvin 62a, it would appear that the rationale for this ruling is that regarding business agreements among gentiles, a monetary value worth less than a prutah is significant. (See Hilchot Melachim 9:9.)
The Rambam’s wording, however, suggests a second rationale—that since the agreement is more of a Rabbinic requirement than a business arrangement, an agreement which does not comply entirely with contractual law is also acceptable. The Or Sameach explains that the concept stated by the Rambam is necessary. Otherwise, the rental agreement would not be strong enough to have bearing on halachic questions involving a Jew.

Based on Eruvin 80a, the Maggid Mishneh maintains that it is possible to rent the gentile’s domain from his wife even though he himself refuses to agree to such an arrangement.

Eruvin 63b-64a mentions that a gentile once refused to rent out his property, and the Rabbis were able to secure permission to carry in the courtyard through such an arrangement.

Since neither had rented the gentile’s property before the commencement of the Sabbath, it was impossible for them to establish an eruv (Halachah 9). As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 21, an eruv must be established before the commencement of the Sabbath. Hence, in this instance, the only alternative is for one to subordinate the ownership of his domain to the other.

More specifically, the person to whom the domain was subordinated may carry. The person who himself subordinated the domain may not carry unless his colleague subordinates his domain to him, as stated in Halachah 5. Nevertheless, what is significant about this halachah is that it shows that although carrying was forbidden in the courtyard at the commencement of the Sabbath, it may be permitted later on.

This halachah is based on actual incident that occurred concerning Resh Lakish and his student, Rabbi Chanina, when they were on a journey (Eruvin 65b ).

If, however, the original owner retains the right to store some of his goods on the property or use it in any way, we may rent it from him (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 382:18).

Needless to say, the rental agreement can be made with the tenant. The Rambam is granting an additional option: to make the agreement with the tenant. The Mishnah Berurah 382:62 adds that even if the tenant is present, the property may be rented from the original owner.

I.e., since the Jews established an eruv via the windows, it is possible to suppose that all the Jews would be considered to be a single entity. This, in turn, would cause them to be allowed to carry, as stated in Halachah 9. Nevertheless, the Rabbis did not allow for this leniency.

See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 2:4 and Hilchot Shabbat 30:15. As mentioned in 1ggerot Moshe, Vol. 111, Responsa 12, 21, and 22 (see also Be’ur Halachah 385), there are certain leniencies regarding the status of a person who publicly violates the Sabbath laws at present. Nevertheless, the overall attitude must still be one of stringency.
It must, however, be emphasized that the offspring of such Jews have a full portion in their Jewish heritage. Instead of shunning them, we must make every effort to draw them close to their spiritual roots. (See Hilchot Mamrim 3:3.)

Sefer HaKovetz and the Tzafenat Paneach state that, in contrast to a rental from a gentile, the rental fee must be equal at least to the value of a prutah. Nevertheless, the Rambam ‘s wording does not indicate such a ruling.

At present, the eruvim established in most modem communities include many Jews whose conduct does not, as yet, reflect complete observance of the Sabbath laws. These eruvim are acceptable, because, as is explained at the conclusion of Chapter 5, they are established with the consent of the local government, which acts on behalf of all the inhabitants of the city and grants the Jewish community permission to establish an eruv.

See Hilchot Teshuvah 3:8 and the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Avot 1:3), which explain that Tzadok and Boethus were talented students of Antigonus of Socho. Disillusioned with their master’s teachers, they started splinter groups with the intent of swaying the people from the observance of the mitzvot. When they saw the people’s loyalty, they adopted a new tactic, claiming that only the Written Law was divine in origin; the Oral Law, they maintained, was a human invention.