Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The grandson of Adam. See Genesis 4:26, 5:6-11. Enosh lived from the year 235 after creation to the year 1140 (3525 to 2620 B.C.E.).

Interestingly, the Rambam does not attribute the rise of paganism to simple commoners, but to the “wise” of the generation.

Our text of Shabbat 118b mentions that “the generation of Enosh” were idol worshipers. However, certain versions of that text omit the words “generation of.” (See She’iltot D’Rabbi Achai Gaon, Bereishit.)

See Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, Chapter 3, for a description of the stars and the spheres, and their place within the Rambam’s conception of the cosmos.

I.e., mediums of Divine influence.

Rashi finds an allusion to the worship of false gods in Enosh’s times in Genesis 4:26: אז הוחל לקרא בשם ה', which he renders, “It was then that they called profanely upon the name of God.”

In Hilchot Yesodei Torah, Chapter 3, the Rambam explains that the stars and the spheres are on a higher plane than the creations of our world. Though they influence our world, they are also God's creations and have no free will of their own. They are no more than an axe in the hands of a wood-chopper, and should not worshiped or served.

Note the Rambam’s comments on astrology in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 4:7), which are quoted in the commentary on Chapter 11, Halachah 16.

It is questionable if such worship is forbidden to gentiles or not. Based on Deuteronomy 4:19, certain authorities maintain that the gentiles may worship other gods, provided they have the awareness that God is the ultimate power (שיתוף). The Rambam, however, does not mention this perspective in these halachot, nor in Hilchot Melachim, ch. 9, where he discusses the prohibition against the worship of false gods as it affects gentiles.
[In Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 2), however, he states “Israel is commanded regarding the unification of God”; from which it could be inferred that gentiles need not believe in this concept and can combine their worship of God with other powers.] All authorities agree that such worship is forbidden for Jews.

It is unclear from the Rambam’s statements here whether, originally, they would worship the stars without any self-interest — merely with the intent of honoring those whom God honors — or whether their service was self-oriented — i.e., they worshiped the stars because they considered them as mediums of Divine influence and hoped to derive benefit from their service. In the following halachah and in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 4:7), the Rambam mentions the second view. It is, however, unclear if this was the original intent of the star-worshipers or whether this was a later development.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

As the pagans mentioned in Halachah 2 later did. The first generations of star worshipers were aware of God’s existence and conceived of the stars as no more than intermediaries between themselves and Him.

See also the Guide for the Perplexed (Vol. I, Chapter 36) where the Rambam explains a similar idea using the same Biblical proof-text.

i.e., as an entity of substance.

The worship of the stars.

This and the following two halachot are somewhat problematic. The Rambam conceived of the Mishneh Torah as a book of law. He included philosophical and historical points only when they are halachot, directives for our behavior. In this light, this entire chapter seems unnecessary. This difficulty can be resolved based on Chapter 2, Halachah 3, which states that it is forbidden to entertain thoughts of idol worship. Hence, in order to know which thoughts are forbidden, the Rambam feels it necessary to describe the entire thought process which led people to worship idols (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 20). The phenomenon described by the Rambam does not belong entirely to the past. Although, at present, bowing down to the “stars and spheres” is not very common — although it has been renewed by some cultists — the theoretical premise that motivated the ancients to serve the stars is still followed by many. Is it all that uncommon to find people who compromise their service of God in expectation of receiving benefits by following what they perceive as the natural order?

Note Hilchot Yesodei Torah 9:5, which states that anyone who states that God told him in a prophetic vision to worship idols should be considered a false prophet. See also the Guide for the Perplexed (Vol. II, Chapter 36) where the Rambam describes how people can be overcome by their powers of imagination to the extent that they — as do others who see them in such a trance — think of themselves as prophets, although, in fact, they received no Divine influence.

Thus, this represents a second stage in the spread of idol worship. At first — as explained in Halachah 1 — star worship was not institutionalized, but was practiced by individuals because of their mistaken conceptions. The second phase involved the development of religious institutions and set modes of worship. The leaders, however, still recognized God and attributed the instructions to worship the stars to Him. In the third stage — as the latter portion of this halachah states — people would worship the stars and idols without any awareness of God.

See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 4:7) and his statements in Chapter 11, Halachah 16, where he explains that idol worship was instituted by the leaders of the nations to unite the people of a particular land, give them a sense of national identity, and establish a hierarchy of leaders.

With these statements, the Rambam explains how people began to worship statues and idols. Since the star was far away and could not be perceived as more than a twinkling dot in the sky, the people wanted a more tangible image which they could relate to. The “prophets” obliged and devised forms for statues to serve as talismans to bring down influence from these stars.

Note Deuteronomy 12:2, which commands the Jews to destroy “all the places where the nations... would worship their gods, on the high mountains, on the hills, or under any luxuriant tree.” Note the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. III, Chapter 45, where the Rambam mentions the gentile practice of building temples on hills and mountaintops.

At this stage, their service was clearly self-oriented. They wanted to derive benefit or prevent harm to themselves through this service.

This represented a further descent. Rather than prophesy in the name of God, these imposters would speak in the names of the false divinities themselves. (See also Chapter 5, Halachot 6-7.)

Note Chapter 3, Halachah 2, which describes the service of Ba’al Pe’or. The people would defecate before the idol as an act of worship.

It is not clear at which point in the history of the world this change took place. The period between Enosh’s birth and Abraham’s lasted slightly more than one thousand years, with the flood taking place approximately 750 years after Enosh’s birth.

Note the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Chulin 1:1), where he also differentiates between the people who believe in the spiritual service intended to draw down spiritual energy from these celestial bodies and practice it, and the common people who worship the idols blindly, on faith.

Thus: At first star worship was not institutionalized, but was practiced by individuals because of their mistaken conceptions. The second phase involved the development of religious institutions and set modes of worship. The leaders, however, still recognized God and attributed the instructions to worship the stars to Him. In the third stage people would worship the stars and idols without any awareness of God.

The true God.

See also the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. II, Chapter 39, where the Rambam cites these individuals as prophets. Despite the awareness of God possessed by these individuals, our Sages speak critically of them. For, although they themselves were righteous, they did nothing to influence the people around them.

Note Genesis 5:22: “And Chanoch walked with God.”

Though his righteousness is not mentioned explicitly in the Torah, it is mentioned by our Sages in a number of places — e.g., Yalkut Shimoni, Bereishit 42, which states: “Metushelach was a completely righteous man.”

See Genesis 6:9: “And Noach was a righteous man, perfect in his generation.”

Noach’s youngest son.

Shem and Ever are frequently mentioned by our Rabbis as righteous sages. See Bereishit Rabbah 63:6, which explains that when Rivkah went “to seek out God” (Genesis 25:22), she went to the house of study of Shem and Ever.

Abraham was born in the year 1948 (1812 B.C.E.).

In several places — e.g., Bava Batra 15a and Rosh HaShanah 11a — our Sages referred to Abraham with this expression.

Nedarim 32a states: “Abraham was three when he recognized his Creator.” Although the Rambam states that it was not until Abraham was forty that he gained true awareness of God, his process of search began at age three.

Note the Midrash HaGadol (Parashat Lech Lecha), which explains that Abraham questioned: Why should we bow down to idols, gods that we ourselves make? We should bow to the earth, for it produces crops that sustain us. Therefore, he began to worship the earth. Then he saw that the earth needs rain, and began to worship the sky. Later, he saw that the most brilliant creation in the sky was the sun, and began to worship it. Afterwards, when the sun set and the moon rose, he began to worship the moon. When the sun rose the next morning, he did not know what to do. He did not see which was stronger: the sun or the moon. So Abraham continued in a quandary, questioning: Who was the true God?

Interestingly, in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 1:5, the Rambam uses the same concept as a proof for the existence of God.

Bereishit Rabbah 61:1 elaborates on the lack of instruction that was available to Abraham. Note the Ra’avad and the Kessef Mishneh, who question why Noach, Shem, and Ever (all of whom were alive at this time) did not try to nullify the worship of idols and why they did not instruct Abraham. They offer two explanations. The first is that they were afraid and hid from the idolaters. (See Midrash Tehillim 118. Note, however, teachings which state that these righteous men also protested the worship of false gods, Tanna Devei Eliyahu Rabba, Chapters 20 and 25.) Alternatively, Shem and Ever lived in the land of Canaan, while Abraham lived in Babylon. The question remains, however, why did Abraham not seek out these righteous men (Kinat Eliyahu)?

Indeed, our Sages relate that his father had a shop where idols were sold.

See Bereishit Rabbah 39:8, which states that Abraham was always worried that God would not absolve him from his sin of worshiping idols.

These are the fundamental principles of the Jewish faith, as explained in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 1:1-6.

Their worship of idols dulled their sensitivity to spirituality to the point where they lost all awareness of God.

Note Bereishit Rabbah 64:4, which mentions two opinions regarding when Abraham became aware of God: one when he was three and one when he was forty-eight. It is possible that the Rambam’s text of the Midrash read “forty” instead of “forty eight.”
As explained above, these opinions are not necessarily contradictory. Abraham’s process of inquiry could have begun at age three, while at forty he gained greater understanding, and at forty eight, he achieved an even higher level of awareness.
Avot 5:21 states: “At forty, one achieves understanding.” By associating Abraham’s appreciation of the Creator with this age, the Rambam implies that this awareness can come as a product of our own thought and meditation.

Bereishit Rabbah 39:1 explains Abraham’s process of thought with a parable. A person saw a brightly lit palace. He wondered: Could this palace exist without an owner? Immediately, the owner revealed himself to him. Similarly, Abraham wondered: Is it possible for the world to exist without One Who controls it? Immediately, God revealed Himself to him.

Our Sages relate that after breaking his father’s idols, he put a stick in the hands of the largest idol. When his father asked him why he destroyed the idols, he replied that he didn’t do it; the idol holding the stick did. His father curtly dismissed his reply: “That idol is only metal. It cannot do anything,” he roared at his son.” If so, why do you worship it?” Abraham replied.

The Rambam’s words imply that the value of offering sacrifices at this time (before the Torah commanded that they be offered) was not as the acts of service of God, but in the educational effect they had on the people and the awareness of God they inspired.

Nimrod (Pesachim 118a).

By tossing him into a burning furnace.

Interestingly, when the Rambam lists the ten trials that Abraham endured in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Avot 5:3, he does not mention this episode at all.

See Genesis 11:31. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam mentions Abraham’s exile from his native land as the first of his ten trials.

On the phrase, Genesis 12:5, “the souls they had gathered in Charan,” Bereishit Rabbah 39:21 comments, “These are the converts they made. Abraham would convert the men and Sarah would convert the women.”

See Genesis, Chapter 12, which describes Abraham’s journeys within the land of Canaan.

Sotah 10a states: “Do not read ‘And he called.’ Read ‘And he had others call’” — i.e., Abraham motivated others to become aware of God and call out to Him.

The Rabbis question the fate of all these people. We do not find any mention of the perpetuation of their faith in God. Perhaps the cultural influences of the surrounding environment were too powerful. If the children of Israel themselves turned to idol worship after two generations in Egypt, could any more be expected from these individuals?

Most commentaries point to Avodah Zarah 14b, which relates that Abraham composed a four-hundred-chapter text against the worship of false gods. Kinat Eliyahu notes that here, the Rambam is not referring to the negation of idol worship, but to the propagation of the faith in one God. Therefore, he suggests that the reference is to the Kabbalistic tradition (Zohar, Vol. II, 275b) that Sefer Yetzirah was composed by Abraham. (See also Kiryat Melech.)

Note Genesis 18:19: “I have known him that he will command his children and household after him, and they will keep the way of God....”

Jacob also studied under Shem and Ever (see Rashi, Genesis 25:27, Bereishit Rabbah 25:16).

I.e., he and not Esau would continue the spiritual heritage of Abraham.

In contrast to Abraham and Isaac, all of Jacob’s children were righteous. (See Hilchot Kri’at Shema 1:4.)

The Torah itself does not mention Jacob’s selection of Levi as a leader. A number of sources in the oral tradition (Pirkei D’Rabbi Eliezer, Chapter 39; Shemot Rabbah 15:27), however, reveal this concept.

The Midrash Tanchuma (Vayigash) interprets Genesis 46:28: “And Jacob sent Judah before him,” to mean that he charged him with founding a yeshiva. Similarly, Yoma 28b states that this Talmudic academy continued throughout the Egyptian exile.

Note Hilchot De’ot 1:7, which explains that the expression, “the way of God,” refers to ethics, emulating the qualities of spirit which God has revealed.

In this context, note the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Melachim 9:1. After relating the seven universal laws given to Noach and his descendants, the Rambam states:
In addition to these, Abraham was commanded regarding circumcision. He instituted the
morning prayer. Isaac separated tithes and added another prayer service towards evening.
Jacob added the prohibition against eating the gid hanasheh, the “displaced nerve,” and
instituted the evening prayers.

Thus, the mantle of leadership passed to Kehat and then to Amram, Moses’ father.

This describes the initial period of the Jews’ stay in Egypt, when they prospered both spiritually and materially.

The entire period of the Egyptian exile lasted 210 years. As long as Jacob’s sons were living, the Jews preserved the heritage of their fathers and were treated with honor by the Egyptians. The last of Jacob’s sons to die was Levi. After his death, the spiritual level of the Jews descended. Levi lived 137 years. He was 44 when he entered Egypt. Thus, this spiritual descent occurred 93 years after the Jews entered Egypt.

When the Jews adopted Egyptian values, as a reflection of their spiritual state, they were enslaved by the Egyptians.

The tribe of Levi was also the only tribe which perpetuated the mitzvah of circumcision (Sifri, Berachah). As a result of their spiritual fortitude, the tribe of Levi was never enslaved.

Our Sages relate that, in the Egyptian exile, the Jews had descended to the forty-ninth degree of impurity. Had they descended another level, it would have been impossible for us ever to be redeemed.

This is a reference to Deuteronomy 7:7-8: “It is not because of your greatness over all the other nations that God desired you and chose you..., but it was because of God’s love for you and because He kept the oath He swore to your fathers.”

Rav David Arameah notes that the word עשה, rendered as “brought forth,” literally means “made.” He explains that from Moses’ birth, God granted him the potential to develop unique spiritual awareness. Although the Rambam also accepts this concept (see the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. II, Chapter 32), it is more likely that he chose this expression as a reference to I Samuel 12:6 (Rav Kapach).

See Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 7:6, where the Rambam elaborates on the advantages Moses had over all the other prophets. Indeed, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Introduction to Chapter 10 of Sanhedrin), he includes belief in the supremacy of Moses’ prophecy as the seventh of his Thirteen Principles of Faith.

After 117 years of idol worship and slavery.

As will be explained in the subsequent chapters. The Rambam's elaboration on the negative experience of our people in Egypt and the giving of the Torah has the following implication. Although man can appreciate the futile nature of idol worship and the greatness of God with his own intellect, because man is fallible, it is necessary to have these principles institutionalized in an objective, unchanging religious code (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 20).

The Rambam counts the prohibition against worshiping false gods as the first of the 365 negative commandments. In these halachot, he does not mention this prohibition in the manner in which he usually introduces one of the 613 mitzvot in this text, because he introduced this prohibition previously in the Mishneh Torah, mentioning it in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 1:6. The inclusion of this mitzvah in those halachot is appropriate, because it is one of the foundations of our faith.

See Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, Chapters 2 and 3, for a description of these creations

Fire, wind, water, and earth. The Rambam describes the existence and function of these four fundamental elements in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, Chapters 3 and 4.

All the creations of our physical world are created from a combination of these four elements.

As the Rambam mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 1.

And is subject to the punishments mentioned in Chapter 3, Halachah 1.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are some authorities who, using this verse as a proof-text, do not prohibit gentiles from worshiping false gods with this intent. However, all authorities agree that Jews may not worship in this manner.

Obviously, the intent is not that we are forbidden to gaze at the celestial beings (Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 10).

See Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 3:9, which states that the stars and the spheres are alive and are conscious of God’s existence.

In the first chapters of the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. II, and briefly in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 4:3, the Rambam explains that all the creations of this world are combinations of different elements and will therefore ultimately return to their initial elemental state. In contrast, the existence of the stars and the spheres remains constant.

To “honor those whom God honors,” as mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 1, or to derive benefit from serving them, as mentioned in Halachah 2 of that chapter.

The words “Be very careful” imply a Scriptural prohibition. In Halachah 3, the Rambam describes the prohibition involved in harboring such thoughts.

Note the fifth of the Rambam’s Thirteen Principles of Faith (Commentary to the Mishnah, Sanhedrin, Chapter 10):
The fifth fundamental principle is that it is fit to serve God alone... and not the entities which are below Him: the angels, the stars, the spheres, or the fundamental elements.
This is because they all perform their functions because of their inherent nature. They have no control or choice, but merely [fulfill] God’s will. We should not make them intermediaries to reach Him through them, but rather direct all our thoughts to Him, paying no attention to anything else. This is the... prohibition against worshiping false gods

The commentaries have also included studying other books by pagans and nonbelievers in this prohibition.

See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Avot 2:17), which states that one may study “the ideas of the gentiles in order to reply to them.” Indeed, from the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. III, Chapters 29 and 30, it appears that the Rambam himself undertook such study. (The Rabbis have, nevertheless, suggested that such study be limited only to certain individuals who have received permission from a rabbinic authority to concern themselves with these issues.)
Note also Chapter 3, Halachah 2, and Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:1, which state that judges must be somewhat familiar with the rites of the pagans in order to judge cases dealing with such questions. There is no source, however, where the Rambam explicitly mentions that one may study about idol worship for this reason. (See Shabbat 75a and Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De’ah 179:29.)

The Zohar, Vol. I, 100a, mentions this prohibition together with its rationale, “lest your heart be tempted to this service.”

Note Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 10) and Tosafot (Shabbat 149a), which explain that this prohibition applies only to statues worshiped as idols, in contrast to Rashi (Shabbat, ibid.), who explains that it refers even to statues erected for decorative purposes.

Note the comments of the Sifra on this verse, “If you turn to them, you will make them gods.”

See Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 10), which defines this prohibition as “analytical thought and study concerning the fantasies and empty thoughts of the founders [of idol worship] — i.e., that spiritual nurture can be drawn down from this star in this manner, it is proper to burn incense to this star in this manner....”

I.e., such enquiries are prohibited.

Here, abstract intellectual curiosity is forbidden. The Rambam operates under the premise that there is nothing positive that can be learned from idol worshipers, and there is a danger that one will be attracted to their lifestyle. Therefore, since there is “nothing to gain and everything to lose,” inquiry about such subjects is forbidden.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 10) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 213) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

. E.g., in his curiosity, uncovers an image to see what it looks like (Maharshal) or performs a ceremonial act of idol worship merely as practice (Kessef Mishneh).
The Rambam’s statements here are used as support to negate the opinion of the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 345), which states that lashes are never given for the violation of a prohibition that can be transgressed without performing a deed, even when one violates it by committing a deed.

Punishment is administered only for the violation of prohibitions by actual deeds. In this instance, the prohibition can be violated by thought alone — in which case no punishment is administered. There are, however, also instances when deed — and thus punishment — is also involved. Eruvin 17b notes that even though the proof-text for this prohibition mentions the word אל rather than לא, it is no different from other Torah prohibitions, and its violation is also punishable by lashes.

Note the Introduction to Sefer HaMitzvot (Shoresh 9), which states that there are mitzvot of thought, of feeling, of speech, and of deed.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 47) defines this mitzvah as follows:
We are forbidden to be freethinking [to the extent that] we accept principles which run contrary to those of the Torah. Rather, we should structure our thoughts, setting for them guidelines, those being the mitzvot of the Torah

See also Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 2:12, 4:11,13, where the Rambam mentions the restrictions placed on the study of deeper spiritual concepts lest one err in his conception.

There are several ways to understand the expression used by the Rambam: “destroy the world.” On the most obvious level, it is a figurative expression, not to be interpreted literally. On a deeper level, it can be seen as a reference to his statements in Hilchot Teshuvah 3:4 that a person should always “see himself and the entire world as equally balanced between merit and sin. If he commits one sin, he tips his balance and that of the entire world to guilt and brings on destruction.” Today, we can appreciate the Rambam’s words in a very literal sense. Society as a whole is plagued by irrational acts of violence and on a global level it is possible for utter destruction to be brought about if a few individuals act irresponsibly.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Introduction to the Tenth Chapter of Sanhedrin), the Rambam lists the oneness of God as the second of his Thirteen Principles of Faith. See also Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 1:7, 2:10.

Chaggigah 11b states: “It would have been better for someone who considers the [following] four matters never to have been created.” The passage continues by mentioning the four questions quoted by the Rambam here.

Our translation is based on Rashi’s interpretation of Chaggigah, ibid.

In Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 7:1, the Rambam states: “It is [one] of the foundations of [our] faith that God communicates by prophecy with man.” Similarly, the Rambam lists the concept of prophecy as the sixth of his Thirteen Principles of Faith

As the eighth of his Thirteen Principles of Faith, the Rambam states: “The Torah which we have was given by Moses our teacher... and emanates — in its entirety — from the Almighty.” He explains that this also applies to the oral law. He reiterates this concept in his introduction to the Mishneh Torah.

The Rambam’s statements should be interpreted, not as a restriction of one’s thinking processes, but rather a call to structure our thoughts according to the guidelines provided for us by the Torah. In this context, it is worthy to refer to Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 4:13: I maintain that it is not proper for a person to stroll in the Pardes (study Torah’s mystic secrets) unless he has filled his belly with bread and meat. “Bread and meat” refer to the knowledge of what is permitted and what is forbidden, and similar matters concerning other mitzvot. Even though the Sages referred to these as “a small matter” — since our Sages said: “‘A great matter,’ this is Ma’aseh Merkavah. ‘A small matter,’ this is the debates of Abbaye and Ravva” — nevertheless, it is fitting for them to be given precedence because they settle a person’s mind. Thus, the Rambam teaches that a person should not embark on the study of deep spiritual questions until he has gained the intellectual maturity which comes from Torah study. Even after a person gains such maturity, there is no need for him to concern himself with the study of idol worship because there is no value which he can derive from such study.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 47) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 387) counts this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Instead, he should follow a structured pattern for intellectual growth and development prescribed by a Torah master

Sifri, Parshas Shelach; see also Berachot 12b.

For a more precise definition of the term minnut, see Halachah 5 and notes.

In Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains:
Their intent in mentioning “immorality” was the pursuit of pleasure and physical desire, [to the extent that] one’s mind is constantly preoccupied with such thoughts.

In Hilchot Teshuvah 3:8, the Rambam includes among the categories of those who have no portion in the world to come: “nonbelievers, heretics, those who deny the Torah... those who cause the many to sin, and those who depart from the ways of the community.” Following the whims of one’s heart can lead to the transgression of these prohibitions.

Because it does not involve a deed. There is some difficulty with the Rambam’s statements. The transgression of both of the prohibitions mentioned in this halachah involves thought and can also involve deed. Just as the commentaries suggested several deeds which violate the first prohibition, similar acts could be performed which violate the latter prohibition. The Rambam, however, appears to imply that there is no way that the latter prohibition could be transgressed in a manner warranting punishment.

The passage implies that it is speaking about a single sin; nevertheless, the verse specifically mentions “all the mitzvot.”

Sifri, Parshas Shelach and Horiot 8a

I.e., a single prohibition which is equivalent to the violation of the entire Torah.

Note the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 8:1-2, which explain that the essence of the prophetic tradition is linked to the revelation of God on Mount Sinai.

Note Hilchot Melachim 9:1, which states that God commanded Adam concerning the worship of false gods. This statement is based on Bereshit Rabbah 16:6.

The verse states that performance of such an act is a denial of “all that God commanded you through Moses….”

Just as the acceptance of false gods removes one from the entire sphere of Torah practice, denying their existence gives one a point of connection to the revelation of God’s truth.

. Because the foundation for all the mitzvot is that they were commanded by the One God Who desires that we serve Him alone.
Note the Tanya, Chapter 20, which explains that the two mitzvot, the acknowledgement of God and the negation of idol worship, are the foundation of all Torah practice. Therefore, the entire Jewish people heard God proclaim these two mitzvot on Mount Sinai. Every act a person performs can be seen as either the acknowledgement of God or the acknowledgement of a set of values aside from His, equivalent figuratively to the acceptance of another god.

The Turei Even maintains that this applies to a person who serves false gods even once.

I.e., he is denied the privileges offered to our fellow Jews — e.g., the return of a lost article or the granting of interest-free loans. Their ritual slaughter of animals is unacceptable and they are not counted as members of a minyan. Similarly, restrictions are placed with regard to drinking wine which such individuals have touched. Should such a person repent, he is treated as any other Jew.

The violation of other prohibitions, even those so severe as punishable by death, differs from the worship of false gods. A person commits other transgressions because he cannot overcome his desires. By doing so, he does not deny his connection to God. Idol worship, in contrast, represents an abrupt severance of all ties a person has with God and Torah.
[It must be noted that a person who publicly desecrates the Sabbath is considered equivalent to one who worships idols and is also treated like a gentile in all regards (Hilchot Shabbat 30:15).]

Note the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Teshuvah 3:9: There are two categories of apostates: an apostate with regard to a single mitzvah, and an apostate with regard to the entire Torah. An apostate with regard to a single mitzvah is someone who has made a practice of willfully committing a particular sin [to the point where] he is accustomed to committing it and his deeds are public knowledge. [This applies] even though [the sin] is one of the minor... [but] applies [only] if he [commits the sin] with the intent of angering God. In most aspects of Torah law, there are no differences between these two categories. However, certain distinctions do exist. For example, an apostate with regard to the entire Torah is prevented from bringing sacrifices to the Temple. However, if his apostasy is limited to a particular mitzvah, his sacrifices may be accepted (Chulin 5a, Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 3:4). Similarly, in Hilchot Shechitah 4:14, the Rambam disqualifies all ritual slaughter performed by an apostate who worships false gods, but accepts slaughter performed by an apostate with regard to a specific mitzvah.

The published texts of the Mishneh Torah use the word apikoros here, rather than min, and continue to do so throughout this halachah. In Hilchot Teshuvah, the Rambam differentiates between the two, explaining that a min is a person who does not believe in God, while an apikoros is one who does not believe in the Torah. The authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah use min.
The Aruch explains that the term min was derived as follows: The early Christians referred to themselves as מאמנים — “the faithful.” As a gesture of derision, the Sages shortened that expression to מינים, literally meaning “sorts” — i.e., all sorts of deviant believers. Later, they expanded the use of the term to apply to others who deny fundamental principles of faith.

The commentaries have pointed to the apparent contradiction between these statements and the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Teshuvah 3:14:
When does the statement apply that these individuals [a list of 13 categories including minnim] do not have a portion in the world to come? When they die without having repented. However, if such a person repents from his wicked deeds and dies while a Baal-Teshuvah, he will merit the world to come, for nothing can stand in the way of `.
Even if he denies God’s existence throughout his life and repents in his final moments, he merits a portion in the world to come. Any wicked person, apostate, or the like who repents, whether in an open, revealed manner or in private, will be accepted, as implied by [Jeremiah 3:22]: “Return, faithless children.” [We may infer] that even if one is still faithless, as obvious from the fact that he repents in private and not in public, his Teshuvah will be accepted.
This apparent contradiction was brought to the Rambam’s attention during his lifetime. In one of his Responsa (101), he resolved the issue by explaining that his statements in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim refer to the attitude which should be adopted by the Jewish people. They should never regard such an individual as a Baal-Teshuvah, because it is possible he is merely feigning repentance in order to gain public acceptance. In contrast, in Hilchot Teshuvah, the Rambam is referring to acceptance by God, Who sees the true feelings of every individual. If a person’s repentance is sincere, regardless of the severity of his previous sins, God will accept him. (Note also the commentary of the Lechem Mishneh and the Responsa of the Radbaz, Vol. V, 1518, which offer similar explanations.)
Even with regard to acceptance by men, the Rambam urged tolerance and consideration. At the conclusion of Iggeret HaSh’mad, he writes:
It is not proper to drive away those who profane the Sabbath.... Rather, we must draw them close and urge them to perform mitzvot. Our Sages of blessed memory explained that even if a person voluntarily sinned, when he comes to a synagogue to pray, we should accept him and not deal scornfully with him.

Avodah Zarah 17a questions: Since they will never “repent,” how could they be expected to “regain the paths of life”? The Talmud answers: “Even after they repent, they will not ‘regain the path of life’... — i.e., they will die.”
Rashi interprets the Talmud’s statements simply, that they will die quickly. From the Rambam’s statements quoted above and from the Radbaz’s interpretation of them, it would appear that the Rambam interprets this as referring to spiritual death.

The prohibitions mentioned in Halachah 3.

See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 1:1), where he also defines the term minnim in a similar manner. In Hilchot Teshuvah 3:7, the Rambam offers a slightly different — and more precise — definition of the term:
Five individuals are described as minnim:
a) one who says there is no God or ruler of the world;
b) one who accepts the concept of a ruler, but maintains that there are two or more;
c) one who accepts that there is one Master [of the world], but maintains that He has a body or form;
d) one who maintains that He was not the sole First Being and Creator of all existence;
e) one who serves a star, constellation, or other entity, so that it will serve as an intermediary between him and the eternal God.
The difference between these two statements caused the Kessef Mishneh to explain that these two definitions do not refer to the same individuals. From the Rambam’s responsa referred to above, however, it would appear that he, himself, did not share that opinion. Even so, it is obvious that this halachah is speaking in much more general terms than in Hilchot Teshuvah, since some of the other categories of people whom Hilchot Teshuvah describe as not having a portion in the world to come — e.g., those who deny the Torah and those who proudly sin — appear to be included in the definition of minnim the Rambam uses here.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avot 2:17), the Rambam notes the apparent contradiction between this advice and the Mishnah’s directive, “Know what to answer an apikoros.” He explains that the latter statement applies when a gentile attempts to persuade a Jew to leave the true faith. In contrast, no answer should be given to a Jewish nonbeliever. We assume that his questions do not reflect a genuine desire to know, but were intended to poke fun at the Torah. Hence, answering him will merely give him the opportunity to add further ridicule.

i.e., he cannot be relied upon to perform an act for the sake of God. Therefore, a Torah scroll which he writes must be burned (Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 6:8). We assume that when he wrote God’s name, he intended that it refer to his false god.

The Mishnah (Sanhedrin 60b) states: “One who accepts it as a god is liable for execution” — i.e., the verbal acceptance of another entity as a God is sufficient to make one liable for execution. See Chapter 3, Halachah 4, and Hilchot Shegagot 1:2.

This passage — as explained in Halachah 4 — refers to idol worship

In conscious defiance of God.

In Hilchot Sanhedrin 15:6-7, the Rambam mentions that it is a positive commandment to hang a blasphemer and an idolater. (These are the only individuals who are hanged.) They are not executed by hanging. Rather, after the condemned is stoned to death, his corpse is hung for a fleeting second.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 15:1-2.

Although they are two different prohibitions, the conceptual similarity they share causes them to be grouped together in the Mishneh Torah.

The Rambam also mentions this expression with regard to idolatry in Hilchot Yesodei Torah 1:6. Its source is Sanhedrin 45b.

Sanhedrin 60a states that the term, “God’s four-lettered name,” is used to exclude the name, י–ה. Blaspheming this name does not warrant execution.

In Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 6:2, when mentioning the names of God which are forbidden to be erased, the Rambam begins with, “The name which is written י–ה–ו–ה. This is [referred to as] [God’s] explicit name and is [also] written א–ד–נ–י.” He considers the two a single name. Hence, though it is a matter of controversy, as will be explained, the Rambam maintains that blaspheming the name א–ד–נ–י is sufficient for a person to be condemned to death.

I.e., the person must say: May ---- curse ----, mentioning one of God's names first and either the name א-ד-נ-י or the name י-ה-ו-ה last.

Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah (ibid.) mentions seven names of God which are forbidden to be erased, the names י–ה–ו–ה and א–ד–נ–י which, as mentioned above, are considered as one and the names Eil, Elo’ah, Elohim, Elohai, Shaddai, and Tz’vaot.
The above follows the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah. The commentaries on that halachah mention various different versions of the text.

Sanhedrin 56a explains that since the verse mentions the blaspheming of God’s name twice, we can derive that in order to be deserving of punishment, one must curse God’s name with another one of His names.

The name א–ד–נ–י or the name י–ה–ו–ה.

The Hebrew term used, כינוים, does not refer only to the seven names mentioned above, but to any term used to describe God.

But is not executed by the court.

And, indeed, the verse from the Torah uses the name י–ה–ו–ה.

The Rambam mentions himself in the first person only when stating an opinion which he feels lacks adequate support from previous sources.

I.e., for blaspheming both the name א–ד–נ–י and the name י–ה–ו–ה. This is based on the Rambam’s conception of the two as a single name, as Kiddushin 71a states: “I am not referred to as [My name] is written. My name is written י–ה–ו–ה and it is pronounced א–ד–נ–י.”

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 60) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 71) consider this prohibition as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. (Note also Hilchot Melachim 9:1, which includes blaspheming God’s name as one of the seven universal prohibitions forbidden to gentiles as well as to Jews.) Leviticus, Chapter 24, relates an instance in which God’s name was blasphemed. Moses asked God how to punish the offender and was told that he, and similarly, any future blasphemers, should be executed. This passage, however, does not contain a specific verse forbidding such blasphemy. (See also I Kings, Chapter 21, which relates how Navot was stoned to death — albeit on a trumped-up charge — for blaspheming God’s name.)

Although this verse is the source for another prohibition, which forbids cursing a judge (Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 315), blasphemy is considered to be a prohibition in its own right.

So that the curse against God’s name need not be constantly repeated.

The Hebrew name יוסי is used by the witnesses instead of God's name because it has four letters, as does God's unique name. Also, its numerical equivalent is 86, the numerical equivalent of God's name, אלהים (Rashi, San. 56a).

After the examination of the witnesses has been completed and the judges are prepared to issue a verdict

To minimize the desecration of God’s name.

Since they may not have punishment administered unless they hear explicit testimony that God’s name was, in fact, cursed (Rashi, ibid.).

As he heard it, thus cursing God’s name himself.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Sanhedrin 7:8) states that the witnesses do not repeat the curse explicitly. The Babylonian Talmud (Sanhedrin 60a), however, interprets the judges’ rending of their garments as associated with the acts required when hearing actual blasphemy. Whenever there is a difference of opinion between the two Talmuds, the Babylonian Talmud’s view is accepted. Accordingly, the Rambam states that the witnesses repeat the actual curse.

As a gesture of respect for God’s name.

As a sign of mourning, as required in Halachah 10.

One may mend garments torn in mourning for any relative except one’s parents. In the latter instance — and for other sources of bereavement — e.g., the death of one’s teacher, the burning of a Torah scroll, witnessing the cities of Eretz Yisrael and the Temple in destruction — the tear may never be mended (Hilchot Eivel 9:1-2).

Sanhedrin 60a explains that, according to Torah law, both witnesses are not required to state all the particulars of a case. It is sufficient for one witness to make a statement and for the other to say, “I observed the same act.” With regard to other transgressions, the Sages enforced the stringency of requiring both witnesses to make complete statements. In this instance, they did not require more than the Torah itself obligates to prevent unnecessary repetition of the curse

Although the statements of two witnesses are sufficient to convict the offender, the testimony of a third witness is significant, because if his testimony is negated, the entire case may be nullified (Rashi, Sanhedrin 60a).

Wishes to retract the curse he uttered

Directly after uttering it. The phrase, תוך כדי דיבור, rendered as “in the midst of speaking,” has a specific halachic meaning: “the time it takes to recite the words, שלום עליך רבי, Shalom Alecha, rabbi, (Peace unto you, my teacher).”

Generally, when a person retracts a statement in such a short time, his retraction is accepted and no attention is paid to his initial statements. This provision is granted in consideration of the possibility that a person may speak casually and, without knowing, make an error. No such leniency is granted with regard to blasphemy. We assume that blasphemy will never be uttered casually, and that a person who curses God does so in full awareness of the seriousness of his act. Other exceptions to the above rule are the worship of false gods, marriage, and divorce. In these instances as well, a person is considered to be aware of the seriousness of his statements and is not given the opportunity to retract (Nedarim 87a).

Based on the premise mentioned previously, the Kessef Mishneh maintains that blasphemy is a unique instance, and the “presence of witnesses” alone is sufficient to warrant punishment. Generally, before an offender can be punished for a transgression, he must receive a warning from the witnesses, advising him that the deed he is about to perform is forbidden and he is liable for punishment for performing it (Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:1-2). Because of the obvious severity associated with blasphemy, there is no requirement for such a warning.
[The Kessef Mishneh also cites the transgression of bearing false testimony. In that context, the Rambam writes (Hilchot Edut 20:4), that since there is no deed connected with the transgression of giving false testimony, there is no need for a warning. The same concept also applies regarding a blasphemer, who is punished even though he did not commit a deed.] The Kessef Mishneh himself questions this rationale. Other authorities (Avodat HaMelech) reject it and require that the witnesses issue a warning for a blasphemer as well.

Any one of the seven names which may not be erased

I.e., “May false god X strike God.”

Pious men who will react to a breach of Torah practice with fervor.

The classic case of a “zealous” person slaying an offender is Pinchas’ slaughter of Zimri for having relations with a Midianite woman (Numbers, Chapter 25). There are a number of sins which, according to Torah law, are not punishable by death. The nature of the offence, however, is so serious that anyone who takes the law into his own hands and slays them is not punished for his act (Sanhedrin 81b).

Immediately. They must act directly after his blasphemy. If not, slaying the blasphemer is judged as murder. (Compare to Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 12:5.)

I.e., because his statements, however irreverent, are not punishable by death according to Torah law. Note Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah (ibid.), which states that if a zealous person asks a court whether to slay the offender, the court should not instruct him to do so. Thus, we see that the Torah is not granting license to kill. Rather, it is absolving someone who does so out of a spontaneous, gut-felt appreciation that this is what is necessary, from being punished for his act.

As explained in Halachah 7. There is some difficulty with the Rambam’s statements. In this halachah, he appears to use the expression “unique names” in reference to all seven names which may not be erased, while in Halachah 7 the expression “unique name” refers only to the names י–ה–ו–ה and א–ד–נ–י.

The Hebrew ברכת ה’, literally means “the blessing of God’s name,” is a euphemism used through the Talmudic literature to refer to blasphemy

As a sign of mourning. (See Hilchot Eivel 9:1-2.)

I.e., this applies not only to the names י–ה–ו–ה, א–ד–נ–י or to one of the seven names for God which may not be erased, but to any term — e.g., “Merciful One” or “Gracious One” — which is used to refer to Him.

Sanhedrin 60a mentions this as a point of controversy between Shmuel (who maintains that one is obligated to rend one’s garments only over the blasphemy of God’s explicit name) and Rav Chiyya (whose opinion is quoted by the Rambam).

As Elyakim and Shevna did in the narrative cited below.

Isaiah 37:1 relates that when Elyakim and Shevna related Ravshakeh's blasphemy to King Hezekiah, he also rent his garments. Note Halachah 8, which mentions that the judges must rend their garments when the witnesses to blasphemy repeat it in court. [Note Hilchat Eivel 9:8, which states that the witnesses themselves need not rend their garments, because they did so when they heard the blasphemy uttered originally.]

Sanhedrin (loc. cit.) mentions that this point is also debated by the same Sages. Shmuel’s opinion is the one quoted by the Rambam, while Rav Chiyya maintains that — in Biblical times, though not during the Talmudic period — one is obligated to rend one’s garments over blasphemy uttered by a gentile.
The Kessef Mishneh and others raise the question why the Rambam accepted Rav Chiyya’s view on one issue and Shmuel’s view on the other. Since the Talmud mentions the two issues together, it would seem appropriate for the Rambam to follow one of the authorities on both questions. Among those who attempted to resolve this difficulty is the Radbaz (Vol. VI, Responsum 2157). He attacks the basic premise for the question. The Rambam, he explains, accepted Rav Chiyya’s original statement, since the blasphemy of any term used for God generates a chilul HaShem great enough to warrant rending one’s garments. In contrast, he does not consider blasphemy uttered by a gentile as chilul HaShem, since the gentile is unaware of the holiness connected with God’s name.

Isaiah, Chapters 36 and 37, relates how Sancheriv, King of Assyria, laid siege to Jerusalem and sent Ravshakeh as head of the siege party. Hezekiah, the king of Judah, sent Elyakim and Shevna to negotiate with Ravshakeh, who responded with arrogance, demanding outright surrender and blaspheming God. Hezekiah responded to his blasphemy by praying to God, who wrought an awesome miracle, slaying 185,000 of Sancheriv's troops. (See also II Kings, Chapters 18 and 19.) The thesis that Ravshakeh was an apostate Jew is accepted without question by the Babylonian Talmud (Sanhedrin 60a), although there is a debate to that effect in the Jerusalem Talmud. The only apparent allusion to this thesis in the Biblical narrative is his ability to speak Hebrew.

The obligation of the judges to place their hands on the blasphemer’s head is derived from the inclusion of the word “all” in the proof-text quoted below (Sifra, Emor). Were the intent that only the witnesses should do so, it would have been sufficient to say: “And those who hear shall....”

Individually. It is not sufficient that one individual act as the agent of the others (Kessef Mishneh).

Thus, this placing of the hands — as the washing of the hands of the elders on an eglah arufah, Deuteronomy 21:7, represents a statement of absolution of responsibility.

Perhaps the Torah requires the performance of this act in this instance because, in the course of the trial, the witnesses repeated the blasphemy and the judges caused them to do so. Hence, a special measure is required to absolve them from blame for the sin of blasphemy (Kin’at Eliyahu).

I.e., if he is forced to worship false gods by another person, he is not held responsible for his act. It is nevertheless forbidden to consent to such pressure. One is obligated to sacrifice one’s life rather than consent to such worship (Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 5:2,4).

As opposed to someone who worships inadvertently.

Mo’ed Katan 28a relates that a person liable for כרת (Karet) would die before reaching the age of fifty. The Rambam (Hilchot Teshuvah 8:1) emphasizes that being “cut off in this world” is not the sum total of Divine retribution for such a transgression. Rather, the person’s soul is also cut off and prevented from reaching the World to Come.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:1-2.

When he committed the offense and later testified in court.

As mentioned above, Chapter 2, Halachah 6.

He performed an act of idol worship without realizing that it was forbidden, or was not aware of the punishment involved (Hilchot Shegagot 2:2).

Though the sin offering brought to atone for idol worship differs from that brought to atone for other sins — see Numbers 15:27-31; Hilchot Shegagot 1:4 — the Rambam uses this term to differentiate it from a Karban Olah V’Yored — a guilt offering which differs depending on the financial status of the person bringing it.

See Numbers, Chapter 25, which describes the Jews’ worship of this image. See also Sanhedrin 61a.

The Aruch identifies the Hebrew Marculis with the Greek god, Mercury. He notes that the form used to represent the deity and its manner of service resemble the descriptions found in Roman and Greek sources. See Tosafot, Sanhedrin 64a for a different interpretation.

Note Halachah 5.

. Clearing away these stones leaves more room for others to throw. Hence, such an act is also considered to be service of the deity (Sanhedrin 64a).

For he did not serve the god in the service required for it, or through one of the four services which were accepted as modes of worship for all gods, as explained in the following halachah. One might think that a person would be held liable for serving one of these gods in the manner used to serve the other, since they are both served in an unbecoming manner. Sanhedrin 61a teaches us that, nevertheless, one is exempt.

The Torah’s inclusion of such a question implies that this knowledge is significant. A person who does not worship an idol in the accepted mode of service is exempt (Sanhedrin, ibid.).

Note Chapter 2, Halachah 2, which forbids the study of idolatrous practices. Apparently, license to do so is granted the sages to allow them to gain the knowledge mentioned in this halachah. (See Sanhedrin 68a.)

Thus, were the court not cognizant of the different modes of idol worship, they could not administer the appropriate punishment.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 6) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 29) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. It, to be distinguished from the prohibition against the belief in false gods (Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 1), involves the performance of deeds of worship in service of false gods. The Ramban (Hasagot L’Sefer HaMitzvot) considers the two prohibitions as one negative commandment. The Rambam’s view, however, is justified by other authorities.

That one is liable only when performing services with which a deity is worshiped.

See Chapter 6, Halachah 8, which states that this means bowing one’s face toward the ground,

Since these four modes of worship are accepted services of the true God, using them to serve false gods is absolutely forbidden (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandment 6).

In Halachah 6, the Rambam discusses paying reverence or showing affection to false gods through services with which the true God is not worshiped.

In Halachah 6, the Rambam discusses paying reverence or showing affection to false gods through services with which the true God is not worshiped.

Note Rashi, Sanhedrin 60b, who explains that since the verse does not state, “Whoever worships a deity through sacrifice,” we can conclude that the sacrifice of an animal is sufficient for one to be held liable, even when this is not the accepted mode of service.

He is stoned to death.

Pouring a libation and bringing a burnt offering, which are not explicitly forbidden by the Torah.

This represents an example of the eighth of Rabbi Yishmael's thirteen principles of Biblical exegesis: When a specific case is first included in a general category and then, singled out to instruct us regarding a new concept, we assume that it has been singled out not only to teach us concerning its own case, but rather for that new idea to be applied with regard to the totality of the general category.

I.e., it is a particular case included in a general category.

This is the new concept for which the Torah singled out this service to teach us.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 5) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 28) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. This prohibition also includes performing the other three services mentioned above. In this instance as well, the Ramban (Hasagot L’Sefer HaMitzvot) considers this prohibition to be included within the first negative mitzvah, the prohibition against believing in false gods. The Rambam’s view, however, is justified by other authorities.

Bowing down is not considered to be one of the Temple services. Hence, it — as opposed to bringing a burnt offering or pouring a libation — cannot be derived from the prohibition against sacrificing, and requires a unique verse of its own.

Be it an animal, incense, or any other substance.

Before an idol or on its altar.

And is forbidden even if this is not the accepted mode of service. Sanhedrin (loc. cit.) equates sprinkling blood with offering a libation, based on Psalms 16:4: “I will not pour their libations of blood.”

These are considered as libations (Avodah Zarah 50b) for which one is held liable even if this is not the mode in which the deity is worshiped.

For there is no concept of ritual slaughter with regard to locusts. The Or Sameach holds one liable when one offers a locust on an altar before a false deity.

In which instance one would be held liable, based on the principles stated in Halachah 2.

Note Avodah Zarah 51a which states that this leniency only applies to the slaughter of any animal lacking a limb. In contrast, one is held liable for the slaughter of an animal with another disqualifying physical blemish.

Because even the gentiles do not offer sacrifices of such animals. The Ra’avad holds one liable even for the slaughter of such an animal or of a locust, explaining that although the Rambam’s decision reflects certain opinions mentioned in the Talmud, the final decision is that one is held liable. He explains that such forms of slaughter are much closer to the concept of the slaughter for sacrifice than the offering of feces or urine are to the service of libation.

In which instance one would be held liable, based on the principles stated in Halachah 2.

Note the Ra’avad who emphasizes that the rules stated apply although the service of this deity does not involve breaking or throwing a staff.

Since this activity resembles the slaughter of an animal.

To justify the seeming difficulty in the Rambam’s decisions mentioned by the Ra’avad (see above), the Lechem Mishneh explains that since staffs are used in the worship of this deity, an act that resembles slaughter that is performed with a staff is significant. In contrast, animals lacking limbs and locusts are never used in the service of such deities; hence, their slaughter is of no consequence. [Note, however, the Rama, who explains that one is liable only when the deity is worshiped by breaking the stick.]

There are commentaries who maintain that the intent is that the false deity that becomes forbidden, i.e., it becomes forbidden to be used, as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 4. This interpretation depends on the female construction of the word נאסרת. Other authorities quote the word in a masculine form and interpret it as a reference to the staff. Since it was used in the worship of a false god, it is forbidden, as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 2. It is possible to explain the Rambam’s intent in this manner as well.

Since this activity resembles pouring a libation before an idol.

This decision makes the Rambam's line of reasoning difficult to follow. If throwing the staff is not comparable to sprinkling blood, why is one held liable for it? Accordingly, some commentaries have explaiped that this decision applies only when the deity is worshiped by throwing staffs. The Pri Chadash, however, differentiates between the liability of the worshiper (for which a sprinkling that spatters is not required) and the prohibition of the worship of the deity (for which it is).

A single whole entity.

Since the reason that these services are considered significant even though the deity is not normally worshiped in this manner is that these services were performed in the Temple, the analogy must be complete. Thus, the entity poured or thrown before the deity must spatter, as blood spatters when sprinkled on the altar (Avodah Zarah, loc. cit.).

Even though he does not perform a deed of worship.

The Rambam mentions that one is liable for stoning specifically. Generally, the term “liable” means “liable to bring a sacrifice.” In this instance, however, a person who makes such a statement inadvertently is not obligated to bring a sacrifice. A sacrifice is only brought when one performs a deed in violation of the Torah’s command (Hilchot Shegagot 1:2).

Creates a new false god for himself (Lechem Mishneh).

The Lechem Mishneh explains that this expression is merely a figure of speech. There is no need to perform a deed — lifting up the brick — for one to be held liable.

When two people do not witness this declaration, the death penalty may not be administered by the court. The person is, however, liable for karet (premature death at the hand of God) if he made his statements intentionally.

As explained above (Chapter 2, Halachah 9), this term has a specific meaning, the amount of time it takes to say שלום עליך רבי.

Although a retraction made in this amount of time is normally considered significant, different rules apply with regard to the acceptance of false gods. It is assumed that a person would never make such a statement unless he were fully aware of its ramifications.

I.e., both the act he performs and his intent in performing it is to abuse the false deity.

For a sacrifice, as will be explained. This is an extension of the principle stated in Halachah 2.

Sanhedrin 64a relates that one of the Sages of the Talmud actually made such an error and threw a rock at a shrine of Marculis, with the intent of destroying it. When the matter was brought before his colleagues, they informed him of his mistake.

Although he consciously performed an act which is considered to be worship of these gods, since his intent was not to serve them, he is not considered to be one who willfully serves idols. Hence, he is not punished by the court for his deed, nor is he obligated for karet by God. Since he, nevertheless, did perform an act of worship to these gods, he must bring a sacrifice for atonement.
The above represents the Kessef Mishneh’s interpretation of this halachah. Many other authorities (see Tosafot, Sanhedrin 64a) disagree, and maintain that even in such circumstances, one could be held liable for capital punishment. For example, two witnesses who knew the law were present and warned the person against repudiating the idol in this fashion. He ignored their warning and performed the derisive act of worship. Although his intent was not to serve the deity, since he performed an act of worship despite the warning he was given, he is liable for execution.
Rav Kapach brings support for the Kessef Mishneh’s view from the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 7:6. There, the Rambam discusses a similar situation and states that a person who performs such service “is liable for a sin offering.” In the original texts of that commentary, the Rambam stated that the person “is liable.” The addition of the words “for a sin offering” appear to indicate that he is liable only for an offering, but not for punishment by the court. Note also Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 5:4, where the Rambam states that a person who unknowingly worships a false god is exempt for his deeds.

The commentaries note that the Rambam interprets “out of love” differently from “out of fear.” “Out of love” refers to a love for the image and its service, while “out of fear” means fear of what the deity can do to the person. Rav Kapach explains the Rambam’s position, justifying the need for such a difference in interpretation. Most idolaters do not worship their images out of a genuine conviction that they are the true god, but rather for the benefit they feel this service will bring them. Therefore, were a person to serve an idol with this intent in mind, the Rambam would hold him liable. In contrast, were he to serve out of fear, he is not considered to be acting on his own volition, and hence is not held responsible.

See Chapter 1, Halachot 1-2.

As stated in Halachah 1.

Without accepting it as a god — even though he served it.

As mentioned in Halachah 2.

In Halachah 3.

Since he did not accept the deity as a god. Although the Rambam’s opinion is questioned by many other authorities, it is based on an established tradition of Talmudic interpretation. This halachah has its source in Sanhedrin 61b. That passage is also quoted in Shabbat 72b. Rabbenu Chanan’el, one of the foremost commentators in the generations between the Geonim and the Rambam, interprets the latter passage using the same concepts — and almost the same phraseology — as employed by the Rambam here.
The Ra’avad and others challenge the Rambam’s interpretation and explain that “out of love” and “out of fear” mean: motivated by the love or fear of the person who tries to influence one to worship the false deity. The Rambam cannot accept this interpretation, because in Hilchot Yesodei Torah 5:4, he states that a person who is forced to serve false gods is not held liable for his deeds (Kessef Mishneh).
The fact that a person is not held liable for such service does not at all minimize the seriousness of the prohibition involved. In no way is one allowed to serve false gods for such reasons. Even with regard to the Ra’avad’s interpretation “out of fear” — i.e., out of fear of a person — the Rama (Yoreh De’ah 150:3) prohibits performing any act that might be interpreted as idol worship — e.g., bowing to a ruler who is wearing an image.

This commandment is described in Halachot 2 and 3.

Nor execution, as is one who worships a false deity.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that punishment is not given because this prohibition is a שבכללות לאו — i.e., a prohibition that includes many different forbidden acts. One is not liable for lashes for the violation of such a prohibition, as stated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2-3.
To explain: The prohibition, “Do not serve them,” is twofold in nature. It prohibits the worship of a false deity through its accepted modes of service, as stated in Halachah 2. This is a sin punishable by death. The same prohibition also forbids these expressions of affection or reverence. These deeds are not, however, punishable by death because they are not acts of worship.
Since violation of this prohibition incurs a penalty of execution, it is not associated with the punishment of lashes. Since, in essence, this prohibition is not associated with lashes, even the many transgressions of a lesser nature which are also included within this prohibition are also not punishable in this manner (Rav Kapach).

Kissing and the like.

And not merely as an expression of emotion. The Lechem Mishneh questions the addition of the words “as an act of worship,” noting that in Halachah 5, the Rambam holds one liable for performing the service with which Pe’or or Marculis was worshiped, even though one’s intent was to repudiate the idols. Thus, it appears that once a person performs a service which is the accepted mode of worship, his intent is no longer significant.
The Pri Chadash resolves this difficulty, explaining that the extent of liability is different. In the previous halachah, the offender was liable for a sin offering alone, while here, the person is liable for execution.

Avodah Zarah 12a states that if the person turns his back or side to the idol, his bowing would not be considered to be an act of deference, and no prohibition is involved. Even if no other people are present, this and the following prohibitions apply. Any prohibition that was instituted because of the impression which might be created (מראית עין) is forbidden even in a person’s most private chambers.

From the commentaries’ discussion of this law, it appears that if the person does bow down, he is not held liable for his actions. Kin’at Eliyahu questions the difference between this decision and Halachah 5, which holds a person who throws a stone to Marculis with the intent to repudiate it liable for a sin offering. He resolves that difficulty, explaining that in Halachah 5, the person intended to throw the stone at the idol. Since that act constitutes worship of this deity, he is held liable. In contrast, in our halachah the person did not bow down to the idol at all. The only reason the bowing is prohibited is that a mistaken impression might be created.

Avodah Zarah (loc. cit.) mentions a third prohibition: that a person should not bow down to drink from a spring that flows in front of an idol. The Kessef Mishneh notes that Rav Yitzchak Alfasi also omits this law, and explains that it was not contained in their text of the Talmud. (This is somewhat unlikely, since it is found in Rabbenu Chanan’el’s text of Avodah Zarah.) The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1389) states that this law is included in the law mentioned in the following halachah. Hence, it is not mentioned explicitly by the Rambam.

In the context of the discussion of this law, the Rama (Yoreh De’ah 150:3) states an important general principle. Prohibitions which were instituted because of the impression which might be created (מראית עין) need not be upheld whenever there is a threat to human life.

I.e., he commissioned another person to make the idol for him.

I.e., although he commissioned the fashioning of the idol, he did not worship it or explicitly accept it as a god. Accordingly, he is not punished by execution as above. He is, nevertheless, considered to have violated a Scriptural prohibition.

The Lechem Mishneh questions this statement, noting that lashes are not given for a transgression which does not involve a deed, and that speech is not ordinarily considered to be a deed. He explains that since the craftsman fashions the idol on behalf of the person who commissioned him, he is considered to be the latter’s agent. Therefore, the one who commissioned him is held responsible for his deed.
The commentaries question this explanation, noting that — with the exception of a few specific instances — the Torah never holds a person who commissions another individual to commit a sin liable, since the person who actually committed the sin is responsible for his actions. Also, the Rambam’s phraseology here implies that one is held liable regardless whether the craftsman is a Jew or gentile, and a gentile is never given the halachic status of an agent. The following are among the resolutions offered to this difficulty:
a) A hired worker’s actions — whether positive or negative — are always attributed to his employer (Machaneh Efrayim, Hilchot Shutafim 8).
b) The verse prohibiting this act reveals that this is one of the few exceptions to the general rule mentioned above, and in this case, the person who commissioned the agent is held liable (Darchei HaMelech).
c) Commenting on Hilchot Sechirut 13:2, the Mishneh LaMelech explains that if it is possible to violate a particular prohibition by committing a deed, one is punished by lashes even when one violates it without committing a deed. The same concept can be applied here (S’deh Chemed).
d) The deed for which one is punished is not the command to make the idol, but rather its purchase or acquisition (Merchevat HaMishneh, Alfandari).

The grammatical structure of this verse allows it to be interpreted, “Do not have an idol... made for you.” Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 2) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 27) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Even when he merely acts as a craftsman and does not worship or believe in the idol himself. This applies even when he is making the idol for a gentile.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 3) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 214) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

For he violates both of the above prohibitions. See Hilchot Sanhedrin 17:4 for a description of how punishment is administered when a person is liable for more than one measure of lashes.

I.e., they were made as decorations and works of art, without any intent that they be worshiped.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 4) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 39) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Rambam’s statement sheds light on an interesting Rabbinic debate. The Sages of the Talmud often established “fences around the Torah” — i.e., safeguards to prevent the violation of Torah law. (See Avot 1:1.) There is a question whether the Torah itself instituted prohibitions for such a purpose — i.e., are there mitzvot that are instituted without a self-contained goal of their own, but merely to prevent the violation of other prohibitions? (See Lekach Tov ch. 8.)
From the Rambam’s statements here (see also Hilchot De’ot 7:8), it appears that he accepts such a premise. It appears that there is nothing intrinsically wrong in making statues per se. Nevertheless, since if such statues are made, the possibility exists that they may be worshiped, the Torah forbids us to make them.

As explained in the following halachah, this prohibition also applies to the sun, the moon, and other celestial beings. It is permitted to make an image of all creations of our world aside from man. Avodah Zarah 43b derives this from the above verse. The Hebrew words translated as “Do not make with Me...” can also be rendered, “Do not make Me...” — i.e., do not make images in the human form, the form in which God has revealed Himself (Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De’ah 141:21).

Or any other material. The Rambam mentioned these materials because they were commonly used in his time.

The Tur (Yoreh De’ah 141) states that we are forbidden to make only a complete human statue. A bust of a head alone or a statue which is lacking any one of the body’s limbs is not forbidden. Though the Shulchan Aruch (141:7) does not accept this view, it is shared by the Rama.

But not by execution, since these statues were not worshiped as idols.

Though the images on a tapestry protrude slightly, since they are not a fully formed statue, there is no prohibition involved in making them. Note the contrast to the prohibition against making images of the celestial beings mentioned in the following halachah and notes.

In ancient times, it was customary for rulers to seal their documents with a signet ring. (See Esther 8:8.) Wax would be poured on the document and the ring pressed into the wax, producing an imprint which is a reverse image of that on the ring.

On one's finger, because a protruding image is forbidden, as stated in the previous halachah.

For the human image it produces is sunken into the wax.

Because there is no prohibition against such a human image.

Which is forbidden.

Our understanding of the Rambam’s statements here can be enhanced by referring to his Commentary to the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 3:3:
This does not mean a sphere which represents the sun or a hemisphere which represents the moon, but rather the images which the astrologers [i.e., those following Greek mythology] attribute to the stars,... e.g., Saturn is represented as an old dark man of venerable age, Venus is represented as a beautiful maiden adorned with gold, and the sun is represented as a king with a diadem sitting in a chariot. [These are forbidden because] they are falsehoods and the nature of falsehood is that it will surely spread.
Rav Kapach supports this interpretation by quoting Bamidbar Rabbah 2:6, which describes the pennant of the tribe of Issachar as having a picture of the sun and the moon. Were these images forbidden, it would be unlikely that Moshe would have told the tribe to depict them. Even if the decree was instituted in the later generations, it is not probable that the Rabbis would forbid images that had previously been used for a Torah purpose.
The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 141:3) quotes the Rambam’s opinion from his Commentary to the Mishnah. The Turei Zahav 141:13 and the Siftei Cohen 141:8, however, note that the Rambam’s statements which were quoted above (and the Rama’s statements) refer to a question whether one is allowed to keep images of the sun or moon that he finds. Here, the question is whether one is allowed to make such images oneself, for decorative purpose only. From the discussion of the question in Avodah Zarah 43b, where the Sages question how Rabban Gamliel possessed forms of the moon, it would appear that there is a prohibition against making images of the sun and the moon themselves.
This interpretation, however, is also somewhat problematic, because the Rambam writes that there is no prohibition against making images of animals, and some of the constellations of the Zodiac are represented and referred to as animals. For example, one of the Zodiac constellations is a fish and Gittin 36a describes Rav as making a drawing of a fish. Another is a lion, which is one of the most popular images found in Jewish art.

As the Rambam writes in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 2:3-5, the angels have no body or form. Hence, here, he is obviously referring to a form which a man has conceived of as appropriate for a particular angel. Alternatively, it could refer to the metaphoric imagery used by the prophets.

The Rambam (quoting Avodah Zarah, loc. cit.) mentions the above Biblical proof-text in connection with this prohibition. It would appear, however, from the fact that making such images is not punishable by lashes, that the prohibition is only Rabbinic in nature. The reference to the verse must be understood as an asmachta (use of the Biblical verse as a support for a Rabbinic decree).

Those who are “with Me.”

This refers to the celestial beings and the angels. (See Chapter 1, Halachah 1, and Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 2:3.)

According to the Rambam’s statements in his Commentary to the Mishnah, the difference between the prohibition against making these images and those of humans can be explained as follows: The prohibition against making human statues is Biblical in origin and is defined by the Torah itself. In contrast, the prohibition of making images of the celestial beings was a safeguard instituted by the Rabbis against Greek and Roman culture. It, therefore, applies to all images, whether pictures or statues, because both could influence people to stray from the Torah’s ways.
According to the simple interpretation of the terms “sun” and “moon,” the difference can be explained as follows: The sun and the moon, as we perceive them, appear against the background of the sky. Therefore, for a representation of them to be forbidden, it also need not protrude (Tosafot, Avodah Zarah, loc. cit.).

Avodah Zarah 42b also mentions a prohibition against making the image of a d’rakon which Rashi and others interpret as an animal similar to a serpent. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam describes this image as a fishlike man with fins and many scales, probably referring to the Greek god Neptune.

From these two halachot, particularly according to the Rambam’s understanding as reflected in his Commentary to the Mishnah, we see that there is no conflict between Torah law and aesthetics. There are only two restrictions: realistic human statues (and according to some authorities, these must be complete, full-bodied statues) and depictions of pagan gods. Even according to the other opinions which forbid depictions of the sun, the moon, and the like, there is no prohibition against abstract portrayals of these entities. No other restrictions apply at all.
There is definitely a divergence between the approach to life that spawned much of the art forms of Western culture and a Torah lifestyle. Perhaps for that reason, many religious Jews have traditionally shunned participation in and patronage of the arts. In the present generation, however, a number of our Torah leaders have urged religious artists to dedicate themselves to expressing Torah ideas and values in a variety of art forms, explaining that:
a) Through these media, it is possible to reach many Jews who might never enter a synagogue or Torah center;
b) Everything in the world was created to be used by the Jews for a Torah purpose (Rashi, Genesis 1:1). This also applies to art. Using these art forms for Torah purposes expresses the true intent for their creation and endows them with a depth of meaning and inspiration — and in its deepest sense, a new wellspring of creativity.
According to Kabbalah, God’s presence is more manifest in the sefirah of Tiferet (“Beauty”) than in any other sefirah. Thus, the challenge confronting a Torah artist today is to use beauty as a medium to express Godly truth.