Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

At least one of the members of the Supreme Sanhedrin, a minor Sanhedrin, or a court of three must have received semichah (ordination) from a teacher who himself had been given semichah.

Our teacher, Moses ordained Joshua by placing his hands upon him, as Numbers 27:23 states: "And he placed his hands upon him and commanded him." Similarly, Moses ordained the 70 judges and the Divine presence rested upon them. Those elders ordained others, and the others still others in later generations. This tradition continued until the Talmudic era, when the Sages had received ordination one from the other in a chain extending back to the court of Joshua, and to the court of Moses.

A person who is ordained by the nasi and one ordained by another ordained judge have the same status, even if that ordained judge never served in a Sanhedrin.

How is the practice of semichah practiced for all time? The person conveying ordination does not rest his hands on the elder's head. Instead, he is addressed by the title of Rabbi and is told: "You are ordained and you have the authority to render judgment, even in cases involving financial penalties.

The semichah which ordains elders as judges may be conveyed only by three individuals. One of the three must have received semichah from others as explained.

The term Elohim can be applied only to a court which received semichah in Eretz Yisrael alone. They are wise men who are fit to render judgment who were scrutinized by a court within Eretz Yisrael which appointed them and conveyed semichah upon them.

At first, whoever, had received semichah would convey semichah on his students. Afterwards, as an expression of honor to Hillel, the elder, the Sages ordained that semichah would not be conveyed upon anyone unless license had been granted by the nasi.

They also ordained that the nasi should not convey semichah unless he is accompanied by the av beit din, and that the av beit din should not convey semichah unless he was accompanied by the nasi. The other elders could convey semichah themselves after receiving license from the nasi, provided they were accompanied by two others. For semichah cannot be conveyed by less than three judges.

Semichah may not be conveyed upon elders in the diaspora even if the judges conveying semichah received semichah in Eretz Yisrael. Even if the judges conveying semichah were in Eretz Yisrael and the elders to receive semichah were in the diaspora, they should not convey semichah. Needless to say, this applies if the judges conveying semichah were in the diaspora and the elders to receive semichah were in Eretz Yisrael.

If both of them were in Eretz Yisrael, semichah may be conveyed even though the recipients are not in the same place as those conveying semichah. Instead, the judges conveying semichah send to the elder or write to him that he has been given semichah and that he has permission to adjudicate cases involving financial penalties.

This is acceptable, because both of them are located in Eretz Yisrael. The entire area of Eretz Yisrael which the Jews who left Egypt took possession of is fit to have semichah conveyed within it.

Judges who themselves were granted semichah may convey semichah on many individuals - even 100 - at one time. King David once conveyed semichah on 30,000 individuals on one day.

Such judges may appoint whoever they desire for particular matters, provided he is fit to adjudicate all matters.

What is implied? A court has the authority to give semichah to a remarkable judge who is fit to issue rulings with regard to the entire Torah and limit his authority to the adjudication of financial matters, but not to what is forbidden and permitted. Conversely, they may grant him authority with regard to what is forbidden and permitted, but not to adjudicate cases involving financial matters. Or they may give him license with regard to adjudicating both such manners, but not laws involving financial penalties, or to rule with regard to financial penalties, but not to rule that a blemish disqualifies a firstborn animal. Or they may give him license merely to absolve vows, to judge stains, or to rule only within other similarly limited parameters.

Similarly, the judges conveying semichah have permission to give the person receiving semichah license to judge only for a specific time, telling him: "You have permission to judge or issue rulings until the nasi arrives here," or "...as long as you are together with us in this city," or to issue other similar restrictions.

When a sage of remarkable knowledge is blind in one eye, he is not given semichah with regard to matters of financial law although he may adjudicate such cases. The rationale is that he is not fit to judge all matters. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

If there was only one judge in Eretz Yisrael who possessed semichah, he should call two other judges to sit with him and they should convey semichah on 70 judges at one time or one after the other. Afterwards, he and these 70 should join together to make up the Supreme Sanhedrin and grant semichah to others to make up other courts.

It appears to me that if all the wise men in Eretz Yisrael agree to appoint judges and convey semichah upon them, the semichah is binding and these judges may adjudicate cases involving financial penalties and convey semichah upon others.

If so, why did the Sages suffer anguish over the institution of semichah, so that the judgment of cases involving financial penalties would not be nullified among the Jewish people? Because the Jewish people were dispersed, and it is impossible that all could agree. If, by contrast, there was a person who had received semichah from a person who had received semichah, he does not require the consent of all others. Instead, he may adjudicate cases involving financial penalties for everyone, for he received semichah from a court.

The question whether semichah can be renewed requires resolution.

When a court received semichah in Eretz Yisrael and then departed to the diaspora, they may judge cases involving financial penalties in the diaspora in the same manner as they judge such cases in Eretz Yisrael. For the Sanhedrin exercises judicial authority in Eretz Yisrael and in the diaspora, provided the judges have received semichah in Eretz Yisrael.

The exilarchs in Babylon function instead of the kings. They have the authority to impose their rule over the Jewish people in all places and to judge them whether they consent or not. This is derived from Genesis 49:10: "The staff will not depart from Judah" - this refers to the exilarchs of Babylon.

Any judge who is fit to adjudicate cases and was given license to serve as a judge by the exilarch has the authority to act as a judge throughout the entire world, whether in Eretz Yisrael or in the diaspora. Even though either or both of the litigants do not desire to argue the case before him, they are required to do so despite the fact that he does not have the authority to adjudicate cases involving financial penalties.

Any judge who is fit to adjudicate cases and was given license to serve as a judge by the court in Eretz Yisrael has the authority to act as a judge throughout Eretz Yisrael and in the cities which are located on its boundaries even though the litigants do not desire to argue the case before him. In the diaspora, by contrast, the license granted him does not afford him the authority to compel the litigants to appear before him. Although he has the sanction to adjudicate cases involving financial penalties in the diaspora, he may adjudicate such cases only when the litigants consent for him to judge. He does not have the authority to compel the litigants to accept his rulings unless he is granted such authority by the exilarch.

When a person is not fit to act as a judge because he is not knowledgeable or because he lacks proper character and an exilarch transgressed and granted him authority or the court erred and granted him authority, the authority granted him is of no consequence unless he is fit. To cite a parallel: When a person consecrates an animal with a physical blemish to be sacrificed on the altar, the holiness does not encompass it.

A king may not be enthroned except by the High Court of 71 judges. A minor Sanhedrin for every tribe and every city may be appointed only by the High Court of 71 judges. A tribe that has been led to apostasy in its entirety, a false prophet, or a case in which the High Priest might be liable for capital punishment, may be judged only by the High Court of 71 judges. Financial cases involving a High Priest, by contrast, may be adjudicated by a court of three.

Similarly, the determination of a rebellious elder or a city led to apostasy and the decision to cause a woman suspected of adultery to drink the waters which test her may only be done by the High Court. Similarly, the decisions to extend the city limits of Jerusalem and the limits of the Temple Courtyard, to enter a voluntary war, and to measure the distance between a corpse and the nearby cities may be done only by the High Court of 71 judges. These concepts are derived from Exodus 18:22: "All the major matters will be brought to you."

Cases involving capital punishment may not be judged by a court with less than 23 judges, i.e., a minor Sanhedrin. This applies not only to instances where humans are judged with regard to capital punishment, but also when animals face such judgment. Therefore an ox which is stoned to death and an animal used in bestial sexual practices is condemned to death only by a court of 23 judges. Even when a lion, a bear, or a cheetah, that has been domesticated and which has owners, kill a human, it is executed based on the judgment of a court of 23. When, however, a snake kills a human, even one ordinary person may kill it.

When a person who spreads a malicious report concerning his wife, at the outset, the case is judged by a court of 23. For there is the possibility of a capital case arising if the husband's claim proves true and the woman is to be stoned to death. If the husband's claim is not substantiated, and the woman's father comes to demand payment of the fine, the matter may be judged by a court of three.

What is the source which teaches that capital cases may be judged only by a court of 23? Although this is a matter conveyed by the Oral Tradition, there is an allusion to it in the Torah. Numbers 35:24-25 states: "And the congregation shall judge... and the congregation shall save...." Implied is that there must be the possibility of a congregation judging - and condemning him to death - and a congregation saving - and seeking his acquittal. Now a congregation is no less than ten. Thus there are at least 20 judges. We add three judges so that there not be an equally balanced court and to allow the possibility of "following after the inclination of the majority."

Lashes are decided upon by a court of three judges. Even though the person may die when lashes are administered to him.

Decapitating the calf is performed by five judges.

The enlargement of the month is decided upon by three judges.

The enlargement of the year is decided upon by seven judges. All of the above must possess semichah as we explained.

Cases involving financial penalties, robbery, personal injury, the payment of double for a stolen article, the payment of four and five times the value of a stolen sheep or ox, rape, seduction, and the like may be adjudicated only by three expert judges who have received semichah in Eretz Yisrael,

Other cases of financial law, e.g., admissions of financial liability and loans, do not require an expert judge. Even three ordinary people, or even one expert judge may adjudicate them. For this reason, cases involving admissions of financial liability, loans, and the like may be adjudicated in the diaspora. Although a court in the diaspora is not referred to as Elohim, they carry out the charge of the court of Eretz Yisrael. This charge does not, however, give them license to adjudicate cases involving financial penalties.

The courts of the diaspora adjudicate only cases that commonly occur and which involve financial loss, e.g., admissions of liability, loans, and property damage. Matters that occur only infrequently, by contrast, even though they involve financial loss, e.g., an animal that injures another, or events that commonly occur, but do not involve financial loss, e.g., a double payment for theft, are not adjudicated by the judges of the diaspora.

Similarly, all the financial penalties which our Sages imposed against a person who punches a colleague, slaps a colleague, or the like are not adjudicated by the judges of the diaspora. Whenever a person is required to pay half the damages for the destruction of property the matter is not adjudicated by the judges of the diaspora, with the exception of the half payment for damages caused by pebbles propelled by one's animals. For that is a reimbursement for financial loss and is not a financial penalty.

Whenever the injuries a person suffers are evaluated by calculating his worth as one calculates the worth of a servant, the payment is not expropriated by the judges of the diaspora. Therefore if a person injures a colleague, compensation for the damages, the pain, and the embarrassment for which he is liable is not expropriated by the judges of the diaspora. Compensation for the inability to work and medical expenses is, by contrast, expropriated in the diaspora, because they involve a financial loss. The Geonim ruled in this manner and stated that it is a commonplace matter to expropriate compensation for the inability to work and medical expenses in the diaspora.

The judges of the diaspora do not exact payment when an animal injures a person, because this is an uncommon occurrence. When, by contrast, a person damages an animal belonging to a colleague, he must pay the complete damages to his colleague regardless of where this takes place, just as he is responsible if he ripped his garments, broke his utensils, or cut down his produce.

Similarly, when an animal causes damage by eating or by treading, since its owner is forewarned that this is its inherent natural tendency, it is a common matter and the damages are expropriated by the judges of the diaspora. This applies whether it damaged another animal, e.g., it rubbed against it, it consumed produce that it would naturally eat or the like, or it damaged food or utensils by treading upon them in which instance he is obligated to pay full damages. Payment for all of these damages can be expropriated by the judges of the diaspora.

If, however, an animal was not prone to cause damage, then it caused damages to the extent that the owner was warned, and then it caused damage again, e.g., it bit, it butted with its body, it lay down, it kicked, or it gored, these damages are not expropriated by the judges of the diaspora. The rationale is that there is no concept of the owner of an animal being forewarned in the diaspora. Even if an animal caused its owner to be forewarned in Eretz Yisrael, and then it was taken to the diaspora where it caused damage, the damages are not expropriated, because this is an uncommon occurrence.

Why is there no concept of warning an owner in the diaspora? Because testimony must be given against the owner in the presence of a court. And the concept of a court applies only with regard to judges who have been given semichah in Eretz Yisrael.

Accordingly, if a court of judges from Eretz Yisrael were in the diaspora, just as they have the authority to judge laws involving financial penalties in the diaspora; so, too, testimony regarding an animal can be delivered in their presence in the diaspora.

When a person steals or robs, the principal can be expropriated by the judges of the diaspora. They do not, however, expropriate the double payment.

The judges of the diaspora do not expropriate payment in every situation where a person would be liable to make compensation based on his own statements. For the payment to a maiden's father for blemishing her virginity and for the embarrassment she suffers, and a person who must pay an atonement fee because his ox killed another person are situations where a person must make compensation, because of his statements. For example, he said: "I seduced so-and-so's daughter," or "My ox killed so-and-so." Nevertheless, such payments are not expropriated by the judges of the diaspora.

Judgments involving situations where a person's actions served as a direct cause of damage are not equivalent to laws involving k'nasot and they may be adjudicated by the judges of the diaspora.

Similarly, the laws applying to a person who gives money belonging to a colleague to gentiles - even if he merely threatens to do so - may be adjudicated by the judges of the diaspora.

The custom of the yeshivot of the diaspora is that even though they do not expropriate money due as k'nasot, they place the person who causes the damage under a ban of ostracism until he satisfies the plaintiff or goes with him to Eretz Yisrael to have the case adjudicated.

Once the person who causes the damage pays the amount that he would be held liable for, the ban of ostracism is lifted whether the person who suffered the injury is appeased or not. Similarly, if the person who suffered the injury seizes an amount of property belonging to the person who causes the damage equivalent to the amount he would be awarded by the court, we do not expropriate it from his possession.

When one person is an expert judge and he is known by many to possess such knowledge, although he is allowed to judge cases involving financial law alone, an admission of liability made in his presence is not considered as an admission made in the presence of a court. This applies even if he possesses semichah.

When, by contrast, a court is composed of three judges, even though they do not possesses semichah, and even if they are ordinary men and are not referred to as Elohim, an admission made in their presence is considered as an admission made in a court of law. Similarly, if a person denies an obligation in their presence and witnesses come and testify against him, he is established as one who has lied. He cannot offer another claim, as we have explained.

The general principle is: With regard to the admission of financial responsibility, cases involving debts, and the like, their authority is the same as that of a court composed of judges possessing semichah with regard to all matters.

The following laws apply whenever a judge adjudicates a case involving financial matters and errs. If his error involves matters that are revealed and known - e.g., a law that is explicitly stated in the Mishnah or the Gemara, the ruling is reversed. The situation is returned to its original status and the judgment required by halachah is rendered. If it is impossible to return the matter to its original status, e.g., the person who unwarrantedly received the money traveled overseas, or he was a stubborn and strong person, the judge is not liable. Although he caused a loss, he did not have the intent of doing so. Similar laws apply if a judge ruled that a substance that was pure was impure, that an animal that was kosher was unacceptable and had it fed to the dogs, or the like.

Different principles apply if the judge errs in a case requiring a decision to be made by using one's logic to weigh alternative positions, for example, a case arose involving the subject of a difference of opinion among the Sages of the Mishnah or the Sages of the Gemara where it was not explicitly stated whose opinion the halachah follows. The judge decided to follow one opinion without knowing it had already been universally established practice within the Torah community to follow the other view.

In such a situation, if the judge was an expert who had been given license to adjudicate cases by the exilarch, or even if he had not been given such license, but the litigants voluntarily accepted him as their judicial authority, the ruling is reversed. The rationale is that he is an expert.

If the ruling cannot be reversed, he is not liable to make restitution. This applies both to a judge who received permission from the exilarch or one received permission from a Jewish court to adjudicate cases in Eretz Yisrael, but not to serve as judge in the diaspora, as explained.

Different rules apply if the person who erred in a question of logical deduction was an expert judge, but he had not received license to adjudicate cases, nor was he accepted by the litigants as an authority, or was not an expert, but was accepted by the litigants to adjudicate their case according to Torah law. If he personally took property from one litigant and gave it to the other, his actions are irreversible and he should pay the damages from his own resources. If, however, he did not personally take the property from one and give it to the other, the decision should be reversed. If the decision cannot be reversed, he should pay the damages from his own resources.

When, however, a person is not an expert and was not accepted by the litigants adjudicates a case, even though he was given permission to act as a judge, he is considered as one of the men of force and not as a proper judge. Therefore, the judgment he renders is of no consequence. This applies whether he erred or whether he did not err. Either one of the litigants may withdraw and have the case adjudicated by a proper court.

If such a judge erred and personally gave property from one litigant to the other, he is obligated to pay from his own resources. He may then regain the money from the litigant to whom he gave property unlawfully. If one litigant paid the other because of the ruling of such a judge and the recipient is unable to return the money or if the judge rendered an object ritually impure or gave meat that was kosher to the dogs to eat, the judge must bear the loss as is the law regarding anyone who causes damages. For such a person has the intent of causing damages.

When a judge errs and obligates a person who is not required to take an oath to do so, and in order to free himself from the obligation to take the oath, this person negotiated a compromise with the other litigant, the compromise may be revoked. Even though he affirmed the compromise with a kinyan, it is of no substance. He agreed to pay or to waive the other person's liability only to free himself from the oath to which the person who erred obligated him. And whenever a kinyan is carried out on the basis of an error, it is annulled. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When two people are involved in a dispute concerning a judgment, one states: "Let us have the matter judged here," and the other says, "Let us ascend to the Supreme Court, lest these judges err and expropriate money contrary to the law," we compel the latter litigant to have the matter adjudicated locally.

If he asks the judges: "Write down the rationale why you have rendered this judgment against me and give it to me, lest you have erred," they must write down their rationales and give him the transcript. Afterwards, they expropriate what he owes. If the local judges feel the need to ask for clarification regarding a matter from the Supreme Court in Jerusalem, they should write down their question and send it. After their inquiry, the judgment should be rendered in the local court on the basis of the answer written to them by the Supreme Court.

When does the above apply? With regards to judgments dependent on claims issued by both litigants or a situation when a lender desires to have the case adjudicated locally and the borrower says: "Let us go to the Supreme Court." If, by contrast, the lender says: "Let us go to the Supreme Court," we compel the borrower to ascend with the lender, as implied by Proverbs 22:7: "A borrower is a servant to the lender."

Similarly, if a person claims that his colleague injured or damaged his person or his property or stole from him, and the plaintiff desires to ascend to the Supreme Court, the local court compels the defendant to ascend together with him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When does the above apply? When the person from who property was stolen, the person who suffered injury or damage, or the lender has witnesses or proof that support his claim. When, however, his claim is unsupported, we do not obligate the defendant to leave his locale. Instead, he takes an oath there and is freed of obligation.

Similar concepts apply in the present age, when there is no Supreme Court, but there are places where there are great sages whose expertise is renown and there are other places where there are scholars who are not on that level. If the lender says: "Let us go to this-and-this place in this-and-this land to have the case adjudicated by so-and-so, the great sage," we compel the borrower to go with him. This was the practice continually in Spain.