Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

When a person gives eggs to a chicken farmer with the intent that the chicken farmer have chickens sit on the eggs until they hatch, and then for the chicken farmer to raise the chicks with the profits to be divided between them, the owner of the eggs must provide the chicken farmer with a wage for his work and sustenance.

Similarly, when a person evaluates calves and ponies and then entrusts them to a caretaker with the intent that he tend to them until they grow into large animals with the profits to be divided between them, the owner of the animals must provide the caretaker with a wage for his work and sustenance for every day, like an unemployed worker. He must raise calves until they are three years old, and a donkey until it is capable of bearing a burden. He cannot sell the animal without the consent of his partner until this time.

Similarly, if one evaluates animals and then entrusts them to a caretaker to fatten them, with the profits to be divided between them, the owner of the animals must provide the caretaker with a wage for his work, like an unemployed worker. If the owner tells the caretaker: "Take the head and the fat tail for yourself in exchange for your work, aside from your share of the profits," it is permitted.

If the caretaker has other animals that he was also working to fatten in addition to this one that was evaluated, and similarly, if one has other calves, ponies or eggs, since he is caring for his own at the same time as he is caring for his colleagues', even if the owner gives him only a small amount as a wage for the entire period of the partnership, it is acceptable, and they may divide the profits equally. If the caretaker was already employed as the owner's sharecropper and he is taking care of animals belonging to both himself and the owner of the field, the owner does not have to pay him anything as a wage.

When a person has calves or ponies evaluated, he has chickens sit on eggs, or he has an animal evaluated to be fattened with the profits to be divided between them and he does not pay a wage to the caretaker, the laws that govern such a relationship are the same as those that govern an investment of money. We see how much the animals or the eggs were evaluated for and how much profit was made, and the caretaker is given two thirds of the profit. If there is a loss, he is required to bear one third of the loss.

We evaluate a cow, a donkey and any other animal that usually performs work and eats, and the profits are divided between the owner and the caretaker. For although care is required, the caretaker is able to derive other profit for himself because of the work of the animals. For he may hire them or work with them himself and benefit from the fee or their work.

One should not evaluate a calf together with its mother, or a pony with its mother. For the calf or the pony does not perform any work, and yet it requires care.

When a person has an animal evaluated and entrusts it to a colleague, until when is the colleague obligated to care for it? For a female donkey, 18 months. For an animal that lives in a corral - e.g., sheep or cattle - 24 months. If the owner desires to divide the profits within this period, the caretaker can prevent him from doing so, because they entered into a partnership without making any stipulations.

We set these rules because the care and profit ratio for an animal for the first year cannot be compared to that of the second year. In the first year, it requires much care and brings little profit, because at the beginning it becomes heavier only with much difficulty. In the second year, by contrast, it requires little care and there is much profit, because it becomes much heavier, gaining every day. Therefore, the caretaker may prevent him from dissolving the partnership until the end of the second year.

If the animal that was evaluated gives birth while in the possession of the caretaker, the calf is considered part of the profit and is divided between them. In a place where the custom is that the caretaker raises the offspring, he should raise them and afterwards sell them. In a place where it is not customary that the caretaker raise the offspring, he is nevertheless required to care for the offspring for a limited period. For a lightweight animal, he is required to care for it for 30 days. For a large animal, he is required to care for it for 50 days. Afterwards, the offspring is sold and the profits are divided.

If the caretaker desires to care for them longer than this period, he should evaluate them before three men on the thirtieth or fiftieth day. Afterwards, any profit that is made should be divided between them as follows: The caretaker should receive three fourths of the profit, and his partner, one fourth. The rationale is that the caretaker owns half of the offspring and because he cares for the half belonging to his colleague, he is given half of that half - i.e., a total of three fourths. If the caretaker did not make such a stipulation in the presence of three witnesses, he is considered to have waived this extra profit, and the offspring are divided equally among them.

In a place where it is customary to figure in a porter's fee to the money invested, that fee should be added. The entire fee that the administrator receives for carrying the merchandise should be figured into the profit on the investment. Similarly, if it is the local custom to add an extra fee for handling an animal, it should be added. In a place where it is customary to add an extra fee to the caretaker's wages for handling offspring, it should be added. Whenever a person enters into an investment or partnership agreement, he should not deviate from the local business practices.

The following rules apply when Reuven owns a field and invites Shimon to till it, to sow it or to plant within it, to manage the expenses spent on its account, to sell the produce, and to divide between them the profit that exceeds the cost. Whether they agreed to divide the profits equally or they agreed that Reuven would receive a larger share, whether all the expenses were undertaken by Reuven or by Shimon, any such arrangement is permitted. Even "the shade of interest" is not involved.

Shimon, who takes care of working the land, managing the expenses and selling the produce, is called a sharecropper. If the sharecropper claims: "I agreed to till the field for half the profits," but the owner of the field claims that they agreed on a third, we follow the local custom. The one whose claim departs from the local custom must bring proof to support his position.

The following laws apply when a husband hires sharecroppers to till property belonging to his wife, and then he divorces her. If the husband is himself a sharecropper, since the husband does not have any connection to the property any longer, the sharecroppers' connection also ceases. If the value of the field increases, they are granted only the share of their expenses equal to the field's increase in value. And they must support their claim with an oath.

If the husband is not a sharecropper, we assume that the sharecroppers were hired according to the custom of the land, and they are given the share granted to other sharecroppers.

When brothers or other heirs do not divide the estate of their benefactor, but instead, they all use it together, they are considered partners in all matters.

If one of a group of brothers or one of a group of partners was appointed to the service of the king, the profit he receives is divided among them. If one of them becomes ill and is cured, the expenses required for his cure should be shared. If, however, he became sick because of his own negligence, he went out in the snow, or in the sun during the summer until he became ill or the like, he is responsible for bearing the expenses for his cure by himself.

The following - all types of partners, sharecroppers, guardians of orphans who were appointed by the court, a woman who does business in the family home or who was charged by her husband to serve as a storekeeper, and a member of the household - are all required by Rabbinic Law to take an oath, despite the fact that the claimant does not have a certain claim against them, lest they may have stolen something from their colleague while performing business on his behalf, or perhaps they were not exact when making a reckoning.

Why did the Sages ordain this oath? Because these people give themselves license, thinking that they are deserving of whatever they will take from the property of the owner, since they do business and work on his behalf. Therefore, the Sages ordained that they are required to take an oath despite the fact that the claimant does not have a certain claim against them, so that they will perform all their deeds justly and in good faith.

None of the above are required to take an oath because of an indefinite claim until the plaintiff suspects them of taking two silver pieces - i.e., two silver me'ah, as will be explained. If, however, they are suspected of taking less than this amount, they are not required to take an oath.

Based on this, my teachers ruled that if one partner died, the heirs cannot compel their father's partners to take an oath concerning an indefinite claim. For they are not knowledgeable about their father's affairs and do not know for certain that their father suspected the partner of wrongdoing so that it can be said that the heirs suspect the partner of taking two silver me'ah.

There are, however, others who rule that the heir may require him to take an oath despite the fact that his claim is indefinite. It is proper to rule in this manner. For we see that the heirs may require a widow who became a guardian during the lifetime of her husband to take an oath.

Although there are no witnesses that a person was his colleague's sharecropper or partner, but rather he himself admits to this fact, saying: "I am his partner, sharecropper or member of his household - but I did not steal anything from him," he must take an oath while holding a sacred article. The rationale is that we do not employ the principle of migo to free a person from the responsibility of taking an oath, but only to free him from a financial commitment.

Which member of the household can be required to take an oath because of an indefinite claim? One who brings workers in and leads workers out, who brings produce in and takes produce out. When, however, a member of the household is not involved in the business affairs of the household, but merely enters and leaves, he cannot be required to take an oath because of an indefinite claim.

Similarly, a guardian appointed by the father of orphans before his death cannot be required by the orphans to take an oath because of an indefinite claim. Similarly, a woman who did not serve as a guardian in her husband's lifetime, and did not do business with the property of the estate after her husband's burial cannot be required to take an oath because of an indefinite claim.

Similarly, if she did business with the property of the estate between her husband's death and burial, she is not required to take an oath regarding the transactions conducted during this period. For if she were required to take an oath, she would not sell any property in order to make the burial possible, and the deceased would become loathsome.

When a person sends an article with a colleague to sell, or sends money with him to purchase produce or merchandise for him, even though the principal did not pay the agent a wage, and the agent does not own any portion of the merchandise nor derive any benefit from it, since he did business with his colleague's money, he is considered a member of his household. Even though the principal has merely an indefinite claim, the agent can be required to take an oath that he did not steal anything from him when he brought him the merchandise that he purchased or a portion of it, or the money from the sale he conducted for him.

When both partners are involved in the business of the partnership or the one who is involved in the business entrusts the merchandise - or a portion of the merchandise - or the funds belonging to the partnership without weighing, measuring or counting them, there is a doubt concerning both of them, and either one can require the other to take the oath required of a partner. If, however, only one of the partners does business and the other is not involved in the business dealings at all, only the former can be required to take this oath.

The above oath can be administered when the initial relationship is still current. If, however, the partners or the sharecroppers dissolved their relationship, the woman was divorced, the member of the household went elsewhere, or the agent brought the principal the merchandise he purchased for him or the money from the merchandise he sold for him, the principal remained silent without making a claim against the other party, and the other party departed, the principal is not able to require that other party to take an oath because of an indefinite claim afterwards. If, however, the principal has a definite claim against him, he can require him to take an oath, and then require him to take additional oaths concerning anything he desires.

Similarly, if at a later time, the other person is required to take an oath to the principal - whether required by Scriptural Law or by Rabbinic Law - e.g., he became a partner or a member of the person's household again - the principal can require him to take an oath that he did not steal anything during their present partnership or while he was his partner, sharecropper, member of his household or guardian previously. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When partners have dissolved their partnership, but the partnership is still owed debts by others, the partners cannot require each other to take an oath because of an indefinite claim, for they have already divided the partnership's resources. The debts that remain are not significant in this context, for they are matters of public knowledge. When any portion of the debt is repaid, they will each take their appropriate portion of the debt.

Similar concepts apply if it has been made known that cash remains in the coffers of the partnership, but the partners have not taken their portion of that cash. Neither may require an oath of the other, because cash is considered as if it is already divided.

Similarly, if a reckoning was made of the assets of the partnership possessed by all the partners, and it was determined that one partner was holding a specific and known entity belonging to another, it is considered as if the assets were divided, even though he had not taken it as of that time.

If, however, any of the produce belonging to the partnership remained, and it had not been divided or weighed, or any dimension of the partnership remained concerning which an accounting had not been made and thus, neither of them knew the extent of the portion that is due him, the partnership is still considered viable, and either may require the other to take the oath mentioned above.

When a person issues a claim against a colleague after the dissolution of a partnership, he cannot compel him to take an oath except through the convention of gilgul sh'vuah, as explained above. He may, however, have a ban of ostracism issued against anyone who stole from his colleague while he was his partner, sharecropper or member of his household, and does not admit that he stole.

The following law applies when a partner claims that the partnership relationship with his colleague involved a certain stipulation, and the colleague denies that such a stipulation ever existed or admits the existence of a stipulation, but claims it was for a lesser amount than the plaintiff claims. The plaintiff may determine the oath the defendant takes.

The same ruling applies if the plaintiff asks that property belonging to the partnership be returned to him, and the defendant claims to have given it to him, but the plaintiff claims that he never received it, or the defendant claims that merchandise was his, while the plaintiff claims that it belongs to the partnership, or with regard to any other claims of this type.

What is implied? If the plaintiff desires not to require the partner to take the oath required of partners, but instead to require him to take merely a sh'vuat hesset on the claim he denies and does not admit to have taken place, he may require him to take only the lesser oath. If he desires, he can include all the claims in the oath required of a partner. Although he has an indefinite claim, he will require the partner to take an oath that he did not steal anything throughout the duration of the partnership, that these and these stipulations existed between the partners, that the merchandise was his, or that he paid this and this amount. The same principles apply in all analogous situations.

The following rule applies when a person lodges a claim against a partner with the intent of obligating him to take the oath required of partners, the defendant claims: "We have already divided the assets of the partnership, and nothing that belongs to you remains in my possession," and the plaintiff differs, maintaining that the assets were not divided, nor was a reckoning made. The defendant cannot be required to take an oath because of an indefinite claim. This ruling also applies when the plaintiff admits dividing the assets, but claims that the division was made with the stipulation that the defendant take the oath required of partners whenever the plaintiff demanded, and the defendant has constantly been procrastinating.

This ruling applies even when the defendant admits that after the division of the assets, he owed the plaintiff something, but claims that the plaintiff agreed to consider that as a debt, or considered it as an object entrusted to the defendant for safekeeping.

Even if there are witnesses that the two were once partners, the plaintiff cannot require an oath with an indefinite claim. Nor may the plaintiff require the defendant to take a sh'vuat hesset that they divided the assets or that they were never partners. The rationale is that a sh'vuat hesset is never required, nor even is a claim included in an oath using the convention of gilgul sh'vuah, unless the claim is such that if the defendant admitted it, he would be liable to pay money. If, however, the claim is one that if the defendant admitted it, he would be required only to take an oath, he may not be required to take an oath on the indefinite claim, even because of the convention of gilgul sh'vuah. Geonim, who are masters of instruction, ruled in this manner.

The following rule applies if the plaintiff claims: "You are still my partner, and property belonging to me worth such and such remains in your possession," and the defendant counters, by claiming: "We already divided the assets of the partnership, and I no longer have anything belonging to you in my possession," or "I was never your partner." The defendant must take a sh'vuat hesset that he does not possess anything belonging to the plaintiff, and because of the convention of gilgul sh'vuah, he must include in the oath that he did not steal anything from him. The defendant need not include in the oath that he was not his partner or that they already divided the assets of the partnership, for the reason explained above.

The following rule applies when the plaintiff claims that he and the defendant are still partners, and that he therefore has the right to require him to take an oath because of an indefinite claim, while the defendant denies ever becoming the plaintiff's partner. If the plaintiff brings witnesses who testify that the defendant was his partner, and the defendant then claims: "We divided the assets of the partnership," his claim is not accepted. The rationale is that he was proven to be a liar with regard to this oath. Therefore, he is required to take the oath required of a partner. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

The convention of gilgul sh'vuah is also relevant in the following situation. Reuven placed 400 dinarim in the coffers of the partnership, while Shimon invested 200 dinarim. They worked as partners and did business together, but all the money was held by Reuven. If Reuven claimed that there was a loss of 500 dinarim, Reuven may not take the oath required of partners that he suffered such a loss to require Shimon to pay 50 dinarim from his own funds. Instead, Reuven should take the oath required of partners that there was a loss. He should take the maneh that is in his possession, but Shimon is not required to pay anything.

If Reuven claims that Shimon has definite knowledge of the loss, he may require Shimon to take the oath required of partners, and based on the convention of gilgul sh'vuah, he may compel him to include that he does not have definite knowledge of this loss.

Different rules apply if Shimon was not at all involved in the work of the partnership. Shimon should take a sh'vuat hesset that he does not have definite knowledge of the loss, and he is then freed of liability. Moreover, if the maneh that remains was in Shimon's possession, it should be divided equally between them. The rationale is that a partner is not one of those who is required to take an oath and then collect money from the defendant. Instead, the oath he takes enables him merely to be freed of responsibility or to assume ownership of property in his possession. Be careful with regard to this law, for even masters of instruction have erred with regard to it.

The following law also involves the division of the assets of a partnership. Shimon claims that he owes Levi a maneh because of this partnership. If he has resources of the partnership in his possession that are sufficient to pay the debt, and he can give them to Levi, his word is accepted. He should repay the debt, and afterwards he and Reuven should calculate how the assets should be divided.

If Shimon does not have funds from the partnership in his possession, we do not rely upon his word to expropriate money from Reuven or merchandise known to belong to the partnership, lest Shimon and Levi are perpetrating deception, seeking to obtain Reuven's property. Even if the loan is recorded in a promissory note, Reuven is not required to pay any portion of it.

If Shimon claims that Reuven has definite knowledge that the debt Shimon incurred came as a result of the partnership, and should be borne by both of them, Reuven is required to take a sh'vuat hesset that he does not know that the partnership has incurred this debt - or because of the convention of gilgul sh'vuah, he should include this statement in the oath he takes as required of partners. Afterwards, Shimon should pay the debt from his own funds.

Similarly, if there is a promissory note stating that, due to Shimon, Levi owes the partnership 100 dinarim, and Shimon claims: "I received payment and returned the money to the coffers of the partnership," or "I extended credit to him for a two- or three-year period," his word is not accepted, lest he be perpetrating deception, seeking to obtain Reuven's property.

How should this case be adjudicated? Levi was already freed from obligation through Shimon's admission. If Shimon does not bring proof of his claim, Shimon must pay Reuven's share from his own funds. He should then demand payment from Levi at the end of the time span he mentioned. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.