Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

As stated in Chapter 21, Halachah 1, these two reasons are the source for the prohibitions placed in the category of sh'vut.

This restriction stems from the fact that the verse mentions, "Restraining your feet."

Rabbenu Asher, in his gloss on Shabbat 150a, associates this prohibition with discussing matters that are forbidden to be performed on the Sabbath itself. This thrust is reflected in the decisions of Shulchan Aruch HaRav 307:1 and the Mishnah Berurah 307:1.

The Rambam mentions these principles in Halachah 3. In this context, it can be noted that all the examples the Rambam gives in this halachah reflect activities forbidden on the Sabbath.

For the verse specifically mentions speech, thus excluding thought from the prohibition. Nevertheless, as the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 306:8) emphasizes, "It is a mitzvah not to think of these matters at all. Instead, one's attitude should be that all of one's work has been completed."

According to the later authorities, this prohibition applies only when it is obvious that one's intent is to take care of one's own needs. If, however, it appears that one is merely taking a pleasure stroll, there is no prohibition (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 306:2; Mishnah Berurah 306:1). See, however, the notes on the following halachah.

2000 cubits from one's place at the commencement of the Sabbath. (See Chapter 27, where this concept is discussed at length.)

The Maggid Mishneh states that by mentioning "the end of the Sabbath boundary," the Rambam alludes to a concept stated by Tosafot (Shabbat 150a) - i.e., that if one's field is within the Sabbath boundary, there is no difficulty and one may walk to it on the Sabbath so that one can begin work on Saturday night. If the field is at the end of the Sabbath boundary, it is obvious that one is walking to proceed to one's field. When the field is within the Sabbath limits, by contrast, it is not obvious that one's intent is to perform forbidden labor.

Although the Shulchan Aruch 307:9 quotes this law, the Magen Avraham 307:13 questions the rationale, for the verse from Isaiah quoted above appears to prohibit walking to facilitate the performance of any activity forbidden on the Sabbath, regardless of the appearance created.

As explained in the following halachah, this refers to a task that is prohibited on the Sabbath itself.

See Halachah 8.

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 306:1), which states that this refers only to an animal that is able to walk on its own. If the animal is too young to walk on its own, it is forbidden to go and wait for it, since even if there were houses, one would be forbidden to carry the animal, because of the prohibition of muktzeh.

One may not, however, say, "I am riding," for riding is forbidden on the Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 307:30).

Similarly, he may ask the colleague to accompany him (Maggid Mishneh, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 307:8).

Although both the employer and the employee understand the implication, since the employer is not making a direct statement - but merely an allusion - this is permitted. The Maggid Mishneh associates this with the concept mentioned at the conclusion of the first halachah: speaking about forbidden matters is prohibited, but not thought. Since no forbidden matters are discussed, the fact that they are implied is of no consequence.

The Ramah (Orach Chayim 307:1) mentions that a person who enjoys talking about news and matters of this nature may engage in such discussions on the Sabbath, since this brings him pleasure. Needless to say, Torah scholars are encouraged to direct their attention to loftier matters (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 307:2).

The Maggid Mishneh equates activities which involve a mitzvah with matters of communal interest. He emphasizes that it is only the prohibitions against involvement with mundane matters that are relaxed because of the performance of a mitzvah. Other prohibitions - e.g., telling a gentile to perform a forbidden activity, or performing an act that resembles or that may lead to the performance of a forbidden labor (i.e., shvut) - are never relaxed, even for the sake of a mitzvah .

As the Rambam mentions (Chapter 6, Halachot 9-10), the prohibition against instructing a gentile to perform an act that is forbidden as a sh'vut is relaxed when a mitzvah is involved, but only when the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 307:5) mentions an opinion permitting us to instruct a gentile to perform a forbidden act for matters of serious communal need, and also a more stringent opinion, that even forbids giving a gentile such instructions. The Ramah also notes a more lenient approach that allows one to tell a gentile to perform a task forbidden by the Torah. In practice, the Rambam's view, as interpreted by the Maggid Mishneh, is accepted by most authorities except in cases where a great loss is involved. In those instances, the leniency mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch is accepted.

The Magen Avraham 306:10 gives as an example, calculating the cost of a feast associated with a mitzvah.

A mikveh must contain 40 seah to be halachically acceptable.

As mentioned in Hilchot Keilim, Chapter 22, a piece of cloth is susceptible to contracting ritual impurity only if it is of a specific size. There are different sizes, depending on the type of cloth.

Or for the benefit of a synagogue or other charitable cause.

From the discussion of this matter by the later Rabbis, it appears that this phrase has two meanings: a) to examine and inspect a situation where the communal interest is involved; b) to plan out a course of action to deal with questions of this nature, and even to execute that plan, provided the only prohibition being violated is involvement in mundane affairs - for example, to speak to the gentile communal authorities.

For earning one's livelihood is a mitzvah of great esteem. (See also Hilchot Matnot Ani'im 10:18 and the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Avot 4:5.)

The details of financial arrangements involved in the marriage or the instructions should not, however, be discussed on the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 306:6).

See Shabbat 12b, which states that permission to visit the sick and comfort mourners on the Sabbath was granted "with difficulty," because it runs contrary to the mood of pleasure that should characterize the Sabbath (Rashi). Significantly, the treatment of this subject in Shulchan Aruch HaRav 287:1-3 appears to reflect a different emphasis from that of the Rambam.

In this context, note one of the Rambam's responsa (208), which emphasizes the importance of refraining from reciting any prayers containing requests whether of a communal or an individual nature on the Sabbath or on festivals.

As the Rambam writes in Hilchot Eivel 14:6, one of the fundamental aspects of the mitzvah of visiting the sick is to arouse divine mercy on their behalf. Nevertheless, since it is forbidden to plead on the Sabbath, one makes a statement that acknowledges God's kindness. The phrase cited by the Rambam is also used as the basis of the Mi Sheberach prayers recited for a sick person in the synagogue on the Sabbath.

Our translation is based on the commentary of the Maggid Mishneh, which is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 306:3).

As the Rambam mentions in Chapter 30, Halachah 13, generally one is not allowed to set out on a sea journey less than three days before the Sabbath so that one will have already acclimated oneself to the travails of sea travel by the Sabbath. Nevertheless, because of the person's involvement in the performance of a mitzvah, this restriction is waived.

The later authorities maintain that particularly because a mitzvah is involved, if the gentile does not agree to halt the journey at the outset, one need not refrain from traveling with him (Mishnah Berurah 248:2).

The Torah gives a husband and a father the right to nullify vows made by his wife and daughter. (See Numbers, Chapter 30.)

The reason that all vows may be nullified on the Sabbath is that a vow can be nullified by a husband or father only on the day that he hears it. Therefore, if he were not able to nullify it on the Sabbath, he would never be able to nullify it in the future. To preserve this right, our Sages did not forbid nullifying vows on the Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh).

In this instance, only the vows that are necessary to be absolved for the sake of the Sabbath may be absolved on the Sabbath, since there is nothing preventing one from absolving the other vows on the following day (Maggid Mishneh).

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 322) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 114) count this commandment as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Note the Magen Avraham 339:3, which questions the Rambam's statements, asking why lashes that do not involve the violation of the Sabbath laws ares included in this prohibition. He explains that it is inevitable that the administration of lashes will result in bleeding.

Alternatively, the commandment teaches us that no cases of this nature may be judged on the Sabbath. The Minchat Chinuch (Mitzvah 114) favors this answer, for it also resolves another problem: Why is this restriction given the status of a separate mitzvah? Since the principle that the observance of a positive commandment does not supersede the observance of the Sabbath laws is already known, why is it necessary for the Torah to give us this commandment?

In his gloss on the Mishneh Torah, Rabbi Akiva Eiger notes that there is a principle that a person who refrains from performing a positive commandment should be beaten until he agrees to perform it. Since these blows are not given as punishment, but rather as a prod to motivate the person to observe the commandments, they may be administered on the Sabbath.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this explanation is an original thought developed by the Rambam.

The Tzafenat Paneach notes that when considering the minimum size of a pebble one is liable for carrying, Shabbat 81a mentions two opinions: a pebble large enough to throw at an animal and a pebble large enough to throw at a bird. He questions why in Chapter 18, Halachah 11, the Rambam follows the opinion that requires a pebble large enough to throw at an animal, when in this halachah the Rambam mentions a purpose to be served by a pebble large enough to scare away a bird.

In resolution, the Tzafenat Paneach explains that a pebble large enough to scare away a bird can serve a purpose as mentioned in this halachah. Nevertheless, as stated in Shabbat 79a, a person will not take the trouble of carrying an article that is tiny. Hence, the minimum measure for which one is liable for carrying must be more substantial.

Note the Mishnah Berurah 342:1, which states that this applies only when a person has not accepted the Sabbath. If, however, the person or the community in which he is living has accepted the Sabbath, these activities are forbidden even if a mitzvah is involved.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 4, which states that, "There is a doubt whether beyn hash'mashot is considered as part of the day or as part of the night." Although, as mentioned there, we act stringently regarding the observance of Torah prohibitions during this time, certain leniencies are granted regarding Rabbinic prohibitions, as the Rambam explains.

See S'deh Chemed (K'lalim, Pe'at HaSadeh 2:2) and others, who question whether or not the leniencies mentioned by the Rambam apply both beyn hash'mashot on Friday and beyn hash'mashot on Saturday. There is room to differentiate between them, because during beyn hash'mashot on Friday, the prohibition against these activities has not yet taken effect. On Saturday evening, by contrast, since the prohibitions have been in effect throughout the Sabbath, one might think that they need not be relaxed until the Sabbath has definitely concluded. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 342:1 rules that one may follow the more lenient view. See also the Be'ur Halachah 342 who mentions this issue.

Significantly, most manuscript copies of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 3:3) state that the prohibitions in the category of sh'vut do not apply during beyn hash'mashot, without mentioning the qualification that the matter must be pressing or involve a mitzvah. In one of his responsa (Birkat Avraham, Responsum 14), Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son, explains that the Rambam changed his perspective when composing the Mishneh Torah and adopted a more stringent view than he had originally held.

This is forbidden as a sh'vut, as stated in Chapter 21, Halachah 6.

This is forbidden as a sh'vut, as stated in Chapter 23, Halachah 5.

This refers to an eruv t'chumim (which allows a person to extend his Sabbath boundary), as stated in Hilchot Eruvin 6:9-10. Hilchot Eruvin 6:13, the Rambam states that during beyn hash'mashot, only an eruv chatzerot (which allows a person to carry in an enclosed area) may be made, but not an eruv t'chumim). The present ruling does not, however, represent a change of opinion. It is referring to an instance where the eruv was made before the commencement of the Sabbath, and the person merely desired to move it on the Sabbth.

Note the Birkat Avraham, loc. cit.,, which states that, even though tithing is itself a mitzvah, there is no obligation to tithe at a particular time. Here, the intent is that carrying out the activity beyn hash'mashot will allow the performance of a mitzvah that could not otherwise be performed. If that is true regarding tithing produce that definitely has not been tithed - e.g., to provide one with food for the Sabbath - one may separate tithes beyn hash'mashot.

As mentioned in Chapter 23, Halachot 9 and 14.

See Chapter 23, Halachah 15. Although tithing this produce involves a shvut and there is no mitzvah involved, this tithing is permitted, because the prohibition against using the produce is not that severe.

The Rambam's rulings here have aroused the attention of the commentaries. To understand his perspective, it is worthy to quote Chapter 12, Halachah 7:

Should a child desire to extinguish [a fire], he should not be allowed if he is acting on his father's behalf. If he is acting on his own initiative, the court is not obligated to restrain him.

Relevant concepts are also reflected in the Rambam's rulings, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 17:27- 28:

[When] a minor eats a forbidden food or performs a [forbidden] labor on the Sabbath, the court is not obligated to restrain him, for he is not of intellectual maturity.

When does the above apply? When [the child] acts on his own initiative. We may not, however, feed him [forbidden food] ourselves. This applies even to foods that are forbidden because of Rabbinic decree. Similarly, it is forbidden to accustom him to desecrating the Sabbath, even regarding matters that are forbidden as a sh'vut.

Although the court is not obligated to restrain a child [from eating forbidden foods], the [child's] father is obligated to rebuke him... to train him [to conduct himself] in a holy manner.

According to the Rambam, the court is never obligated to restrain a child from performing a prohibited act, regardless of whether it originates from the Torah itself, or from Rabbinic decree. The child's father, however, is obligated to educate him. If the father fails to do so, the court should rebuke the father if he allows his child to violate prohibitions that stem from the Torah. If, however, the prohibitions stem from Rabbinic law, the court is not obligated to rebuke the father.

This explanation of the Rambam's approach is based on the statements of Rav Yosef Karo in the Kessef Mishneh and on his rulings in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 343:1). The Ramah (based on Tosafot, Shabbat 121a) introduces a different perspective: that when a child has reached an age when it is fit to educate him in the performance of the mitzvot, the obligation to educate him falls on the court as well. Therefore, they are obligated to restrain him from transgressing Jewish law.

In this and in the following halachah, the Rambam sets the conceptual basis for the prohibitions described as muktzeh. The particular laws that result from these principles are described in the following two chapters.

See the notes on the beginning of Chapter 21, which use this halachah as a support for the principle that the positive commandment to rest on the Sabbath is more than just a restatement of the negative commandment not to perform forbidden labor.

Walking, talking, and carrying.

The three reasons mentioned by the Rambam are the product of his own original thought. The Ra'avad notes that the Talmud (Shabbat 124b) mentions a further reason: lest one come to carry articles from one domain to another.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam did not intend to negate the reason mentioned by the Talmud. Nevertheless, as Shabbat 123b mentions, the prohibition originally instituted was partially relaxed. The reasons why it was not relaxed entirely are stated by the Rambam.

The Rambam's wording implies that it is forbidden for a person to carry an article unless his act is purposeful. (See Chapter 25, Halachah 3 regarding which purposes are acceptable.) One may not carry a utensil, even one that is used for a permitted activity, without a purpose. (See also the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on that halachah.)

In many manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah, the text reads "a hammer to crack open nuts." A blacksmith's hammer is considered as a utensil that is used for purposes that are forbidden (see Halachah 7). Nevertheless, a hammer specifically used to crack nuts is placed in a different category. The need to make this distinction is avoided by our version of the text which refers to a hatchet.

As mentioned in the conclusion of the previous chapter, the Maggid Mishneh interprets the Rambam's statements as meaning that we are not allowed to carry a utensil for no purpose at all, even one that is generally used for a permitted purpose. This law is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 308:4).

There are, however, several leniencies suggested by the later authorities - e.g., using such a utensil for a permitted purpose and then placing it down where one desires (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:12; Mishnah Berurah 308:16). Alternatively, one may move it with one's feet or in a manner that is considered irregular (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:15).

I.e., utensils that are used for a forbidden purpose, as mentioned in Halachah 2.

After one picks up such a utensil and uses it for a permitted purpose, one may continue carrying it and place it wherever one desires (Maggid Mishneh).

They may not be moved at all, even if one desires to use them for a purpose that is permitted, or one requires the place that they are occupying (Ramah, Orach Chayim 308:7).

I.e., as indicated in the subsequent halachot, if a person set aside or prepared a stone or board for a specific purpose, it is considered a utensil and may be moved on the Sabbath.

No matter how large a utensil is, it is permitted to be carried it on the Sabbath if one would ordinarily carry such a utensil during the week (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:2). (See, however, Chapter 26, Halachah 11, and notes.)

Shabbat 122b differentiates between the doors of a chest - which are permitted to be carried if removed on the Sabbath (see Halachah 12) - and the doors of a house, which are not. The Rambam explains that the reason for this distinction is that, even though the doors of a house are considered utensils, it is unlikely that before the Sabbath commenced, one considered using them on the Sabbath. Therefore, they are considered muktzeh, as is explained in Halachah 9 and notes.

Rashi, by contrast, maintains that these doors are not utensils, and that is the reason it is forbidden to carry them.

The Rambam uses the word "even" both here and in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 17:1). It would appear that his intent is that it is taken for granted that doors that were removed before the Sabbath and were not prepared to be used for another purpose may not be used on the Sabbath. Even doors that were removed on the Sabbath and had been used as doors on this Sabbath may not be carried if they are removed.

See the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 311), which mentions certain leniencies regarding moving a corpse if one fears that it will begin to decompose.

Yevamot 80b states that a child born after only eight months will surely die. Therefore, even while he is still living, it is forbidden to carry him on the Sabbath.

Tosafot, Shabbat 135a, states that this ruling is no longer followed, since at present it is impossible to determine exactly when a child was conceived. Therefore, we cannot be certain of the length of time the mother was pregnant. Furthermore, the advances in medical technology have enabled us to save the lives of many babies who would surely not have survived in previous generations. At present, it is a mitzvah to attempt to save the lives of all premature babies, even if doing so involves performing a forbidden labor on the Sabbath.

Our translation of the above terms is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 17:2).

Significantly, this is the only one of the examples given by the Rambam that is not mentioned in the Mishnah (op. cit.). The Rabbis cite Eruvin 102b or Shabbat 124b as possible sources.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam uses this statement as proof that there is no prohibition against removing a splinter on the Sabbath.

Because it is no longer useful as a utensil (Shabbat 123a). Thus it resembles a stone which cannot be carried on the Sabbath. See Halachah 12.

Since there are times when it is preserved in this state for the purpose of removing thorns and the like (Rashi, Shabbat, loc. cit.).

Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:3, which states that not all utensils that are set aside as merchandise are intended solely for that purpose. Many storekeepers consider making personal use of the wares in their shops. In such an instance, one would be allowed to move the article on the Sabbath.

The word muktzeh means "set aside." Since a person would ordinarily have no thought of using such a utensil on the Sabbath, it is placed in this category. Even if he changes his mind afterwards and decides to use it on the Sabbath, this is forbidden. Since at the commencement of the Sabbath it was not his intent to use it, it may not be moved for the entire day.

The commentaries compare this law regarding merchandise to Chapter 26, Halachah 14, which states that food, even when set aside to be sold, is never considered muktzeh.

All these utensils are used for professional purposes that are forbidden on the Sabbath. Since they are delicate instruments, their owners will not use them for other purposes, lest they become damaged.

For these same reasons, it is forbidden to use the oil in the lamp, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 12.

It must be emphasized that, because the articles mentioned in this halachah were involved with the performance of a forbidden activity on the Sabbath itself, the prohibitions governing it are more severe than those applying to an article used for a forbidden labor. It is forbidden to move the articles mentioned in this halachah, even when it is necessary to use the place where they are located or one desires to use them for a permitted purpose.

As evident from Halachah 17, the present halachah refers to an instance when money was intentionally placed on the table. If it was forgotten there, more lenient rules apply.

Rashi, Beitzah 26b, derives this concept from Exodus 16:5, "On Friday, they will prepare what they have brought," which implies that the Sabbath preparations are completed on Friday, before the Sabbath's commencement. An article that is not prepared for use at that time may not be used throughout the Sabbath.

Kerosene produces an unpleasant odor. Therefore, even a metal lamp that uses it for fuel is considered repulsive.

This halachah grants permission to carry the repulsive article for other purposes. One is allowed to remove an article that contains filth from a room regardless, as stated in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 279:6, 308:34-35).

Although one would generally not think of using such a utensil because it is repulsive, since its use is not totally out of the question, it is not forbidden as muktzeh. According to the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 308:35), however, this leniency does not apply to a chamber pot. It is considered as too repulsive to use for other purposes.

Note the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger, which states that it appears that such entities may be moved only when one desires to use them for a purpose and not when one merely desires to use the place in which they are being kept. The Mishnah Beruah 279:19, however, differs and also permits moving the article when one desires to use its place.

Compare to Halachah 6.

The Merkevet HaMishneh notes that in this clause the Rambam mentions "before the Sabbath" after "on the Sabbath," because it is the greater inclusion. Since the doors were not fixed before the Sabbath, one might think that they are no longer considered part of a utensil, and hence it would be forbidden to carry them on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, since they are fit to be attached to their original utensil, they may be moved.

In the following clause, the Rambam mentions "on the Sabbath" after "before the Sabbath," because it is the greater inclusion, as explained in the following note.

When an article breaks on the Sabbath and it is no longer fit to be used for its original purpose, there is a difficulty. There is a difference of opinion among the Sages whether an object that is nolad - i.e., "comes into existence initially" on the Sabbath - is permitted or not. Since it was on the Sabbath that it first became possible to use the broken pieces of the utensils for this new purpose, it is possible to consider them as nolad (Magen Avraham 308:14).

The prevailing view is that objects that are nolad are permitted to be moved on the Sabbath. They are, however, forbidden to be moved on a festival. Accordingly, if an article breaks on a festival, it would be forbidden to move its broken pieces even if they were fit to be used for a constructive (other than one resembling the article's original) purpose Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:24].

It must, however, be noted that the Magen Avraham's conception is not accepted by all authorities. Many maintain that since these pieces were always fit for use - either as part of the larger utensil or in their own right - they should not be considered nolad (Be'ur Halachah 308).

Our translation follows the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah, even though there appears to be a printing error. To explain: In the Mishnah (Shabbat 17:5), there is a difference of opinion between the Sages. The first opinion of the Mishnah states that the broken pieces of a utensil may be carried provided they can be used for any constructive purpose. Rabbi Yehudah differs and maintains that the broken pieces may be carried only when they can be used for a purpose that resembles the intent for which they had originally been used.

Although the wording of the standard printed text follows Rabbi Yehudah's opinion, the examples he gives and the continuation of the halachah follow the other view. Significantly, many manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah state "provided the pieces can be used for a constructive purpose."

Although the Baal Halachot Gedolot and other sages of the early generations follow Rabbi Yehudah's opinion, in the later generations almost all the authorities accept the other view.

For they are no longer a utensil, and hence may not be carried, as stated in Halachah 6. Note the Ramah (Orach Chayim 308:6), who mentions that if the broken pieces of the utensil present a danger, they may be moved.

With the latter clause, the Rambam excludes objects that were never used as the coverings of utensils before the Sabbath, nor were they prepared for to be used for this purpose. Furthermore, if it is not common practice to use an object for this purpose - e.g., a stone - it may not be moved on the Sabbath despite the fact that it was used as a covering several times during the week (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:36).

(See also Rashi (Shabbat 126b), who states that we may carry a cover only when it is fit to be used as a utensil in its own right. His opinion is not shared by other authorities.)

According to the Maggid Mishneh, this refers to a utensil that is buried entirely within the ground and does not protrude at all. Since it is built in this manner, the Sages apply the laws governing pits and vats to it, lest people be unable to distinguish between them. If, however, a utensil that is attached to the ground projects from the ground, its cover does not require a handle, as will be explained (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:10).

This refers to covers that are not attached with a hinge, as is obvious from Chapter 10, Halachah 14.

By mentioning this law in this context, it would appear that the Rambam considers the rationale for the prohibition to be that without handles, the cover is not considered a utensil (Rav David Arameah).

Other authorities explain that when a cover lacks handles, its removal or placement resembles building. If, however, the cover has a handle, it is clearly distinguished as a separate entity that is intended to be handled (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:37; Mishnah Berurah 308:42). The Rambam touches on the latter prohibition, albeit in a slightly different manner, in Chapter 22, Halachah 25.

In Talmudic times, an oven was a separate utensil whose base was attached to the ground, but which protruded from the ground entirely. Therefore, it could not be confused with a pit or a vat (Maggid Mishneh). As the structure of ovens has changed throughout the ages, there has also been a variation in the laws governing their covers.

Based on Tosafot, Shabbat 43b, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 311:8) describes these laws with the term טלטול מן הצד, "carrying in an indirect manner."

An article that is permitted to be carried.

An article that is forbidden to be carried, because it is used for construction. More precisely, the term פגה refers to an unripe fig that is placed in the straw to ripen.

The commentaries question whether or not this refers to an instance where the coals are burning. Were the coals to be burning, there is the possibility that by removing the cake, one will extinguish the upper coals and cause the lower coals to burn. The Maggid Mishneh quotes Rashi (Eruvin 77a) as explaining that the coals have already been extinguished.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that the wording chosen by the Rambam differs slightly from that of the Talmud. The Talmud states "a cake buried in coals," while the Rambam speaks of a cake "lying on coals." Therefore, he maintains that the law stated by the Rambam applies even when the coals are burning.

Rabbenu Avraham, the Rambam's son (Birkat Avraham, Responsum 9), also shares that opinion, explaining that it is not absolutely necessary that the person will cause the coals to move, and this is not his intention. Therefore, there is no prohibition involved, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 5. (See also Hilchot Shegagot, Chapter 7.) Significantly, however, when Rav Yosef Karo mentions these laws in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 311:9), he cites the example of the fig and the straw, but omits mention of the cake and the coals entirely.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 311:8) emphasizes that this refers to an instance where the vegetables were placed in the earth for storage purposes and they had not yet become rooted there. Were they to have taken root in the earth, it would be forbidden to remove them.

If, however, a portion of its leaves is not protruding, it is not permitted to pierce them with a spindle and remove them. By doing so, one would appear to be creating a pit in the earth.

This is the opinion of the Maggid Mishneh. The Magen Avraham 311:21, however, mentions the opinion of the Tosafot, Shabbat 50b, from which it appears that this leniency would be allowed.

This is an example of the second principle mentioned in the previous halachah, that one may not carry a forbidden object because of a permitted object lying upon it. Note Chapter 26, Halachah 21, which mentions that exceptions to this principle are made to save a corpse from the heat or from a fire.

The bracketed additions were made on the basis of Shabbat 141b.

Shabbat 141b explains that this refers to a situation where the son might become sick if his father does not pick him up. If there is no danger of the child's becoming sick, the father is forbidden to pick him up (Magen Avraham 309:1).

A coin of the Talmudic period.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 309:2 mentions that it is even forbidden to hold the child by the hand that is not holding the coin.

The Magen Avraham 309:3 states that this refers to an instance where one firmly attached the stone in the hole, making it a permanent part of the basket. Otherwise, carrying the stone in the basket is forbidden.

Note the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 21:1), where the Rambam interprets this law and the one that follows as a single concept (as the Ra'avad does in his notes). According to that understanding, the leniency of using the stone as part of a container is permitted only when the basket contains fruit that will spoil if the container is overturned. Thus, the Rambam's decision here reflects a change of mind in favor of a more lenient ruling.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 309:3) mentions the converse of this principle. When the fruits are firm and will not be spoiled if the basket is overturned and they are spilled to the earth, the basket should be overturned before it is carried.

As mentioned above, the Ra'avad objects to this decision, based on his interpretation of Shabbat 142a. The Maggid Mishneh states that according to the text of the Talmud we have, the Ra'avad's interpretation must be accepted. It is, however, possible that the Rambam's text of the Talmud had a different version of this passage. Both the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 309:3) follow the Rambam's approach.

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) also mentions that if one needs to use the place where the basket with the stone is placed, one may move it without overturning it, even though it contains fruit that will not be spoiled. (See Halachot 17 and 20).

Shabbat 142b emphasizes that we are required to tilt the jug only when it is moved for the sake of its wine. If one moves it to use the place where it is located, there is no need to dislodge the stones. This ruling is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 309:5).

Were he to tilt the jug there, the falling stone might break other jugs.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 309:6 and the Mishnah Berurah 309:14 emphasize that if one's intent is only that the money should not be stolen, it is forbidden to shake it from the pillow.

The Ramah (Orach Chayim 309:4) states that the following restrictions apply only when one places a forbidden article on an article of one's own, and not when one places a forbidden article on an article belonging to a colleague. For a person cannot cause an article belonging to a colleague to become forbidden.

Note the Magen Avraham 309:6, which states that the word "intentionally" must be interpreted to mean "for a useful purpose." If, however, a person put down an article on another object intentionally, but with no particular purpose in mind, it is considered as if he forgot it there.

Since the article is forbidden beyn hash'mashot, the time of the commencement of the Sabbath, it remains forbidden for the entire Sabbath.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 309:4) also mentions the opinion of Tosafot, who maintain that a base for a forbidden object is created only when one's intent was that the forbidden object remain on the base for the entire Sabbath. If one intended to shake it off the base, or have it transferred by a gentile over the course of the Sabbath, it is not considered a base.

Although the Rambam's opinion is accepted by the later authorities, the more lenient view may be followed if there is a possibility that a loss will be caused - e.g., a lamp falls on a table (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 309:7).

Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 17:6) and Hilchot Keilim 20:1. Rashi and others render the Hebrew קרויה as a "gourd."

I.e., since the bucket is made of earthenware, it is not necessarily heavy enough to sink. Therefore, the stone is used as a weight.

In such an instance, the bucket itself becomes forbidden, because it serves as a base for a forbidden object (Mishnah Berurah 309:8).

This refers to a reed that was not altered to serve as a hanger. It is not considered a utensil and is therefore deemed muktzeh.

The intent is that one must hold the garment that is not muktzeh, and not the reed that is (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:16). The Mishnah Berurah 308:64 mentions that one must remove the garment without moving the reed. It is questionable, however, whether the Rambam would agree to that stringency, for this appears to resemble the other instances of טלטול מן הצד, "carrying in an indirect manner," described above.

I.e., produce other than grain, wine, or olive oil.

After the tithes have been given to the Levites, they are required to separate a tenth of the produce that they have been given. This produce is given to the priests and is governed by same laws as terumah. (See Numbers 18:25-32.)

Once terumah has contracted ritual impurity, the priests are forbidden to partake of it and it must be burnt.

The produce separated as the second tithe must be eaten in Jerusalem. When a person lives far from Jerusalem, produce that has been separated as the second tithe can be redeemed by exchanging it for money (Deuteronomy 14:24-27).

With the exception of the first fruits (bikkurim), produce is not offered in the Temple. If a person consecrates produce, his intent is that it be sold, and the proceeds given to the Temple.

Produce purchased from an individual on whom we cannot depend to have separated tithes.

When one redeems the second tithe or consecrated property, it is necessary to add a fifth of its value to the sum. (One pays 125%.) Nevertheless, as long as one has given the value of the produce, it is considered to have been redeemed, and the additional fifth is considered a debt. Note a parallel in Hilchot Eruvin 1:15.

It must, however, be noted that in Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 5:12, the Rambam writes that the sacred dimension of the second tithe is considered to have departed from the produce after it has been redeemed, even though one has not paid the additional fifth. Nevertheless, one should not partake of this produce, even on the Sabbath, unless one pays that fifth.

In contrast, in Hilchot Arachin 7:3, the Rambam writes that one is permitted to partake of consecrated produce after it has been redeemed, despite the fact that one has not paid the additional fifth.

The presence of an article that is forbidden to be carried does not cause the entire container to become forbidden.

Our translation follows the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah. The Kessef Mishneh mentions that the version of this halachah in the texts of the Mishneh Torah commonly available in his time read: "When does the above apply? When the impure [terumah] was below...." He, however, prefers the version found in our standard texts, because it parallels the text of Shabbat 141b. Significantly, Rav Kapach notes that both versions appear in ancient manuscripts.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that if the pure terumah is above, one should remove the pure terumah by hand, and then leave the remainder.

That were not cemented in place. Hence, there is a possibility that one will move them when one sits down.

The Magen Avraham 308:41 emphasizes that if one will not move the stones when sitting, there is no prohibition. Moreover, the Magen Avraham emphasizes that the prohibition against muktzeh pertains only to carrying objects with one's hands, and not to moving it with one's body. (See the following halachah.) Therefore, the intent in both clauses of this halachah is to carry the stones or the branches in order to sit on them.

I.e., performed a deed preparing them.

Although the Ramah (Orach Chayim 308:21) desires to equate the row of stones with the date branches, the Magen Avraham (loc. cit.) justifies the Rambam's ruling.

In contrast to the previous law, thought is sufficient to change the status of the date branches. This leniency is granted because date branches are often used to sit on. It was the person's thought to use the branches for kindling that caused them to be forbidden. Hence, his thought itself is sufficient to remove that prohibition.

By contrast, a row of stones is generally used for construction and not as a seat. Therefore, one must perform a deed that indicates one's desire to use the row to sit upon. Consequently, in the present era, when it is no longer customary to sit on date branches, in this instance as well one must perform a deed to indicate one's intent (Magen Avraham 306:40).

The person did not intend to use them as a mat in the future when he sat upon them. Nevertheless, since date branches are commonly used for that purpose, that is sufficient to cause them to be considered as a useful object (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:51).

In the Talmudic era, straw was generally used for the purpose of kindling. Therefore, it is classified as muktzeh. The Magen Avraham 308:53 notes that in his era, straw was used most commonly for animal fodder. Therefore it should not be classified as muktzeh.

For the prohibition against moving muktzeh applies only when one moves it with one's hands.

I.e., placing the pillow or sheet on it is a clear indication that one intends to use it as a mattress. Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 311:15 and the Mishneh Berurah 311:31, which state that if one puts straw on a bed with the intention of sleeping on it, one may spread it out by hand.

The bracketed addition is made on the basis of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 308:35), which states that unless the person sets aside a corner of the house for the earth, it is considered part of the floor of the house. This implies that the person emptied out the container, for otherwise the earth would remain a distinct entity.

This act indicates that the person plans to use the earth on the Sabbath. Therefore it is considered a designated article (מוכן). (See Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 2:18.)

In the ages prior to household plumbing, earth was necessary to cover urine, feces, and other wastes.

This law has already been explained in Chapter 5, Halachah 13. Were one to place the receptacle there before the commencement of the Sabbath, it would be permitted.

According to most authorities, nolad, an article that first comes into existence on the Sabbath, is not forbidden. Nevertheless, an egg laid on the Sabbath is forbidden to be moved. This is a decree enacted as a safeguard, lest one move an egg laid on a festival, as explained in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Beitzah 1:1).

One must, however, be careful not to move the forbidden article when covering it (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 310:6; note the gloss of the Ra'avad to this halachah).

Although there is an opinion in Shabbat 43a that states that one may carry an article only for the sake of an object that may itself be carried, this opinion is not accepted as halachah (Maggid Mishneh). (Note, however, the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh on Chapter 26, Halachah 22.)

I.e., water dripping from a leaking roof or the like.

There is no prohibition against carrying rainwater. Thus, in placing the receptacle there one does not nullify the possibility of using the receptacle later (Mishnah Berurah 338:30).

This pattern may be repeated any number of times.

Water with which one bathes need not be as clean as water that one drinks. Nevertheless, one will not bathe with water that is soiled. Although the Tur (Orach Chayim 338) differs with the Rambam and does not require the water to be clear, the Rambam's view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 338:8) and the later authorities.

The reason for the prohibition against placing a receptacle to collect the water is that one is invalidating the utensil for future use. The commentaries question this decision, noting that ultimately, when the receptacle becomes full, one is permitted to move it because it is repulsive. They explain that this restriction was instituted because, at the outset, it is forbidden to cause an article to become repulsive (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 339:9, Be'ur Halachah 339).

These leniencies are granted only within a person's permanent dwelling, as reflected in the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:34.

Literally, "a chamber pot."

Leniency is granted if there is a possibility of loss involved (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit. 308:37).

Produce from Eretz Yisrael from which the agricultural requirements (terumah and the tithes) have not been separated. Until these requirements are separated, the produce is not fit to eat and it is considered as muktzeh as explained in Halachah 19.

See Chapter 23, Halachah 15.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 13.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 313:7) emphasizes that one may use these utensils only to prevent the beam from falling further. It is forbidden to raise the beam to its original position, because that would be considered as if one were building.

Unless there is ample space, we fear that the pressure will be so great that it will be impossible to remove them later. Therefore, one will have nullified all future possibilities of using them (Shabbat 43a).

Based on Chapter 1, Halachah 6, one must add that the person must place down the mat in a manner that will not inevitably cause the bees to be snared (פסיק רישא). Were that to be the case, the person who places down the mat would be liable for snaring.

Which are muktzeh like all animals and fowl.

Although one is forbidden to carry the basket while the chicks are in it, one is not considered to have invalidated the possibility of using the receptacle, because one may move it after the chicks descend.

If, however, the chicks are in the basket throughout beyn hash'mashot on Friday, the basket becomes muktzeh (Mishnah Berurah 308:148).

Rashi and the Rashba (Shabbat 128b) explain the problem differently from the Rambam: that while the animal is standing on the cushions, it is impossible to move them. This interpretation is difficult, because one may move them after the animal departs,. According to the Rambam's interpretation, by contrast, there is no difficulty, because once the cushions are wet, they cannot be used. The Rambam's interpretation is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 305:19).

Although the prohibition against carrying an animal by hand is also Rabbinic in origin, it is more severe. Therefore, our Sages did not nullify it despite the suffering caused to the animal.

There are authorities who are more lenient and maintain that even the latter prohibition is waived because of the animal's suffering. The later authorities rule that one may rely on this decision in a situation where a great loss will be incurred. Moreover, they add that all agree that one may instruct a gentile to lift the animal from the cistern. This is preferable to placing the cushions and blankets there (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 305:26; Mishnah Berurah 305:70).

Needless to say, this is forbidden in the public domain, because it is forbidden to carry an animal there (Shabbat, loc. cit).

I.e., hold them by the necks or shoulders and direct them (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit. 308:40).

This is the Rambam's interpretation of Shabbat (loc. cit.). Rashi and the Ra'avad offer a different rationale for the prohibition against lifting a chicken: that the chicken will lift up its legs from the ground, causing one to carry it. This interpretation is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).

I.e., the object may be carried to perform a permitted task or because the place in which it is lying is needed (Chapter 25, Halachah 3).

The Maggid Mishneh writes that, for this reason, it is as though they are not considered to be utensils.

See Chapter 10, Halachah 3, and the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 15:2, which mention the use of a weaver's rope.

See Chapter 21, Halachah 3, which states that one may sweep a floor on the Sabbath only if it is paved. Since sweeping is permitted in that instance, however, it is considered a permitted activity.

Nevertheless, according to the Ramah (Orach Chayim 337:2), who forbids sweeping with these brooms even on a paved floor, a broom would be considered a utensil used for a forbidden purpose. The notes on that halachah mention the views of the later authorities.

Rashi, Shabbat 124b, states "to sit upon."

For this reason, a more lenient ruling is given than with regard to the row of stones mentioned in Chapter 25, Halachah 21, where one must indicate one's desire to use them on the Sabbath. (See Mishnah Berurah 306:73.)

Since they are not considered to be utensils. (See Chapter 25, Halachah 6.)

Although there is no utensil to cover there, since it is fit to cover a utensil one may take it to use for another purpose (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 306:7). Needless to say, one may carry it only less than four cubits.

As the Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) emphasize, this leniency applies only to the broken pieces of a utensil. Since it was originally considered a utensil, it remains in this category as long as it can serve a useful purpose. In contrast, a stone is not considered a utensil, even though it is fit to cover another utensil, unless it is designated for this purpose.

Although it is useful, since its owner discarded it before the commencement of the Sabbath, there was no intent of using it at the time the Sabbath commenced. Therefore, it becomes forbidden. (See Ramah, Orach Chayim 308:7.)

If, however, it is discarded on the Sabbath itself, its use is permitted, since at the time of the commencement of the Sabbath it was still deemed to be a useful article (Maggid Mishneh).

Our translation is taken from the dictionary of Rabbi Tanchum of Jerusalem. The Maggid Mishneh renders the term מקורזלות as "sharp."

Although stones are not considered to be utensils and therefore may not ordinarily be carried, an exception is made in order to allow a person to take care of his basic hygienic needs.

Because of the advances in civilization, the situations described in this and the following halachah are no longer common practice. Nevertheless, the motivating principle behind these laws - that our Sages allowed certain leniencies for the sake of human dignity and hygiene - is pertinent at all times.

In this context, it is worthy to note the difference of opinion mentioned by the Ramah (Orach Chayim 312:1): According to one opinion, it is permitted to carry these stones only in one's own courtyard; i.e., only the prohibition against carrying stones is lifted. A second opinion, however, maintains that the prohibition against bringing an article from a carmelit into the private domain is also lifted in this instance. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 312:4 and the Mishnah Berurah 312:8 favor the latter view.

I.e., the size of all three together may not exceed a fistful (Maggid Mishneh).

Rashi (Shabbat 81a) relates that since the earth is likely to crumble - and then it will no longer be useful for this purpose - the prohibition against carrying it was never lifted.

Rashi (loc. cit.) and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 312:1) explain that carrying the stones might entail extraordinary difficulty, which is normally forbidden on the Sabbath. An exception is made in this instance, however, for the reasons mentioned above.

There is no concern that one might be performing a derivative of the forbidden labor of grinding, nor of the forbidden labor of demolishing.

As a corollary to this principle, the Mishnah Berurah 312:6 mentions that it is permitted to carry toilet paper. Although paper is generally considered to be muktzeh, since the purpose for which this paper is used is clearly designated, it is not placed in this category. The Mishnah Berurah, however, emphasizes that tearing the paper on the Sabbath is forbidden.

Since a shard is sharp and might tear one's membranes (Rashi, Shabbat 82a).

Because in this instance the shard is smooth and will not tear one's membranes. Since the shard comes from a useful article, it is not muktzeh, as the stones are.

Since the grass is useful as animal fodder, it is not considered muktzeh. Therefore, using it is preferable to using the stone. Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 312:6), which states that one may use grasses that are still attached to the ground, provided one does not uproot them.

If the grasses are firm, there is a possibility that their sharp edges will perforate one's membranes (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:5).

The Ramban states that if they were discarded before the commencement of the Sabbath, they are considered to be muktzeh. This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 308:12).

The Maggid Mishneh cites the Ra'avad who states that this refers to the remnants of a tallit used for prayer, which are inappropriate to be used to clean filth. The Rambam, however, interprets this as referring to the remnants of all garments. Although the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:13) quotes both views, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:41 favors the Rambam's opinion, explaining that even though smaller pieces of cloth are fit to be used to clean filth, this does not cause them to be considered to be a כלי, "useful article," unless they are explicitly designated for this purpose. Therefore, they are placed in the category of muktzeh like stones.

The minimum size of a piece of cloth that is susceptible to ritual impurity (Hilchot Keilim 22:20).

Hilchot Keilim (op. cit.) mentions that a cloth three thumbbreadths by three thumbbreadths is fit only for the poor. A rich person, by contrast, will not consider a cloth valuable until it is a minimum of three handbreadths by three handbreadths. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 308:41 and the Mishnah Berurah 308:52 also apply these concepts with regard to our present halachah.

See Chapter 25, Halachah 12.

And thus perform a forbidden labor. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 308:16) applies this concept to other articles - e.g., a bench that has one leg broken off.

Hence, moving it at all is forbidden. (See Hilchot Eruvin 3:7, from which one can derive the following: A ladder leading to a loft is usually left there permanently. Therefore, it is a heavy structure that is not considered to be a כלי, a utensil, but rather a permanent part of the building's structure.)

Since it is usually moved from dovecote to dovecote, it is light and is therefore considered to be a כלי. Accordingly, if there were no room for suspicion that one would snare doves, one would be allowed to move it.

The Maggid Mishneh draws attention to Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 5:4, which states that the only reason the Sages permitted moving such a ladder on a holiday was to allow for festive joy (i.e., to permit one to bring doves to slaughter). Therefore, on the Sabbath, when slaughtering is forbidden, there is no reason to allow one to move such a ladder. A household ladder, by contrast, may be moved (Mishnah Berurah 308:78).

The Rambam describes the construction and use of such a rod in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 17:3).

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 313:1), which states that for a reed to be "categorized as a utensil," it is not sufficient merely to think about using it for that purpose; one must actually adapt the article to fit the purpose for which it is intended to be used.

I.e., it is used as a door stop. Thus, it resembles slightly the bolt mentioned in the following halachah.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 313:1) mentions two perspectives on this matter. Rashi states that one must prepare the reed for use as a utensil that can be employed for other purposes. Otherwise, using it as a door stop will be considered to be building. Rabbenu Tam explains that as long as the reed is prepared for use as a door stop, it is sufficient.

Although in this halachah, the Rambam's perspective appears to follow that of Rashi, in his gloss to Chapter 23, Halachah 13, the Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam follows the position of Rabbenu Tam. The later authorities agree that one may rely on Rabbenu Tam's view (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 313:2; Mishnah Berurah 313:7).

Rashi and others explain that the difficulty with the doors mentioned in this halachah is that since they do not meet all the criteria of ordinary doors, closing an opening with them resembles building. The Rambam, by contrast, appears to maintain that the difficulty is whether doors of this nature are considered to be כלים, useful articles, or not. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 313:3) follows Rashi's view.

If the board used as a door lacks any sign of a hinge, it is not considered a כלי, a useful article, and carrying it is forbidden. In this instance, since it has the mark of a hinge, it was obviously used as a door in the past. Therefore, if it meets either of the other conditions mentioned by the Rambam, it may be moved on the Sabbath.

Our translation is based on Rashi (Eruvin 101a) and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.). More precisely, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Eruvin 10:8), the Rambam defines the Hebrew term מוקצה as "a distinct place that is not used for any purpose, nor is it required by its owner - e.g., a barn or stable."

The Shulchan Aruch emphasizes that the ruling concerning moving the partition used as a door is dependent on the fact that this enclosure is used infrequently. If an entrance that is frequently used were closed with such a partition, it would be considered as having been set aside for this purpose. However, since this is not the case, there is reason for the restrictions mentioned.

According to the Rambam, the fact that they were attached to the wall before the Sabbath indicates that they were intended to be used as a door. According to Rashi, it is sufficient to indicate that one is not building on the Sabbath.

The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam's wording appears to indicate that two criteria must be met: The partition used as a door must have at least the remnant of a hinge, and it must either be attached to the wall or be suspended above the ground. He objects to this conception, explaining that based on Eruvin 101a, it would appear that if a partition is suspended above the ground, it is considered to be a door even if it never had a hinge.

The Maggid Mishneh states, however, that it is possible that the Rambam also shares this conception. (Merkevet HaMishneh postulates that he surely does. Otherwise, the Rambam's words would be redundant, since it is impossible for a door to be suspended above the ground unless it hangs from the wall or is attached by a hinge.) The Maggid Mishneh's view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 313:3).

As in the previous halachah, Rashi and others explain that the reason the prohibition was instituted is that this door does not resemble an ordinary door. Hence, one appears to be building when closing it. The Rambam, by contrast, explains that the prohibition stems from the fact that the door is not prepared to serve as a כלי, a useful article. Therefore, moving it is forbidden, as explained in the previous chapter.

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 313:4), which states that even if the entrance has a doorstep, since it is uncommon to use a door made of a single piece of wood, such a door may not be used on the Sabbath. Moreover, the Shulchan Aruch continues, this prohibition applies even when the door has a hinge.

The Magen Avraham 313:8 and other later authorities, however, maintain that one may rely on the Rambam's opinion if a door is used frequently as an entrance and an exit. This is surely true in the present age, when it is very common for doors to be made from a single piece of wood.

Eruvin 10:10 relates that there was a synagogue in Tiberias that had such a bolt. Its congregants refrained from using it on the Sabbath until Rabban Gamliel and the elders ruled that using it was permitted.

In this instance as well, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit:1) is more stringent and requires the bolt to be tied to the door even when it has a bulb at the end. (See the following halachah and notes.)

For the fact that it is tied to the door clearly indicates that it has been set aside for a purpose.

This refers to an instance where the bolt is attached to a rope that is, in turn, attached to the door. If the bolt is removed by detaching the rope from the door and carrying the bolt and the rope together, the presence of the rope serves as an indication that the bolt has been set aside to be used for a significant purpose. Therefore, there is no prohibition involved. If, as in the following clause, the bolt is detached from the rope, there is nothing to indicate that it is a useful article. Hence, it is forbidden (Kessef Mishneh).

The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's interpretation of the Hebrew ניטל באגדו. Instead, he offers a different explanation: that the rope with which the beam is attached to the door with a knot that is strong enough to hold the beam when it is removed. This is the interpretation that Rav Yosef Karo follows in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 313:1).

It was permitted to use such a bolt in the Temple, because none of the Rabbinic prohibitions in the category of sh'vut were in effect there. Outside of the Temple, using such a bolt was prohibited for the reasons mentioned by the Rambam (or according to others, because this resembles building, Eruvin 102a).

Rav Moshe Cohen of Lunil and others question the distinction between this halachah and Chapter 22, Halachah 30, which mentions a piece of wood that is used to close a window. The Maggid Mishneh explains that in that instance, leniency was granted only when the piece of wood is prepared for that purpose. In the present halachah, by contrast, nothing has been done to indicate that the bolt is set aside for purposeful use.

It must be emphasized that the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) takes a different perspective and maintains that the restrictions were instituted lest it appear that one is building when using such a door. According to this perspective, unless the conditions mentioned above are met, it is forbidden to use this bolt, even if it was prepared for this purpose before the Sabbath.

This applies even when one has not lit this candelabrum at the commencement of the particular Sabbath in question. Had the candelabrum been lit at that time, carrying it would have been forbidden, as reflected by Chapter 25, Halachah 23.

See Chapter 22, Halachah 26.

The Kessef Mishneh questions the phrase "because of its weight," for seemingly Shabbat 46a considers that as another rationale for stringency, not at all dependent on the fact that the candelabrum has grooves. Indeed, these rationales offered by two separate sages seem to be mutually exclusive. He and other commentators attempt to resolve this difficulty. Rav Kapach notes that many authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah omit this problematic phrase.

In the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 279:7), Rav Yosef Karo follows the reasoning he mentions in his Kessef Mishneh and forbids the use of all candelabra with grooves, whether large or small.

A new shoe will most likely be firmly fixed on the shoemaker's block, and removing it would necessitate moving the block. This is, nevertheless, permitted, because the shoemaker's block is considered to be a utensil that is used for a forbidden intent. Accordingly, it may be moved when one desires to use the space it takes up - in this instance, the space within the shoe where one puts one's foot [Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 308:14)].

Rashi (Shabbat 141a) explains that putting clothes in a press is forbidden, because it appears to be an activity performed for the sake of the weekdays that follow, and not for sake of the Sabbath itself.

Rashi (loc. cit.) offers a different rationale for this prohibition: that setting up a professional press resembles building and opening it resembles the labor of demolishing. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 302:4) quotes Rashi's view.

Shabbat 49a,b mentions the use of such wool for the purpose of insulating food to keep it warm.

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 259:1), which follows the ruling of Rabbenu Asher (in his gloss on Shabbat 49a), who permits picking up such rolls if they are used as insulation, unless they are explicitly set aside for sale. Although these rolls are generally used for spinning wool, since they are not very valuable, the fact that they are employed for the purpose of insulation is sufficient for them to be considered to have been set aside for that purpose (Mishnah Berurah 259:6).

Note the Magen Avraham 259:2, which states that they must be set aside to be used for this purpose - e.g., insulation - forever. It is not sufficient that one decide to use them for this purpose on merely one Sabbath.

These are likely to be used as mats to sit on (Shabbat, loc. cit.).

The Ramah (Orach Chayim 308:25) mentions an opinion that states that this leniency applies only to cow hides, but not to sheep hides. The later authorities, however, do not accept this view (Mishnah Berurah 308:107).

It would appear that the Rambam's intent is that although these repulsive entities should be forbidden to be removed since they are not כלים, it is permitted to remove them because of the discomfort their presence causes.

I.e., this term is used as an idiom to describe all repulsive entities.

Note Chapter 11, Halachah 4, for a more specific definition of the Hebrew wording used.

The Ra'avad accepts the Rambam's ruling only when the warming-pan has coals that had turned to ash before the commencement of the Sabbath. The Ra'avad offers a different explanation of the leniency, stating that it is granted because the warming-pan is the base for a permitted article (the ash that existed before the commencement of the Sabbath) and a forbidden article (the remainder of the ash and the chips of wood). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 310:8) quotes the Ra'avad's interpretation.

Our translation is based on the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 308:36).

Although the oil had not been separated before the commencement of the Sabbath, one is allowed to partake of it on the Sabbath. As mentioned previously, the Rambam follows the view of Rabbi Shimon (Shabbat 19b) who permits the use of nolad (objects that come into existence on the Sabbath).

In contrast to utensils that are forbidden in this instance, as mentioned in Chapter 25, Halachah 9.

See, however, the following halachah.

As examples of this principle, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 310:2) states that one may pick up seeds from the ground which fell before the Sabbath that have not become rooted or eggs that were laid before the Sabbath from beneath a chicken. (See also Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 1:18.)

I.e., fresh grapes and figs and dried grapes and figs are desirable foods. In the process by which these fruits dry out, they pass through a stage when they become repulsive.

The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) states that there are two drawbacks to such fruit: a) it is unfit to be eaten; b) the owners intentionally set it aside, not to be used until it became dried. Therefore, the restriction is placed upon it.

See Hilchot Rotzeach 11:9, which explains that partaking of such foods is forbidden, because it is possible that a poisonous snake deposited venom there.

See Chapter 19, Halachah 14.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 12 and Chapter 25, Halachah 10.

From the use of the word "begin," the Beis Yosef (Orach Chayim 331) derives the following ruling: If one begins emptying the storehouse before the commencement of the Sabbath, one may complete the removal of its contents on the Sabbath, even if one's purpose is not directly associated with a mitzvah.

The Turei Zahav 331:1 objects to this leniency, however, for this appears to be unnecessary work that should not be permitted on the Sabbath.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 18:1, based on Shabbat 127a), the Rambam explains the reason that this restriction was instituted. It is very likely that there are grooves or cavities in the floor of a storeroom, and a person would be tempted to level the floor if he were allowed to empty the entire room. The Turei Zahav 333:1 explains that the prohibition was instituted to prevent a person from exerting himself excessively.

Significantly, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 331:1 quotes both rationales, indicating that they are not mutually exclusive.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that this number is not intended as a limitation. Indeed, every person may take out as many containers as he needs at one time.

It must be emphasized that this interpretation is dependent on a version of Shabbat 126b-127a that is not accepted by many other authorities, including the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 333:1).

I.e., a single individual is not allowed to clear out the entire storehouse. Instead, each individual - or a substitute for him - must clear out the area he needs. Although one person may remove as many containers as he can carry at one time, he may not, however, return to take more (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit.). See also the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 333:3).

See Chapter 21, Halachah 2.

See the notes on Chapter 3, Halachah 12, for a more specific definition of the type of bean referred to.

Because they are very bitter, they are not eaten at all (Maggid Mishneh).

A shrub whose roots penetrate deeply into the ground.

The Maggid Mishneh objects to the mention of mustard seed. Although it is used as food for doves, it is also commonly used to prepare food for humans. There is a general principle that whenever a substance is considered to be food both for animals and for humans, it is considered to be set aside for use for humans and not for animals. The Kessef Mishneh, however, justifies the Rambam's ruling.

A person should throw the shells - and similarly, any other waste left after eating - over his shoulder so that he will not create a repulsive situation on the table before him. For, as mentioned above (Halachah 13), at the outset creating a repulsive situation is forbidden (Maggid Mishneh). Significantly, this point is not emphasized by the later authorities.

Or dogs (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:31).

According to most authorities, although meat must be salted to remove the blood before cooking, there is no prohibition against eating uncooked unsalted meat. (See Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 67:2.) Nevertheless, according to the Rambam (Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 6:12), it is necessary to salt raw meat before one eats it. From the juxtaposition of these two rulings, Rav Kapach derives that, according to the Rambam, it is permitted to salt meat on the Sabbath to remove its blood.

For it is unfit for both human and animal consumption.

Rav Kapach explains that the intent is not that the broken glass is actually considered to be food by the ostriches. Instead, the intent is that ostriches have strong digestive organs, which will not be torn by the glass. As such, the glass will assist them in the process of digestion, because it will help shred the other food that they have consumed.

A wild vegetable of the onion family (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 18:1).

Nevertheless, a person who owns a species of animal that is rarely found may carry whatever food is necessary for it, even though it is not usually consumed by other animals (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:29).

Preparation is necessary, because we assume that these substances would ordinarily be used for kindling (Maggid Mishneh). Note the Magen Avraham 308:53, which states that straw is usually employed at present as a mattress or for animal fodder. Hence, it is permitted to be carried even though it was not prepared before the Sabbath.

At times these substances are used for kindling, at times for animal fodder, and at times for other purposes that serve humans.

Since these substances are less likely to be used for kindling, everything depends on the person's intent when he brought them home. Note the Magen Avraham 321:1, which states that if one brings them home without any specific intent, they are considered to be animal fodder. (See also Chapter 21, Halachah 19.)

This is forbidden, lest one follow the same practice in an earthen feeding trough.

Note the Mishneh Berurah 324:41, which gives another reason for the prohibition against shifting food to the side: Some of the straw has surely become repulsive and is no longer fit to be carried.

For an ox will not hesitate to eat food from before a donkey.

Because oxen chew their cud.

The Mishnah Berurah 324:37 emphasizes that the intent is that an animal of another species will not eat food that is soiled with the spittle of an ox. One ox will, however, eat food that is soiled with the spittle of another ox.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that, in contrast to a meat hook, a fish hook is not a proper utensil and will be discarded after use. Hence, it may not be carried on the Sabbath. Rav Kapach objects to this interpretation, noting that if this explanation were correct, it would have been more appropriate to state this halachah in Chapter 25, which differentiates between entities that are considered utensils and those that are not.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 310:1) states that it is permitted to carry a fish hook, because it is not considered too repulsive to move.

All the leniencies mentioned in this halachah are intended to inhibit the process of the corpse's decomposition.

Moving the pillow, and not the corpse, by hand. Although the corpse will also be moved, this is of no consequence.

If a corpse is covered by blankets or sheets, it is possible that they will serve as insulator and keep heat from diffusing, thus causing the corpse to decompose more quickly.

For this would involve moving a limb (Rashi, Shabbat 151b).

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 311:13 and the Mishnah Berurah 311:22 relate that, based on the Zohar, it has become customary to close a corpse's eyes and straighten its limbs on the Sabbath, for the failure to do so will lead to danger.

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 311:4), which mentions an opinion that allows a corpse to be carried if it is dressed in the clothes it wore while it was alive. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 311:10 accepts this ruling; the Mishnah Berurah 311:16, by contrast, does not.

Thus, it is as if the corpse were merely a medium to enable one to carry the bread or the baby.

This refers to carrying a corpse within a private domain. (See also Halachah 23 and notes.)

If a baby or a loaf of bread is not available, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 311:1) allows one to move a corpse by shifting it from one bed to another. The Ramah (loc. cit.:2) offers another alternative - to have a gentile carry the corpse.

Spreading the mats constitutes the construction of a temporary tent. This is permitted only because of the discomfort suffered by a living person, and not for the sake of preserving the corpse. Therefore, it is necessary to undertake all the stages in this process, so that it will not be obvious that this is being done for the sake of the corpse (Kessef Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch HaRav 311:11; Mishnah Berurah 311:19).

Or will shortly reach that state (Ramah, Orach Chayim 311:2).

The Maggid Mishneh notes that the Rambam does not mention carrying the corpse with a baby or a loaf of bread on it, as in Halachah 21. The commentaries differ on whether this is necessary. The Rashba maintains that it is desirable to place another article on the corpse, so that one will be carrying the corpse for the sake of a permitted article.

The Ramban, by contrast, explains that since one is carrying the corpse into a carmelit and violating a Rabbinic prohibition associated with a forbidden labor, it is preferable to minimize the violation of that prohibition by not carrying another article. Although the prohibition against carrying an entity (the corpse) that is muktzeh will be violated in a more serious way, it is preferable to violate that prohibition (which is associated with a sh'vut) than the prohibition against carrying into a carmelit, which has its source in the forbidden labor of transferring articles.

Although the Rashba's view is accepted by the later authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 311:2; Mishnah Berurah 311:9), one may rely on the Ramban's view if there is not another useful article available, and carry the corpse out without anything else.

The corpse may be carried into a carmelit, but not into a public domain (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 311:5; Mishnah Berurah 311:10).

The Tur allows carrying a corpse even into the public domain; since one does not intend to use the corpse, carrying it is a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה, and the prohibition against performing such an activity is waived in this instance. The Rambam would surely not accept this premise, for he maintains that one is liable according to the Torah for performing a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. Even the later Ashkenazic authorities who accept the basic principle of the Tur do not accept this leniency.

See Hilchot Mamrim 1:2, which interprets this as a commandment prohibiting us from transgressing a directive instituted by the Rabbis. All the Rabbinic commandments have their source in this mitzvah from the Torah. See also Hilchot Kilayim 10:29.

The commentaries emphasize that this ruling indicates that according to the Rambam, the main source for leniency is the regard for the honor of the living, that they are forced to remain in a house permeated by the odor of a decaying corpse.

[It is possible to explain that according to the view of the Ramah cited in Note 106, the honor of the corpse is also considered, and removing it is allowed even if the people in the home have an alternative place to spend the Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 311:7)].