Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Since it is from a non-kosher species, even if it was slaughtered in a kosher manner, that fact is insignificant in this context. Although a kosher animal is considered as dead after ritual slaughter, this does not apply with regard to a non-kosher animal.

I.e., after an animal is slaughtered, it still makes convulsive movements before its soul actually departs. As long as a non-kosher animal makes such movements, it is considered as alive and it does not impart impurity.

If its head is cut off, it is considered to have died and imparts impurity as a carcass does, even if its body continues moving.

I.e., if it contracts impurity from another source. Since such slaughter would enable a Jew to partake of a kosher animal, it is considered significant enough for a non-kosher animal to be deemed as food.

The rationale is that killing a kosher animal in this manner does not cause it to be considered as food. Hence, when a non-kosher animal is killed in this manner, it is also not considered as food. See Hilchot Tum’at Ochalin 3:4.

No matter how it was killed, even if it was slaughtered in the ritual manner (Hilchot Melachim 9:12).

One of the Seven Universal Laws Commanded to Noah and His Descendants is the prohibition against eating meat or an organ cut off an animal while it is alive (ibid. 9:1, 10-13). In this halachah, the Rambam is emphasizing that even though slaughter has been performed on an animal, it is still considered alive with regard to this prohibition.
This is not merely a theoretical argument. At present, many slaughtering plants are highly automated with animals slaughtered and then cut up while they are on a conveyor belt. It is not infrequent for the operators of the plant not to be willing to wait the short amount of time it would take for these convulsive movements to stop before having the animal cut in pieces. Thus the meat and organs severed in such a manner are forbidden to a gentile.

I.e., the windpipe or the esophagus.

I.e., since slitting only one of the signs does not cause an animal to become acceptable to be eaten, it is not considered as food until it actually dies.

See Hilchot Shechitah 3:19; Hilchot Tum’at Meit 1:13.

I.e., the meat surrounding the hip bone.

I.e., no longer alive.

The rationale is that as long as it is in its mother’s womb, it is considered as part of her body and not as an independent entity. This is borne out by the ruling that if the mother animal was ritually slaughtered, it would be permissible to partake of the fetus. Although this ruling applies only to a kosher species, Leviticus 11:39 makes an association between kosher species and non-kosher species [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 4:3)].

See the parallels in Hilchot Tum’at Meit 2:3.

Even in part.

See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 5:2.

I.e., if they are separated from a living animal, they do not impart impurity at all.

An animal was injured or maimed and a part of its flesh or limbs was not severed from its body, but hung loosely and was not functional. Note the parallels with regard to the prohibitions of partaking of such a limb, as stated in Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 5:6.

Rav Akiva Eiger mentions that this applies only if the animal is healthy. If it is a tereifah, i.e., it will die within twelve months, flesh separated from it during its lifetime is considered as having been separated from a carcass.

I.e., even during the animal’s lifetime, they are already considered as food and can contract impurity. As Rav Yosef Corcus emphasizes, this is the fundamental concept taught by this halachah.

Through contact with liquids, as explained in Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 1:1-2.

Like food. The blood that flowed from the animal at the time of slaughter makes the limb fit to contract impurity [Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 2:6; the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 9:7)].

As stated in Halachah 3. It is only a limb that is intact that imparts impurity.

I.e., a complete limb, regardless of the size, as stated in Halachah 3. Some manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah follow a different version, stating: “In both instances, there is no minimum measure.” The Kessef Mishneh suggests that this is the proper version.

I.e., possessing an infirmity that will cause it to die within twelve months. See Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 4:7-9; Hilchot Shechitah, chs. 5-11.

I.e., the ritual slaughter is effective in this regard.

I.e., the fetus is not considered as an independent entity, but as one of the limbs of the mother. Since the mother was slaughtered in an acceptable manner, all of its meat, including the fetus, does not impart ritual impurity. In his gloss to Halachah 7, the Kessef Mishneh states that this leniency applies even if the fetus would itself be con-sidered as tereifah.

The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that we are speaking about an instance where the mother animal was tereifah or slaughtered unacceptably. If the mother was kosher and slaughtered in an acceptable manner, the fetus is considered as one of the limbs of its mother. If it is alive- regardless of the month of its gestation- it may be eaten without being slaughtered itself and does not impart impurity according to Scriptural Law. (There are certain restrictions according to Rabbinic Law.)

Like a human (see Hilchot Tum’at Meit 1:14, et al), an animal fetus that was born after eight months of pregnancy is not expected to live. Hence it is deemed a tereifah and is forbidden to be eaten even if it was slaughtered in an acceptable manner. While it is alive, it does not impart impurity, but when it is slaughtered—even acceptably—it does.
Alternatively; the phrase “after it was deemed tereifah” could refer to the mother, i.e., after the mother was deemed a tereifah and the fetus ripped from its womb (Kessef Mishneh).

Before an animal from a kosher species became a tereifah, there was a time when it could have been slaughtered and been kosher. This fetus, however, never had and never will have a time when it could be considered as an independent kosher entity.

Until an animal that was born without going through a full term of gestation lives seven days, we are not certain that it is a viable offspring and it is forbidden to partake of its meat even if it was properly slaughtered (see Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 4:4).

From Shabbat 134b and Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot, op. cit., it appears that it is questionable whether it is viable or not. Hence, we are stringent and apply the principle stated previously, that since this animal never had a time when it was considered as an independent kosher entity, ritual slaughter is not effective for it at all, not even to prevent it from being considered as a carcass. Nevertheless, if it was slaughtered, the impurity it imparts is only of questionable status. Rav Yosef Corcus states that this is hinted at by the phrase “like a non-viable offspring,” i.e., that it is comparable to an animal of that status.

Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 5:14, 7:3.

I.e., the period of gestation was full term.

I.e., it is permitted to eat its meat, regardless of how it was killed.

According to Scriptural Law, even if it steps on the ground, it does not require ritual slaughter. Slaughter was required by the Sages as a decree, because of the impression that might be created (Chullin 75b).

I.e., after the mother was slaughtered, its body came in contact with a source of impurity.

Because from the slaughter onward, it is considered as an independent entity.

In this instance as well, it is considered as an independent entity, and not as part of its mother.

See Hilchot Tum’at Ochalin 2:6; Hilchot Tum’at Meit 1:14.

See Hilchot Shechitah 12:10; see also Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 11:12.

I.e., even if it dies without ritual slaughter, it is not considered as a carcass, because it was considered as one of its mother’s limbs at the time the mother was slaughtered. This applies even if the offspring was tereifah (Kessef Mishneh).

This applies whether the mother animal was kosher or tereifah. If, however, the mother was tereifah, the offspring is forbidden to be eaten even though it does not impart ritual impurity (ibid.). This leniency applies only if the slaughter of the mother was acceptable. If the slaughter of the mother was not acceptable, as soon as the fetus dies, its meat imparts the impurity associated with a dead animal.

As stated in Halachah 6.

As is a limb severed from a living animal, as stated in Halachah 3.

For it is purified through the slaughter of its mother, as stated in Halachot 6-7. This applies provided it does not come in contact with the limb that was cut off. (Moreover, if it comes in contact with that limb, it contracts the impurity that stems from contact with impure foods.)

Since the limb was extended outside the body before the animal was slaughtered, it is considered as tereifah. The rationale is that, included in the definition of tereifah is any animal, or part of an animal, that before slaughter was found in an inappropriate place (Chulin 68a, Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 5:9). There the Rambam states: “Even if [the fetus] returns the limb to the womb of the mother and afterwards, [the mother] was slaughtered or the fetus was born and lived for several years, that limb is forbidden as a treifah.”

As stated in the previous halachah.

As mentioned, for ritual slaughter to be acceptable, one must slit both the windpipe and the esophagus. In the interim, between the slitting of the two, the fetus stuck out its foot.

I.e., it is considered as if the fetus stuck out its foot after the slaughter of the animal.

This applies even if the animal is slaughtered according to all the laws of ritual slaughter, as the Rambam proceeds to state.

I.e., when carried, and, of course, when touched (Chulin 13b). This lends credence to the concept that the impurity the animal imparts is a Rabbinic decree.

The term Samaritan- Kuti (“Cuthean”) in classical Hebrew—denotes the people whom the invading King of Assyria settled in the northern part of Eretz Yisrael (Samaria) in place of the exiled Ten Tribes. These people converted to Judaism, but were selective in their observance, and hence were never accepted as an integral part of our people. Indeed, the early Talmudic Sages questioned whether their conversion was halachically effective or not. By the time of the later Sages, it had been discovered that they were idolaters, and they were deemed to be outright gentiles.

I.e., if a gentile accepts the observance of the Seven Laws Given to the Descendants of Noah, he is granted the right to dwell in Eretz Yisrael. See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6; Hilchot Melachim 8:10-11. Nevertheless, in this context, his status is no different from that of other gentiles.

The Ra’avad rejects the Rambam’s ruling outright, for the Rambam seems to be implying that the gentile’s slaughter is significant and it is only the Sages who disqualify it. The Ra’avad, by contrast, maintains that the gentile’s actions are entirely insignificant. The Kessel Mishneh also questions the Rambam’s ruling, however, stating that the Tosefta (Chulin 1:1) cites a verse from which it is derived that the slaughter of a gentile is of no consequence whatsoever. The Kessef Mishneh, however, states that according to the Rambam, the reference to the verse could be interpreted as an asmachta, the use of a verse by the Rabbis as support for their own decree.

Chapter 6.

And gentiles as a whole, as implied by Exodus 34:15; see Avodah Zarah 29b.

For it can be assumed that the gentile has his false deity in mind [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 1:1)].

See Hilchot Shechitah 4:11. From Halachah 12 of that source, however, it appears that the Scriptural prohibition only applies when the animal was slaughtered by an idolatrous gentile. If the gentile did not serve false deities, his slaughter is forbidden only by Rabbinic decree.

As stated in Halachah 6.

As mandated by Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash3:12-13; Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 18:13-15.

I.e., the bare bone, without an olive-sized portion of meat on it.

Although the bone contains marrow which is considered as meat, as long as it is intact, it does not impart impurity.

Even though he is carrying the marrow, since the bone is intact, it does not impart impurity.

Because the marrow it contains is no longer enclosed.

I.e., it has dried out and is no longer connected to the bone.

Were the animal to be alive.

If there is sufficient marrow inside a bone, it has the potential to regenerate flesh that had been peeled off the bone.

I.e., it is considered like a limb severed from a living animal, because the marrow will cause it to regenerate. If, however, the marrow has already dried out, it is only considered as flesh from a carcass.

Hilchot Tum’at Meit 2:5.

I.e., there is room to say that since the act of perforating the bone is minimal, from the time the person had the intent of perforating it, it is considered as if it had been perforated entirely. The Kessef Mishneh notes that the standard published text of Chulin 126b does not leave this question unanswered and rules that the bone is considered to have been perforated already. He suggests that the Rambam had a different version of that text. Rav Yosef Corcus states that since the Talmud debates a similar issue in another source, it appears that a final ruling on the subject had not been reached.