Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

A person who strikes a woman and causes her to miscarry is liable, even if her injury was caused unintentionally. He must compensate the woman's husband for the value of the fetus, and the woman for the injury and the pain.

How is the payment for the fetus assessed? We evaluate how much the woman would be worth before she gave birth, and how much she would be worth had she given birth. The difference between these two figures should be given to her husband.

If her husband died after she miscarried, the assessment should be given to his heirs. If a woman was struck after her husband died and she miscarried, the assessment for the fetus should also be given to the woman.

If the woman who miscarries was married to a convert, and a person injures her during the convert's lifetime, he must pay the assessment for the fetus to the husband. If the convert dies without leaving any heirs, he is not liable. If the woman is injured after the convert dies, she acquires the right to the assessment for the fetus.

If the woman was a maidservant or a gentile at the time of conception, and was freed or converted before the accident took place, the assessment for the fetus belongs to her.

When a person strikes a woman, and she miscarries and dies, he is not liable for payment, even if he struck her unintentionally.This law is derived as follows. Exodus 21:22 states: "If there will not be a fatal injury, he must certainly be punished financially." Thus, we see that Scripture did not distinguish between unintentional and intentional conduct with regard to an act punishable by execution by the court, and freed the perpetrator from financial liability in all instances.

When does the above apply? When the person intended to strike the woman. When, however, he intended to strike his colleague, but instead struck the woman - although she died - since he killed her without intention, this is considered a matter that does not involve capital punishment, and he is liable for the assessment for the fetus.

A person who strikes his father or his mother, but does not draw blood, is liable to pay the five assessments. If, however, he drew blood while striking his parents or injured a colleague on the Sabbath - even if he did so unintentionally - he is not liable for a financial penalty, because these sins are punishable by execution by the court. And as we explained, Scripture did not distinguish between unintentional and intentional conduct with regard to an act punishable by execution by the court, and freed the perpetrator from financial liability in all instances.

With regard to causing injury on the Sabbath, one might ask: "A person who causes injury is considered to be performing destructive activity, and one who performs destructive activity on the Sabbath is not liable for execution. Why then is the person who causes injury considered to be transgressing a sin punishable by execution by the court?"

The resolution is: since the person is satisfying his evil inclination by injuring his colleague, he is considered to be performing constructive activity. Thus, he is performing an act that is punishable by execution. Therefore, he is not liable for a financial penalty.

When a person injures a colleague on Yom Kippur, he is liable to pay financial compensation, even though he did so intentionally.

This is the halachah although he transgressed a sin that is punishable by lashes. Generally, whenever a deed that a person commits obligates the person to receive lashes and pay a financial penalty, he should be lashed and is not required to pay a financial penalty, for a person is never obligated for both lashes and a financial penalty. Although this is the general rule, an exception is made with regard to a person who injures a colleague. For the Torah specifically stated that a person who injures a colleague should pay compensation, as Exodus 21:19 states: "He shall pay unemployment compensation."

A person who injures a Canaanite servant whom he owns is not liable for any penalty. If he injures a Hebrew servant whom he owns, he is liable for all the assessments, with the exception of unemployment compensation.

When a person injures a Canaanite servant belonging to a colleague, the owner of the injured servant receives the five assessments. Even if he gave him powerful medication that caused the servant pain but healed him quickly, the owner is entitled to payment for all medical expenses.

Whenever a servant has been freed, but his bill of release has not been given to him yet, the penalty granted to the owner if the servant is killed by an ox is not paid because of him. If others injure him, he cannot collect the money for himself, because he is not a totally free man yet. Nor may his owner collect that money, because he no longer owns him.

For this reason, if an owner knocks out one of his servant's teeth, and then blinds his eye, he must free him because of his tooth, but he is not required to pay him because of the eye. If, however, the servant seizes the assessment that would be due him, it is not expropriated from him.

When a servant has been half-freed, he must work for his master one day, and may work for himself the next day.

The following rules apply if such a servant was embarrassed by a person, or one caused him pain, or he was gored by an ox, or the like. If this took place on the day on which he must work for his master, the master is entitled to the payment. If this took place on the day when he works for himself, he is entitled to the payment.

When a person injures a Hebrew servant belonging to another person, he is liable for all five assessments. Land should be purchased with the money, and the servant's master is entitled to the profits. When the servant is freed, the land is released from his owner's control.

If the servant was injured in a way that does not impair his work at all - e.g., the tip of his ear or the tip of his nose was cut off - the entire payment should be given to the servant, and his owner is not entitled to the benefit.

The following rules apply when a person injures a girl below the age of majority who is not his own daughter. If the injuries reduce the money her father would receive for consecrating her, the assessment should be given to her father. Similarly, the unemployment assessment should be given to her father, for her wages belong to him, and the money received for selling her as a servant belongs to him.

The assessments for pain, embarrassment and medical attention, by contrast, belong to the girl herself. Similarly, if the injuries do not reduce the money he would receive for consecrating her, the assessment should be given to [the daughter].

When a person injures his own daughter, he must pay her only the assessments for pain, medical attention and embarrassment.

The following rules apply when a person injures a married woman. The unemployment benefits and medical assessment should be given to her husband. With regard to shame and damages, the rules are: If the damage is plainly evident - e.g., he injured the woman's face, her neck, her hands or her arms - a third is given to her, and two thirds are given to her husband. If the damages are in concealed places, a third is given to her husband, and two thirds are given to her.

The assessment for the husband should be given to him immediately. The assessment for the woman should be used to purchase land, from which the husband is entitled to the profits.

When does the above apply? When others injured her. When, however, a husband injures his wife, he is required to pay her the entire assessment for the damages, the embarrassment and the pain. This money is hers entirely. The husband has no rights to the profits. If she desires to give the money to another person, she may. This is the ruling rendered by the geonim. The husband must pay for her medical expenses, as he pays for all her other medical expenses.

When a person injures his wife through sexual intercourse, he is liable for the damages.

The following rules apply when a woman injures her husband. In a case where he had added an amount above the minimum to her marriage contract, if the husband desires, we require her to sell the right to this additional amount to her husband for the price she would receive for it, and her husband is entitled to collect the damages from these funds. If he desires, he may divorce her and collect the damages from the entire sum of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

If he had not added an amount above the minimum to her marriage contract, she may not sell him the rights to the money due her by virtue of her ketubah itself, for it is forbidden for a person to remain married to a woman for one moment without a marriage contract. Thus, if the husband desires, he may have a promissory note written obligating her to pay for the damages, or he may divorce her and collect the amount due him from the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

The following rules apply when a person injures his sons who have attained majority. If they are not dependent on him for their livelihood, he must pay them the damages immediately. If they are below the age of majority, he should purchase land for them with the money due them for the damages, and they are entitled to the benefits. The same rules apply if they are injured by others.

If a father injures sons who are dependent on him for their livelihood, he is not liable. This applies whether or not they are above majority. If others injure them, the person who causes the injury must compensate them immediately if they are above majority. If they are below majority, the damages should be used to purchase landed property. They are entitled to its profits until they reach majority at which time the property becomes theirs without limitation.

An encounter with a deaf mute, a mentally incompetent individual or a minor is undesirable. For if a person injures them, he is liable, but if they injure another person, they are not.

Even if the deaf mute gains the ability to speak and hear, the mentally incompetent person attains competency, and the minor comes of age, they are not obligated to pay for injuries they caused previously. For at the time they caused the injuries, they were not fully mentally competent.

An encounter with a servant or a married woman is undesirable. For if a person injures them, he is liable, but if they injure another person, they are not liable to pay immediately.

They must, however, pay afterwards - i.e., if the woman is divorced or if her husband dies and if the servant is freed. They are held responsible because they are mentally competent. They are considered as a creditor who has no resources with which to pay, and who is thus held liable with regard to damages if he becomes wealthy.

A servant belonging to a man is considered as his own person, and an animal as one of his possessions.

What is implied? If a person places a burning coal on the heart of a servant belonging to a colleague and causes him to die, or if he pushes him into the sea or into a fire from which the servant could ascend, but the servant fails to do so and died instead, the person who caused his death is not obligated to pay financial compensation. If, however, he does this to an animal belonging to a colleague, it would be considered as if he had placed a coal on a garment and burned it, in which case he would be liable for damages. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

It is forbidden for a person to injure anyone, neither his own self nor another person. Not only a person who causes an injury, but anyone who strikes in strife an upright Jewish person, whether a minor or an adult, whether a man or a woman, violates a negative commandment, as Deuteronomy 25:3 states: "Do not continue... to flog him." One may conclude that if the Torah adjures us against adding to the blows due a sinner, surely this prohibition applies with regard to striking a righteous person.

It is even forbidden to raise up one's hand against a colleague. Whoever raises a hand against a colleague, even though he does not hit him, is considered to be a wicked person.

When a person strikes a colleague with a blow that does not warrant a p'rutah to be paid in recompense, he should receive lashes. For there is no financial penalty to be exacted for transgression of this negative commandment.

Even if a person strikes a servant belonging to a colleague with a blow that does not warrant a p'rutah to be paid in recompense, he should receive lashes. This penalty is required because a servant is obligated to perform certain mitzvot.

If a gentile strikes a Jew, he deserves capital punishment, as implied by Exodus 2:12): "He turned to and fro... and struck the Egyptian."

Our Sages imposed a penalty on foolish and violent men, and gave a person who was injured the following privilege. His word is accepted when he takes an oath while holding a sacred article that another person caused him such and such an injury, and he is awarded the appropriate damages. This applies provided there are witnesses.

What is implied? Two people testify that the injured person entered the domain of the accused whole and left after being injured, but they did not see the injury being inflicted. Although the accused claims not to have inflicted the injury, since the injured person claims that he did, the injured person is given the prerogative of taking an oath and collecting the money due.

When does the above apply? When the injury was located in a place where the person could have inflicted it upon himself, or a third person was there whom the injured person could have instructed to strike him to implicate the accused. If, however, a third party was not present, and the injury was in a place that the injured could not have inflicted upon himself - e.g., he was bitten between his shoulders and the like - he may collect the appropriate payment without an oath.

If the person who caused the injury admits causing it, he is liable to pay all five assessments. For there are witnesses that the injured person entered the accused's domain of sound body at the time of the quarrel and departed with an injury.

If, however, there are no witnesses there at all, the injured person states: "This person injured me," and the accused admits doing so, he is not liable for the assessments for damages and the pain. He is, however, liable for the assessments for unemployment, embarrassment and medical attention, because of his own admission.

For this reason, if he denies causing the injury, he can free himself of liability by taking a Rabbinic oath.

Why should a person pay these three assessments on the basis of his own admission? The assessments for unemployment and medical attention represent a financial obligation and are not considered to be k'nasot. For if he does not reimburse the injured person for them, he will have caused him to forfeit the money he spent on medical treatment and the money he lost through unemployment.

And with regard to embarrassment, it was when he admitted before the court that he caused the injury, that he brought about the embarrassment. For when an injury is caused in private, a person is not caused any embarrassment. It is his admission before the court that embarrasses him.

From this one can conclude that there is no difference with regard to the embarrassment assessment, whether that assessment is due him because he caused the person to be embarrassed in the presence of others, or it is due him because he made an acknowledgement in the presence of others of the embarrassment he caused. Therefore, a person is liable for an embarrassment assessment because of his own statements.

A person who damages a colleague's property cannot be compared to one who injures his physical person. When a person who damages a colleague's property pays him what he is obligated to pay him, he receives atonement. In contrast, when a person injures a colleague's physical person, paying him the five assessments is not alone sufficient to generate atonement. Even if the person who caused the injury sacrifices all the rams of Nevayot, he cannot generate atonement, nor is his sin forgiven until he asks the person who was injured to forgive him.

It is forbidden for the person who suffered the injury to be cruel and not to forgive the one who caused the injury. This is not the course of behavior for a descendant of Israel.

Instead, since the person who caused the injury asks and pleads of him for forgiveness once or twice, and he knows that he has repented from his sin and regrets his evil deeds, he should forgive him. Whoever hastens to grant forgiveness is praiseworthy and is regarded favorably by the Sages.

There is another difference between the damages to an individual's physical person and to his property. If a person tells a colleague: "Blind my eye..." or "Cut off my arm, and you will not be liable," he is liable for the five assessments. The rationale is that it is well known that a person does not genuinely desire this.

When, by contrast, a person tells a colleague: "Tear my garment..." or "Break my jug, and you will not be liable," he is not liable. If, however, he did permit him to damage his property, but did not stipulate that he would not be liable, he is obligated to pay for the damages.

When does the above apply? When first the person entrusted the articles to the person who destroyed them as a watchman - i.e., he borrowed them or was entrusted with them for safekeeping. In such a situation, if the owner told the watchman to break it or rip it, and the watchman did so, the watchman is liable to pay for the damages, unless the owner explicitly stipulated that the watchman would not be held liable.

When, however, the owner of an article tells a colleague: "Take this utensil and break it," "Take this garment and rip it," if the other person follows the instructions he was given, he is not liable.

When a person tells a colleague: "Break a utensil belonging to so and so, and you will not be liable," and the listener follows these instructions, the listener is liable financially. It is as if he told him: "Blind so-and-so's eye, and you will not be liable."

Although the person who caused the damages is liable to pay, the person who gave him the instructions is considered to be his partner in the transgression and a wicked person. For he caused a blind man to stumble, and supported a person who committed a transgression.

A person who damages property belonging to a colleague is obligated to pay the full extent of the damages. Regardless of whether he did so unintentionally or because of forces beyond his control, it is considered as if he had acted intentionally.

What is implied? If a person fell off a roof and broke utensils, or tripped while he was walking, fell on a utensil and broke it, he is liable to pay the full extent of the damages. This is implied by Leviticus 24:21, which states: "A person who strikes an animal will pay for the damages," without distinguishing between an intentional and unintentional blow.

The same laws (i.e., that the person who caused the damage should pay for it, as indicated by the proof-text) apply whether one kills an animal belonging to a colleague, breaks his utensils, tears his garments or cuts down crops or trees he planted.

When does the above apply? When the damage is done in a domain belonging to the person whose possessions were damaged. If the damage was done in a domain belonging to the person who caused the damage, he is not required to pay unless he purposely caused the damage. If he caused the damage unintentionally or due to forces beyond his control, he is not liable.

Similarly, if both of them were present in a domain belonging to a third party with his permission - or without his permission - and one unintentionally damaged property belonging to the other, the person who caused the damage is not liable.

The following rules apply when a person was climbing a ladder and the rung of the ladder broke under him, and it fell and caused damage. If the rung was not tightly fit or it was not strong enough to bear the person's weight, he is liable. If it was tightly fit and strong enough to bear the person's weight, but it slipped from its place or rotted, the person is not liable. For this is an act of God. The same concepts apply in all analogous situations.

All the above applies if the damage takes place in the domain belonging to the person whose possessions were damaged. If the damage takes place in the domain belonging to the person who causes the damage, he is not liable unless he intentionally causes the damage, as explained above.

If another person filled a courtyard belonging to a colleague with jugs of wine and oil, the owner of the courtyard may enter and leave in an ordinary manner. If any of the jugs break when he enters or leaves, he is not liable for them. This applies even if the jugs were brought in with the permission of the owner of the courtyard, as long as the owner of the courtyard did not accept responsibility for watching them.

If, however, the owner of the courtyard broke the jugs intentionally, he is liable to pay for them. This applies even if the jugs were brought in without the permission of the owner of the courtyard.

When one ox climbs on top of another ox with the intention of killing it in a domain belonging to the owner of the lower ox, and the owner of the lower ox pulls his ox away to save it, thus causing the upper ox to fall and die, the owner of the lower ox is not liable. This applies regardless of whether the ox that attacked was tam or mu'ad.

The following rules apply when the owner of the lower ox pushes the upper ox, and it dies. If he could have pulled one ox away, so that the attacking ox would not be pushed violently, and he did not do so, he is liable. If he could not have pulled an ox away, he is not liable.

The following rules apply when two people were walking in the public domain. If one approached carrying a jug, and the other approached carrying a beam, and the person's jug was broken by the other's beam, the owner of the beam is not liable. The rationale is that they both have permission to walk in this domain.

If the owner of the beam was walking ahead and the owner of the jug following afterwards, and the jug was broken on the beam, the owner of the beam is not liable. If the owner of the beam stood still to rest because of the weight of his burden, and the jug was broken on the beam, the owner of the beam is liable. If the owner of the beam warned the owner of the jug and told him to stand still, the owner of the beam is not liable.

If the owner of the beam stood still to adjust his burden, he is considered as if he is walking, and he is not liable. This applies even if he failed to warn the owner of the jug, for he is preoccupied with his own progress.

If the owner of the jug was walking ahead, and the owner of the beam following afterwards, and the jug was broken on the beam, the owner of the beam is liable. It is considered as if he broke the jug intentionally with his hands. If the owner of the jug stood to rest, the owner of the beam is not liable. If, however, the owner of the jug warned the owner of the beam and told him to stand, the owner of the beam is liable. If the owner of the jug stood still to adjust his burden, the owner of the beam is liable, even if the owner of the jug did not warn him.

Similar principles apply if one person proceeds while carrying a lamp, and another comes carrying flax, or in other analogous situations.

When two people were proceeding in the public domain, one of them was running and one was walking, and one was injured by the other unintentionally, the one who is running is liable, for he is departing from the norm.

If it was Friday afternoon, after sunset, when the collision took place, he is not liable. For he has permission to run at that time, so that the Sabbath will not enter when he is not ready to accept it. If both individuals were running, and one injured the other, neither is liable. This applies even on other days.

There is no difference whether a person injures a colleague with his hand, injures him by throwing a stone or shooting an arrow, opens a current of water on a person or on utensils and damages him or them, or spits or sneezes and causes damage with his spittle or mucus while it is being propelled by his power. All of these are considered derivatives of damage that a person causes, and he is liable for all of them, as if he had caused the damage with his hands.

If, however, the spittle or the mucus came to rest on the ground, and afterwards a person slips on them, the person who spat or sneezed is liable as if it were a cistern. For every obstacle is considered a derivative of a cistern, as we have previously explained.

When a blacksmith who was beating with a hammer on an anvil causes a spark to fly from beneath the hammer, and the spark causes damage, the blacksmith is liable. It is as if he threw a stone or an arrow.

Similarly, if a builder who is contracted to tear down a wall cracks the stones or causes other damage, he is liable. If he is tearing down one side of a wall, and the stones on the other side fall, he is not liable. If they fall because of his blows, he is liable. For this is considered like shooting arrows and causing damage.

A person who holds under water an animal belonging to a colleague, or if an animal fell into water and he prevented it from ascending and thus caused it to die in the water, or if he left it in the sun and restricted its movement so that it could not find shade until the sun killed it - in all these, and in any analogous situations, the perpetrator of these acts is liable to pay for the animal's loss.

If two people kill an animal together or break a utensil together, the damages are divided between them.

Our Sages ruled in the following manner concerning the liability in the situation to be described. Five people placed their five burdens on an animal and it did not die, and then a sixth person came and placed his burden upon it, and it did die. If the animal was walking while carrying the previous burdens, and it stood still and did not walk when the last person placed its burden upon it, the last person is liable.

If at the outset, the animal was not walking, the last person is not liable. If it is not known whether or not the animal was walking, all the six people should share the damages equally.

Similarly, if five people sat on a chair and it did not break, and then another person sat down upon it and it did break, the last person who sat down is liable. Although it was fit to break before he sat down, he is responsible, since he caused it to break sooner. For the others could say to him: "Had you not used it for support, we would have stood up before it broke."

If they all sat down at the same time, they are all liable. The same rules apply in other analogous situations.

Our Sages divided the liability for the damages in situations when a man and an ox combined to push into a cistern a person, utensils, or an ox that was disqualified for use as a sacrifice. If the person or the animal pushed into the cistern was injured or died, or the utensils were broken, all three - the person who pushed, the owner of the ox and the owner of the cistern - are liable, and the damages should be divided among them in the following manner.

With regard to the payment for offspring which were aborted because of the fall and the four assessments other than damages, the man is liable, and the owner of the ox and the owner of the cistern are not liable. With regard to the atonement fine and the fine of 30 shekalim for killing a servant, the owner of the ox is liable, and the man and the owner of the cistern are not liable. With regard to the destruction of utensils and the death of an animal that was disqualified as a sacrifice, the man and the owner of the ox are liable, and the owner of the cistern is not liable.