Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

A rebellious elder who differed with the Supreme Sanhedrin concerning a matter whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering is liable for execution. This applies whether the court forbids the matter and he permits it or the court permits the matter and he forbids it. Even if he bases his statements on the received tradition, saying: "This is the tradition I received from my masters," and they say: "This is what appears to us as appropriate on the basis of logical analysis," since he differs with their ruling and performs a deed or directs others to do so, he is liable. Needless to say, this applies if they also rule on the basis of their having received teachings through the Oral Tradition.

Similarly, he is liable for execution if he differs with them with regard to a decree that they issued to safeguard a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering. For example, if he permits the consumption of leaven on the fourteenth of Nissan during the sixth hour or forbids deriving benefit from it in the fifth hour, he is worthy of execution. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

The above applies whether the rebellious elder disputes a matter whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering or he disputes a matter which leads to a situation involving a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering.

What is implied? If they disputed whether relations with a woman are adulterous or incestuous, if a shade of blood would render a woman ritually impure or not, if a woman is impure because of birth or not, if a woman is a zavah or not, if this fat is forbidden or permitted and the like, their difference of opinion involves a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering.

What is meant by a matter that will lead to a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering. For example, the Sages differed concerning the declaration of a leap year, if the leap year must be declared before Purim or may be declared throughout Adar, he is liable. For this leads to partaking of chametz on Pesach. Similarly, if they differed with regard to a matter of financial law or with regard to the number of judges able to adjudicate matters of financial law, he is liable. For according to the opinion which maintains that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff, everything which he expropriated from him was expropriated according to law and according to the decisions of the court. But according to the opposing view, whatever he expropriated is stolen property. If he uses it to consecrate a woman, she is not consecrated. And yet according to the opinion that the person expropriated his own property, the consecration is valid. If another person engages in relations with her willfully, he is liable for kerait and if he engages in relations with her inadvertently, he is liable to bring a sin offering. Thus their difference of opinion led to a matter whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering.

Similarly, if their difference of opinion concerned lashes, if one person was liable to receive lashes or not, or they differed with regard to the number of judges in whose presence lashes must be administered, he is liable. For according to the opinion who says that he should not be lashed, the court is injuring him and the judges are liable to make financial restitution. Anything expropriated from them is taken according to law. But according to the opinion which says that he is liable for lashes, everything he expropriates from them is stolen property. If he uses it to consecrate a woman, she is not consecrated.

Similarly, if they differed with regard to whether or not a person is obligated to pay after making an endowment evaluation or interdicted property, he is liable. For according to the opinion that says that he is not liable to pay, if it is taken from him, it is stolen property and if it is used to consecrate a woman, the consecration is not valid.

Similarly, he is liable if he differed with the majority concerning the redemption of consecrated property, had they been redeemed or not. For according to the opinion that the redemption is invalid, if he used that article to consecrate a woman, the consecration is not valid.

Similarly, if they differed with regard to bringing an eglah arufah, whether a city is obligated to bring or not, he is liable. For according to those who say that city is obligated to bring the calf, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it and if he uses it to consecrate a woman, the consecration is not valid. Similar concepts apply if they differed with regard to orlah. And similar concepts apply with regard to leket, shichechah, and pe'ah, if they differ whether it belongs to the poor or to the owner, he is liable. For according to the opinion which says that it belongs to the owner, it is stolen property in the hands of the poor and if one consecrates a woman with it, she is not consecrated.

Similarly, if the rebellious elder differs with the court with regard to a category of factors that impart ritual impurity, e.g., blemishes on the skin, blemishes on homes, or blemishes on garments, he is liable. For according to the opinion that the person is pure, he is permitted to enter the Temple and partake of consecrated foods, but according to the opinion that he is impure, if he enters the Temple or partakes of consecrated food willfully, he is punishable by kerait, and if he does so inadvertently, he is liable for a sin offering. Similar concepts apply if they differed with regard to the purification of a person afflicted by tzara'at, if he can be purified or not.

Similarly, he is liable if they differ with regard to the obligation to make a sotah drink the water which conveys the curse: Is a woman required to drink the water or is she not required? For according to the person who says that she must drink, if her husband dies before she drinks, she is forbidden to her yevam, while according to the person who says that she is not required to drink, she may perform the rite of yibbum. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

It is necessary to investigate and examine whether a difference of opinion will lead to these consequences. If it will lead to another consequence - which after a series of even 100 consequences - that will bring about a situation involving a prohibition whose willful violation is punishable by kerait and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin offering, the rebellious elder is liable. This applies regardless of whether he ruled leniently and the others ruled stringently or he ruled stringently and they ruled leniently.

If the difference of opinion between the rebellious elder and the court will not lead to such a situation, the rebellious elder is not liable for execution unless the difference of opinion concerns tefillin.

What is implied? If the rebellious elder gave a directive to add a fifth compartment to tefillin or he himself made tefillin with five compartments, he is liable. This applies provided he first made four compartments as required by law and then made a fifth compartment and attached it to the outer compartment. For when an outer compartment is not exposed to the open space at all times, it is unacceptable.

The obligation of a rebellious elder in such a matter is a law transmitted by the Oral Tradition. If, however, they differed with regard to other mitzvot, e.g., he disputed one of the laws concerning a lulav, tzitzit, or a shofar, one claiming that it is unacceptable and the other claiming that it is acceptable, one claiming that the person fulfilled his obligation and the other claiming he did not fulfill his obligation, or one says: "He is pure," and the other says: "He is impure two degrees removed," the elder is not liable for execution. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

A person who curses his father and mother should be executed by stoning, as Leviticus 20:9 states: "He cursed his father and his mother; he is responsible for his death." He is stoned to death whether he curses them while alive or after they died. It is necessary that his act be observed by witnesses and they warn him as is required with regard to other individuals executed by the court.

The above applies to both a man and woman, and also to a tumtum and an androgynus, provided they reached majority, the age when they can be subjected to punishment.

A person is not liable for execution by stoning unless he curses his parents with one of God's unique names. If he cursed them with another term used to refer to Him, he is not liable for execution by stoning. He should, however, be lashed, as he would be lashed for cursing any other proper Jew.

Similarly, a person who curses his paternal and maternal grandfather is considered as if he cursed any other person.

What is the source which serves as a warning against cursing one's father and one's mother? We have heard the punishment explicitly stated, the warning, however, is not stated explicitly. Instead, it can be inferred from Leviticus 19:14: "Do not curse a deaf-mute." Since a person is warned not to curse any Jew, his father is also included, for he is also Jewish.

A person who strikes his father or mother should be executed by strangulation, as Exodus 21:15 states: "One who strikes his father or his mother should certainly die." It is necessary that his act be observed by witnesses and they warn him as is required with regard to other individuals executed by the court.

The above applies to both a man and woman, and also to a tumtum, and an androgynus provided they reached majority, the age when they can be subjected to punishment.

A person is not liable for strangulation until he wounds his parents. If he does not wound them, it is as if he strikes another Jew. If he strikes them after their death, he is not liable.

When a person strikes his father on his ear and causes him to become deaf, he is liable for execution. The rationale is that it is impossible for him to become deaf without there being an internal wound. Instead, we can be certain that at least a drop of blood was released within the ear and that caused him to become deaf.

When a person lets blood for his father, or if he was a doctor and amputated flesh or a limb, he is not liable. Even though he is not liable, the initial and preferred option is for him not to perform the operation. Nor should he remove a thorn from the flesh of his father or mother lest he cause a bruise.

When does the above apply? When there is another person there who is capable of performing these actions. If, however, there is no one else there capable of doing this but him and they are suffering, he may let blood or amputate according to the license that they grant him.

What is the source which serves as a warning against striking one's father and one's mother? We have heard the punishment explicitly stated, the warning, however, is not stated explicitly. Since a person is warned not to strike any Jew, his father and mother are also included.

A shituki is liable for cursing or striking his mother, but not his father. Although his mother is questioned and she says: "He is the son of so-and-so," he should not be executed by stoning or strangulation because of her testimony.

A person who is conceived through relations between a Jew and a maid-servant or a gentile woman, by contrast, is not liable for cursing or striking his father or his mother. Similarly, a convert - even if he was conceived outside the faith, but born within the faith - is not liable for cursing or striking his father.

Just as such a person is not liable for cursing or striking his father, he is not liable for cursing or striking his mother. This is derived from Exodus 21:17: "One who curses his father and mother shall die." Implied is one who is liable for cursing his father is liable for cursing his mother. Since such a person is not liable for his father, he is not liable for his mother.

A convert is forbidden to curse or to strike his gentile father or to degrade him, so that people will not say: "They came from a more severe level of holiness to a lesser level of holiness, for this person degrades his father." Instead, he should offer him certain measures of honor.

A servant, by contrast, has no connection to his natural parents. His natural father is as if he was not his father with regard to all matters. This applies even if they were both freed.

When a person's father and mother are absolutely wicked and violate transgressions - even if they were sentenced to death and being taken to their execution - it is forbidden for a son to strike them or curse them. If he curses them or wounds them, however, he is not liable. If they repent, even if they are being taken to their execution, he is liable and is executed because of them.

To whom does the above apply? To the convicted person's son. If, however, an unrelated individual struck or cursed a person after he was sentenced to death, even though he repents, he is not liable, for that person will be executed. If, however, he embarrasses him, he is liable to pay a fine for embarrassing him.

If a person's father or mother committed a transgression punishable by lashes and the son is a court attendant, he should not lash them. Similarly, if they were obligated to be placed under a ban of ostracism, he should not be the agent to apply this ban. Nor should he push them or degrade them while acting as the emissary of the court even though it is fit to do this to them and they have not repented.

A son should not serve as an agent to strike or curse his parents except if they entice others to worship idols. For concerning such a person, the Torah Deuteronomy 13:9 states: "Do not have pity and do not cover up for him."

In any situation where a person is obligated to take an oath to his son, we always saw that he never obligated him to take an oath that involves a curse. Instead, he should have him take an oath that does not involve a curse.

We already explained, that when a father kills his son, none of the slain person's brothers become "the redeemer of the blood."

The Torah showed concern not only for striking or cursing one's parents, but also for shaming them. Anyone who shames his parents, even with words alone or merely with an insinuation, is cursed by the Almighty, as Deuteronomy 27:16 states: "Cursed be he who degrades his father and his mother." And Proverbs 30:17 states: "The eye that mocks a father and scorns the training of a mother, the ravens... will gouge it out." The court has the right to administer stripes for rebellious conduct because of this and to punish in the manner they see fit.

Honoring one's father and mother is a positive commandment of great importance, as is fearing one's father and mother. The Torah equates the honor and fear of one's parents with the honor and fear of God Himself. Exodus 20:12 states: "Honor your father and your mother," and Proverbs 3:9 states: "Honor God from your wealth." Similarly, with regard to one's father and mother, Leviticus 19:3 states: "A person must fear his mother and father," and Deuteronomy 6:13 states: "And you shall fear God, your Lord." Just as He commands us to honor and fear His great name; so, too, He commands us to honor and fear our parents.

A person who curses his father or mother is executed by stoning and a person who blasphemes God is executed by stoning. Thus the punishment for the two is equated.

A father is mentioned before a mother with regard to honor and a mother is mentioned before a father with regard to fear to teach that they are both equal with regard to fear and honor.

What is meant by fear and what is meant by honor? Fear is expressed by not standing in his place, not sitting in his place, not contradicting his words, nor offering an opinion that outweighs his.

He should not call him by name, neither during his lifetime or after his death. Instead, he should say: "My father and my master." If his father or his teacher had the same name as others, he should call those other people by a different name. It appears to me that one should be careful only with regard to this matter with regard to a name that is unusual which is not used frequently by people. With regard to the names which people are generally called, by contrast, e.g., Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and the like, one can call others by that name in any language and at any time outside his father's presence without thinking anything of the matter.

What is meant by honoring them? One should bring them food and drink, clothe them and cover them from their resources. If a father does not have financial resources and a son does, the son is compelled to sustain his father and his mother according to his capacity. He should bring him out and bring him home and serve him in all the ways one serves a teacher. Similarly, he should stand before him as one stands before a teacher.

When a father was the student of his son, the father need not stand in the presence of the son. The son, by contrast, must stand before his father even if he is his student.

A son is obligated to honor his father in other matters when he is carrying out his business and seeing to his concerns. What is implied? If a person went to a place because of his father's words, he should not say: "Hurry and free me on my own account," or "Let me go on my own account," instead "Hurry and free me because of my father," "Let me go because of my father." Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. He should always include in his words statements that indicate that he is concerned with his father's honor and that he fears him.

A son is obligated to honor his father even after his death. What is implied? If he repeats a teaching in his father's name, he should not say: "This is what my father said." Instead, he should say: "This is what my father, and teacher - may I serve as atonement for him - said."

When does the above apply? Within twelve months of his passing. After twelve months, he says of him: "May he be remembered for the life of the world to come."

Both a man and a woman are obligated to honor and fear their parents. It is only that the man has the capacity to do this and a woman is subject to another's influence. Therefore if she is divorced or widowed, they are both equal.

To what degree does the mitzvah of honoring one's father and mother extend? Even if one's parent takes his purse of gold and throws it into the sea in his presence, he should not embarrass them, shout, or vent anger at them. Instead, he should accept the Torah's decree and remain silent.

To what degree does the mitzvah of fearing them extend? Even if one was wearing fine garments and sitting at the head of the community, if one's father and mother came, ripped the clothes, struck him on the head, and spit in his face, he should not embarrass them. Instead, he should remain silent and fear the King of kings who commanded him to conduct himself in this manner. Were a mortal king to decree something which would cause him even more suffering he would not be able to move a limb in protest. Certainly, this applies when the command emanates from He who spoke and caused the world to come into existence as He desired it.

Although these commands have been issued, a person is forbidden to lay a heavy yoke on his sons and be particular about their honoring him to the point that he presents an obstacle to them. Instead, he should forgo his honor and ignore any affronts. For if a father desires to forgo his honor, he may.

A person who strikes a son who has attained majority should be placed under a ban of ostracism, for he is transgressing the charge, Leviticus 19:14: "Do not place a stumbling block in front of the blind."

When a person's father or mother lose control of their mental faculties, their son should try to conduct his relationship with them according to their mental condition until God has mercy upon them. If it is impossible for him to remain with them because they have become very deranged, he should leave them, depart, and charge others with caring for them in an appropriate manner.

A mamzer is obligated to honor and fear his father even though he is not liable for striking him or cursing him until he repents. Even when his father was a wicked person who violated many transgressions, he must honor him and fear him.

If he sees his father violate Torah law, he should not tell him: "Father, you transgressed Torah law." Instead, he should tell him: "Father, is not such-and-such written in the Torah?" as if he is asking him, rather than warning him.

When a person's father tells him to violate the words of the Torah - whether he tells him to transgress a negative commandment or not to fulfill a positive commandment, even if all that is involved is a point of Rabbinic Law - he should not listen to him, as can be inferred from Leviticus 19:3: "A person must fear his mother and his father and keep My Sabbaths;" - all are obligated in honoring Me.

The following laws apply when a person's father tells him: "Draw water for me," and he has the opportunity to perform a mitzvah. If it is possible for the mitzvah to be performed by others, they should perform it and he should concern himself with honoring his father. For we do not negate the observance of one mitzvah, because of the observance of another mitzvah. If there are no others able to perform the other mitzvah, he should perform the mitzvah and neglect his father's honor. For he and his father are obligated to perform the mitzvah.

Torah study surpasses honoring one's father and mother.

If a person's father tells him: "Bring me a drink of water," and his mother tells him: "Bring me a drink of water," he should overlook his mother's honor and honor his father first. For both he and his mother are obligated to honor his father.

A person is obligated to honor his father's wife even though she is not his mother, throughout his father's lifetime, for this is included in honoring his father. Similarly, he should honor his mother's husband throughout her lifetime. After her death, however, he is not obligated to honor him.

It is a Rabbinical decree that a person is obligated to honor his oldest brother as he is obligated to honor his father.