Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

This number is first found in the Halachot of Rav Yitzchok Alfasi at the conclusion of the tractate of Yoma. In his repsonsa (367), the Rambam writes that though no previous source is found for this number, each of these sins is either explicitly mentioned in the Talmud or the Midrashim or can be derived from the principles mentioned there.

Commission of even one of these deeds hamper an individual’s repentance. However, should the person commit more than one of the twenty four, his deeds will have a cumulative effect and the obstacles will be greater (Ra’avad, Rosh HaShanah lectures).

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Yoma 8:7), the Rambam writes that “God will not help him repent.” Other transgressors are given spiritual inspiration to abandon their sins and return to God as Shabbat 104a states: Whoever comes to purify himself is given assistance.” Furthermore, Berachot 3b mentions heavenly voices which arouse people to Teshuvah. These individuals are not granted these privileges. Nevertheless, should they persist in their efforts to repent, God will accept their Teshuvah as stated in Halachah 6.

Yoma 87a explains that Teshuvah is withheld from such an individual lest he repent and thus, merit a place in Gan Eden while those who were influenced by him continue sinning and thus, be sentenced to Gehinom.

In this context, Sanhedrin 107a relates that Gechazi, Elisha’s disciple, was prevented from repenting because he did not let students attend Elisha’s yeshiva.

מסית in Hebrew, a person who tries to convince a single individual to serve idols (Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 5:1).

מדיח, a person who tries to entice an entire community to pagan worship (ibid. 5:2). See Sanhedrin 67a for further differences between the two.

Judaism does not support the principle of “permissive parenthood.” Parents have the responsibility to educate their children and set firm standards for their behavior. While children are young, parents must exercise their authority and guide them towards desirable conduct. As children mature, the parents’ responsibility increases. Kiddushin 30a relates that between the ages of 16 and 22 (18 and 24 according to a second opinion) a father must devote himself to shaping his sons’ character. These are the years when a youth begins to think independently and hence, his father should spend time with him and give him direction during these years. Afterwards, a father still has an obligation to educate his children. However, his ability to enforce his authority on them at this time is less. To influence his children at more advanced ages, he must use greater power of persuasion.

By nature, a child respects his father’s statements. When a child sees his father speaking from the heart, he will surely be moved. Therefore, a father’s words of rebuke are likely to be effective.

Zechariah (3:3), the prophet, envisioned Joshua, the High Priest, as dressed in soiled clothing. Sanhedrin 93a explains the reason for that vision. Joshua’s sons had married women who were unfit for the sanctity of the priesthood; nevertheless, Joshua refrained from rebuking them. Hence, he was required to bear the burden of their sins.

This clause is not included in Rav Yitzchok Alfasi’s Halachot, the source for this entire chapter. However, it can be derived from the references quoted. The Jerusalem Talmud, Ketubot 13:1, states “Anyone who has the potential to admonish his fellow men and fails to do so is held responsible for their misdeeds.” See also Hilchot De’ot 6:7.

Shabbat 54b states: Anyone who has the potential to admonish the people of his household and fails to do so is held responsible for their behavior. [If he can admonish] the inhabitants of his city, he is held responsible for their behavior. If he has the potential to admonish the entire world, he is held responsible for them. That passage continues to explain that when the first Temple was destroyed, the righteous were also slaughtered mercilessly. Why were they forced to suffer? Because they did not rebuke the transgressors.

It must be emphasized that there is no obligation to admonish another person if one is sure that his words will not be heeded. Yevamot 65b states: “Just as it is a mitzvah to make a statement that will be heeded, it is a mitzvah to withhold a statement that will not be heeded.”

In such an instance, repentance itself, becomes the cause of the person’s sin.

Yoma 8:9. Here, also, the transgressor does not try to overcome his desire to sin because of his knowledge of the purifying influence of Yom Kippur. Hence, he will not be given the opportunity to repent.

In this instance, the natural consequences of these individual’s behavior will prevent them from repenting.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 11, and Hilchot Evel 1:10.

Quite often, the spiritual arousal of a community at large will motivate each of its individual members to sincere Teshuvah. However, if a particular person has no contact with the other members of the community, there is no way for him to be affected by that influence.

. See Chapter 3, Halachah 8, and Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:11.

By cutting off his connection to these wise men, a person limits his exposure to influences which would motivate him to repent.

Other commentaries offer different reasons why such an individual will be held back from repenting:
a) By scoffing at a mitzvah in public, a person creates a חילול השם, the desecration of God’s name. This sin cannot easily be corrected (Yereim, mitzvah 6).
b) This is a sin of a very serious nature and should be included in the first category of sins which God will prevent those who committed them from repenting (Meiri, Chibut HaTeshuvah).

Rav Yitzchok Alfasi also includes one who demeans his parents in this category. Among the reasons offered by the commentaries to explain the Rambam’s omission of that clause is that here the Rambam does not focus on the severity of the sin, but rather on its consequences. In contrast to a teacher, a parent will never utterly reject his child.

II Kings (Chapter 5) relates that after Elishah cured the leprosy of Na’aman, commander of the Syrian troops, he refused to take any payment. Afterwards, Gechazi, his disciple, ran after Na’aman and requested a talent of silver from him. Na’aman willingly complied, offering him twice that amount. When Gechazi returned to Elisha, the prophet castigated him harshly for his behavior and cursed him to be afflicted with Na’aman’s disease. Afterwards, Gechazi used the spiritual teachings Elisha had imparted to him to grant the power of speech to the golden calves erected by Jeroboam (Sanhedrin 107b).
The uncensored manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah also mention Jesus as an example of a student who was rejected by his teacher and subsequently, led many away from the true faith.

And, hence, he will sink lower and lower without ever being able to correct his mistakes.

Hilchot De’ot 6:7-8 states: A person who sees that his fellow man has sinned or is going in an incorrect path, is obliged to rebuke him…as [Leviticus 19:17] states: “You must surely admonish your fellow man….” If he accepts the rebuke, it is good. If not, one must rebuke him a second and a third time. When a person first admonishes his fellow, he should not speak to him in harsh tones to the point where he is embarrassed… Surely, this applies in public. When does the above apply? With regard to matters between man and man. However, with spiritual matters, if he does not repent [after being admonished] in private, he should be shamed in public. His sin should be made known and he should be insulted in their presence… until he betters his way. This was the practice of all the prophets in Israel.

Moses died on the seventh of Adar. On Rosh Chodesh Shvat, slightly more than a month before his passing, he began to review the entire Torah with the Jewish people and reprove them for their sins in the forty year journey in the desert. This verse is included among those statements.

Moses made this statement on the day of his death after writing a Torah scroll and giving it to the tribe of Levi. The rest of the people protested, complaining that they had an equal share in the Torah. Moses was pleased with their response and wrote Torah scrolls for them as well. Nevertheless, implicit in this verse which praises the people for their present willingness to serve God is a rebuke for all those years when they were not as anxious.

This verse is part of the song, Ha’azinu, which contains Moses’ final admonishments to the people to observe Torah and mitzvot.

At the very beginning of his ministry to the people, Isaiah was charged with rebuking them.

In the Bible, this verse precedes the one quoted above and it is questionable why the Rambam reverses their order.

That prophecy continues: “Your neck is an iron sinew, your forehead, brass… I knew that you would deal treacherously and you have been called a transgressor from birth.”

For example, in God’s initial charge to Jeremiah (1:10-17), He tells him: I have set you this day over the nations…. I will utter My judgments against them, regarding all their wickedness for forsaking Me…. Gird up your loins, and arise, and speak to them all that I have commanded you.

At all times, whether the spiritual level of the people at large is refined or not.

If possible a person should be found with the attributes of both age and wisdom. If that is impossible, wisdom takes precedence over age (Ta’anit 16a).

Berachot 6b states: “Anyone who has the fear of heaven will have his words respected.” Some commentaries explain that unless a person fears God, his listeners will tell him: “Correct yourself, before you correct others” (Arichin 16b). Other commentaries explain that being in the presence of a Godfearing person makes an impression on an individual and inspires him to genuine Teshuvah.

Lest his listeners tell him, “You also did not repent until your later years.”

This quality is also related to the fear of God. Sukkah 49b states, “Every person who finds favor in people’s eyes, surely fears heaven.”
Devarim Rabbah 1:4 relates: The blessings should have been uttered by Moses and the admonishments, by Bilaam. However, were the admonishments stated by Bilaam, the people would have said: “It is our enemy who is admonishing us.” Therefore, God said: “Let Moses who loves them, admonish them.”

Thus, this person’s behavior will separate him from influences which would motivate him to repent.

The Rambam emphasizes that the repentance of the following individuals will not be “complete.” However, the doors of Teshuvah will not be closed to them entirely. Beitzah 29a offers a suggestion for partial atonement when a person is unable to identify the victims he wronged: “Someone who stole and does not know from whom he stole, should use the funds for the public welfare.”

In Chapter 2, Halachah 9, the Rambam explained that before repenting for having wronged another person, it is necessary to pay the wronged party whatever is owed him and to appease him for the difficulties he suffered. In this context, the Tosefta (Bava Kama 10:8) states that stealing from a community is more severe than stealing from an individual because it is much easier to make restitution to an individual.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Halachah 9, a person who curses his fellow man must ask for his forgiveness and appease him. In this instance, when a person curses an entire community, it will be difficult to ask each one of its members for forgiveness.

Proverbs 29:24 states: “Whoever is a partner with a thief hates his soul.”

Hence, he will never be able to identify the owner of the stolen articles or make restitution for the theft. Thus, he will not be able to fulfill the basic requirements for repentance.

By taking his share of the stolen property, he demonstrates his consent and approval of the act.

To steal again. As mentioned in Halachah 1, a person who withholds rebuke or in any other way motivates a person to sin will not be given the opportunity to repent. (See also Hilchot Geneivah 5:1)

There are three transgressions involved in keeping a lost object that one discovers: a) Negation of the positive command to return a lost article; b) Violation of the prohibition against ignoring a lost article; c) Violation of the prohibition against stealing (Hilchot Gezeilah V’Aveidah 11:1-2).

Hilchot Gezeilah V’Aveidah, Chapter 13, describes the process in which a person must announce the discovery of a lost article in order to give its owners the opportunity to claim it.

. For it is likely that the owner will not respond to an announcement for the lost article if it is made long after the article was lost

In most texts of the Mishneh Torah, this word is printed as שור. However, the Ra’avad and other commentaries maintain that the proper word is שוד, meaning “collateral” or “pledge,” referring to a person who lends money to the poor and when they are unable to pay, exacts payment by seizing possession of their land or goods at a reduced value. Certain manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah also follow this version. The Or Sameach notes that both these wrongs are mentioned in the same Biblical chapter. Job 24:3 criticizes those who “take the widow’s ox (שור) as a pledge.” 24:9 admonishes those who “take the pledge (שוד) from the poor.”

Or “pledge.”

Since the misappropriated article cannot be returned, one’s Teshuvah will never be complete as above.

After mentioning the command to appoint judges, Deuteronomy 16:20 states: “Do not take a bribe.” See Hilchot Sanhedrin, Chapter 23, for a description of this prohibition.

The abovementioned verse continues: “A bribe blinds the wise.” The judge who takes the bribe remains wise, but his wisdom is perverted. Accordingly, he will analyze the case before him and render a decision that has a logical basis. However, that decision will be tainted by bias. When he desires to correct his wrong and attempt to discover what he, in fact, owed the wronged party, he will never be able to view the matter totally objectively, and, thus, will not be able to arrive at a proper figure.

Thus, adding a further element of severity to his sin as explained above.

And do not consider these actions as sins.

And thus, there is little likelihood that he will repent.

Rav Yitzchok Alfasi (loc. cit.), the source for the Rambam’s statements, uses the term, המרגיל, interpreted by Rabbenu Yonah (Sha’arei Teshuvah, Sha’ar 1) to mean one who frequently engages in this practice.

Even when invited by his host (Zohar Chadash, Ruth, p. 79). For example, a person enters his fellow man’s house when he is eating. Out of courtesy, the host invites his unexpected guest to join in the meal. However, since the host did not expect his arrival, there is not necessarily enough prepared for him.

For by joining in the meal, the guest prevents the host or his family from receiving their due portions.

Included in this category is anyone who causes a poor person to spend his money unnecessarily. The poor are very sensitive about their economic plight and will often spend money in order to hide their situation from others. A person who preys on this weakness and causes a poor person to spend beyond his needs commits a serious transgression (Meiri, Chibur HaTeshuvah).

It is forbidden to make use of articles given as collateral for a loan lest they depreciate (see Bava Metzia 82b).

Articles which do not easily depreciate.

While, in fact, there is a certain amount of depreciation. The lender will not take notice of this factor and, thus, will withhold funds which are rightfully due to the poor borrower.

The Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer, Chapter 21) states that this prohibition applies even if these women are unmarried and there is no prohibition against taking them as a wife. In Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 21:3, the Rambam writes that one can look intently at an unmarried woman if one is considering marrying her. However, it is forbidden to do so for other intents.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 47) considers this as one of the Torah’s 613 prohibitions. See also Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 2:3 and Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 21:2.

Similarly, it may lead to masturbation or the emission of wasteful seed, sins more severe than forbidden relations (Tanya, Chapter 7).

Commenting on this verse, the Jerusalem Talmud, Berachot 1:5, calls the heart and eyes “Two hawkers for sin.” Similarly, Bamidbar Rabbah 10:2 quotes Proverbs 23:26: “Give Me your heart and let your eyes observe My ways,” and asks: Why did God ask the Jews for their heart and eyes? Because He knows that sin is dependent on them.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 14, and Hilchot De’ot 6:3.

The Meiri (Chibur HaTeshuvah) relates that this applies even if he had no intention of shaming his fellow man and only desired his own benefit.

Shabbat 97a states: “One who suspects the worthy is liable for lashes.”

The Meiri (loc. cit.) offers another reason why this person will never repent. If anyone reproves him for his behavior, he will not heed their admonishments. Rather, since his nature is to suspect people even though they are not guilty, he will suspect those who reprove him as well.

Hence, he will never be able to thoroughly repent for the very basis of Teshuvah is the abandonment of a sin (See Chapter 2, Halachot 2 and 3).

In truth, there is a tendency for every sin to create a self-reinforcing pattern as Pirkei Avot 4:2 states: “One transgression brings about another.” However, the particular qualities mentioned are extremely difficult to overcome.

Hilchot De’ot 7:2 states: Who is a gossiper? One who collects statements and goes from person to person saying: “This is what so and so said.” “This is what I heard from so and so.” Even if what he says is true, it is as if he destroyed the world

This involves spreading unfavorable gossip about his fellow man even if it is true. In contrast, gossip involves the spreading of any information about another person even if it is not derogatory.

Hilchot De’ot 2:3 states: There are certain attributes concerning which a person is forbidden to follow a middle path. Rather, he should separate himself from them entirely…. Anger is a very evil quality…. A person should train himself not to become angry even when the situation warrants it…. The Sages of the previous generations stated: “Anyone who gets angry is considered as if he worships false gods.”

Similarly, Pirkei Avot 1:7 teaches, “Do not fraternize with a wicked person.” In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam writes: “This excludes all friendship [with such individuals] whatsoever…. We acquire bad attributes by keeping company with the wicked.” In his introduction to the tractate of Avot (Shemoneh Perakim), Chapter 4, the Rambam elaborates on this principle at length, explaining that our character traits are acquired from the people with whom we associate.

Chapter 1 of those halachot define following desirable character traits as fulfilling the mitzvah of walking in God’s ways.

Every action a person performs leaves an impression on his character. Even though a Baal-Teshuvah has already asked God to forgive his sins and has, accordingly, been granted atonement, the effects of sin on his soul remain unless he has repented with complete Teshuvah, Teshuvah from love, at which point, his sins become transformed into merits (Rosh HaShanah 29a).

Transgressions mentioned in this chapter.

Which also make Teshuvah more difficult.

As explained in the commentary to Halachah 1, nothing can stand in the way of sincere repentance.

Obviously, it will require great effort for him to do so.

Despite the fact that God will not assist him because of his sins.

Pirkei Avot 3:18 states “Free will is granted.” Similarly, Berachot 33b states: “Everything is in the hand of heaven except the fear of heaven.” In the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. III, Chapter 17, the Rambam writes: “Man has a completely independent potential, i.e., he can, by his choice, desire, and inclination, do whatever he wants to do.” In the following halachot, the Rambam deals with many of the theoretical questions concerning free will, among them: the fact that certain people seem to have inherent tendencies to good or evil, the relationship between free will and reward and punishment, and the apparent contradiction between free will and God’s omniscience. The Rambam also discusses these issues at great length in his Commentary to the Mishnah, in Chapter Eight of his introduction to the tractate of Avot, which is popularly referred to as Shemoneh Perakim. Frequent references to that text are made in this commentary. As explained at the beginning of this text, in his introduction to the Mishneh Torah, the Rambam outlines the structure of the text as “halachot, halachot,” practical directives for our behavior. Philosophical and ethical concepts are only mentioned if they can be applied as “halachot.” In this context, the discussion of free choice in this and the following chapter must be seen, not as abstract philosophy, but rather as fundamental principles necessary to bring a person to the conclusion mentioned in Chapter 8, Halachah 1: “Since free choice is granted to all men, a person should always strive to do Teshuvah.

In Shemoneh Perakim, Chapter 8, the Rambam writes: All of man’s actions are placed in his hand. He is not forced to do any of them and there is no external force motivating him…. [Deuteronomy 30:15, 19] teaches “Behold, I have set before you today life and good, death and evil…. Choose life.”
All the other principles concerned with study and fulfillment of the mitzvot [depend on this principle].

Other commentaries render the phrase כאחד ממנו as “one of us.” The Rambam’s interpretation is based on Targum Onkelos and Targum Yonatan. See also Bereishit Rabbah 21:5.

In Shemoneh Perakim (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that, when He created the world, God established certain natural laws to govern its functioning. Any creation bound by those laws lacks free choice. God, the Creator, stands above the limitations He instituted. Man has also been endowed with the unique potential to govern his own behavior, without the laws of nature governing his decisions.

It is his choice and no predetermined factors that govern his behavior.

The wording of this halachah is problematic. It appears to imply that man gained the power of choice because he ate from the tree of knowledge. In truth, the power of choice is vested within man because he was created “in the image of God” (Genesis 1:27). His soul is “a spark of God.” Hence, even the most elevated Divine potentials are reflected within his soul.

This fatalistic perspective runs contrary to the very core of Jewish belief. Though certain verses from the Bible appear to support it, e.g., “The wicked are estranged from the womb (Psalms 58:4),” “Before you came out of the womb, I sanctified you (Jeremiah 1:5),” as will be explained, these verses refer to a person’s natural inclinations. However, each person has the potential to rise above these tendencies.

Tana D’Bei Eliyahu, Chapter 25, states that every man is obligated to say: “When will my deeds equal those of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.”

Who “sinned and caused the many to sin.”

These statements can be clarified on the basis of some Talmudic references that deal with these questions. Bava Batra 16a relates that Job attempted to free the entire world from judgment, complaining to God: “You created righteous men; You created the wicked.” His colleagues answered him: God created the evil inclination and created Torah as “a condiment for it.” This implies that although man may have been created with certain negative tendencies, he has the potential, through Torah, to elevate and refine them. Niddah 16b states: The angel who governs pregnancy… takes a drop [of sperm] before God and asks: “Master of the world, what will be the fate of this drop? Will [the resulting child] be strong? Will he be weak? Will he be wise or foolish, rich or poor”? However, he does not ask: “Will he be righteous or wicked… for everything is in the hands of Heaven except the fear of Heaven.” In Shemoneh Perakim (loc. cit.), the Rambam elaborates on this issue: It is impossible that a person will be born possessing a certain positive attribute or character fault…. However, it is possible that a person will be born with a natural tendency towards a [particular] quality or fault; i.e., this activity will be easier for him than others…. However, if a person with a particular tendency ignores and does not train his natural inclination, his potential will never be aroused. Similarly, even an obtuse person [with little intellectual ability] will succeed in knowing and understanding if he is instructed and taught. People are born with different natures. Some have a greater degree of natural refinement than others. Hence, it is easier for them to be righteous. Others, either because of heredity or environment, possess more materialistic tendencies and will have a more difficult struggle. However, to be righteous, even the most refined must make an effort to elevate himself. Similarly, even the most coarse is not predestined to sin, but rather, has the potential to rise above his natural inclination. This potential is an expression of the essential Godly nature possessed by every individual. Just as God is not limited or bound by nature’s rules, so, too, no Jew need be held back by these constraints. Regardless of his nature, he has the potential to reveal his inner Godly nature. Nevertheless, to allow for the expression of this inner Godliness, each person must undergo at least a minimal amount of personal struggle and challenge. In matters that are not associated with the service of God, a person’s natural tendencies have a stronger hold. However, since a Jew’s Godly essence affects every aspect of his personality, he is able, even in these areas, to rise above and change his natural tendencies. Thus, though one may be born without great intellectual gifts, he may with effort, develop his mind and achieve higher degrees of understanding than others born with greater natural gifts.

As explained, some people require greater determination and effort to make a positive choice, but each individual is ultimately responsible for his own behavior.

The source for the designation of Jeremiah as the author of Eichah is the Pesikta to Eichah Rabbah which interprets the narrative in Chapter 36 of the book of Jeremiah as describing the composition of the scroll of Eichah.

Devarim Rabbah 4:3 states: After God declared, “Behold, I have given you today the blessing and the curse,” “from the mouth of the Most High, neither evil nor good come forth.” Rather, good and evil come about as a natural process. Those who do evil must face difficulty and those who do good are granted benefits. It must be noted that this interpretation differs from that of most commentaries who consider the verse as a rhetorical question: “Is it not from the mouth of the Most High that [both] evil and good come forth?” However, even those interpretations explain that God does not arbitrarily dispense good or evil. Rather, as implied by the following verse, a person’s fate is dependent upon his deeds.

Whatever evil comes to man is a result of his own doing.

For regardless of his circumstances, he had the potential to act righteously.

Rabbi Brachiah interpreted this verse: “Why should a person complain about his lot in this world? Let him complain about his sins (Eichah Rabbah).”

And reap the consequences of this behavior.

Even if man has sinned, at all times, he has the potential to repent and better his lot.

That man is granted free choice.

As explained in the following halachah.

Verse 19 continues with the request “Choose life, so that you and your descendants will live.”

The narrative continues: “The blessing [will come] if you obey the commandments of God…. The curse [will come] if you do not obey the commandments of God….”

Perhaps, by this expression, the Rambam implies that this includes even those deeds which are not directly associated with a person’s service of Torah and mitzvot; for example, the woman one will marry or possessions one will acquire. Though Sotah 2a relates that these matters are decreed “forty days before a child is conceived,” in Shemoneh Perakim (loc. cit.), the Rambam writes that even these matters are given over to man’s choice. Since a person may marry according to Torah or in violation of its rules, and, similarly, may acquire wealth in good faith or unjustly, these matters are also related to his Torah service and, consequently, left to his choice.

God wants the people to remain righteous. Nevertheless, though He desires their righteousness, He does no more than wish, as it were, for He has left the matter to their choice (See Avodah Zarah 5a).

And each individual bears responsibility for his actions. The question arises: God loves man and desires his welfare, why does He not merely wish that He do good? Why does He grant man the possibility to sin? Wouldn’t it have been better to have created him with the tendency to do only good? The resolution to these questions can be explained as follows: Bava Metzia 38a states, “A person desires one measure of his own more than nine measures belonging to a colleague.” Our natural tendencies are to appreciate what we have earned and worked for, and to regard presents that are given to us without any effort on our part as “bread of shame.” This same principle also applies regarding our spiritual accomplishments. Were we able to attain spiritual heights without effort, we would not appreciate them. Therefore, in His generosity, God created a challenge for us. In this context, we can understand the inner meaning behind our Sages’ comment (Bereishit Rabbah 9:5) on Genesis 1:31, “And God saw all that He had made and it was very good” — “Very” refers to the evil inclination.” Ultimately, it is the struggle to subdue and transform the evil inclination which brings us to the most complete good. Nevertheless, the question still remains: Man’s choice is equally balanced. If so, how can God risk that His most beloved creation might possibly choose evil? In His willingness to allow man this choice, we see God’s great trust in man. He is willing to grant us that choice for He trusts that we will choose good. He knows that, temporarily, we may succumb to our natural instincts and make a wrong choice, but has faith that, ultimately, we will turn to Him in genuine Teshuvah.

As believed by religious fatalists.

These statements appear to contradict Hilchot De’ot 1:2 which declares: There are certain qualities that a person possesses from the beginning of his creation according to the nature of his body. There are other qualities towards which the nature of a person is inclined and he will be able to accept them more readily than other qualities. The last statement does not present a great problem for, as explained on the basis of Shemoneh Perakim (Chapter 8), a person’s natural tendency to a particular quality does not contradict the principle of free choice for he can, albeit with greater effort, overcome that tendency. However, the statement that there are qualities inherent to a person’s character is problematic. Certain commentaries have explained that this is referring to personality traits such as cleverness, introversion, and the like which are not directly related to one’s service of Torah and mitzvot. Alternatively, the above can be explained in terms of the statement (Shabbat 156a), that a person born under the sign of Mars will shed blood. However, it is not known whether he will be a murderer or a mohel (a person responsible for ritual circumcision). Similarly, in this context, a person may be born with certain attributes. However, the manner in which he expresses them, whether in accordance with Torah law or not, is dependent on his choice.

The Rambam totally discounts the influence of astrology. In Shemoneh Perakim (loc. cit.), he describes it “the madness with which the astrologers attempt to deceive….” Similarly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 4:7, he writes: “Many people… think these matters are true…. Even good and pious followers of our Torah think they are correct, although forbidden by the Torah. They do not realize that they are empty words and lies….” See also Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 11:16. It must be noted that many prominent Rabbis do not share the Rambam’s opinion. The Nimukei Yosef (Sanhedrin, Chapter 7) writes that the workings of the heavens and their influence on man’s behavior is “great wisdom and a decree by which God… instituted that the world would be governed.” See also Ramban, Responsum 282.

As mentioned in Chapter 4, Halachah 2, the function of the prophets is to admonish the people. However, if man did not have freewill, these reproofs would be of no avail.

Hence, there would be no need for the prophet’s words of admonishment. Those whose tendencies were inclined to good would act righteously regardless and those whose natures were inclined toward bad would, nevertheless, be doomed to continue their pattern of behavior.

Reward and punishment only apply when one has free choice. What sense it there in rewarding one for doing something that he was fated to do? How can one be punished for a wrongdoing that was his destiny? Furthermore, if a reward would be granted to the righteous, it should also be rendered to the wicked for both equally exercised the potentials that God granted them (see also Emunot V’De’ot, Discourse 4).

Similarly, Psalms 37:23 states: “The steps of man are ordered by God” and Avodah Zarah 7b comments: “A person will not stub his toe unless it is declared upon him from above.”

In this resolution, the Rambam must show how an unchanging Divine will can allow for variations in behavior dependent on man’s choice. To do so, he takes an example from the powers of nature.

In Shemoneh Perakim, the Rambam emphasizes that God’s desire for the universe to be guided by nature’s rules “was willed in the six days of creation. All entities should continue to follow their nature as stated [by Ecclesiastes 1:9], ‘That what has been will be, and that which has been done is what will be done. There is nothing new under the sun.’” Thus, we see how God’s original desire for creation allows for a variety of natural phenomena without any change of will on His part.

Thus, God’s initial desire in granting man freewill included within it a willful acceptance of any and all decisions that man would make even if those decisions run contrary to the Torah.

Exercising freewill in all aspects of his behavior.

I.e., since man is responsible for his actions.

As our Sages commented: “God does not withhold the reward of any creature from him.”

As our Sages commented: “There is no death without sin and no hardship without iniquity.”

I.e., the reward or punishment received by man is a product of his own behavior.

The verse continues “walk in the ways of your heart and the sight of your eyes;” i.e., exercise free choice.

Kohelet Rabbah relates that the Sages considered entombing the book of Ecclesiastes because of certain verses. For example, the first section of the above verse appears to contradict the Torah’s command: “Do not follow after your heart and your eyes.” However, these fears were resolved by the second half of the verse which explicitly states that God will judge man for all of his deeds.

Thus, the verse means: rejoice in the free expression of your potential, but control that potential so that it will be expressed according to God’s will. Otherwise, you will be judged for your shortcomings.

Devarim Rabbah 2:22 states: “God knows what has been and what will be in the future as [Isaiah 46:9-10] states: ‘There is none like Me, declaring the end from the beginning.’”

The concepts of free-choice and God’s omniscience appear contradictory.
As explained in Halachot 3 and 4, the concept of free-choice is fundamental to our faith. Similarly, the concept of God’s omniscience is stated in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 2:9 as one of the essential foundations of our thought system. The existence of entities which are not known by God would imply that they are independent of Him and, thus, other gods, as it were.

Thus, there would appear to be a restriction on man’s freedom of choice.

Granting man totally free-choice.

. And there would be an entity with a certain degree of independence from God, ח”ו. Furthermore, if God did not have a complete knowledge of man’s future behavior, after man acts independently, God’s learning of the choice which a person made would involve a change within Him. One of the basic principles of faith is that God cannot change (See the Responsa of the Rivosh, 118).

The phrase is borrowed from Job 11:9.

Though the Rambam does not completely resolve this apparent contradiction, by outlining the fundamental principles of faith involved in the issue, he demonstrates how the matter transcends our human comprehension. Accordingly, it should be accepted as a matter of faith and not rationalized according to the principles of intellect (Avodat HaMelech).

Halachah 10 of that chapter states: God recognizes the truth [of His being] and knows it as it is. He does not know with a knowledge that is separate from Him, as we know, for we are not one with our knowledge. In contrast, the Creator, blessed be He; He, His knowledge, and His life are one from every side and standpoint, in every manner of unity. For were He to live with a life that is apart from Him or know with a knowledge that is apart from Him, there would be many gods, He, His knowledge, and His life…. Thus, you must say that He is the knower, He is the object of knowledge, and He is the knowledge itself. All is one. This matter is beyond the potential of [our] mouths to mention, [our] ears to hear, or the heart of man to grasp it in its entirety.

In the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. I, chapter 68, the Rambam relates that human intellect reflects the interrelation of three entities: the person who conceives of the idea, the idea which he desires to conceive and his actual thought processes. Shemoneh Perakim (loc. cit.) explains that a person can exist independent of the idea he conceives and the idea can exist independent of the person. Thus, they are obviously two separate entities.

Within God’s knowledge, there is no concept of separation. He is one with His knowledge. Furthermore, as Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 2:10 continues: “He does not know the creations from the perspective of the creations as we know them. Rather, He comprehends them from His perspective. Thus, as He knows Himself, He knows everything.” Thus, He is one with the object of knowledge as well.

The basis of the difference between our knowledge and that of the Creator is, nevertheless, within our comprehension. God is קדמון. Nothing caused Him and He exists independent of all other entities. Accordingly, all of God’s powers and all the effects produced by them, including His knowledge and all that He knows, exist within the context of His oneness. In contrast, man exists within the context of an environment separate from himself. Even the powers granted to him existed before he came into being. Therefore, even though through his knowledge, man can reach beyond himself and develop a connection with other entities, that connection, as any bond with an external entity, is, by definition, limited and no compete oneness can exist.

The word creation implies the existence of a Creator who is of a totally different nature than the entities He creates and thus, unable to be comprehended by them.

Which is one with His essence.

Though we are also blessed with the power of knowledge, the difference between His knowledge and our knowledge is greater than the difference between heaven and earth (Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. III, Chapter 20).

Thus, it is impossible to fully explain the apparent contradiction mentioned at the beginning of this halachah. The Ra’avad comments on these statements: This commentator did not follow the manner of the wise, for a person should not initiate discussion of an idea if he does not know how to conclude it. [Here], he began by asking questions and left the matter unanswered, relying on faith. [If so,] it would have been better to [initially] leave the matter for the believers to accept with trust, without arousing their hearts and causing their minds to be left in doubt…. Even though there is no ultimate answer, it is proper to offer a partial answer and say: Were man’s righteousness or wickedness dependent on the Creator’s decree, i.e., His knowledge was His decree, we would have a severe question. However, the Creator has removed this dominion from His hand and transferred it to man. Thus, His knowledge is not a decree. Rather, it resembles the knowledge of the astrologers who know from the appreciation of one power what will be a certain person’s path [of behavior]. It is well known that [the fate which governs] everything that happens to a person, whether of great or lesser importance, was transferred by the Creator to the constellations. However, He granted man the wisdom to have the power to take his destiny out from under the influence of the constellations. This is the power which was given to man to be either good or bad. The Creator knows the power of the constellations… and also whether [man’s] intellect will have the power remove the matter from their influence. Thus, His knowledge is not a decree. However, all this is not worthwhile. The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s statements because, ultimately, he leaves the matter as a question of belief, without explaining the issue on an intellectual basis. Thus, a person might be aroused to question and doubt these fundamental points of faith without receiving a sufficient conceptual base to resolve them. In his own attempt at resolving this issue, the Ra’avad differentiates between decree (גזרה) and knowledge (ידיעה). Divine decree and free-choice are two contradictory concepts that can never be resolved. However, God’s knowledge is not a decree. Instead, His knowledge can be compared to that of a person who appreciates a pattern of causation and accordingly, knows what will be the future outcome. No one would say that his knowledge caused that chain of events. The various array of forces involved produced the outcome and the person was merely an outside bystander who was able to appreciate the factors at work. The forces governing man’s destiny are the powers of fate vested in the constellations (in this matter as well, he contradicts the Rambam who discounts the influence of astrology as explained in Halachah 4) and man’s power of choice which is enclothed in his intellect. God knows the strength of both these powers and, thus, can appreciate the future outcome without at all compromising on man’s power of choice. However, in conclusion, the Ra’avad is unsatisfied with his own explanation as well and prefers that the matter be left entirely to faith without any attempt at resolving it intellectually. A resolution similar to that of the Ra’avad is also offered by Rav Moshe Almoshino (See Medrash Shmuel, Tosafot Yom Tov, Avot 3:15), who differentiates between the knowledge that an event will take place and the forces causing it to occur. The Tosafot Yom Tov explains that the Rambam also had this conception in mind, nevertheless, he maintained that the matter can only be grasped through faith because of a different problem. A person can predict a future event only if the chain of causation he comprehends is invariable. If there is a possibility for change, it is impossible for him to have any definite knowledge. Thus, in regard to the question of free-choice, we must say that there is a possibility for man to act as he wishes. If so, it is impossible for any knowledge that resembles man’s to appreciate beforehand the outcome of such a pattern of causation. However, God’s knowledge, which is one with His essence and, therefore, views past, present, and future as one, can appreciate the choice which man will make. Torah Or, Parshat VaYera, adds a further point, God’s knowledge is the force which maintains the creations and keeps them in existence. Furthermore, God’s potentials are complete in themselves and, thus, must ultimately be expressed (אין הכח חסר פועל). If so, the above cannot serve as a complete resolution of the apparent contradiction between free-choice and God’s omniscience. Torah Or continues, differentiating between two types of Divine knowledge: Frequently (e.g. Eruvin 13b, Kiddushin 30b), our Sages use the expression, “it is revealed and known before God,” describing God’s knowledge in passive terms. On the other hand, there are times when an active term is used; for example, Genesis 18:21, “I will descend and see,” Exodus 2:25, “God saw the Israelites and God knew.” The active expression implies a type of knowledge which will bring about an effect in our world (in the above examples, the destruction of Sodom and the redemption of the Jews). In contrast, the passive term alludes to God’s knowledge as it is united with His essence, the level of “He and His knowledge are one.” The nature of that level of knowledge is too transcendent to have an effect on matters of this world. God knows the course of behavior we will choose through the second form of knowledge. Hence, that knowledge does not affect our decisions and allows us to choose freely.

Thus, man is granted absolute freedom to determine his own fate.

Since the choice is man’s, he must take responsibility for his deeds, as above Halachot 2 and 4.

See Halachah 4.

Halachot 3 and 5 mention a number of these verses.

That man is granted free choice.

On the basis of these verses, many people conclude that, not only does God know what choice man will make (Divine omniscience), He decrees the nature of that choice and controls man’s destiny (Divine decree).

Though the Rambam does not completely resolve this apparent contradiction, by outlining the fundamental principles of faith involved in the issue, he demonstrates how the matter transcends our human comprehension. Accordingly, it should be accepted as a matter of faith and not rationalized according to the principles of intellect (Avodat HaMelech).

Chapter 5, Halachah 4. Similarly, in the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, in his Thirteen Principles of Faith listed in the introduction to Chapter 10 of Sanhedrin (principle 11), he emphasizes how reward and punishment are fundamental to the Jewish faith.

“God knows the sinners and according to His wisdom and uprightness, He determines the extent of their punishment” (Shemoneh Perakim, chapter 8). The workings of the scales of Divine judgment cannot be perceived by our limited intellects. However, it is clear that the various punishments administered to different people depend on the nature of their characters, the sins they committed, and the circumstances surrounding them.

The Jerusalem Talmud, Peah 1:1, relates that a person who possesses more merits than sins suffers retribution for those sins in this world so as to enter the world to come without any blemishes on his record.

For example, Arichin 16a relates that the affliction of tzara’at (generally translated as leprosy) comes as retribution for the sins of slander, murder, false oaths, adultery, pride, theft, and miserly behavior. Similarly, Vayikra Rabbah 17:4 states that first God afflicts a sinner’s body. If he does not repent, he takes his soul.

The Jerusalem Talmud, Sotah 1:7, states that a person’s loss of possessions can atone for severe sins: “If a person transgressed a sin punishable by death at God’s hand, his ox may die, he may lose his chicken, and his glassware may break…. Thus, his obligation is reduced.”

Bar and Bat Mitzvah, twelve for girls, thirteen for boys.

The first clauses of that verse state: “Fathers shall not die because of their sons, nor shall sons die because of their fathers.” Sanhedrin 27b notes the apparent contradiction between that verse and Exodus 34:7, “He [G‑d] visits the iniquity of the fathers on the children,” and explains that unless a son sins himself, he is not to be punished for his father’s behavior. However, a sinner can bear the cumulative guilt of both his and his ancestor’s transgressions. Nevertheless, this principle applies only after the son reaches majority. While he is a minor, he may still die because of his father’s sins (Sifri). Similarly, Ketubot 8b states when fathers offend God, He vents His wrath on their children. See also Tosafot, Shabbat 25a.

The Rambam’s statement appears to be a quote from a previous source. However, to this writer’s knowledge, this statement in this form is not found in the Talmud or popular Midrashim. This touches on a significant point regarding the Mishneh Torah. In order to allow the text to flow freely, the Rambam did not mention the sources from which he derived his halachot. [Indeed, this became a point of controversy (see the Ra’avad’s comments on the introduction to the Mishneh Torah) and in his later years, the Rambam stated that he regretted that decision.] Subsequently, many Torah scholars have dedicated themselves to finding the sources for the halachot. Often, the task is not overly taxing. However, there are many halachot in which the Rambam appears to be referring to sources and those references cannot be found in the Talmud or Midrashim that we possess. This has led many commentaries to state that the Rambam possessed sources from the Talmudic period which have not been passed on to us. Others maintain that the Rambam took the liberty of interpreting the Biblical verses himself on the basis of knowledge gleaned from other sources.

The Jerusalem Talmud, Peah 1:1, relates that a person with more sins than merits enjoys the benefit of his merits in this world so that he can be given full punishment in the world to come.

The Jerusalem Talmud (loc. cit.) gives as examples, “one who removes the yoke [of Torah], one who acts brazen-facedly to the Torah, and one who abrogates the covenant [of circumcision].”

That a person suffers retribution for his sins.

In his commentary to Avot 4:11, the Rambam explains that just as a shield wards off an enemy’s attack, Teshuvah prevents retribution from affecting man. Though Teshuvah totally absolves a person from retribution in the world to come (Iggeret HaTeshuvah, Chapter 2), in this world, it merely serves as a shield, i.e., retribution will come for a person’s sins, but his Teshuvah will protect him.

Free-choice is not only a negative factor. On the contrary, God granted man this potential so that he use it in His service.

In this halachah, the Rambam gives one explanation (a second explanation is offered in Halachah 5) to resolve the difficulty presented by certain Biblical verses that imply that God decrees that man will sin. In the previous halachot, the Rambam had described various levels of retribution. This halachah deals with the most severe levels of retribution, one in which a man is prevented from repenting. In such an instance, God removes man’s potential for free-choice. (A further explanation of the concepts mentioned in this halachah is found in Shemoneh Perakim, Chapter 8.)

. In this instance, the Rambam does not define what constitutes “a great sin.” In contrast to the sins mentioned in Chapter 3 that “hold back Teshuvah,” no arbitrary criteria are mentioned.

At times, the cumulative effect of many lesser sins can have the same effect as a more severe sin. A parallel to this concept exists in Torah law. Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:14, relates that if, on the Sabbath, there is no kosher food available for a person who is critically ill, it is preferable to slaughter a kosher animal rather than serve him non-kosher food. Though eating non-kosher food is a much less severe prohibition, the person will transgress it with every morsel he eats. In contrast, the Sabbath laws, though more severe, need only be overlooked once. In Lekach Tov (Chapter 15), Rav Yosef Engel brings a number of examples where כמות, quantity, takes precedence over איכות, level or quality.

“After God waits for the wicked to repent and they fail to do so, He takes the potential for Teshuvah from their heart…. Even if they desire to repent and pray to God, they find themselves incapable of doing so” (Shmot Rabbah 11:1).

However, even when a person’s Teshuvah will be obstructed, he should not despair of establishing a bond with God. King Menasheh committed more severe sins than all the kings who preceded him. Nevertheless, II Chronicles 33:12 relates that, “when he was in affliction, he sought God, his Lord, and humbled himself before the God of his fathers.” Commenting on this verse, the Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin 11:2 relates that the angels “stopped up the windows of heaven” to prevent his prayers from reaching God. Nevertheless, when God saw that Menasheh’s intent was sincere, He “dug a tunnel under the heavenly throne” to allow him to repent.

God tells the prophet that the spiritual sensitivity of the people will be dulled to the point that they will not appreciate the need for repentance.

This verse describes the chain of events which led to the destruction of the First Temple. Each day, God would send a new prophet to exhort the people to repentance. However, the people would respond with scorn.
Ultimately, God removed the possibility of repentance from them and (loc. cit. 17), “brought upon them the king of the Kasdim who slew their young men with the sword… and had no compassion young men, virgins, old men, or the feeble.”

The association of Teshuvah with the metaphor of healing or remedy was employed in Chapter 1, Halachah 4, quoting Jeremiah 3:22, “I will heal your backsliding.”

I.e., prevent him from responding affirmatively to Moses’ appeal to send forth the people.

As the Torah subsequently relates, he enslaved the people, murdered their children, and embittered their lives.

Pharaoh was punished not only for his previous deeds, but for his refusal to send the Jewish people after “God hardened his heart.” One might ask: How could he be punished for an act that he had no choice but to commit? The question can be resolved on the basis of the halachah (Bava Metzia 42a, Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:15) which obligates a watchman to make restitution for property that was destroyed by factors beyond his control if he was negligent in its care initially (תחילתו בפשיעה סופו באונס). Similarly, though ultimately, Pharaoh was not responsible for his actions — since the ability to choose freely was taken from him — because of his initial wickedness, he was obligated to suffer the consequences of his later deeds as well.

Hence, Moses’ mission appears futile and purposeless.

Egypt was the center of the civilized world of that age. Hence, what happened there became known to all mankind. Any observer could have realized that after the first plagues, Pharaoh should definitely have heeded Moses’ request. His refusal to do so clearly demonstrated that, aside from his stubbornness, God’s hand was also involved. Thus, Pharaoh served as an example to teach all men.

God will “negate his free-choice” (Shemoneh Perakim, loc. cit.).

The king of the Amorites whose territory lay in the path of the Jews on their way to Eretz Yisrael. Though the Jews offered to pass through his land without engaging him in war, he refused and challenged them in battle. His armies were utterly defeated and he was slain (Numbers, Chapter 21).

It would have been unfair to punish Sichon for not allowing the Jews to pass through his land, since that decision was made because, “God… hardened his spirit….” However, prior to that instance, Sichon had committed many other sins and as retribution for his wickedness, God prevented him from accepting the Jews’ offer (Shemoneh Perakim, loc. cit.).

Torat Kohanim, commenting on Leviticus, 18:3, relates that the Canaanites’ behavior was more depraved than any other idolatrous nation.

The preceding verse relates: There was no city which accepted a peaceful settlement with the children of Israel except the Chivites who lived in Gibeon. All the rest, they conquered in battle.” Based on the Jerusalem Talmud, Shivi’it 6:1, Hilchot Melachim 6:5 relates: Joshua sent three letters [to the Canaanites] before entering the [promised] land: At first, he sent them: “Whoever desires to flee, should flee.” Afterwards, he sent a second [message]: “Whoever desires to accept a peaceful settlement, should make peace.” Then, he sent again: “Whoever desires war, should do battle.” The command to destroy the Canaanites only applied to those who did not accept a peaceful settlement. Hence, after seeing all the miracles which accompanied the Jews, it would have been logical for the Canaanites to accept Joshua’s offer of peace.

Hoshea 4:17 describes the Israelites of that age with the statement: “Ephraim is joined to idols, let him go.” Shemoneh Perakim (loc. cit.) interprets the verse: Because “Ephraim is joined to idols,” he willingly established a bond with idol worship, it is fit to “let him go,” to abandon him to his love for them and remove his potential for repentance.

Elijah made this statement in his confrontation with the prophets of Ba’al at Mount Carmel. Rav Saadia Gaon interprets this verse as a request for God to turn the hearts of the people back to Him. Nevertheless, the Rambam views it as an explanation of how it was possible for Israel to continue serving Ba’al.

They had free will and used that potential to commit severe transgressions which warranted harsh punishment.

There are two complementary points brought out by this halachah:
Firstly, it further develops the concept mentioned in the previous halachah, showing how the awareness that, at times, God will prevent people from repenting has motivated the righteous to entreat Him to help them continue on the path of truth. Frequently (see Berachot 4a), out of their humility, our spiritual giants would consider themselves as sinners and worry that God would remove His influence from them. A second explanation can be given on the basis of the Zohar, Vol. I, 59a, which interprets the verse within the context of the seeming contradiction between free will and Divine determination. The Zohar asks: How could David make such a request? It has been taught everything is in the hand of God except righteousness and sin. It explains that David was not asking God to take the choice away from him, but rather to show him the path which will enable him to proceed, on his own initiative, to true service of God.

Shmot Rabbah 19:2 infers a similar concept, explaining that the verse represents David’s request that the evil inclination not be able to sway him from the path of Torah.

This verse is part of “A Psalm by David, after Nathan the prophet came to him after he had been intimate with Batshevah.” After that event, David thought God had closed off the doors to Teshuvah for him. Nevertheless, he persevered in prayer, hoping that ultimately, he would be given the opportunity to repent.

In which the righteous appear to ask God to direct their behavior. They are not requesting that He take away their free will and remove the possibility of committing evil. On the contrary, their request is that God continue to allow them that choice instead of punishing them by decreeing that they never repent.

The question posed by this verse resembles those mentioned in the previous halachah. The verse appears to imply that God will place people on the path of truth, and thus, put them in a position where they are not able to choose evil. Accordingly, the Rambam explains the verse’s intention.

The choice whether to heed the prophet’s words or not remains theirs. Similarly, the Jerusalem Talmud, Makkot 2:6 interprets this verse to mean that God shows sinners a path of Teshuvah.

Positive behavior creates a self-reinforcing pattern. The more good one does, the more one desires to do. Hilchot De’ot 1:7 elaborates on the process in which the repetition of good deeds encourages good character traits.

Shabbat 104a, Yoma 38b, Menachot 29b

Rashi (Menachot, ibid.) states: “One who comes to purify himself, needs assistance because of the evil inclination, therefore, help is granted to him.”

Tosafot Yom Tov (Avot 5:18) states that only after a person considers repentance does God assist him in this matter. This is consonant with the concept of free-choice mentioned in this chapter. However, other Rabbis explain that even before a person considers the concept of Teshuvah, there are Divine forces arousing him to that decision.

The Lechem Mishneh explains that the Rambam is adding a further point to the explanation given in Chapter 5, Halachah 5. The Turei Even objects, explaining that here the question is of a different nature. In Chapter 5, the Rambam spoke about God’s knowledge. As explained above, knowledge and free-choice are not necessarily contradictory concepts. However, in this halachah, the Rambam deals with the question of Divine decree. Once God states a prophecy, that prophecy will surely be fulfilled and, hence, it seemingly contradicts the concept of free will.

This prophecy was included in the covenant between God and Abraham established by halving the sacrifices (bris bein habetarim).

This prophecy was conveyed to Moses shortly before his death.

In Shemoneh Perakim, the Rambam elaborates slightly more, asking, “Does the fact that God included the laws requiring the punishment of stoning in the Torah mean that a person who commits a sin requiring that punishment does not exercise free will?”

Explaining that ultimately, there would be people who sin.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s explanation and offers a different explanation: No one would say that Moses’ statement (Deuteronomy 31:29): “I know that after I die, you will become corrupt and turn away from the path that I have prescribed for you,” removed the Jewish people’s potential for free choice. Instead, the intent is that Moses, as the leader of the people, knew their tendencies and was able to predict that they would not withstand the challenges presented them. Surely, God can possess similar knowledge.

This statement is obviously not a decree that any specific person will be cursed with poverty. Rather, it relates the general pattern of worldly affairs, explaining that there will always be poor people among the Jewish community. Similarly, in the statement quoted above, God was informing Moses that the wicked would continue to exist.

The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam’s statements: These are lengthy and underdeveloped words…. I would almost call them childish…. There are two possible explanations regarding the Egyptians: a) … The Egyptians were wicked and deserving of punishment. If they had listened to Moses originally and sent forth the Jews, they would not have suffered or drowned in the sea. However, it was Pharaoh’s arrogance and scorning of God… which caused [his punishment]. b) The Creator had stated, “they will enslave them.” However, the Egyptians [overstepped that decree,] forcing them to do backbreaking work, slaughtering them, and drowning them, as implied by [Zechariah 1:15]: “I was slightly angered, but they helped [forward] the evil.” The first resolution proposed by the Ra’avad resembles the Rambam’s own statements in Halachah 3 and does not acknowledge the unique difficulty which the Rambam addresses himself to here, that seemingly it was a Divine decree that made the Egyptians enslave the Jews. The second resolution, also mentioned by the Rambam, Genesis, 15:14, is based on the Shmot Rabbah 30:15, which offers a comparison to a king who ordered his son to work for a certain master, but promised him he would be treated fairly. Instead, the master was overbearing and made the prince suffer greatly. When the king was ultimately reconciled with his son, he ordered the execution of the cruel master. Support for the Rambam’s explanation can be brought from Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 10:4. There, the Rambam explains that, in contrast to prophecies of Divine favor, prophecies concerning retribution may remain unfulfilled. Hence, in this instance, there was no definite Divine decree forcing the Egyptians to oppress the Jews. On the contrary, the Divine decree was itself subject to change. Therefore, every one of the Egyptians who made the decision to cause difficulty to the Jews must accept full responsibility for his deed.

Though the above explanation clarifies the question of God’s decree, still God surely knew which individuals would bring His decree to fulfillment. Thus, to answer this question, the Rambam refers to his previous explanation (Chapter 5, Halachah 5) that God’s knowledge is not bound by the same rules as human knowledge. In one of his responsa (159), the Rambam writes: “Anyone who pays no attention to our words [on the question of free-choice] in the commentary to the tractate of Avot (Shemoneh Perakim) and in Sefer HaMadah which are built on eternal foundations, and searches to contradict these statements based on a statement of the Aggadah, Midrash, or that of one of the Geonim… is committing suicide, as it were.”