Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

A person who admits a portion of a claim is not required to take a Scriptural oath until the plaintiff lodges a claim against him for an entity with a specific measure, weight or number, and the defendant admits owing a portion of that measure, weight or number.

What is implied? A plaintiff claims: "You owe me 10 dinarim," and the defendant responds: "I owe you only five"; "You owe me a kor of wheat," "I owe you only a letech"; "You owe me two litras of silk," "I owe you only a rotel." In all these and in other similar situations, he is liable.

Different rules apply, however, if the plaintiff claims: "I gave you a wallet full of coins," and the defendant answers: "You gave me only 50," or he claims: "I gave you 100 dinarim" and the defendant answers: "You gave me only this pouch, and you did not count the contents before me. I do not know what was in it. You are receiving what you gave me." In these and all similar situations, he is not liable to take an oath.

Similarly, if the plaintiff claims: "I gave you a room full of grain," and the defendant answers: "You gave me only ten korim" or he claims: "I gave you ten korim," and the defendant answers: "I do not know how much you gave me, because you did not measure them before me. You are receiving what you gave me," the defendant is not liable.

If, however, if the plaintiff claims: "I gave you this room that was filled with grain until the projection," and the defendant responded: "It was filled only to the window," he is liable. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

A person who admits a portion of a claim is not required to take a Scriptural oath, unless he makes his admission with regard to a matter that he could deny [owing].

What is implied? A plaintiff lodged a complaint against a colleague, saying: "You owe me 100 dinarim. 50 are recorded in this promissory note, and 50 are not recorded in a promissory note." The defendant responds: "I owe you only the 50 mentioned in the promissory note." He is not considered to be a person who admits a portion of a claim. For his denial would be of no consequence with regard to the sum mentioned in the promissory note. All of his property is on lien to it, and even if he denied it, he would be obligated to pay. Therefore, he is required to take only a sh'vuat hesset concerning the 50 that are not mentioned in the promissory note.

The following rules apply when a dispute arises concerning a promissory note that mentions that the defendant owes sela'im, but does not mentioned the number of sela'im he owes. The lender states: "You owe me five sela'im, and that is the intent of the promissory note." The borrower counters: "I owe you only three; that is what is implied by the promissory note."

Because of the promissory note alone, he would be obligated to pay only two sela'imHe is, nevertheless, not liable to take a Scriptural oath despite the fact that he admitted owing a sela that he could have denied, because he is like a person who returns a lost article. And it is one of the ordinances instituted by our Sages that any person who returns a lost article should not be required to take an oath, as explained in the appropriate place.

Similarly, when a person tells his colleague: "My father told me that you owe me a maneh." The defendant responded: "I owe you only 50 dinarim." He is a person returning a lost object, and he is not liable even for a sh'vuat hesset. Needless to say, this applies if a person on his own initiative acknowledged: "I owed your father a maneh. I repaid him 50 dinarim, but I still owe him 50." He is not liable even for a sh'vuat hesset."

If, however, the heir claims: "I know with certainty that you..." or "...your father owe my father a maneh" and the defendant responds: "I owe your father only 50 dinarim" or "My father owes you only 50," he is considered to be a person who admits a portion of a claim and is required to take a Scriptural oath.

When a plaintiff claims: "You owe me a maneh and this article is security for it," and the defendant claims: "I owe you only 50 dinarim" he is considered to be a person who admits a portion of a claim and must take a Scriptural oath.

If the security is worth only 50 dinarim or less, the defendant must take the oath and pay the 50 that he acknowledged owing. If the security was worth 100 dinarim or more, since the lender has the right to claim its value, the lender should take an oath and collect his claim from the value of the security.

If the security was worth 80 dinarim, the lender must take an oath that he is owed at least 80 and then he collects that amount from the security. The borrower must also take a Scriptural oath with regard to the 20 that he denies.

If the borrower denies the entire matter, saying: "This is not security. Instead, it is an entrusted article and I do not owe him anything," the lender must take an oath that he is owed at least 80 and the borrower must take a sh'vuat hesset with regard to the 20 that he denies.

The following ruling applies when a plaintiff claims: "You owe me a maneh" and the defendant responds: "I know that I owe you 50 dinarim, but I am unsure of whether or not I owe you the other 50." The defendant is obligated to take a Scriptural oath, because he acknowledged a portion of a claim. He cannot take an oath regarding the portion he denied owing, because he does not know whether he is liable or not. Therefore, he must pay the entire maneh; the lender is not required to take an oath. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

The defendant may have a conditional ban of ostracism issued against anyone who lodges a claim against him when the plaintiff is not certain that the defendant is obligated.

Similar concepts apply in the following situation. The plaintiff claims: "I lent you a maneh and here is one witness who will testify that this is so." The defendant responds: "That is true, but you owe me a maneh to match it." The defendant is obligated to take an oath, but cannot take that oath, and hence, is obligated to pay.

Why can he not take an oath? Because he acknowledges the content of the testimony of the witness. And a person who must take an oath because of the testimony of one witness may take the oath only when he contradicts the witness, denies his testimony and takes the oath to support his denial.

Similarly, when there is a promissory note signed by one witness and the defendant claims to have paid the debt, or a person denied a claim, a witness testified against him, and then the defendant stated that he paid the debt or returned the entrusted article, the defendant is obligated to take an oath, but may not take the oath. Hence, he must pay.

An incident once occurred concerning a person who seized a slab of silver from a colleague in the presence of one witness. Afterwards, he said: "I seized it, but what I seized was mine." Our Sages said: "He is obligated to take an oath, but may not take the oath. Hence, he must pay. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

The testimony of one witness is also significant in the following instance. The plaintiff claims: "I lent you a maneh." The defendant denies the matter entirely, and the plaintiff brings one witness who testifies that the defendant took a loan in his presence. Had there been two witnesses, a presumption that the defendant is lying would have been established, and the defendant would be obligated to pay, as will be explained. Hence, the defendant is required to take an oath because of the testimony of one witness. For wherever the testimony of two witnesses requires a defendant to make financial restitution, the testimony of one witness requires him to take an oath.

If after the witness testifies, the defendant changes his claim and states that he paid the debt, he is required to make financial restitution. The plaintiff is not required to take an oath, as we have explained.

When a plaintiff claims: "You owe me a maneh" the defendant denies the claim entirely, and witnesses testify that the defendant still owes the plaintiff 50 dinarim, all of the Geonim have ruled that the law is that the defendant must pay 50 and take an oath concerning the remainder. The rationale is that the principal's own admission should not have greater legal power than the testimony of witnesses.

An oath is not taken on claims concerning the following according to Scriptural Law: landed property, servants, promissory notes and consecrated property. Even though a defendant admitted a portion of a claim or a witness testified against him, or he served as a watchman and sought to free himself on the basis of one of the claims according to which a watchman is freed of liability, he is not required to take an oath. These concepts are derived from Exodus 22:6, which, with regard to the obligation to take an oath, states: "When a person will give his colleague" - this excludes consecrated property - "money or utensils..." - this excludes landed property. And it excludes servants, which the Torah associated with landed property. It also excludes promissory notes, for their actual substance is not of financial value like money or utensils. They only serve as proof of an obligation.

With regard to all of these matters, the defendant must take a sh 'vuat hesset if the plaintiff issues a definite claim with the exception of consecrated property. In that instance, even though a person is not liable to take an oath concerning them according to Scriptural Law, our Sages ordained that the defendant take an oath resembling a Scriptural oath. This requirement was instituted so that people would not treat consecrated property lightly.

Accordingly, when a plaintiff claims: "You sold me two fields," and the defendant responds: "I sold you only one," or he claims: "I entrusted two servants..." or "...two promissory notes to you," and the defendant responds: "You entrusted only one," the defendant is required to take only a sh'vuat hesset.

Similarly, if the plaintiff claims: "This courtyard, this servant or this promissory note that is in your possession is mine; you sold it to me," and the defendant denies the existence of the matter entirely, he is required to take merely a sh'vuat hesset. This applies whether the plaintiff brings a witness to support his claim or not.

A similar law applies when a person digs cisterns, trenches or caves in his colleague's property, reducing its value, and the owner of the field claims that the digger is liable to make financial restitution. Regardless of whether the owner claimed that a defendant dug such caves, and the defendant responded: "I did not dig anything," the owner claimed: "You dug two caves," and the defendant answered, "I dug only one," or one witness testified that he dug caves and the defendant responded: "I did not dig anything," the defendant is required to take only a sh'vuat hesset regarding the claim.

The following laws apply when the plaintiff claimed both utensils and landed property. Whether the defendant: acknowledged owing all of the landed property, but denied owing any of the utensils, acknowledged owing all the utensils, but denied owing any of the landed property, acknowledged owing some of the landed property, but denied owing the remainder as well as all of the utensils, he must take a sh'vuat hesset.

If, however, the defendant acknowledged owing some of the utensils and denied owing the remainder, as well as all of the landed property, since he is required to take an oath with regard to the utensils that he denied, he must also take an oath concerning the landed property that he denied together with them, for it is all one claim.

Similar laws apply when the plaintiff claims utensils and servants, or utensils and promissory notes, for all such claims are governed by the same legal process.

When a plaintiff lodges a claim concerning grapes that are ready to be harvested, or grain that has dried and is ready to be reaped, and the defendant accepts a portion of the claim and denies a portion of the claim, he must take an oath concerning those he denied, as is required with regard to other movable property, provided they no longer require the nurture of the ground. The rationale is whatever is ready to be harvested is considered as though it has been harvested with regard to the denial and admission of claims.

If, however, the crops require the nurture of the ground, they are considered to be landed property in all contexts, and only a sh'vuat hesset is required concerning them.

When a person lodges a claim against his colleague, saying: "You dwelled in my courtyard for two months, and you owe me two months rent," and the defendant responds, "I dwelled there for only one month," he is considered a person who denied a portion of a claim.

Thus, if the rent for the month that he denied owing is equivalent to two silver me'in, he must take an oath. The rationale is that the claim does not focus on the land itself, but on the rent for it, and that is movable property.

When a plaintiff claims: "I gave you a promissory note that served as proof of a debt of ten dinarim," and the defendant denies the matter entirely, the defendant is required to take a sh'vuat hesset.

If he reverses the obligation for the oath, requiring it of the plaintiff, the plaintiff must take a sh'vuat hesset that the note served as proof of a debt of ten dinarim, which he lost when the promissory note was destroyed. Afterwards, he may collect his claim.

If the defendant admitted: "It is true that you gave me the promissory note, and it was lost," he is not liable, even to take a sh'vuat hesset. For even if he was negligent in its care and it was lost, he would not be liable, as we have explained in Hilchot Chovel.

When a person tells a colleague: "The promissory note in your possession mentions a factor that is advantageous to me," and the colleague states: "I will not produce my promissory note," or "I do not know if it states anything that serves as support for your position," we compel him to produce the promissory note and bring it to court.

If the holder of the promissory note claims that it was lost, we issue a conditional ban of ostracism against him.

If, however, the person who desires to see the promissory note claims that he is certain that his colleague is holding a promissory note that mentions a factor that is advantageous to him, his colleague must take a sh'vuat hesset that the promissory note is no longer in his possession and it is lost. My teachers ruled in this manner.

An oath is never administered because of claims issued by deaf-mutes, mentally or emotionally incapable individuals and minors. In the latter instance, this principle applies regardless of whether the minor's claim involves his own issues or those of his father. For admitting a portion of a claim owed to a minor is like returning a lost article.

Similarly, if the defendant denied the entire debt, and one witness came and testified on behalf of the minor, the defendant is not required to take an oath. For it is as though there were one witness, but no plaintiff, because a claim lodge by a minor is not a substantial claim.

Thus, if a minor said to an adult: "You owe me..." or "You owe my father a maneh," and the defendant said: "I owe you only 50," or "I do not owe you anything" and there was one witness who corroborates the minor's claim, the defendant is not liable to take a Scriptural oath.

If, however, a person acted as a watchman for a minor and claimed that the entrusted article was lost, he is required to take the oath required of a watchman. The rationale is that this oath is not taken because of a claim.

Similarly, if a person admitted that he was a partner or a guardian of a minor, the court should appoint a guardian for the minor, and the partner or the like should take an oath despite the fact that there is only an indefinite claim against him.

My teachers ruled that although a Scriptural oath is not taken because of the claim of a minor, a sh'vuat hesset must be taken. This applies even when the minor is not resourceful with regard to financial matters. The rationale is that an opportunity should not be granted for a person to take money belonging to a minor, and depart without paying him at all. I also favor this approach, and think that it will lead to the improvement of society.

Thus, if a minor lodges a claim against an adult, whether the adult admits a portion of the claim or denies it entirely, whether there is a witness who supports the plaintiff or not, the defendant is required to take a sh'vuat hesset. He cannot reverse the responsibility for the oath, placing it on the minor, because an oath is never administered to a minor. Even a conditional ban of ostracism is not imposed upon the minor, for he does not know the severity of the retribution received for taking a false oath.

The following rules apply when an adult lodges a claim against a minor. If the claim involves a matter that will benefit the minor - e.g., a claim involving business transactions - and the minor admits his liability, we expropriate payment from the minor's property. If the minor does not possess any resources, we wait until he gains such. Then he must pay. If the minor denies the obligation, the plaintiff must wait until the minor attains majority. At that point, he is required to take a sh'vuat hesset.

The following rules apply when a person lodges a claim against a minor in a matter that will not benefit the minor - e.g., damages or personal injury. Even though the minor admits his responsibility and he has resources with which he could pay, he is not liable even after he attains majority. If the plaintiff was one of those who takes an oath and collects the money that he claims - e.g., an employee and the like - since the minor benefits from the fact that an employee will work for him, he may take an oath and collect from the minor. A storekeeper who takes an oath because of his account book, by contrast, may not take an oath and collect from a minor. The rationale is that the minor does not derive any benefit from this. For regardless, he must pay his workers who take oaths and collect from him. Thus it is the storekeeper who caused himself a loss, because he gave his money because of a minor's word. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

With regard to a deaf-mute and a mentally or emotionally incapable individual, we do not concern ourselves with them with regard to any claim, not a claim that they lodged against others, nor a claim that others lodge against them, nor for a lesser oath, and, needless to say, not for a severe oath or to compel them to make financial restitution. A blind man, by contrast, is considered to be a healthy person with regard to all matters concerning such subjects. He must take all types of oaths if required, and oaths are taken in response to his claims.

The court requires that precise statements be made by the litigants. For example, litigants come to court and one of them claims: "He owes me a maneh that I lent to him," "... that I entrusted to him," "... that he stole from me," "... that he owes me as wages," or the like. Should the defendant answer: "I do not owe you anything," "I have nothing of yours," or "You are issuing a false claim," this is not a proper response. Instead, we tell the defendant: "Reply to his claim and clarify your answer as he clarified his claim. Say whether you borrowed from him or did not borrow from him," "... whether he entrusted an article to you or did not," "... whether you stole from him or did not," "... whether he hired you or did not," or lodge any other specific claim. Why do we not accept the general answer? Because it is possible that the person is making an error and this will lead to his taking a false oath. For it is possible that he borrowed money as the plaintiff claims and returned the debt to the lender's son or wife, or gave the lender a present of the value of the debt, and thinks that because of this, he is no longer liable for the debt. Hence, the court tells him: "Why are you saying that you are not liable? Maybe the law would hold you liable and you do not know. Instead, tell the judges the details of the matter, and they will tell you whether or not you are liable."

Even if the defendant is a wise man of great stature, we tell him: "You have nothing to lose by responding to his claim and telling us why you are not liable to him, whether it is because nothing of that nature ever happened, or because you were liable and you repaid the debt. You will not lose, because we follow the principle of miggo."

Similarly, if the plaintiff claims: "This person owes me a maneh," or "He has a maneh of mine in his possession." We ask him: "On what basis do you make this claim? Did you lend him money? Did you entrust it to him for safekeeping? Did he damage your property? Tell us why he is obligated to you." For it is possible that a person will think that a colleague is obligated to him when he is not - e.g., he suspects that he stole from him he promised him to give him a maneh but did not, or the like.

The defendant's word is not accepted in the following situation. The plaintiff claimed that he lent the defendant a maneh, and the defendant denied ever taking the loan. Afterwards, the plaintiff brought witnesses who testified that the loan was given in their presence. In response, the defendant replied that he took the loan, but repaid it. We do not accept his claim. Instead, a presumption that the defendant is lying is established, and he is required to pay.

If, however, in the latter situation, the defendant first replied: "I am not liable," "I do not owe you anything," "You are lying," or the like a different rule applies. Even though the plaintiff brings witnesses who state that the loan was given in their presence, if the defendant says: "That is true, but I returned the entrusted object" or "... repaid the loan," a presumption that the defendant is lying is not established. He may take a sh'vuat hesset and then is released of all obligations.

The following rules apply when witnesses see that the plaintiff counted out money and gave it to the defendant, but did not know for which reason. If the plaintiff demands payment in a court of law, saying: "Give me the money that I lent you,"" and the defendant replied: "You gave me a present," or "You repaid a debt," his word is accepted. He may take a sh'vuat hesset and then is released of all obligations. If, however, he claims that he was never given any money, and the witnesses came and testified that money was counted out in their presence, a presumption that the defendant is lying is established.

A person is never presumed by the court to be a liar unless he denies a matter in court and two witnesses come and offer testimony that contradicts the denial he made.

There is a corollary to the above concept. The plaintiff claimed: "I lent you a maneh." The defendant denied the matter in court, saying: "The incident never occurred." Two witnesses came and testified that the defendant borrowed money from the plaintiff and repaid the debt. After these comments were made, the lender stated: "I did not receive payment." The defendant is obligated to pay. The rationale is that anyone who says: "I did not borrow," is considered to have said: "I did not repay the debt," in the event that witnesses come and establish that he in fact took a loan. Thus, in the above situation, it is as if the borrower said: "I did not repay the debt," despite the fact that witnesses testify that he did. We postulate that the admission of the principal is considered as strong as the testimony of 100 witnesses and the borrower is held liable. The lender is not required to take an oath, for a presumption that the borrower is lying has been established.

A similar law applies if the lender produces a signed note saying that he is liable, and the borrower denies the entire matter and claims that he did not write the note. If the authenticity of the note was established in court or witnesses come and testify that it was his note, a presumption that the defendant is lying is established, and he is required to pay.

There are times, however, when a person is not presumed to be lying despite the fact that his statements conflict with the testimony of witnesses. For example, a plaintiff claims: "I lent you a maneh, and it is in your possession." The defendant responds: "I paid you in the presence of so-and-so-and so-and-so," but those two witnesses come and deny having observed the matter. We do not say that a presumption that the defendant is lying is established. The rationale is that witnesses will remember only a matter concerning which they were designated to serve as witnesses. Hence, a presumption that the defendant is lying is not established, and the borrower may take a sh'vuat hesset and be freed of responsibility.

Similarly, if the plaintiff claims: "Give me the maneh that I lent you when you were standing next to this pillar," and the defendant responded: "I never stood next to that pillar," a presumption that the defendant is lying is not established even though witnesses come and testify that he stood there. The rationale is that a person will not take notice of matters that are not significant. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When a person lends money to a colleague in the presence of witnesses, the borrower is not required to repay him in the presence of witnesses, as explained. Accordingly, if the lender claims: "Give me the maneh that I lent to you; here are the witnesses in whose presence the loan was given." And the defendant claims: "I repaid you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so," we tell the borrower: "Bring them to court and be freed of responsibility." If they do not come, or they died, or they journeyed to another country, the borrower must take a sh'vuat hesset that he paid the debt. For the only reason we require the defendant to bring the witnesses is to clarify his position and be released from the obligation of an oath.

An admission made by the borrower outside of court may not be binding. For example, the plaintiff told the defendant in the presence of witnesses: "You owe me a maneh" and the defendant agreed. The following day, the plaintiff lodged a claim against the defendant in court and brought the witnesses to support his claim. If the defendant claimed: "I was joking with you and I do not owe you anything," he is not held liable. He must merely take a sh'vuat hesset that he does not owe anything.

This ruling applies even when the defendant denies that the event ever happened. The rationale is that the defendant never designated the witnesses to serve in that capacity. And when a person is not charged with acting as a witness with regard to a situation, he will not necessarily remember its particulars. Therefore, even if the defendant said that the events did not ever take place, we do not accept the presumption that he is lying.

Morevoer, the defendant's denial is allowed to stand even in the following situation. The plaintiff hid witnesses behind a fence and told the defendant: "You owe me a maneh," and the defendant agreed. The plaintiff then told him: "Do you wish so-and-so and so-and-so to act as witnesses against you?"

He replied: "No. Lest you press me to judgment tomorrow; for I have nothing to pay you."

On the next day, he called him to court with these witnesses. Whether the defendant claimed: "I was speaking frivolously," or whether he claimed that the matter never took place, he may take a sh'vuat hesset and is then released of responsibility. The rationale is the testimony is not committing until the borrower says: "You are my witnesses," or the lender makes that statement in the presence of the borrower, and the borrower remains silent. The defendant is not presumed to be a liar, because of testimony of this nature.

An incident occurred concerning a person called kav r'shu ("a full measure of indebtedness") - i.e., that he had many debts. He would say: "The only person to whom I owe money is so-and-so." When that person came and lodged a claim against him, he said: "I do not owe him anything." Our Sages said: "He may take a sh'vuat hesset and be released of all obligation."

Similarly, there was a person about whom people would gossip that he was wealthy. At the time of his death, he said: "If I had money, would I not pay so-and-so and so-and-so." After his death, so-and-so and so-and-so lodged a claim against the estate. Our Sages said: "They have no claim against the estate." For a person is wont to try to make himself appear as if he does not possess any money, and even as if he did not leave money to his children. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

As mentioned, witnesses who are hidden cannot give binding testimony, and similarly, when a person admits a debt on his own initiative while witnesses are listening, or a person tells a colleague in the presence of witnesses: "You owe me a maneh" and the colleague admits the obligation, the testimony of the witnesses is not significant. Nevertheless, in all these situations, when the principals come to the court, we tell the defendant: "Why don't you pay the debt you owe him?"

If he says: "I do not owe him anything," we tell him: "Behold you made a statement saying this-and-this in the presence of these individuals," or "You admitted the obligation on your own initiative." If he arises and makes restitution, that is desirable. If he does not offer a defense, we do not suggest one for him. If, however, he claims: "I was speaking frivolously with him," "The event never occurred," or "I did not want to appear wealthy," he is not liable and is required to take a sh'vuat hesset, as we have explained in the previous halachah.