Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

In this instance, we have chosen to depart from the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah and adopt the text found in the Oxford manuscript (the manuscript checked over and signed by the Rambam himself).
The standard text forbids making a covenant with “the seven [Canaanite] nations,” i.e., “the Canaanites, Hittites, Amorites, Girgashites, Perizzites, Chivites, and Jebusites (Deuteronomy 7:1).” The Rambam changed his mind concerning the question of whether this prohibition applies only to these seven nations or to all idolaters. In Sefer HaMitzvot, he states that the mitzvah applies only to the seven Canaanite nations. When listing the mitzvot at the beginning of these halachot, however, he mentions “idolaters.” The phrasing of the halachah supports the opinion that all idolatrous nations are implied, because the laws regarding the saving of lives apply to other gentiles and not to the Canaanites alone.
[Since the opinion mentioned by the standard text has a basis in the Rambam’s works, we will continue to refer to it throughout our notes to this halachah.]

Hilchot Melachim 6:1 relates that when the Jews declare war against another nation, they must offer them a peaceful settlement. This settlement must involve that nation’s acceptance of a) the seven universal commandments given to Noah and his descendants (see Halachah 6), and b) subjugation and the payment of tribute to the Jews. [Hilchot Melachim 6:4-5 relates that such a settlement was also offered to (but not accepted by) the Canaanites.]

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 48) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 93) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
It must be noted that this proof-text [and the continuation of the verse mentioned below] support the contention that these mitzvot apply only to the seven Canaanite nations. The Biblical passage from which they are quoted concerns these nations alone. Nevertheless, the adherents of the other view refer to Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 12:1, which states that the prohibition against intermarriage applies to all gentile nations, even though it is taken from this passage. Similarly, these two mitzvot refer not only to the Canaanites, but to all gentiles.
The Rambam maintains that even if the Canaanites convert, it is forbidden to establish a covenant with them. Therefore, it was forbidden to establish a contract with the Givonites (Hilchot Melachim 6:5). The Ramban (Deuteronomy 20:11) disagrees and maintains that once they accepted Judaism, it was permitted to establish a covenant with them. The narrative in Joshua, Chapter 9, appears to support the Rambam’s view. The Jews’ first reply to the Givonites, “Perhaps you dwell among us. If so, how shall we make a covenant with you,” appears to reinforce the position that any covenant with such nations is forbidden.

And accept the remainder of the seven universal laws given to Noah and his descendants.

Hilchot Melachim 8:10 states that any gentile who does not accept the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants should be slain.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 50) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 426) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. (Further particulars regarding this commandment are mentioned in Halachah 4.)

These laws apply only to an idolater who does not belong to the seven nations. It is a mitzvah to slay a Canaanite, as mentioned above.

Tosafot, Avodah Zarah 26b, note that our Sages declared, “Kill even the best of the gentiles.” Similarly, as mentioned above, the Rambam states in Hilchot Melachim 8:10 that any gentile who does not accept the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants should be slain. These directives, however, can be interpreted to apply only in a time of war or in a time when the Jews have control over the gentiles. When the Jews are in exile or must take into consideration the dictates of gentile authorities, an idolater cannot be slain merely because of the sin of idol worship.

Tosafot, Avodah Zarah 26b, note that our Sages declared, “Kill even the best of the gentiles.” Similarly, as mentioned above, the Rambam states in Hilchot Melachim 8:10 that any gentile who does not accept the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants should be slain. These directives, however, can be interpreted to apply only in a time of war or in a time when the Jews have control over the gentiles. When the Jews are in exile or must take into consideration the dictates of gentile authorities, an idolater cannot be slain merely because of the sin of idol worship.

Significantly, the Rambam does not use the term idolaters. Note, however, the laws mentioning a ger toshav in Halachot 2 and 6 and notes.

This refers to a person who betrays either Jewish lives or Jewish property to gentiles, (a moseir).

See the notes to Chapter 2, Halachah 5, for a definition of these terms. (See also Hilchot Teshuvah 3:7-8.)

See Hilchot Rotzeach UShemirat HaNefesh 4:10, which states that: If one has the potential to slay them with a sword in public, one should. If not, one should trick them into a situation where one can kill them.

The continuation of the halachah was omitted from the standard published text because of censorship. Hence, we have placed it in brackets.

An example of a min.

Examples of apikorsim. In his commentary to Avot 1:3, the Rambam writes that Tzadok and Baithos were students of Antigonus of Socho. When they heard their teacher declare, “Do not serve the master for the sake of receiving a reward,” they were upset, since they thought that he was implying that no reward would be given for the performance of mitzvot. They spoke about the matter between themselves and decided to reject the Torah. They began splinter groups which rejected the core of Jewish practice and coveted material wealth. They found that they could not convince the majority of the people to reject the Torah entirely, so they adopted a different tactic. They claimed that they were true to Torah, but the only Torah that was Divine was the written law. The oral law was merely a human invention. This thesis was only a ruse to sway the people from the performance of the mitzvot. Accordingly, the Sages would frequently refer to all those who deny the Torah and its tradition as Sadducees (“followers of Tzadok”) or Baithosees (“followers of Baithos”).

The Rambam’s phraseology implies that there is no explicit source for the law which follows, but that it can be derived from the previous law regarding saving an idolater’s life (Kessef Mishneh).

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 158:1) states that one may treat gentiles in order to gain expertise that will enable one to treat Jews better.

The gentile may cause the doctor personal harm.

Between Jews and gentiles in general.

The Rama (ibid.) states that a doctor should demand reimbursement. If pressed, however, he may treat gentiles without a fee.

A gentile who accepts the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants.

See Leviticus 25:35. Avodah Zarah 65a states that Jews must support such a gentile from their charitable funds.

The K’nesset HaGedolah states that the prohibitions mentioned above apply only to idol worshipers, but gentiles who do not worship idols (apparently, even those who are not meticulous in their observance of the other six commandments given to Noah) may be given medical treatment for a fee, even if there is no threat of danger or ill-feeling.
See also the Darchei Teshuvah (158:3), who relates that since, at present, a doctor would have much difficulty if he refused to treat gentiles, leniency should be shown in this regard.
From the above, it would appear that a doctor who operates a medical practice today would have no difficulty treating gentile patients. Indeed, throughout the ages, many great Rabbinic authorities, including the Rambam himself, served as doctors to gentiles.

The rationale for this prohibition is mentioned in the following halachah. See also Chapter 7, Halachah 1, which puts a special emphasis on ridding Eretz Yisrael of idol worship.
In Hilchot Terumot 1:7, the Rambam defines the original boundaries of Eretz Yisrael as follows:
[The southern border runs] from Rekem in the east... to the Mediterranean Sea. [The western border] is the Mediterranean Sea from Ashkelon, in the south... to Akko in the north. From Akko, one proceeds [northeastward] to Kziv. The area to one’s right, on the east, can generally be assumed to be of the Diaspora unless it is specifically known that it is part of Eretz Yisrael. The area to one’s left, on the west, can generally be assumed to be of Eretz Yisrael unless it is specifically known that it is part of the Diaspora....
From the Umenum mountains inward, the land is part of Eretz Yisrael, ...outward, it is part of the Diaspora.
In Halachah 8 of that chapter, the Rambam states that in the Second Temple period, the coastal area was not settled by the Jews. Hence, as the Rambam explains in Halachah 5 of that chapter, it is not considered as part of Eretz Yisrael.

In Hilchot Terumot 1:3-4, the Rambam describes the lands which the Sages labeled as Syria: The lands which David conquered outside of the land of Canaan... Why were they given a lesser status than Eretz Yisrael, because David conquered them before he conquered all of Eretz Yisrael.... In Halachah 9 of that chapter, the Rambam defines Syria as the area between Eretz Yisrael and the Euphrates River.

Since it is not actually Eretz Yisrael.

For the reasons mentioned below.

Rav Kapach notes that Avodah Zarah 21a, the source for this halachah, refers to the sale of houses in Syria. Also, since the license is granted only to rent homes as storehouses, it is not appropriate to refer to these as a neighborhood. Hence, he suggests that the Rambam also intended this clause to refer to the sale of homes in Syria, and it was placed here because of a printer’s error.

Where the prohibitions are less stringent.

And thus, removes a source of support for the priests and the needy and prevents the mitzvot associated with the produce of Eretz Yisrael from being observed.

Which, as explained in the following halachah, is included in the Biblical prohibition against being gracious to gentiles.

The Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 151:9 (based on the Tur), prohibits the sale of three houses to gentiles in a Jewish neighborhood, seemingly applying the prohibition to the Diaspora as well. The commentaries explain that such a sale is forbidden lest the gentiles harm the Jews. This prohibition has been mentioned by contemporary authorities to try to prevent Jews from moving away en masse from Jewish neighborhoods in metropolitan areas which are in the process of cultural transformation.

The Rambam is quoting his source, Avodah Zarah 1:9, exactly. In his commentary to that mishnah, he states that, according to the halachah, the word “even” is out of place.

In Eretz Yisrael or in the Diaspora (Beit Yosef, Yoreh De’ah 151). Note the opinion of Tosafot and Rabbenu Nissim quoted by the Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 151:16), which states that this prohibition applies only in Eretz Yisrael.

The Beit Yosef (loc. cit.) explains that in the Diaspora there is no prohibition against selling a house to an idolater (but not to a false deity itself). Once the house is no longer the property of a Jew, he is not responsible for what transpires in those premises.

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 151:10) states that in the present era, there is no prohibition against renting homes to gentiles, because it is not customary for them to bring idols into their homes.
The Siftei Cohen (loc. cit.) takes issue with the Rama, noting that in his community, it was customary for the gentiles to bring idols into homes. The Siftei Cohen does not, however, dismiss the Rama’s view and quotes a number of authorities who allow the Rama ‘s decision to be followed

Note the use of this prooftext in Chapter 7, Halachah 2, for another purpose.

The Ra’avad notes that even this leniency is limited. One cannot rent one’s home as a storehouse for wine used for pagan libations (נסך יין). The commentaries explain that the Rambam also would accept such a decision, but includes it in his statements in Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot, Chapter 13, where he explains that any benefit derived from יין נסך is forbidden.

Such a sale ensures that the gentile will remain in Eretz Yisrael until after the harvest has been completed.

They need not, however, be harvested immediately after the sale (Siftei Cohen 151:14).

תְחָנֵּם, is also related to the word חֲנָיָה, which means “dwelling place.”

Avodah Zarah 20a mentions this and the other two laws derived from the exegesis of this verse. From the Rambam’s statements in Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 50), it would appear that he regards these laws as essential elements of the Torah’s commandment, and not as concepts added by the later Rabbis.

As the Rambam emphasizes in Halachah 6, even the temporary presence of idolaters in Eretz Yisrael is undesirable.

One may, however, praise God for making such a beautiful creation (Kessef Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit., 151:14, Orach Chayim 225:10). Thus, the Jerusalem Talmud (Berachot 9:1) relates that after seeing a beautiful gentile woman, Rabban Gamliel recited a blessing, praising God for creating her.

Which prohibits graciousness in our relations with idolaters.

See Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 426), which explains how our speech and actions influence our behavior.

The Siftei Cohen (loc. cit., 151:18) states that this applies to all gentiles, even Moslems who do not worship idols.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 151:11) states that this prohibition applies only when one does not know the gentile. Otherwise, the gift can be considered as having been given in anticipation or in reciprocation for favors from the gentile.

A gentile who accepts the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants, as explained in Halachah 6.

An animal which dies without being slaughtered properly.

Ger in Hebrew.

Even idolaters.

Some authorities place emphasis on the word “together,” explaining that it is permitted to give to gentiles only when they come together with the Jewish poor. If they come by themselves, however, one is not allowed to give them. The later authorities (see Turei Zahav, Yoreh De’ah 151:9; Siftei Cohen 151:19) do not accept this conclusion, and allow giving them gifts even when they come alone.

Tosafot (Gittin 61a) explains that since giving these donations establishes peace, granting them is not forbidden by the prohibition against giving gifts to gentiles mentioned in the previous halachah.

The stalks of grain which fall during the harvest. (See Leviticus 23:22; Hilchot Matnot Aniyim, Chapter 4.)

A sheaf which is forgotten in the field. (See Deuteronomy 24:19, Hilchot Matnot Aniyim, Chapter 5.)

The ends of the field which the owner is forbidden to reap. (See Leviticus, loc. cit.; Hilchot Matnot Aniyim, Chapters 2 and 3.)

According to Scriptural Law, gentiles are not entitled to benefit from these gifts. Nevertheless, the Rabbis granted them permission to do so to prevent strife from arising between the Jews and their gentile neighbors.

When doing so might lead them to give thanks to their false deity.

The Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 151:12, states that we may also visit their sick, bury their dead, and comfort their mourners.

Even on a day other than one of their holidays (Gittin 62a).

Since wishing them well once is sufficient to prevent ill-feelings from being established (Rashi, Gittin, ibid.).

We have translated this phrase loosely, without dealing with the issue of whether the word shalom is included in the blessing as well. There are, however, authorities who maintain that this is the essential question at hand. Shalom is one of the names of God and should not be mentioned in a gentile’s house on a day when he is involved in the worship of a false deity. According to this opinion, it is permitted to extend good wishes to a gentile, so long as this term is not used (Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De’ah 148:7).
The Siftei Cohen, ibid. and 148:12, states that even according to the opinions (see the introduction to Chapter 9) that state that many of these laws do not apply in the present age, this law must be observed.

So that no ill-feelings are aroused.

So that the gentile will not be so happy that he desires to give thanks to his false deity.

And has no control over Eretz Yisrael.

Although the Jews are living in Eretz Yisrael.

And it is impossible for the Jews to undertake unilateral decisions as to the future of the holy land.

In our land. Obviously, no such prohibitions would apply in the Diaspora, even where the Jewish community has established a certain degree of autonomy.

The Rambam discusses these laws at length in Hilchot Melachim, Chapters 8-10.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 51) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 94) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The verse continues, “lest they cause you to sin against Me.” If the gentiles accept these seven universal laws, they will not lead the Jews to sin.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s decision, exclaiming that such restrictions were never enforced or mentioned throughout our nation’s history. He explains that the proof-text quoted by the Rambam applies to the seven Canaanite nations alone.
The Kessef Mishneh and others substantiate the Rambam’s position from an abstract perspective, explaining that since the verse gives as a reason, “lest they cause you to sin,” we may postulate that it applies to any gentile whose behavior can have a negative influence of this nature.

Literally, a “resident alien.”

The Jubilee must be observed only when the entire Jewish people are dwelling in Eretz Yisrael.

The Rambam discusses the laws governing conversion (as well as further particulars regarding a ger toshav) in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, Chapters 13 and 14.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 30) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 262) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The fundamental principles of the Jewish faith, which are outlined in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah.

The fundamental principles of the Jewish faith and character traits, which are outlined in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah and Hilchot De’ot.

Note the statements of the Maharik (Shoresh 88), which are quoted by the Rama (Yoreh De’ah 178:1):
The above forbids only those practices followed by the gentiles which encourage licentiousness — e.g., wearing red clothing... — those customs that are described as “the ways of the Amorites,” or those which are throwbacks to pagan rituals. Those practices, however, which are beneficial — e.g., that a doctor should wear a special garb unique to his profession — are permitted.

This coiffure was called kumi in Talmudic times. The commentaries explain that a person who cuts his hair in this fashion violates the prohibition mentioned here even when he does not violate the prohibition against shaving the corners of our heads mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachah 1.

The prohibition against such buildings is explicitly mentioned in the Sifra, Parashat Acharei. The Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 178:2) mentions that it is permitted to construct large buildings for the purpose of trade and for use as courts.

The Kessef Mishneh raises a question concerning this, noting that since a variety of different prohibitions are included in this same commandment, it could be considered a שבכללות לאו, a general prohibition whose violation is not punished by lashes (Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2-3). The Rambam himself was asked this question, and he replied in a responsum which explains that although a variety of different actions are prohibited by this commandment, they all share a single theme. In contrast, a לאו שבכללות includes prohibitions of a totally different nature.

Since growing a blorit is connected with pagan rites, it is forbidden for a Jew to assist a gentile in growing one.

The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 178) asks: Though the Sages are entitled to advise a person to withhold the performance of a Torah commandment, we do not find that they were granted permission to dispense license to perform an act which transgresses a commandment. He suggests that since, in this instance, the Torah left the definition of the range of the prohibition to the Sages, they did not include a person who holds a government position in its scope, because his intent in adopting such a style of dress is not to resemble the gentiles, but to help the Jewish people.

The Rambam devotes the next thirteen halachot to the discussion of the prohibitions against different forms of divination, astrology, sorcery, and other occult arts. He includes all these prohibitions under the general category of the laws forbidding idol worship because of the conceptual similarity he sees between the two.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 33) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 249) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Our translation is based on the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 179:3. Rashi, in his commentary to Shabbat 67b, the source for this halachah, renders the clause, “slaughter this rooster which crowed in the evening (as opposed to other roosters which crow in the morning).”

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah, loc. cit.) states that as long as one does not specifically state that one is slaughtering the fowl because it crowed in a strange manner, one may slaughter it. Indeed, it is customary to do so.

The Ra’avad objects vigorously to this statement, declaring:
This is a gross error. Doing such a thing is surely permitted. Perhaps he was confused by the statement (Chulin 95b): “Any omen which does not resemble the omens of Eliezer (see Genesis, Chapter 24) and Jonathan (see I Samuel, Chapter 14) is not an omen.”
[The Rambam] interpreted this to mean that [their deeds] were forbidden, but that is not the intent. Rather, our Sages meant [unless an omen is as apparent as that of Eliezer or Jonathan], one should not rely on it. How could he think that righteous men like them would commit such a transgression? Were they alive, they would have him beaten with tongues of fire.
Though some authorities (the Tur, Yoreh De’ah 179; see also Radak, I Samuel, loc. cit.) support the Ra’avad’s view, the Rambam’s opinion is accepted by many of the Rabbis. They, however, seek to justify the actions of Eliezer and Jonathan. Rabbenu Nissim explains that the omens chosen by Eliezer and Jonathan were calculated to serve, not as spiritual indicators of the appropriateness of their acts, but rather as signs that could be used as the basis for a logical conclusion. For example, in Eliezer’s case, Abraham’s household was characterized by kindness and hospitality. Accordingly, a woman who would offer to pour water for a thirsty wayfarer and his camels would surely be a fitting wife for his son.

The punishment is administered, not for specifying that a particular event will serve as an omen, but rather for performing a deed only because of that omen.

Here, also, the Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that once such an event occurs three times, it is fitting to rely upon it as an omen. Implied is that he considers the debate in the Talmud, not as questioning whether such actions are permitted or forbidden, but whether one should rely on these matters as omens.

The commentaries refer to Chulin 95b, which relates the following episode: Rav Yochanan was contemplating whether to go to Babylon to study under the sage Shmuel. He asked a child to tell him the verse he was studying, and the child replied, quoting I Samuel 28:3, “And Shmuel died”; because of that reply, Rav Yochanan did not make the journey. There are other similar stories in the Talmud. Most commentaries explain that the Sages did not make their decision based on the child’s reply. Instead, they used the reply to reinforce the decisions which they had made previously. Rabbenu Nissim, however, maintains that since, as Bava Batra 12b states, “a shadow of prophecy has been granted to children,” one may use a child’s replies as an omen.

In this context, it is worthy to quote the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 10:3:
Behold, the diviners and sorcerers also predict the future.What differentiates between them and a prophet?
[Though] some of the prophecies made by diviners, sorcerers, and the like materialize, some do not.... Also, it is possible that none of their predictions will come true and they will err completely, as [Isaiah 44:25] states: “He frustrates the omens of impostors and drives diviners mad.”
In contrast, all the words of a prophet come true, as [II Kings 10:10] states: “God’s word will not fall to the ground.”...
The Torah promises that a prophet will relate the truth about those matters for which the soothsayers and diviners give false predictions to the gentiles, so that [the Jews] will not need a sorcerer, a diviner, or the like, as [Deuteronomy 18:10, 14-15] states: “Among you, there shall not be found anyone who passes his son through fire, [a sorcerer, a diviner,....] For these nations... [listen to diviners and sorcerers, God has not given you this lot. God will] appoint a prophet from your midst.”
Though as stated in Halachah 16, the Rambam totally discounts the methods of divination as parallels to prophecy, he does not entirely negate their ability to predict the future. In the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. II, Chapters 37 and 38, the Rambam discusses this subject at length, explaining that these sorcerers and diviners are people with developed powers of imagination, but little spiritual or intellectual refinement. Their process of divination involves putting themselves into a trance in which they focus their entire attention and mental energy on one aspect of their previous experience.
This particular matter becomes blown up and dominates their entire thought processes to the extent that it appears to them that they have stepped beyond normal human limitations and entered into the spiritual realms. The focusing of their thinking processes in this experience can provide them with insight which they did not possess previously. Since, however, this experience is not being produced by Divine spiritual influence, nor are they intellectually refined, the predictions they make will always be somewhat in error.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 31) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 510) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

This punishment is given to a person who violates a Rabbinic ordinance.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 32) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 511) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Rambam’s statements here [and more explicitly in Sefer HaMitzvot] imply that both the fortuneteller and the one who carries out his directives violate this prohibition. The fortuneteller alone, however, is punished by lashes.

In Sefer HaMitzvot (ibid.), the Rambam describes such a person as one who performs tricks with deft hands, and he gives a number of examples: a person who takes a rope, puts it into his cloak, and removes it after it has been “transformed” into a snake; a person who throws rings into the air, and then removes them from a colleague’s mouth. The Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 179:17) explains that on the basis of those statements, the acts of contemporary “magicians” would be forbidden.

See the notes on Halachah 15, which attempt to resolve the apparent contradiction between that halachah and the present one.

The Rambam follows the thesis mentioned in the introduction preceding Halachah 4, that none of the occult arts mentioned in these halachot are anything more than figments of human imagination, nor do they have any effect in this world. Other authorities (Rashi, Deuteronomy 18:11, based on Sanhedrin 65b; the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 179:5) interpret this as referring to a snake-charmer — i.e., someone whose chants actually do have an effect.

Punishment is not administered for a transgression unless a deed is committed, and speech is not generally considered to be a deed. Thus, unless the person performs a deed while chanting, he is not liable for lashes.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 35) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 512) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

When it is forbidden to engage in unnecessary conversation (Kessef Mishneh).

Rav Kapach offers a unique interpretation of this law. He explains that we are forbidden to call a person to cast spells even in the face of a danger to life. What the Rambam (based on Sanhedrin 101a) is saying is that we may pretend to cast a spell over the snakebite (knowing that it is nonsense) in order to settle the victim’s feelings.

Note Hilchot Teshuvah 3:8, which states that those who deny the Torah do not have a portion in the world to come. Sanhedrin 90a states that a person who whispers an incantation over a wound, then spits, and then recites a verse from the Torah, will not receive a portion in the world to come.

The Siftei Cohen 179:18 explains that the prohibition applies only when one expects the mystic power of the verses alone to heal. If, however, one views God as the source of all cures and recites the verses in order to increase one’s merit, there is no prohibition involved even when a person is already sick. As mentioned in the note below, this opinion is accepted throughout the Jewish community.

Our Sages have elaborated at length on the unique merit of reciting Psalms. In all Jewish communities throughout the world, whenever there is a danger to an individual or to the community, it is customary to gather together to recite Psalms. In certain communities, it is customary to recite a portion of Psalms every day according to a standard division which allows the entire book of Psalms to be completed in a week or in a month. (See “On Saying Tehillim,” Kehot Publications.)

The commentaries cite the practice of reciting Kri’at Shema before retiring as an example of such a practice. (See also Sh’vuot 15b; Hilchot Tefillah 7:2.)

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 38) states that the mediums who try to contact the deceased are the ones who are “in truth dead, even though they eat and are sensitive.”

Punishment is administered only when a deed is committed.

Sefer HaMitzvot (ibid.) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 515) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Chapter 6, Halachot 1 and 2, describe the prohibitions involved with practicing divination with an ov and yid’oni, and relate that these prohibitions are punishable by death. The present halachah mentions two new prohibitions (Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandments 36 and 37; Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvot 513 and 514): to inquire of such mediums.

As mentioned above, punishment is administered for violating a Torah commandment only when a deed is committed, and speech is not considered to be a deed. Accordingly, punishment is not administered for merely inquiring of such a medium. If, however, one commits a deed, it is.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 34) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 511) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Our translation follows the Rambam’s opinion (stated openly in the following halachah) that all these occult arts are of no avail and cannot have any effect on reality. Thus, the latter phrase refers to a person who commits a deed performed by sorcerers in an attempt to practice their craft.
It must, however, be noted that the simple interpretation of Sanhedrin 67a is that a person who actually performs a deed through sorcery is executed. One who merely appears to do so is given stripes for rebelliousness.

The commentaries note the apparent contradiction between this halachah and Halachah 9, which states that a person who deludes others into thinking that he has performed a wondrous act is punished by lashes. Among the attempted resolutions of this difficulty are:
a) The person receives two sets of lashes: one for violating the prohibition against divination and one for violating the prohibition against sorcery (Kessef Mishneh).
b) The Rambam is referring to two types of delusion. Thus, in Halachah 9, he speaks of fooling the people into thinking that he “performs wonders,” while in this halachah he does not use such phraseology. The prohibition against divination involves attempting to impress the common people of one’s occult powers in order to exercise one’s authority over them. In contrast, sorcery involves fooling people into believing that one has performed an extraordinary act (Maharik, Responsum 76).

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:1.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 4:7), the Rambam writes that idol worship and the occult arts were used by the gentiles to impress the common people and allow the pagan priests to exert authority over them.

Nonetheless, as he writes in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 4:7), the Rambam recognized that many “pious and good men of the Torah” shared this perspective.
Note the introduction which precedes Halachah 4 where the Rambam’s views — and those of the Torah authorities who held different perspectives — are explained at length.

See the Rama, Yoreh De’ah 179:1. Note also the Ramban’s commentary to this verse in the Torah where he explains that the verse does not forbid consulting the prophets about the future. On the contrary, it is a mitzvah to consult them even in regard to our personal affairs. In that context, note the Rambam’s comments in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 10:3.

In this chapter, the Rambam describes several prohibitions which comprise rites that do not involve the actual worship of idols. The Torah forbids them, however, because they are connected with ceremonial practices performed by idolaters. Note also the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. III, Chapter 37, where the Rambam mentions this concept.
The Tur (Yoreh De’ah 181) takes issue with the Rambam’s statements, noting that there is no statement in the Bible, the Mishnah, or the Talmud, which mentions this point. He objects to the association of the mitzvot with any particular rationale. From a halachic perspective, the mitzvot should be fulfilled because they are God’s decrees, independent of any rational explanation.
The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah, ibid.) defends the Rambam’s statements, based on the ending of Hilchot Me’ilah, where the Rambam states:
It is proper for a person to meditate on the judgments of the holy Torah and know their ultimate rationale to the extent of his capacity.
There are other authorities who draw out halachic concepts from the association of these prohibitions with idol worship. For example, based on this connection, the Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 251) and Sefer HaKovetz forbid the removal of facial hair even when the prohibition against shaving is not violated, as mentioned in the notes to Halachah 7.

The Torah’s prohibition applies only to shaving. One may cut this hair with scissors, as explained in Halachah 6.

The definition of this term is found in Halachah 6.

Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 251) explains that this is a particularly severe prohibition, since its violation involves making a sign for idolatry on our own bodies.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 43) and Sefer HaChinuch (loc. cit.) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

In Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that although this prohibition involves two different activities (shaving the right corner and shaving the left corner), it is not considered to be two mitzvot, because the Torah’s expression forbidding such shaving includes both sides in the same phrase. Had the Torah mentioned both the right and left sides, it would be considered to be two mitzvot.

As mentioned in Chapter 11, Halachah 1, this style of cutting hair is referred to as a blorit and was practiced by the gentiles.

In which case, he does not resemble the gentiles (Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit.).

From this, we see that the mitzvah is not dependent on the rationale mentioned above.

Either his own head or a colleague’s head.

The Ra’avad maintains that this person is not punished, because he did not perform a deed. He is, however, considered to have transgressed the Torah’s prohibition. The Kessef Mishneh differs and maintains that since the person did not perform the deed of shaving, he is not considered to have violated the prohibition at all. This applies even when he specifically ordered the person who shaved him to do so. The Ra’avad’s opinion is, however, supported by the Lechem Mishneh and other authorities.

By moving his head so that it is easier to shave.

A minor below the age of 13.

A child would not be held responsible if he shaved himself, because a child is not held liable for the violation of any of the Torah’s prohibitions until he reaches majority.

Who would be liable if he shaved his own head.

The Kessef Mishneh differentiates between these two instances. With regard to shaving a man’s head, he explains that although a woman is not held liable, she is, nevertheless, forbidden to do so (Halachah 5). With regard to shaving her own head, there is no prohibition whatsoever.

This association also teaches other concepts — among them, that one is liable only when one removes the hair with a razor.

Although Kiddushin 35b mentions several ways to derive this concept through Biblical exegesis, the Rambam chooses to rely on the simple fact of the matter.

Whose performance of mitzvot is generally equated with that of women (Chaggigah 4a).

Had the Rambam derived the above point from the exegesis of a Biblical verse, this conclusion would not be acceptable. Since, however, he derives the concept from logic, the same logic leads to the conclusion that slaves should be held liable for this act (Kessef Mishneh).

Kiddushin 35a derives this concept from Numbers 5:6, “When a man or a woman commits any of the transgressions that men commit....”

The verse prohibiting such contact, Leviticus 21:1, begins, “Speak unto the sons of Aharon....” Kiddushin 35b explains that this expression excludes women.

This refers to mitzvot which are applicable only on certain days — e.g., the blowing of the shofar and taking the lulav and etrog — and also mitzvot that are applicable during the day and not the night — e.g., tefillin.

Through the recitation of kiddush. Since women are obligated by the prohibition against working on the Sabbath, they are also obligated by the positive commandment of sanctifying its holiness (Berachot 20b).
The restriction of this mitzvah to the Sabbath follows the opinion of the Lechem Mishnah, who maintains that the sanctification of the festivals is a Rabbinic injunction. There are, however, other opinions, which consider the mitzvah as applying to the festivals as well.

Since women are obligated by the prohibition against eating chametz, they are also obligated by the positive commandment of eating matzah (Pesachim 43b).

Pesachim 91b explains that the Torah uses the expression (Exodus 12:4): “According to the number of souls [in a household]... individuals should be designated for the lamb,” to include women in the observance of this mitzvah.

The gathering of the entire Jewish people to hear the reading of the Torah by the king which is held every seven years. (See Deuteronomy 31:10-13.) Here, the Torah explicitly mentions that women should attend.

Though in a larger sense this refers to all forms of celebration, in particular it refers to the offering of peace sacrifices in connection with the festival.

Similarly, women are obligated to fulfill most positive commandments whose observance is not associated with a specific time — e.g., the belief in God, mezuzah, and tzedakah. There are, however, several positive commandments whose observance is not associated with a specific time which women are not obligated to fulfill — e.g., Torah study, the redemption of the first born, and the remembrance of Amalek. (See also the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Kiddushin 1:7.)

The word tumtum has its roots in the word atum, which means “a solid block.” It refers to a person whose genitalia are covered by skin, and it is impossible to determine whether the person is male or female. (See also Hilchot Ishut 2:25.) Should a tumtum undergo an operation and the person’s gender be revealed, that person is bound by the laws which apply to that gender.

Androgynous is a combination of the Greek words meaning “man” and “woman.” It refers to a person who possesses the sexual organs of both genders. (See also Hilchot Ishut 2:24.)

I.e., it is unknown whether they are governed by the laws applying to a man or those applying to a woman. The doubts are, however, different in nature. With regard to a tumtum, there is an unresolved question regarding his gender. With regard to an androgynous, however, the question revolves around the Sages’ failure to define his status.

The obligation to perform all the positive commandments that are associated with time, and the various other commandments which men are obligated to perform, but women are not.

Bikkurim 4:3 explains that this refers to the prohibition against being alone with men (yichud), and the laws of ritual impurity that apply to women.

Punishment is not administered when we are in doubt of the person’s obligation.

As mentioned in Halachah 2.

As stated in that halachah, she is not punished for doing so. The Ra’avad and the Kessef Mishneh maintain that this prohibition is Rabbinic in origin. Other authorities, however, state that the prohibition stems from Scriptural Law.

Though the child himself would not be held liable, an adult is liable for shaving the corners of his head, as stated in Halachah 1. Therefore, even a woman is forbidden to shave the corners of his head. Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, based on Nazir 57b, does not accept the Rambam’s view, and maintains that a woman may shave a child’s head.

The Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 181:1, defines “corners” as referring to the place where the skull is joined to the jaw. The Beit Lechem Yehudah writes that the area which the Ari zal would leave uncut extended slightly above his ears.

The Tur’s text of the Rambam stated “four” instead of “forty.”

In one of his responsa, the Rambam writes that the forbidden area is about the size of a thumb.

In one of his responsa, the Rambam writes that he would trim the corners of his head. He explains that — in contrast to the law applying to a Nazarite’s hair — there is no positive commandment to allow this hair to grow and no need to do so. In many Jewish communities, however, it is customary to allow this hair to grow. Since its removal involves the violation of a Scriptural prohibition, they consider the growth of this hair as a sign of Jewish identity.

As is explained in the notes to the following halachah, there is a debate among the Rabbinic authorities if it is permissible to remove the hair of the beard using scissors or even using implements whose effectiveness is equivalent to that of a razor.

Note our notes to Halachah 1. In Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 44), the Rambam notes that even in his time, it was customary for Christian monks to shave their faces.

Sefer HaMitzvot (op. cit.) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 252) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 181:11) writes that there are many opinions with regard to the definition of these five “corners.” Therefore, “anyone who fears heaven should fulfill all the opinions and not shave any portion of his beard with a razor.”

As implied by the verse’s mention of “the corners of your beard,” and not merely “your beard” (Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit.).

Nevertheless, as explained in the notes to Halachah 1, the prohibition is considered to be a single mitzvah, and not five.

From the Rambam’s expression, it appears that the removal of facial hair with scissors is forbidden. One is not, however, punished for such an act. Many contemporary authorities have explained that growing a beard has been accepted as a sign that a person is God-fearing and precise in his observance of the mitzvot. Accordingly, anyone who desires to be viewed as such should not remove his beard even if he does not use a razor.

Note our notes to Halachah 1.

Since this is not the norm. Kiddushin 35b derives this concept from the exegesis of the verse from Leviticus quoted above.

It is, however, forbidden for her to do so, as explained in Halachah 1.

Mo’ed Katan 18a allows the shaving of this hair because it is not one of the five “corners” of the beard.

This statement reinforces the interpretation mentioned in the previous halachah that the Rambam did not allow one’s facial hair to be removed by means other than shaving.
It must be noted that there are authorities who object to the shaving of the mustache. Rabbenu Chanan’el explained that the corners of the mustache are the two lower “corners” of the beard. Others (among them Rabbenu Yonah and the Bayit Chadash) associate its removal with the prohibitions against following the “ways of gentiles” and adorning oneself as does a woman.

The Rabbis have explained that it is proper manners to remove the hair which interferes with eating. Even some Kabbalists who would not touch their beards at all would trim their mustaches (Ben Ish Chai).

Which are often shaved by women.

As an extension of the prohibition against a man beautifying himself in the same manner as a woman does.

The punishment given for violating any Rabbinic ordinance.

Which is prohibited, as mentioned in the following halachah.

The Prisha (Yoreh De’ah 182) states that the word “men” refers even to gentiles. Even if gentile men follow this practice, a Jew is not punished for doing so.

The expression, “one is not given stripes,” and the contrasting statement, “It is permitted,” lead to the conclusion that, even in these communities, it is forbidden for men to remove this hair.

But not with a razor (Siftei Cohen 182:3).

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 39) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 542) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. Curiously, with regard to this and the following prohibition, the Rambam departs from his usual custom and does not mention the Biblical proof-text, Deuteronomy 22:5, for these prohibitions.

Needless to say, a hat that was styled for women is permitted.

Many sources (e.g., Nazir 59a; Targum Onkelos on Deuteronomy, loc. cit.) directly associate this prohibition with a woman’s donning armor or carrying weapons. Significantly, in the listing of mitzvot which precedes these halachot, the Rambam defines the mitzvah as prohibiting a woman from wearing “armament or a man’s apparel.”

I.e., a woman’s coiffure may not resemble a man’s. The Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah read תגלה, “reveal,” instead of תגלח, “cut.” According to that version, the Rambam is saying that when a woman goes out without covering her head, in addition to violating the basic laws of modesty (see Hilchot Ishut 24:11-12; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 21:17), she is also transgressing this Scriptural prohibition.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 40) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 543) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
In Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam mentions two rationales for this and the previous prohibition:
a) Such behavior would lead to licentiousness;
b) The pagans would often dress in this manner for their rituals.

Accordingly, the definition of the pertinent rulings changes according to the norms of the society. Garments which might have been forbidden for men or women in one era may be permitted in another, depending on the standards set by the particular society.

Note the Rama’s statements, Orach Chayim 696:8, which state that on Purim or at a wedding, this prohibition may be waived for the sake of adding to the festive mood of the celebration. The Bayit Chadash and others, however, do not accept this leniency.

To prevent the process of aging from being detected.

For violating this prohibition. The Ra’avad (see also Sho’el UMeshiv, Vol. I, Responsum 210) differs, and maintains that such an act violates only a Rabbinic prohibition. His opinion, however, is not accepted by the later authorities (Darchei Teshuvah 182:15).

Women are accustomed — and therefore, allowed — to hide their age, but not men.

The prohibition applies only when one attempts to look younger. Dyeing one’s hair grey is not forbidden (Turei Zahav 182:7).

Whose status with regard to gender is doubtful, as explained in Halachah 4.

As the Rambam states in that halachah, “the stringencies of both a man and a woman are applied to them.” Hence, they are not allowed to clothe themselves in a manner which is distinct to either a man or a woman.
According to the Yemenite manuscripts mentioned above which substitute תגלה, “reveal,” for תגלח, “cut,” this clause also must be amended accordingly.

Because we are unsure of their gender. Accordingly, it cannot be definitely said that a prohibition has been violated.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 41) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 253) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 253) states that the order mentioned by the Rambam is significant. If it is reversed and the ink is placed on the skin before an incision is made, one is not held liable. The Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 180:1), however, does not accept this view.

Branding themselves as the deity’s servants, as it were.

In Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam states that certain sects in Egypt followed these practices in his time as well.

The Tosefta (Makkot 3:9) adds that one must have the intent that the inscription is made for the sake of idol worship. This point, however, is not accepted by the halachic authorities.

The Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 180:4, states that one is not held liable for branding a servant. The Rama, however, explains that it is, nevertheless, forbidden to do so.

By cutting into his flesh.

For punishment.

The two words “dyed inscription” imply that both activities must be performed for the person to be held liable.

On himself or on a colleague.

The Kessef Mishneh compares this to the prohibition against shaving the corners of one’s head (Halachah 1). Based on this comparison, there are authorities who maintain that although punishment is not administered — because punishment is administered only when a person commits a deed which violates a prohibition — the person who is tattooed is still considered to have transgressed this Scriptural prohibition.

The prohibition applies only when a person makes such gouges as a sign of bereavement over the dead. Even when he gouges himself as an expression of grief for other matters, he is not liable, as stated in Halachah 16. Nevertheless, as stated in the following halachah, one is also liable for gashing or gouging oneself for idols.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 45) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 467) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Though Leviticus 21:5 specifically forbids the priests from expressing their grief in this manner, that injunction is not considered to be a separate commandment. This prohibition applies to both men and women.

Makkot 20b and the Sifra derive this concept through the exegesis of the verse from Leviticus cited above. Although he performs only a single activity, the verse teaches us that he is held responsible for each person he has in mind.

Each separate act warrants punishment.

Note Halachah 15, which explains an instance where one is liable for five measures of lashes even though only a single warning is given, Seemingly, the same law would apply in this instance (Turei Even).

Based on Makkot 21a, it appears that gashing is done with an instrument, and gouging with one’s bare hands.

Thus, regardless of how one performs the act, if one mutilates oneself in grief over the dead, one is held liable. There are opinions (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 180:7), however, which allow one to beat one’s flesh in grief until blood flows.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that this mutilation was not part of the rites used to worship the false deity — for if so, a violator would be executed — but rather a voluntary act, intended to attract the deity’s attention.

The verse refers to the prophets of the Baal who engaged in the confrontation with the prophet Elijah at Mount Carmel.

This implies that this was not an isolated occurrence, but rather the routine followed by the Baal’s priests.

This injunction is not considered to be a separate commandment, but rather a further explanation of the mitzvah stated previously.

Since that is the normal practice, as the verse from Kings continues: “With their swords and lances.”

Doing so is, nevertheless, forbidden (Tzemach Tzedek).

In Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 45), the Rambam explains that the interpretation which follows is an allegory, and the simple meaning of the verse is to prohibit gashing oneself in grief. Nevertheless, it is significant that the Rambam includes this “allegory” in a text which is, as he states in his introduction, “halachot, halachot.” Thus, he emphasizes how important unity is to the Jewish people.
There is an important halachic dimension to the Rambam’s explanation in Sefer HaMitzvot. One of the principles of Torah law is that punishment is never administered for the violation of a לאו שבכללות (“a prohibition which includes within it several different injunctions”; see Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2-3). If this allegorical interpretation of the mitzvah were considered to be included in the simple meaning of the mitzvah, this principle would also apply regarding this mitzvah, and lashes might not be administered when one gashed oneself in mourning (Kessef Mishneh).

This decision has been the subject of much discussion among the Rabbis, because it appears to run contrary to one of the accepted principles of halachah.
The Rabbis concluded that whenever there is a difference in opinion between Abbaye and Ravva, the halachah follows Ravva, with the exception of six specific instances (יעל קגם). In the present case, the Rambam quotes Abbaye’s opinion even though Ravva differs, stating that the prohibition applies only when one follows a divergent opinion without the support of a formal Rabbinical court (Yevamot 14a). When, however, there is a Rabbinical court which advocates each of the differing opinions — e.g., the differences of opinion between the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel — there is no prohibition against following either view until the halachah is determined by the supreme Sanhedrin.
Many authorities have advanced different explanations for the Rambam’s decision. The most straightforward is that of the Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1384), who explains that the Rambam favored Abbaye’s view because of the emphasis on unity. Furthermore, selecting it over Ravva’s in this instance does not represent a break with the accepted tradition, since the difference of opinion here does not center on positions adopted by Abbaye and Ravva independently, but rather on their interpretation of Resh Lakish’s statements.

The Hebrew גדד means both “gash” and “group.”

It must be noted that the Shulchan Aruch does not quote this halachah as law. It would appear that while many of the subsequent Rabbis appreciate the ideal of unity this halachah espouses, they felt that compelling people to conform to a uniform standard would create more strife than would result from the existence of different views.
One of the practical applications of the issues under discussion is the issue of differences between Sephardic and Ashkenazic religious practices (and similarly, the variety of different approaches that exist within these two major groupings). All of the contemporary authorities agree that it is desirable for each group to adhere to its native customs without change. This plurality of halachic perspectives is an expression — and not a negation — of the all-encompassing unity that permeates Torah Judaism. (See Ezrat Cohen, Responsum 103.)

Even today, we find the colloquialism, “tear out his hair in grief.”

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 171) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 468) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Menachot 37b explains that here the intent is not the area which is literally “between the eyes,” but rather the center of the head.

Although, Leviticus 21:5 states specifically that a priest may not create a bald spot on his head, that verse should not be understood to be a separate commandment, but rather a further explanation of this prohibition.

As explained in Halachah 12. If, however, he creates a single bald spot for five individuals, he receives only a single measure of lashes. In contrast, were he to gouge himself once for each of these individuals, he would receive a commensurate number of measures of lashes.

Pulling his hair out

That removes the hair chemically.

Because it is considered as if he performed five different activities.

As mentioned in the verse from Deuteronomy quoted above.

Although the subject of the verse is the priests, Makkot 20b explains that this verse is used to define the scope of the prohibition for everyone, both priests and Israelites.

Nega’im 6:1 defines a gris as an area which encompasses 36 hairs as they stand naturally on one’s head.

Rabbenu Asher disagrees and maintains that one is liable even if he removes two hairs. Furthermore, even the removal of a single hair is forbidden. (See Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 180:9; Gilyon HaMaharsha.)

Though it is forbidden to do, punishment is not administered.

As mentioned in the Biblical proof-texts.

As explained in Halachah 13.

As explained above, the person who performs these activities is held liable. In contrast, the person to whom these acts are done is held liable only if he assists in the performance of the deed.

Each is held liable as if he performed the prohibition himself in its entirety.