Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Stoning is considered a more severe form of execution than decapitation (Sanhedrin 50a).

Thus, they are executed in a more lenient manner than an individual who serves a false god, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 1.

From the passage concerning an עיר הנדחת, it is obvious that proselytizing in this manner is forbidden. Within that passage, however, there is no specific prohibition (i.e., a verse saying “Do not do such and such”) banning such an activity. The Rambam’s question (quoted from Sanhedrin 63b) is: Where is there a verse in the Torah that states this prohibition?

The use of the plural form in the verse implies that at least two people must be involved (Sanhedrin 111b).

The Rambam’s statements are quoted from Sanhedrin 15b. Tosafot explain that the source for this decision is Amos 5:2, which mentions “a city of one hundred.”

Though we have translated אֲנָשִׁים as “people,” its literal meaning is “men” — i.e., adult males (Sanhedrin 111b).

The use of the plural form in the verse implies that at least two people must be involved (Sanhedrin 111b).

The expression “the inhabitants of their city” would be appropriate only if the majority of the city was involved.

Sanhedrin 112a states this limitation because the passage obviously describes a proselytizing effort.

As stated above, the proselytizers must come “from your midst.”

In contrast, were the city condemned as an עיר הנדחת, it would be forbidden for anyone to benefit from the property.

I.e., the supreme Sanhedrin, which met in the Temple courtyard.

Based on this teaching, the Radbaz (Vol. 5, Responsum 1415) resolves the apparent contradiction between Halachah 2 and Hilchot Sanhedrin 5:11, which states that when the totality of a tribe is led astray, it is judged by the supreme Sanhedrin. The Radbaz explains: The tribe is judged by the supreme Sanhedrin. The punishment administered, however, is stoning. (See also the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 1:5.)

I.e., a city belonging to a specific tribe. In contrast, the cities of refuge are the property of the entire Jewish people as a whole.

Jerusalem was also not the ancestral heritage of any single tribe, but rather belonged to the people as a whole. (See also Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 7:14 for other laws that stem from this principle.)

This restriction was instituted lest a large portion of the land be left empty.

The Ra’avad objects to this statement, maintaining that the cities must be located in separate portions of Eretz Yisrael — e.g., one in Judea and one in the Galilee. The Migdal Oz and others justify the Rambam’s position.

This is required because the proof-text also uses a plural expression.

See Chapter 3, Halachot 2-3.

Slaughtering, bringing a burnt offering, offering a libation, and bowing.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 4.

This does not appear to refer to a trial where testimony is formally given in court, but rather a thorough investigation of the evidence, as the passage states (Deuteronomy 13:15), “You must investigate and probe, making careful inquiry.”

The Seder Mishneh suggests Joshua, Chapter 22, as a source for the Rambam’s statements. There it is related how Pinchas and ten elders were sent to investigate the behavior of the tribes of Reuven, Gad, and half the tribe of Menasheh.

The commentaries question the nature of this warning: Most agree that it does not refer to the warning which must be given to an individual to accept responsibility for his acts before committing a transgression. The Lechem Mishneh and others explain that this refers to a general warning given to the city as a whole. Once this warning is given, the laws of an עיר הנדחת can be applied to this city.

The Ra’avad questions of what concrete value their repentance will be. Though Teshuvah will make atonement possible and give them an opportunity to attain the world to come (note Hilchot Teshuvah 3:14), once a person has committed a transgression that has been observed by witnesses, he must be given the appropriate punishment regardless of whether he repents or not. The Sefer Kovetz and the Avodat HaMelech explain that if the city as a whole repents, all the transgressors — even if they constitute the majority of the city — are executed as required. The city itself and its children are not destroyed.

Rav Meir HaLevi questions the execution of the women and children, since Deuteronomy 24:16 states: “A man shall die for his own sins.” Note Hilchot Teshuvah 6:1, where the Rambam states that this concept does not apply to young children. See also his statements in the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. I, Chapter 54, where the Rambam states that, in contrast to all other sins, retribution is visited on the children of idolaters. Note also the Migdal Oz, who cites how even young children were swallowed up together with Korach, Datan, and Aviram (Numbers, Chapter 16).

The Kessef Mishneh states that the Rambam’s phraseology implies that the person who proselytized on behalf of the false gods is not punished as a madeach unless he is successful in leading astray more than half the city’s population. If he does not accomplish this, even though he leads astray many individuals, he is not judged as a madeach, but executed as one who prophesies in the name of idols.

Sanhedrin 112a states: “What motivated these people to live there? (I.e., why did they live in a sinful environment?) Their fortunes. Therefore, their fortunes should be destroyed.”

Note the contrast to someone who derives benefit from a false deity or anything dedicated to it. The latter is liable for a double measure of lashes, as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 2.

The witnesses were disqualified because two other witnesses testified that, at the time when the alleged transgression took place, they were together with the witnesses in another place. (See Hilchot Edut, Chapter 18.)

I.e., why does it not return to the possession of its original owners?

Hence, to reassume ownership over their property, they would have to acquire it with a formal kinyan. In this respect, there is no difference between the owners and any other individuals. Compare to Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 11:13. This applies even to the property of the righteous living in this city.

In many other contexts as well, a person who lives in a city for thirty days is considered as a resident. (See Hilchot Matnot Ani’im 9:12.)

The members of the caravan must be executed for their transgression. The question is: Are they considered to be members of the city and governed by the special laws applying to them, or are they considered to be individuals who worshiped idols?

Note the contrast to Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 4:3, which states that a Jew is obligated to destroy chametz that belongs to a gentile and was entrusted to him for safekeeping, if he accepted responsibility for it. The leniency with regard to an עיר הנדחת is derived by Sanhedrin 112b through the exegesis of the verse quoted above.

The Rambam’s decision differs from Rashi’s interpretation of Sanhedrin, loc. cit., where he requires that all property belonging to the condemned city that is found in neighboring cities be gathered together and burned with the עיר הנדחת.

The animal is killed because its life is dependent on the portion which belongs to the inhabitant of the Ir Hanidachas, it is therefore considered as if it belongs to him entirely.

Exodus 21:28 states: “If an ox gores a man or a woman and [the victim] dies, the ox must be put to death, and its flesh may not be eaten.” The oral tradition teaches that we are forbidden from benefiting from the ox at all. Accordingly, even were the ox to be slaughtered in the ritual manner before the sentence was carried out, one is forbidden to partake of the meat. (See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon, Chapter 10.) The same laws apply to the animals of anעיר הנדחת .

See Hilchot Eivel 14:21, which states that it is forbidden to benefit from a corpse, but that the prohibition does not involve its hair. (See also Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:4.)

This applies also to a wig belonging to a righteous person.

This is the rationale for the law stated in the previous halachah.

They are not burned together with the city.

Nor are they considered ownerless, and thus free to be acquired by anyone.

I.e., they are locked in closed place and allowed to die. They are not killed like the ordinary animals of the condemned city.

Our translation follows the standard published texts of the Mishneh Torah. Rav Kapach notes that the text of the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah would be rendered as "and afterwards, the city is burned."
This is a very important distinction. The Ra'avad and other commentaries note a difficulty with the standard text, questioning why the consecrated property must be burned after it was redeemed. Since it was not condemned together with the city, as the Rambam explains, why should it be burned?
The Kessef Mishneh attempts to resolve the difficulty, explaining that the consecrated property is considered as essentially belonging to the owners, but is "owed" to the Temple treasury. When that obligation is removed by its redemption, it becomes its owners' in its entirety, and thus must be burned together with their other property.

The laws pertaining to both these sacrifices are discussed in Hilchot Bechorot.

Since they are blemished, they are no longer to be sacrificed, nor must they be redeemed. Hence, they are considered to be privately owned animals which must be slain, as stated in Halachah 6.

This applies both to terumah gedolah (the portion of the crops given by the common people to the priests) and terumat ma’aser (the tenth portion of the tithe, which the Levites are required to give the priests).

Therefore, it must be allowed to rot. It is, nevertheless, not burned with the city as a whole, because it is consecrated unto God.

See Deuteronomy 14:22-27 and Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni, which describe how a second tithe is separated from the crops with the intent that it be eaten in Jerusalem. If it is impossible to bring the produce itself to Jerusalem, it should be redeemed, and the money that is used to redeem it should be taken to Jerusalem to be used to purchase food. Both the produce and the money used to redeem it have a certain dimension of holiness. Hence, it may not be burned. It is, nevertheless, the private property of the inhabitants of the Ir Hanidachas. Hence, it is entombed.
In contrast to terumah, it is not left to rot. Our Sages prescribed these different laws because the priests to whom the mitzvah of terumah is given are more scrupulous in its observance than are the common people in the observance of the mitzvot of the second tithe.

It is forbidden to destroy sacred writings, as stated in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 6:8. They are, nevertheless, the private property of the inhabitants of the Ir Hanidachas. Hence, they must be entombed.

The Rambam’s statements were obviously intended to assuage the natural feelings of compassion that would arise when confronting the need to administer such harsh punishment. (See also Hilchot Sanhedrin 11:5: “A display of cruelty to those who sway the people after emptiness is an act of mercy for the world.”)

Avodat HaMelech explains that this decision — in contrast to the law governing the punishment of those who proselytize an עיר הנדחת (see Chapter 4, Halachah 6, note 27) is based on Deuteronomy 13:11: “Because he tried to sway you away from God, your Lord.”

The first half of the passage quoted above deals with a prophet who proselytizes on behalf of false gods; the second half, with a common person who does so. Though the Torah mentions execution by stoning only in the second instance, through a process of Biblical exegesis, Sanhedrin 67a, 89b, derives that the same punishment is also given to a prophet.

If, however, the message is addressed to the majority of the inhabitants of a city, different rules apply, as the Rambam mentions in the previous chapter and in the following halachah.

He is governed by different laws, as explained in the previous chapter.

This is the punishment given to a person who leads the inhabitants of an עיר הנדחת astray, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 6. Since the prophet desires to lead the majority of the population astray, he is stoned only when he is successful in his intent. If he is not successful, he is executed by strangulation as a false prophet (Ben Yedid).

Thus, they are executed by stoning rather than decapitation, and their estates are given to their heirs rather than destroyed.

Note the contrast with regard to the laws applying to a madiach, as explained in Chapter 4, Halachah 5.

The phrase “Follow me” is added on the basis of the Commentary of the Kessef Mishneh, who notes that the mesit must direct his statements to the musat to be held liable.

A mesit is executed only for persuading a person to serve a false deity in a manner which would obligate the person who listens to be executed. A person is executed for serving a false deity through its accepted mode of service, as explained in Chapter 3, Halachah 2, or serving it with one of the four services performed on God’s behalf.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 3.

Generally, a person must be warned before he is punished for committing a transgression. In this instance, however, Sanhedrin 88b states that an exception is made and no warning is required. (See Hilchot Sanhedrin 11:5.)

The testimony of a single witness is not sufficient to convict a transgressor. Hence, the musat must seek to have the mesit repeat his statements in the presence of others.

Here, we see an instance of retribution being meted out “measure for measure.” Since the mesit tried to lure his colleagues to sin, he is also lured into transgression (Kin’at Eliyahu).

One might ask: Why must two witnesses be hidden? On the surface, it would appear sufficient to hide a single witness and then he and the musat could testify against the mesit. This question can be resolved on the basis of the Rambam’s statements (Hilchot Edut 4:1) that, in capital cases, the two witnesses must see each other. Since the witness must be hidden so that the mesit will not see him, it is possible that the musat will also not be able to see him (Pri Chadash).

See Tosafot, Sanhedrin 8b, which explains that although a mesit is not given a complete warning as are other transgressors, the seriousness of the transgression he is committing must in some way be brought to his attention. The statement “How can we forsake...” serves this purpose. Accordingly, if the mesit does not repeat his statements after receiving this warning, he is not liable for execution.

Hilchot Sanhedrin 15:1 relates that execution by stoning involves pushing the condemned from a two-storey height and then throwing heavy stones upon him. Thus, the musat should push the mesit and “throw the first stone.” If this is not sufficient to kill the mesit, others should join in throwing stones.

Avodat HaMelech questions why, both in this halachah and in Sefer HaMitzvot, the Rambam singles out the musat. Although these prohibitions apply to him, seemingly they also apply to all Jews.

See Hilchot Rotzeach 13:14, which explains that the “enemy” referred to in the above verse is “a sinner who violates a transgression after receiving a warning.” Thus, although we must show kindness to transgressors, the mesit is not granted such consideration.

See also Hilchot Sanhedrin 11:5, which states that, in contrast to the general rule, once a mesit is convicted, the court should not listen to any arguments on his behalf.

Hilchot Sanhedrin (ibid.) states that even after a mesit has been vindicated, the case may be reopened if incriminating testimony is found against him.

The Kessef Mishneh and others explain the Rambam’s statements: There are two types of mesitim: a prophet and a commoner. The warning against a prophet proselytizing on behalf of false gods is the same as that for authoring any other false prophecy. (See Halachah 6.) Thus, only the source of the warning against a common person is a matter of question.

The musatim’s statements, and even those of the mesit, are considered to have been made facetiously. Since he is a human being, it is presumed that neither he nor they were serious about worshiping him (Sanhedrin 61b).

See Halachot 1 and 2.

Since the Rambam mentioned a prophet who proselytizes on behalf of a false god, he continues discussing a related issue, “a person who prophesies in the name of false gods.”

Note the contrast to a mesit, who does not require a proper warning, as mentioned in Halachah 3.

This is the same punishment given to a false prophet, as mentioned in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 9:1 and in the following halachah. In contrast, a “prophet” who proselytizes on behalf of false gods receives a more severe form of execution — stoning — as mentioned in Halachah 2.

The passage in Deuteronomy, Chapter 18, which mentions such false prophecy obviously deems it an undesirable activity. There is, however, no explicit verse in that passage forbidding it. The Mechilta D’Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai associates the prohibition with the verse in Exodus. Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 26) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 517) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 28) mentions this as part of the Torah prohibition cited below.

In contrast, as the Rambam explains in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 7:7, 10:1, a person who prophesies in the name of God is asked to verify the authenticity of his prophecy by performing wonders — e.g., predicting future events.

Since this sign or wonder comes to contradict the prophecy of Moses, we can assume that it was performed through sorcery or black magic (Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 8:3).

Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 456) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. (Note the Ramban’s Hasagot, where he contests this point.)

The Rambam also mentions the concept of a false prophet in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, Chapters 7-10. The distinction between his statements there and those made in these halachot shed light on the careful structure which characterizes the Mishneh Torah.

Note Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 9:1, which explains that were a prophet to add to or diminish the mitzvot in any way, he would be automatically considered to be a false prophet.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 27) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 516) consider the prohibition against false prophecy to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Note the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 7:1,4, which describe “the paths of prophecy”: Prophecy is bestowed only upon a very wise sage of strong character... When he enters the Pardes and is drawn into these great and sublime concepts, if he possesses a correct perspective to comprehend and grasp [them], he will become holy. He will advance and separate himself from the masses, who proceed in the darkness of the time. He must continue and diligently train himself not to have any thoughts whatsoever about fruitless things or the vanities and intrigues of the times... [Those aspiring to prophecy] must concentrate their attention [upon spiritual concepts] and seclude themselves, [waiting] in a happy, joyous mood, because prophecy cannot rest upon a person when he is sad or languid, but only when he is happy.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 29) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 518) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

This refers to the supreme Sanhedrin, which held court on the Temple Mount. In Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, Chapter 10, the Rambam elaborates on the process of testing the authenticity of a prophet and how a person’s prophecy can be established as false.

In particular, the Rambam discusses the difference between an oath (שבועה) and a vow (נדר) in the respective halachot in Sefer Hafla’ah. In general, the distinction is that the obligation brought about by an oath centers primarily on the person who accepts the obligation, while that incurred by a vow has a greater connection to the object of the vow.

See Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 7), which mentions the se verity of taking an oath by anything other than God, explaining that taking such an oath will cause a person’s existence to be obliterated.

The punishment for this transgression by lashes is questioned by the commentaries because it involves speech and not a deed and generally punishment for the violation of a prohibition is given only when a deed is involved. Nevertheless, in this instance, taking a vow or oath is considered as a deed.

The citation of this proof-text sheds light on the reason why this prohibition is mentioned here. As mentioned in Halachah 6, this verse also serves as the proof-text for the prohibition against prophesying in the name of a false deity. Hence, it is appropriate that this prohibition be mentioned after the discussion of false prophecy is concluded.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 14) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 87) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 147:3), which states that the mention of the names of these false deities is forbidden “whether it is necessary or unnecessary to mention them.” This implies that the prohibition applies even when a Jew would suffer a loss should he not mention them, and conversely, even when his mention of them is totally casual, without any apparent purpose.

In the previous halachah, the Rambam mentioned the prohibition against making a gentile take an oath on his false deity. In this halachah, he states that it is forbidden to enter into situations which might lead to this. Among the examples given for the latter prohibition is entering into a partnership with a gentile. Since, ultimately, a dispute between the partners that requires taking an oath might crop up, it is forbidden to enter into such an arrangement from the outset (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 156:1, Yoreh De’ah 147:2).

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandments 8 and 9) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 255 and 256) consider the prohibitions against performing the deeds associated with an ov and a yid’oni to be two of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Rambam’s expression implies that the reply is only imagined and is not actually heard by the inquirer. This is consistent with his statements in Chapter 11, Halachah 16, that these practices (and the other means of divination and magic mentioned there) are emptiness and lies that have no real substance.

See also the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 7:7, where he elaborates on the description of this practice.

Rashi (Sanhedrin 65b) states that a yidua is a wild beast. Most commentaries accept his opinion. The Rambam’s statements appear to be based on the Zohar (Vol. III, p. 184b) which describes Balak as a master of this form of divination and states that he performed it using a bone from a bird.

Performing these acts involves the acceptance of entities apart from God as sources of influence. From the commentaries of Rashi and Ramban to Deuteronomy 18:11, it appears that the divinations performed with an ov and a yidoni are a combination of sorcery and idolatry. For the intent is to perform sorcery, yet there is a dimension of servitude to the impure powers one seeks to call on. Therefore, sometimes, these divinations are described as types of idolatry and, sometimes, as sorcery.

In a number of places, the Torah mentions the punishments to be conferred on those who perform these acts. In those verses, however, there is no explicit commandment forbidding such deeds.

Molech was an Ammonite deity whose worship is mentioned several places in the Torah and the prophets. (See I Kings 11:7, II Kings 16:3, 23:10.) Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 7) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 208) consider the prohibition against worshiping Molech to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

In Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam mentions that the warning against this service is “repeated in the Torah.” The first prohibition states that Molech worship is prohibited. The second defines that worship as passing one’s child through fire (Kessef Mishneh).

See the latter half of the following halachah.

Our translation follows the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah. The authoritative manuscripts read “with their (i.e., the priests’) permission.”

The Maharik maintains that the son walks on his own power.

The Rambam’s statements are based on Sanhedrin 64b and the Jerusalem Talmud (Sanhedrin 7:10). The Kessef Mishneh and others object to the Rambam’s interpretation of these sources. They prefer Rashi’s interpretation, which states that the father compelled the son to run through the flames.

The Ramban, in his Commentary to the Torah (Leviticus 18:21), takes issue with the Rambam’s statements and maintains that the son was burned to death in this service. The Meiri elaborates in support of the Rambam’s view, explaining that this service was an initiation rite, consecrating the son unto Molech’s service.

Were the rite to involve cremation of the son, one would be liable even when one performed it in service of another deity, since it would resemble bringing a burnt offering (Kessef Mishneh).

In this instance as well, the Kessef Mishneh maintains that the father causes the son to walk through the fire, but does not carry him.

The Sefer Mitzvot Gadol explains that such a person is not held liable, because being punished for one's transgression brings about atonement. A person whose defiance of God is great enough to motivate him to give over all of his children to the worship of Molech is not granted the opportunity for atonement.

All these laws are based on Sanhedrin 64b.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 11) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 493) consider the prohibition against erecting a monument to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Genesis (28:18) relates how Jacob set up a monument for the worship of God. Afterwards, however, this practice was accepted by idolaters. Thus, what was beloved in the time of the ancestors became “hated” in the era of their descendants (Sifri, Shof’tim).

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 12) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 349) consider the prohibition against prostrating oneself on a stone to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Megillah 22b derives this concept from Genesis 37:10: “Shall your mother and I... come to prostrate ourselves before you on the earth.”

The Temple courtyard and the Temple building were paved with stones, and the Jews and the priests would prostrate themselves there.

Megillah 22b, 23a mentions this concept in connection with the recitation of the Tachanun prayers, which certain individuals would recite lying spread out on the floor. (See Hilchot Tefillah 5:13-14.) At present, in Ashkenazic communities, this issue is relevant during the High Holiday services, when it is customary to prostate oneself several times.

Megillah, loc. cit., mentions these alternatives specifically.

I.e., bowing down with his face to the ground.

This punishment is given for the violation of a Rabbinic command.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, Halachah 2, one is held liable for prostrating oneself to a false deity even when this is not the accepted mode of serving that deity.

From the Rambam’s expression, it would appear that the transgressor’s face would have to touch the ground. From Sanhedrin 65a, however, it appears that one is liable even when one merely bent over in deference to the false deity.

The commentaries note that the Sifri, the source for this halachah, states that the prohibition applies throughout the entire Temple Mount (an area much larger than the Temple courtyard). Avodat HaMelech resolves this difficulty on the basis of the Rambam’s statements (Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 6:10) that the Temple courtyard can be extended to include the entire Temple Mount, but no further.

An asherah is a sacred tree or pole associated with the worship of a fertility goddess.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 13) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 490) consider the prohibition against planting a tree in the Temple courtyard to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The commentaries question whether this “extra restriction” is merely a Rabbinic decree added as a safeguard to the Biblical prohibition, or whether it is included within the scope of that prohibition itself. The Rambam’s statements here (and similarly, his omission of the entire matter in Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit.) lead to the conclusion that he believes that this restriction is rabbinic in origin. [Though he mentions a Biblical verse as a prooftext, that citation is merely an asmachta (support) which the Rabbis used after making their decree.]

Beams that did not protrude were, however, placed within the Temple building for support (I Kings 6:10) and for the purpose of ornamentation (Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 4:8).

Both here and in Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 1:9, the Ra’avad protests against the Rambam’s statements, noting that during the Hakhel celebrations, a wooden platform was constructed for the king, and that the High Priest’s chamber was made of wood. He offers two possible resolutions:
a) The prohibition forbade only the construction of permanent structures, not temporary ones like the king’s platform;
b) The prohibited area — “near the Altar of God” — began in the Courtyard of the Priests and did not apply in the Courtyard of the Israelites and the Women’s Courtyard where the problematic structures were found. See the notes to Hilchot Beit Habechirah where the subject is discussed in detail.