Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

When a person causes damage to a colleague's property that is not evident to the eye, he is not liable to make financial restitution according to Scriptural Law. For the object has not changed, nor has its form become altered. Nevertheless, our Sages ruled that he is liable according to Rabbinic Law, for he reduced the value of the article. They required him to pay the amount by which its value was reduced.

What is implied? If a person causes food belonging to a colleague to be rendered ritually impure, he mixes produce together with produce that is terumah causing it to be considered dimu'a, he mixes a drop of wine that had been used for the sake of idolatry in a colleague's wine, causing the entire quantity to be forbidden, or the like - the amount of the loss is evaluated, and the person who caused the loss is required to pay the entire damages from the finest property in his possession, as is the law regarding anyone who causes damages.

This ruling was a penalty prescribed by our Sages so that none of the ravagers will go and render a colleague's produce impure and then excuse himself, saying: "I am not liable."

For this reason, if the person who caused damage that is not noticeable dies, the penalty is not expropriated from his estate. For our Sages enforced this penalty only upon the person who transgressed and caused the damage, but not on his heirs, who did not cause any damage.

Similarly, a person who inadvertently causes damage that is not noticeable, or as a result of forces beyond his control, is not liable, for our Sages imposed this penalty only upon a person who intentionally causes damage.

When priests intentionally cause a sacrifice to be rendered piggul, they are obligated to make financial recompense to the person who brought the sacrifice. If they cause such an effect unintentionally, they are not liable.

Similarly, a person who intentionally performs work with a red heifer or with water designated for its ashes is obligated to make financial recompense to its owner. If he does so unintentionally, he is not liable.

A person who brings a red heifer to the place where a team of cows are threshing, so that it will nurse and thresh, and a person who is carrying water designated for the ashes of the red heifer who diverts his attention from the water is not held liable by an earthly court. He does, however, have a moral and spiritual obligation to make financial recompense.

When a person pours wine belonging to a colleague as a libation to idol worship, he does not cause the wine to become forbidden. For a Jewish person does not cause property that does not belong to him to become forbidden.

In any of the following situations, the person does cause the wine to be forbidden, and he is therefore liable to make financial recompense:

a) he is a partner with the owner;

b) he is an apostate, who is considered like a gentile;

c) he is given a warning, acknowledges it, and yet disobeys, in which case he is considered an apostate.

How is it possible for such a person to be liable for financial recompense when this act causes him to be liable for capital punishment? Because he becomes obligated to pay for the wine at the time that he lifts it up, while he does not become liable for capital punishment until he actually pours it as a libation.

Whenever a person causes property belonging to a colleague to be damaged - even though he himself is not the one who ultimately causes the damage - since he is the primary cause, he is liable to make financial recompense from the finest property in his possession, like others who cause damage.

What is implied? A person throws a utensil that he owns from a roof onto pillows and blankets, and another person comes and removes the pillows from the ground, causing the utensil to hit the ground and break. The person who removes the pillows is liable to pay the entire sum of the damages, as if he broke the utensil with his own hands. For it was the removal of the pillows and the coverings that caused the utensil to break. The same applies in all analogous situations.

When by contrast a person throws a utensil belonging to a colleague from a roof onto pillows and blankets that belong to the owner of the utensil, and the owner comes and removes the pillows from the ground, the person who threw the utensil is liable to pay for the damages to it. His throwing the utensil is the primary cause for its breaking.

In the above instance, if a person other than the owner of the utensil removes the pillows, both the person who threw the utensil and the one who removed the pillows are liable. For together they both caused the owner's property to be damaged.

Similarly, a person who burns promissory notes belonging to a colleague is liable to pay the entire debt that was mentioned in the promissory notes. Although the promissory notes themselves are not of financial worth, by burning them one causes his colleague a direct financial loss.

When does this apply? Only when the person who burned the note admits that it had been validated in court, that it was for such and such an amount of money and that because it was burned the owner cannot collect the debt. If the person who burned the note does not believe the owner with regard to any of these points, he is required to pay only the value of the paper.

Similarly a person is liable for causing a colleague financial loss in the following situation. Reuven was owed money by Shimon and sold the promissory note recording the debt to Levi. After he sold the note, he waived Shimon's obligation, freeing Shimon of responsibility, as will be explained in its place.

Reuven becomes liable to pay Levi the entire amount mentioned in the promissory note, for he caused him to lose the money that he could have collected with the note. It is as if he destroyed it by fire. Similarly, if one of Reuven's heirs waived the debt, the person who waived the debt must make financial recompense for Levi's loss from the finest property in his possession.

Similarly, if a person designates a servant as an apotiki for a loan and then frees the servant, he is liable to pay the creditor, for he nullified his lien and caused him to lose his money. We also compel the creditor to free the servant, so that when he encounters him, he will not tell him: "You are my servant."

Similarly, if a person pushes a colleague and causes a coin belonging to him to fall from his hand and roll until it descends into the sea, he is liable to pay for it. Similarly, if a person blemishes the ear of a cow, he is obligated to make financial recompense, for he has reduced its value.

Similarly, a person who scrapes the surface of dinarim belonging to a colleague and removes their imprint is liable to pay, for he has caused him a loss. The same applies in all analogous situations.

When a person throws a utensil from a roof toward the earth without there being any pillows beneath it to soften its fall, and another person comes and breaks the utensil with a staff while it is in the air before it hits the earth, the person who breaks it is not liable. The rationale is that he broke only a utensil that would certainly have been broken immediately. And so, it is as if he is breaking a broken utensil. He is not considered to be one who caused damages. Similarly, anyone who performs analogous actions is not liable.

The following rule applies when a person, without the consent of the owner, slaughters an ox that was condemned to be slaughtered because it injures others, or cuts down a tree that was condemned to be cut down because it causes damage to others. He is liable to pay the owner as dictated by the judges, because he prevented him from performing a mitzvah.

If the person who caused the damage claims that the owner told him to slaughter the animal or cut down the tree, he is not liable since it was intended for that fate.

Similarly, if a person slaughters a beast or a fowl, and another person covers the blood without the consent of the slaughterer, he is liable to pay a fine as dictated by the judges.

There are authorities who rule that in such instances a fine of a fixed amount, ten gold pieces, should be paid. For they ruled that anyone who prevents a colleague from performing a positive commandment - that he is fit to perform - by performing it first, should pay the owner ten gold pieces.

When a person causes damage with his own hands, the damage is evaluated in the same way as it would have been evaluated if the damage had been caused by his property.

What is implied? If a person kills an animal belonging to a colleague or breaks one of his utensils, we evaluate the animal's previous worth and the worth of the carcass, or the utensil's previous worth and its present worth. The person who caused the damage must pay the difference to the owner together with the carcass or the broken utensil, as we have explained above with regard to damage caused by an ox. For the same principles prevail.

If a person treads grapes belonging to a colleague, we must evaluate the loss. The same principles apply in other analogous situations.

When the loss he caused is expropriated from the person who caused the damage, it should be expropriated from his movable property. If he has no movable property, it should be expropriated from the finest landed property that he owns.

Similarly, the fines to be paid by a rapist, a seducer or a person who spreads malicious gossip about his wife must be paid from the finest landed property that he owns.

When someone damages property belonging to a colleague and does not know the extent of the damage, the person whose property was damaged is given the prerogative of taking an oath according to the institutions of our Sages - as is a person whose property was stolen - and he may then collect the money that he claims. This applies provided he claims property that one might suppose that he did possess, as has been explained with regard to a person whose property was stolen.

What is implied? A person takes a wallet belonging to a colleague and throws it into the sea, or into a fire, or gives it to a person of force and thus causes it to be lost. The owner of the wallet claims that it was filled with gold coins, while the person who caused the damage says: "I do not know what it contained. Perhaps all it contained was earth or straw."

The person whose property was damaged is entitled to take an oath while holding a sacred article and collect the money he claims, provided he claims articles that we may assume that he owns or that were entrusted to him and would ordinarily be put in a wallet or the like.

If, however, it is not customary to place such articles in such containers, the owner is considered negligent and the person who caused the damage is not held liable.

What is implied? A person grabbed a filled covered leather sack or basket and threw it into the water or burned it. The person whose property was destroyed claimed that it was filled with pearls. His claim is not accepted, and the person who caused the damage is not required to take an oath. For it is not customary to place pearls in baskets or leather sacks.

If, however, the person whose property was damaged seizes property belonging to the person who caused the damage equivalent to the value of his claim, it should not be expropriated from him. Instead, he is required to take an oath that it contained pearls, and then he is able to keep their worth from the goods that he seized. The same laws apply in all analogous situations.

If the person who caused the damage knew that the wallet contained gold coins, but does not know their amount, and the person whose property was damaged claimed that it contained 1000 coins, the plaintiff's claim is accepted. He may collect 1000 gold coins without taking an oath provided he could be presumed [to possess such an amount of money]. For the defendant is required to take an oath, but cannot, as will be explained with regard to an entrusted object.

When a person informs about property belonging to a colleague and causes it to be taken by a strong, lawless person, he is required to reimburse the owner from the finest property in his possession. If the person who informs about the property dies, the owner may collect his due from his heirs, as is the law concerning others who cause damage.

Whether the strong, lawless person is a gentile or a Jew, the person who informs about the property to be taken by him is considered a moseir and is required to reimburse the owner for everything taken by the lawless person. This applies even if the moseir did not actually hand the other person's property over to the lawless person, but merely informed him about it.

When does the above apply? When the moseir showed the lawless person his colleague's property on his own volition. If, however, gentiles or Jews compelled a person to show them property belonging to a colleague, he is not liable to reimburse his colleague.

Nevertheless, should he physically give over his colleague's property to a lawless person, he is liable to reimburse his colleague even though he was forced to do so. The rationale is that a person who saves himself with money belonging to a colleague is obligated to reimburse him.

What is implied? A king decreed that wine, straw or the like should be brought to him. A moseir arose and said: "So and so has a storehouse of wine or straw in this and this place." If the king's servants went and took possession of the other person's property, the moseir is required to compensate him.

If the king compelled this moseir to go and show him the storehouses of wine or straw, or to show him property belonging to a colleague who is fleeing from the king, and the moseir showed him because of the compulsion, he is not liable. If he had not shown these resources to the king, he would have been beaten or killed.

If the moseir took his colleague's property and handed it to the lawless individual, he is liable to pay, although the king compelled him to do so.

When is he liable to pay if, under duress, he took his colleague's property and handed it to the lawless individual? When the property did not come into the lawless person's possession previously. Different laws apply if, however, the lawless person compelled a Jew to show him a colleague's property, and the lawless person stood over the colleague's property and it came into his possession.

If he then compelled a Jew to transport the colleague's property to another place, even if the person who transported the property is the moseir who showed it to the lawless person, the Jew is not liable. The rationale is that since the lawless person stood at the side of the storehouse, it is considered as if all its contents had been already destroyed; it is as if they had been consumed by fire.

The following rule applies when two litigants are involved in a dispute concerning landed or movable property, each one claiming that it belongs to him. If one of them turns the property in question over to a gentile, he should be placed under a ban of ostracism until he removes the lawless person from the situation, returns the circumstances to their former state and brings the matter for judgment in a Jewish court.

When a person was apprehended by gentiles because of a colleague, and his money was taken by them because of that colleague, the colleague is not liable to reimburse him.

The only instance that reimbursement is required from a colleague when a person is apprehended on that colleague's behalf is when a person is apprehended because of someone's failure to pay the head tax that is applied to all the inhabitants of a country each year, or because of the gift that every individual is required to give the king when he or his soldiers require hospitality. In these instances, the person who failed to pay is obligated to reimburse the person who made the payment, provided the money was taken from him explicitly on account of his colleague, and this took place in the presence of witnesses.

The following laws apply when there are witnesses that a person informed about property belonging to a colleague to a lawless person in a manner that obligates him for reimbursement - i.e., he pointed out his colleague's property on his own initiative or was compelled actually to bring the property to the lawless person, but the witnesses do not know the value of the loss he caused. If the person whose property was taken claims that he lost a specific amount, while the moseir denies that such a loss took place, and the person whose property was taken seizes property belonging to the moseir, it is not expropriated from him. Instead, the plaintiff is required to take an oath while holding a sacred article, and then he is entitled to maintain possession of the property he seized.

If the plaintiff did not seize the moseir's property, property may not be expropriated from the moseir unless there is definite proof of the extent of the loss he caused.

A moseir who showed a colleague's property to a lawless man on his own initiative is not given the prerogative of taking an oath. This applies both to a severe oath, or a sh'vuat hesset. For such a person is deemed wicked; there is no disqualifying factor greater than this.

When, however, a person was compelled to show a lawless man a colleague's property or compelled actually to bring this property to the lawless person, in which instance he is liable to pay, he is not deemed a wicked person. He may be liable to pay, but he is entitled to take an oath, like other worthy men.

It is forbidden to inform about a colleague to the gentiles and endanger his physical person or his property. This applies even when the person concerned is a wicked person who commits sins, and even if he causes one irritation and discomfort. Anyone who actually informs about a Jew and endangers his person or his property to the gentiles will not receive a portion in the world to come.

It is permissible to kill a moseir in any country, even in the present age, when the court no longer metes out capital punishment.

It is permitted to kill him before he informs. When he says: "I will inform on so and so and endanger his person and/or his property" - even property of minimal value - he has made it permissible for others to kill him.

He should be warned and told: "Do not inform." If he says brazenly, "No. I will inform about him," it is a mitzvah to kill him, and whoever kills him receives merit.

If the moseir carried out his threat and informed on a fellow Jew, it appears to me that it is forbidden to kill him, unless he has made it an established pattern to inform. In such an instance, he should be killed, lest he inform on others.

In the cities of the west, the common practice is to punish the mosrim who have made an established pattern of informing with regard to people's property, and to hand the mosrim over to gentiles to punish them, beat them and imprison them, according to their wicked ways.

Similarly, one who causes difficulty and irritation to the community may be handed over to the gentiles to be beaten, imprisoned and fined. It is, however, forbidden to hand over to gentiles a person for causing irritation to one individual.

It is forbidden to destroy property belonging to a moseir, although it is permitted to destroy his life. The reason is that his money is given to his heirs.

When a rodef pursues another Jew to kill or to rape him or her and breaks utensils - either those belonging to the person he is pursuing, or those belonging to another person - he is not liable to make financial restitution. The rationale is that he is liable to be killed, for pursuing another Jew warrants his own death.

When a person who is being pursued destroys utensils belonging to the rodef, he is not liable. The rationale is that the rodef's property should not be considered dearer than his life. If he breaks utensils belonging to others, he is liable. For a person who saves his own life with property belonging to someone else must make restitution.

When a person pursues a rodef to save the person he is pursuing, and in so doing breaks utensils - whether those belonging to the rodef or those belonging to another person - he is not liable. This does not follow the letter of the law, but is a Rabbinic ordinance, enacted so that a person will not refrain from trying to save his colleague, or will hesitate and proceed carefully while he chases after the rodef.

When a ship is about to sink because it is heavily loaded, and one person stands up and makes it lighter by jettisoning some of its cargo, he is not liable. For the cargo is considered like a rodef who is pursuing them to kill the passengers. On the contrary, by jettisoning the cargo and saving them, he performed a great mitzvah.

Blessed be God who grants assistance.

Introduction to Hilchos Rotzeach uShmirat Nefesh

They contain seventeen mitzvot: seven positive mitzvot and ten negative mitzvot. They are:
1) Not to murder;
2) Not to accept ransom from a murderer to save him from execution;
3) To exile a person who killed inadvertently;
4) Not to accept ransom from a person who killed inadvertently to save him from exile;
5) Not to kill a murderer directly after the murder, before he stands trial;
6) To save a person who is being pursued, by killing the pursuer;
7) Not to have mercy on the pursuer;
8) Not to stand idly by when a colleague's life is in danger;
9) To set aside cities of refuge, and to prepare the roads leading to them;
10) To break the neck of a calf in a wadi [when required];
11) Never to till or seed the land [where the calf was decapitated];
12) Not to create a dangerous situation;
13) To build a guardrail;
14) Not to cause a well-meaning person to blunder;
15) To help [a person whose animal collapses on a road] to unload it;
16) [Together with the owner] to reload [the animal];
17) Not to abandon him helpless, with his burden.

These mitzvot are explained in the chapters [that follow].

Whenever a person kills a human being, he transgresses a negative commandment, as Exodus 20:13 states: "Do not murder." If a person kills a Jew intentionally in the presence of witnesses, he should be executed by decapitation.

This is implied by Exodus 21:20, which states that when a person kills a servant, "vengeance will certainly be executed." The Oral Tradition explains that this refers to decapitation.

Whether he kills the victim with an iron weapon or burns him with fire, the murderer should be executed by decapitation.

It is a mitzvah for the blood redeemer to kill the murderer, as Numbers 35:19 states: "The blood redeemer shall put the murderer to death." Whoever is fit to inherit the victim's estate becomes the redeemer of his blood.

If the blood redeemer did not desire - or was unable - to kill the murderer, or if the victim did not have a relative to redeem his blood, the court executes the murderer by decapitation.

The following rules apply if a father kills his son. If the victim has a son, this son should kill his grandfather, because he is the blood redeemer. If he does not have a son, none of the victim's brothers becomes the blood redeemer who must kill his father. Instead, he should be executed by the court.

Both a male and a female may become blood redeemers.

The court is enjoined not to accept ransom from the murderer to save him from execution. Even if he gave all the money in the world, and even if the blood redeemer was willing to forgive him he should be executed.

The rationale is that the soul of the victim is not the property of the blood redeemer, but the property of the Holy One, blessed be He. And He commanded, Numbers 35:31: "Do not accept ransom for the soul of a murderer."

There is nothing that the Torah warned so strongly against as murder, as Ibid.:33 states: "Do not pollute the land in which you live, for blood will pollute the land."

When a murderer kills willfully, he should not be killed by witnesses or observers until he is brought to court and sentenced to death, as implied by Numbers 35:12 "A murderer should not be put to death until he stands before the congregation in judgment."

This law applies to all those liable for execution by the court, who transgressed and performed the forbidden act. They should not be executed until their trial is completed by the court.

When does the above apply? When the person has already transgressed and performed the transgression for which he is liable to be executed by the court. When, however, a person is pursuing a colleague with the intention of killing him - even if the pursuer is a minor - every Jewish person is commanded to attempt to save the person being pursued, even if it is necessary to kill the pursuer.

What is implied? If the rodef was warned and continues to pursue his intended victim, even though he did not acknowledge the warning, since he continues his pursuit he should be killed.

If it is possible to save the pursued by damaging one of the limbs of the rodef, one should. Thus, if one can strike him with an arrow, a stone or a sword, and cut off his hand, break his leg, blind him or in another way prevent him from achieving his objective, one should do so.

If there is no way to be precise in one's aim and save the person being pursued without killing the rodef, one should kill him, even though he has not yet killed his victim. This is implied by Deuteronomy 25:11-12, which states: "If a man is fighting with his brother, and the wife of one... grabs the attacker by his private parts, you must cut off her hand; you may not show pity."

There is no difference whether she grabs "his private parts" or any other organ that imperils his life. Similarly, the rodef may be a man or a woman. The intent of the verse is that whenever a person intends to strike a colleague with a blow that could kill him, the pursued should be saved by "cutting off the hand" of the rodef. If this cannot be done, the victim should be saved by taking the rodef's life, as the verse continues: "you may not show pity."

This, indeed, is one of the negative mitzvot - not to take pity on the life of a rodef.

On this basis, our Sages ruled that when complications arise and a pregnant woman cannot give birth, it is permitted to abort the fetus in her womb, whether with a knife or with drugs. For the fetus is considered a rodef of its mother.

If the head of the fetus emerges, it should not be touched, because one life should not be sacrificed for another. Although the mother may die, this is the nature of the world.

The laws of a rodef apply whether a person is pursuing a colleague with the intent of killing him, or a maiden that had been consecrated with the intent of raping her, as reflected by Deuteronomy 22:26, which establishes an equation between murder and rape, stating: "Just as when a man arises against his colleague and kills him, so too, is this matter i.e., the rape of a consecrated maiden."

The same principle is reflected by another verse within the passage, which states (Ibid.:27): "The consecrated maiden cried out, but there was no one to save her." Implied is that if there is someone who can save her, he must do so, using all means including taking the life of the pursuer.

The same laws apply with regard to any woman forbidden as an ervah, but not to relations with an animal. With regard to homosexual rape, by contrast, one may save a man from being raped by killing the intended rapist.

If one pursues an animal with the intent of sodomizing it, or one seeks to perform a forbidden labor on the Sabbath or to worship idols - although the Sabbath and the prohibition against idol worship are fundamental elements of our faith - the person should not be killed until he commits the transgression and is brought to court, convicted and executed.

If a person pursued a woman forbidden as an ervah, took hold of her and inserted the head of his organ within her, he may not be slain, even though he has not concluded sexual relations. He must be brought to court.

If a man was pursuing a woman forbidden as an ervah, and other men were pursuing him to save her, and she tells them, "Let him be, so that he does not kill me," they should not listen to her. Instead, he should be intimidated and prevented from raping her, by maiming his limbs. If he cannot be prevented by maiming his limbs, his life may be taken, as explained above.

When a person could prevent a murder or a rape by maiming the rodef's limbs, but did not take the trouble and instead saved the victim by killing the rodef, he is regarded as one who shed blood and is liable for death. Nevertheless, he should not be executed by the court.

Whenever a person can save another person's life, but he fails to do so, he transgresses a negative commandment, as Leviticus 19:16 states: "Do not stand idly by while your brother's blood is at stake."

Similarly, this commandment applies when a person sees a colleague drowning at sea or being attacked by robbers or a wild animal, and he can save him himself or can hire others to save him. Similarly, it applies when he hears gentiles or mosrim conspiring to harm a colleague or planning a snare for him, and he does not inform him and notify him of the danger.

And it applies when a person knows of a gentile or a man of force who has a complaint against a colleague, and he can appease the aggressor on behalf of his colleague, but he fails to do so. And similarly, in all analogous instances, a person who fails to act transgresses the commandment: "Do not stand idly by while your brother's blood is at stake."

When a person sees a rodef pursuing a colleague to kill him, or a woman forbidden as an ervah to rape her, and he has the potential to save the victim and yet fails to do so, he has negated the observance of the positive commandment: "You must cut off her hand," and has transgressed two negative commandments: "You may not show pity," and "Do not stand idly by while your brother's blood is at stake."

Even though lashes are not given as punishment for the transgression of these prohibitions - because they do not involve committing a forbidden deed - they are nevertheless very severe. For whoever causes the loss of a Jewish soul is considered as if he destroyed the entire world, and whoever saves a Jewish soul is considered as if he saved the entire world.