Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

When one does not read the Written Law, nor study the Oral Law, nor carry on ordinary social relationships, he can be assumed to be wicked and is disqualified as a witness according to Rabbinic decree. The rationale is that whenever a person has descended to such a degree, it can be assumed that he will transgress most transgressions that will present themselves to him.

For this reason, unlearned people should not be designated as witnesses, nor do we accept such a person's testimony unless it has been established that he observes the mitzvot, performs acts of kindness, conducts himself in an upright manner, and carries on normal social relationships. The testimony of such a person may be accepted even though he is unlearned and is unfamiliar with both the Written and Oral Law.

Thus one may conclude any Torah scholar may be assumed to be acceptable as a witness unless he is disqualified, and any unlearned person may be assumed to be unacceptable unless it is established that he follows just paths.

Whoever accepts the testimony of an unlearned person before it is established that he possesses the above positive qualities or before witnesses come and testify that he observes the mitzvot and carries on ordinary social relations is a commoner and will be required to face judgment, for he has forfeited the financial resources of Jews on the basis of the testimony of the wicked.

Similarly, base people are disqualified as witnesses by Rabbinic decree. This refers to people who walk through the marketplace eating in the presence of everyone, those who go unclothed in the marketplace when they are involved in ignoble tasks, and the like. The rationale is that they are not concerned with their own shame. All these people are considered as dogs; they will not be concerned with testifying falsely.

Included are those who partake of charity given by gentiles in public. Although they could derive this benefit in private, they denigrate themselves and accept it in public without showing concern for their honor. All of these individuals are disqualified according to Rabbinical decree.

What is the difference between a person who is disqualified as a witness according to Scriptural Law and one who is disqualified by Rabbinic decree? The testimony of a person disqualified by Scriptural Law is nullified even though it was not announced in synagogues and houses of study that he is unacceptable.

Announcements must be made about a person who is disqualified by Rabbinic decree, by contrast, before his testimony is disqualified. Accordingly, any testimony that he gives before such announcements are made are accepted so that people who relied on him will not suffer a loss, for they did not know that he was unacceptable, and he is disqualified only by Rabbinic decree.

The testimony of one witness is acceptable with regard to the Torah's prohibitions, even though his testimony is not accepted with regard to other matters. This is evident from the fact that when a wicked person known to transgress slaughters an animal, his slaughter is acceptable. We accept his word when he says: "I slaughtered it according to law." When, however, a person is suspected of violating a particular prohibition frequently, his word is not accepted with regard to his own matters. His word is accepted, however, with regard to others.

For this reason, a person suspected of violating a particular prohibition may serve as a judge and as a witness for others. We operate under the assumption that a person will not transgress so that others will benefit.

What is implied? The word of an unlearned person is accepted if he states: "The produce of so-and-so has been tithed." Similarly, the word of a person who is suspected of selling the meat of a firstborn is accepted if he states: "The meat which so-and-so is selling is ordinary meat." Similar principles apply with regard to other prohibitions. For the wicked fear the Torah's prohibitions, but they do not fear causing others monetary loss.

The Kings of Israel may not testify, nor is testimony given against them, because they are strong-armed men of power who do not subjugate themselves to the yoke of the judges. Testimony may be made against a High Priest, by contrast, and he may give testimony concerning the king in the Supreme Sanhedrin, as explained.

Our Sages had no need to list informers, epicursim, and apostates among those who are not acceptable as witnesses. For they listed only the wicked among the Jewish people. These rebellious deserters of the faith are inferior to the gentiles. Gentiles need not be saved from a pit, but neither should they be pushed into one the pious among them will receive a share in the world to come. These deserters of the faith should be pushed into a pit and should not be saved from one; they will not receive a portion in the world to come.

Whenever a person is disqualified as a witness for committing a transgression, he is disqualified if two witnesses testify that he committed a transgression despite the fact that they did not warn him and hence, he does not receive lashes.

When does the above apply? When the person committed a transgression that is universally known among the Jewish people to be a sin, e.g., he took a false or an unnecessary oath, he robbed, he stole, he ate meat from an animal that was not slaughtered in a ritual manner, or the like. Different rules apply, however, if the witnesses see him transgress a prohibition which he most likely violated unknowingly. In such an instance, they must warn him. Afterwards, if he transgresses, he is disqualified.

What is implied? If witnesses saw a person tying or untying a knot on the Sabbath, they must inform him that this desecrates the Sabbath, because most people are unaware of this. Similarly, if they see him performing a forbidden labor on the Sabbath or a festival, they must inform him that the day is the Sabbath or the festival, lest he have forgotten.

Similarly, if a person gambles continually, becomes a collector of the king's duty, or a tax collector who takes more for himself, the witnesses must inform him that a person who does this is not acceptable as a witness. For the majority of the people are unaware of this matter. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. The general principle is: Whenever it appears to the witnesses that the person committing the transgression knew that he was acting wickedly and transgressed deliberately, he is not acceptable as a witness even though he was not given a warning and hence, does not receive lashes.

A person is not disqualified as a witness because of a transgression on the basis of his own testimony. What is implied? A person comes to court and admits that he stole, robbed, or lent money at interest. Although his own statement is sufficient to obligate him to make financial restitution, it does not disqualify him as a witness. Similarly, if he states that he ate meat from an animal that was not slaughtered in a ritual manner or had relations with a woman forbidden to him, he is not disqualified until two witnesses testify concerning the transgression. The rationale is that a person is not deemed as wicked on the basis of his own testimony.

Accordingly, if Shimon testifies that Reuven lent money at interest, and Levi testifies: "Reuven lent me money at interest," Reuven is disqualified as a witness on the basis of the testimony of Shimon and Levi. Although Levi admitted that he borrowed money at interest, he is not deemed as wicked on the basis of his own testimony. Hence, his word is accepted with regard to Reuven, but not with regard to himself.

Similarly, if a person testifies that so-and-so sodomized him, whether against the will of the person sodomized or with his consent, the person sodomized and one other witness can join together and through their testimony have the sodomizer condemned to execution. If a person states: "So-and-so had relations with my wife," he and one other witness can join together and through their testimony have that person, but not the wife condemned to execution. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

If a person testifies: "So-and-so sodomized my ox," he and one other witness can join together and through their testimony have that person condemned to execution. The rationale is that a person is not considered as related to his property.

When two people testify that a person is not acceptable as a witness because he committed one of the abovementioned transgressions and two others come and testify that he repented and renounced his improper conduct or received lashes as punishment for the transgression, he is acceptable. If, however, two witnesses came and contradicted the original witnesses, saying: "He did not commit the transgression and should not be disqualified," there is an unresolved doubt if he is disqualified as a witness or not. Therefore he should not testify, we do not expropriate money on the basis of his testimony, and he should not serve as a judge until he repents.

Whenever a person was obligated to receive lashes, he is considered as an acceptable witness again when he repents or when he received lashes in court. Other persons who were disqualified as witnesses because of money which they seized or stole must repent even if they made financial restitution. Instead, they are disqualified until it is known that they repented from their evil ways.

When is it considered that people who lend money at interest have repented? When they tear up their promissory notes on their own volition and manifest complete regret over their actions to the extent that they do not lend money at interest even to gentiles.

When is it considered that dice-players have repented? When they break their dice on their own volition and manifest complete regret over their actions to the extent that they do not even play without monetary stakes.

When is it considered that those who guide the flight of doves have repented? When they break the tools they use to snare them and manifest complete regret over their actions to the extent that they do not do this even in the desert.

When is it considered that merchants of produce in the Sabbatical year have repented? When the Sabbatical year arrives, they are investigated and it is discovered that they did not sell such produce.

Expressing regret verbally is not sufficient. Instead, they must compose a document, stating: "I, so-and-so, the son of so-and-so, earned 200 zuz from the sale of the produce of the Sabbatical year and this sum is given as a present to the poor."

When is it considered that a person suspected of benefiting from taking a false oath has repented? When he goes to a court which does not recognize him and tells them: "I am suspect to take a false oath." Alternatively, when he is obligated to take an oath in a court which does not recognize him with regard to a significant amount of money and he chooses to make financial restitution rather than take the oath.

Similarly, a butcher who would check the animals he slaughtered by himself and market the meat who sold meat that was trefe is considered like those who partake of such meat and who are unacceptable as witnesses. Such a butcher is unacceptable as a witness until it is evident from his deeds that he regrets the evil he performed. He must wear black clothes, robe himself in black, and go to a place where his identity is not known and return a lost object that is significantly valuable or acknowledge that an animal that is significantly valuable which he owned and slaughtered is trefe.

Similarly, a witnesses who was discovered to have lied who went to a place where he was not recognized and was offered a significant amount of money to deliver false testimony, but refused is considered to have repented and is reinstated as a witness. Similar principles apply in all analogous situations.

Relatives are disqualified as witnesses according to Scriptural Law, as implied by Deuteronomy 24:16: "Fathers shall not die because of sons." According to the Oral Tradition, the verse is interpreted as meaning that included in this prohibition is that fathers should not die because of the testimony of sons, nor should sons die because of the testimony of fathers. Similar laws apply with regard to other relatives.

According to Scriptural Law, only paternal relatives are disqualified - i.e., a father with his sons and grandsons, paternal brothers with each other, and the sons of paternal brothers with each other. Needless to say the uncles may not testify with their brother's sons. Maternal relatives or people related by marriage are disqualified only by Rabbinic decree.

Converts are not considered as relatives. Even two twin brothers who convert may testify on each others behalf. For a convert is considered as a newborn child.

Brothers - whether maternal brothers or paternal - are considered as one degree removed. Their sons are considered as two degrees removed. And their grandsons are three degrees removed.

A person who is three degrees removed may testify on behalf of one who is one degree removed. Needless to say, one who is three degrees removed may testify on behalf of one who is two degrees removed. But two who are both two degrees removed, and needless to say, one who is two degrees removed and one who is one degree removed are both disqualified from testifying.

A father and his son are considered as one degree removed. Therefore a father is disqualified from testifying with his grandson. With his great-grandson, i.e., the fourth generation, he is acceptable, for he is of the first degree and the great-grandson, three degrees, removed. Similar laws apply with regard to women relatives.

What is implied? Two sisters or a brother and a sister - whether paternally or maternally related - are considered as one degree removed. Their children whether male or female are considered as two degrees removed and their grandchildren - including the sons of their sons and the daughters of their daughters - are considered as three degrees removed. Just as we count the degrees descendants are removed for males - one degree, two degrees, and three degrees - so, too, we count the degrees for females.

Whenever a person is disqualified from testifying on behalf of a woman, he is also disqualified from testifying on behalf of her husband, for a husband is considered like his wife. Conversely, whenever a person is disqualified from testifying on behalf of a man, he is also disqualified from testifying on behalf of his wife, for a wife is considered like her husband.

Whenever two women are removed by second degrees, their husbands may testify on behalf of each other. If, however, the women are one degree removed, e.g., a man married a woman, and a colleague married her daughter, the two men may not testify on each other's behalf.

Similarly, the husbands of two sisters are disqualified with regard to each other and are considered as one degree removed.

Similarly, a person should not testify on behalf of the son of his wife's sister, nor on behalf of the husband of the daughter of his wife's sister. He may, however, testify on behalf of the son of the husband of his wife's sister who was born to that person from another wife.

Whenever a witness is disqualified from testifying on behalf of a colleague because he is married to the witness' relative, the witness may testify on behalf of the other relatives of that colleague, e.g., his son and his brother. Similarly, whenever a witness is disqualified from testifying on behalf of a woman because she is married to the witness' relative, the witness may testify on behalf of her other relatives, e.g., her son and her brother.

The father of a bride and the father of a groom may testify on behalf of each other.

A person's paternal brother may testify on behalf of that person's maternal brother and the maternal brother may testify on behalf of the paternal brother, for they have no connection whatsoever.

What is implied? Rachel married Joseph and bore him a son Reuven. Joseph had a son, Menashe, from another wife. Joseph died and Rachel married Shimon and bore him Judah. Menashe and Judah may testify on each other's behalf.

A man and his wife are considered as being removed by one degree. Hence a husband may not testify on behalf of his wife's son, the wife of his wife's son, his wife's daughter, the husband of his wife's daughter, his wife's father, his wife's mother, the husband of his wife's mother, nor the wife of his wife's father.

When a person has consecrated a woman, although the marriage bond has not been consummated, with regard to testimony, it is as if she is fully married.

To whom does the above apply? To the woman he consecrated herself; he may not testify on her behalf. If, however, he testifies on behalf of the relatives of the woman he consecrated, e.g., her sister's husband, her son or daughter, or the like, we do not disqualify him until he marries her.

The Torah did not disqualify the testimony of relatives because we assume that they love each other, for a relative may not testify neither on his relative's behalf or against his interests. Instead, this is a Scriptural decree.

For this reason people who love each other or who hate each other are acceptable as witnesses even though they are not acceptable as judges. For the Scriptural decree disqualifies only relatives as witnesses.