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Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Nedarim - Chapter 10, Nedarim - Chapter 11, Nedarim - Chapter 12

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Nedarim - Chapter 10

1

When a person takes a vow or an oath, saying: "I will not taste [food] today," he is forbidden only until nightfall.1 [If he said]: "I will not taste food for one day," he is forbidden [to eat] for a twenty-four hour period after taking his vow. Accordingly, even though he is permitted [to eat] after nightfall, one who takes a vow "not to taste [food] today" should not eat after nightfall until he asks a sage [to retract his vow]. [This is] a decree lest he take an oath another time not to eat for an entire day and eat after nightfall. For people at large do not know the difference between these two situations.

א

הנודר או הנשבע שאיני טועם היום אינו אסור אלא עד שתחשך שאיני טועם יום אחד אסור מעת לעת משעת נדרו לפיכך הנודר שאני טועם היום אע"פ שהוא מותר משתחשך לא יאכל משתחשך עד שישאל לחכם גזירה שמא ישבע פעם אחרת יום אחד ויאכל משתחשך שהרי אין כל העם יודעים הפרש שבין זה לזה:

2

When one takes a vow, saying: "I will not taste [food] a day," there is an unresolved question.2 [Hence] he is forbidden to [eat] for an entire day, as if he had said "for one day." If he eats after nightfall, he does not receive lashes.3

When one takes a vow, saying: "I will not taste [food] during this week,"4 he is forbidden to eat during the remainder of the week and on the Sabbath, but he is permitted on Sunday.5 [When he says:] "I will not taste [a type of food]6 for one week," he is forbidden to eat [that type of food] for seven full days. If he says "[I will not eat a type of food] a week," there is an unresolved question. [Hence] he is forbidden to [eat that type of food] for seven full days. If he eats after the Sabbath, he does not receive lashes, as we explained.7

ב

נדר שאני טועם יום הרי זה ספק ואסור מעת לעת כאומר יום אחד ואם אכל אחר שחשיכה אינו לוקה שאני טועם שבת זו הרי זה אסור בשאר ימי השבת וביום השבת והרי הוא מותר מאחד בשבת שאני טועם שבת אחת הרי זה אסור שבעה ימים מעת לעת אמר שבת סתם ולא פירש לא אחת ולא זו הרי ספק ואסור שבעה ימים מעת לעת ואם אכל אחר שבת אינו לוקה כמו שבארנו:

3

[When one takes a vow, saying:] "I will not drink [wine] during this month," he is forbidden in the remaining days of the month. He is, however, permitted on the day of the following Rosh Chodesh even if the month is lacking.8 [If he took a vow, saying]: "I will not drink [wine] for an entire month," he is forbidden for 30 full days. [If he said]: I will not drink [wine] for a month," he is forbidden for 30 full days because of the unresolved question.9

ג

שאני שותה חדש זה אסור בשאר ימי החדש אבל ביום ראש חודש יהיה מותר אף על פי שהיה חדש חסר שאני טועם חדש אחד אסור שלשים יום גמורים מעת לעת נדר חדש סתם אסור שלשים יום מעת לעת מספק:

4

[When one takes a vow, saying:] "I will not eat meat this year," even if there is only one day left in the year,10 he is forbidden only that day and is permitted to eat [meat] on Rosh HaShanah. For the beginning of the year with regard to vows is Rosh Chodesh Tishrei.11

[If he says:] "I will not eat [meat] for one year," he is forbidden for a complete year12 from day to day. If it is a leap year,13 he is forbidden in that year and in the extra month. [If he says]: "I will not eat [meat] for a year," he is forbidden for a complete year from day to day, because of the unresolved question as explained.14

ד

שאני אוכל בשר שנה זו אפילו לא נשאר מן השנה אלא יום אחד אין אסור אלא אותו היום וביום ראש השנה מותר וראש השנה לנדרים הוא יום ראש חדש תשרי שאני אוכל שנה אחת הרי זה אסור שנה תמימה מיום ליום ואם נתעברה השנה אסור בה ובעיבורה שאני אוכל שנה הרי זה אסור שנה תמימה מיום ליום מספק כמו שבארנו:

5

[When one takes a vow, saying:] "I will not drink wine this seven-year cycle," he is forbidden in the remaining years of the seven year cycle and in the Sabbatical year.15 He is not permitted until Rosh HaShanah of the year after the Sabbatical year.

[If he says:] "I will not drink wine for a seven-year cycle," he is forbidden for seven full years from day to day. [If he says: "I will not drink wine] this Jubilee cycle, he is forbidden in the remaining years of the Jubilee cycle and in the fiftieth year itself.16

ה

שאני שותה יין שבוע זה אסור בשאר שני השבוע ובשנת השמטה ואינו מותר אלא מראש השנה של מוצאי שביעית שאני שותה יין שבוע אחד אסור שבע שנים גמורות מיום ליום אמר יובל זה אסור בשאר שני היובל ובשנת חמשים עצמה:

6

[The following rules apply when one says:] "I will not drink wine until Rosh Chodesh Adar: If it was a leap year, but he did not know that it was a leap year when he took the vow, he is forbidden only until Rosh Chodesh Adar I.17 If he took the vow until the end of Adar, he is forbidden until the end of Adar II.18 If he did know that it was a leap year, he is forbidden until Rosh Chodesh Adar II.19

ו

שאני שותה יין עד ראש אדר אם היתה שנה מעוברת ולא ידע שהיא מעוברת כשנדר אינו אסור אלא עד ראש חדש אדר ראשון ואם נדר עד סוף אדר הרי זה אסור עד סוף אדר שני ואם ידע שהשנה מעוברת ונדר עד ראש אדר אסור עד ראש אדר שני:

7

When a person forbids himself from benefiting from a substance until Pesach, whether he said "until before Pesach" or "until Pesach," he is only forbidden until the holiday commences. If he says: "while it is Pesach,"20 he is forbidden until Pesach concludes. If he said: "until the wheat harvest" or "until the grape harvest," or "while it is the grape harvest" or "while it is the wheat harvest," he is forbidden only until that time arrives.21

ז

האוסר עצמו בדבר עד הפסח בין שאמר עד פני הפסח בין שאמר עד הפסח אינו אסור אלא עד שיגיע בלבד ואם אמר עד שיהיה הפסח הרי אסור עד שיצא הפסח אמר עד הקציר או עד הבציר או שאמר עד שיהיה הבציר או הקציר אינו אסור אלא עד שיגיע:

8

This is the general principle: Whenever there is a fixed time22 for a subject mentioned in a vow, he is forbidden only until that time comes. If he words [his vow] "as long as it is," he is forbidden until that time concludes. Whenever a subject does not have a fixed time - like the time of the wheat harvest or the grape harvest23 - whether he said "until" or "while it is," he is forbidden only until that time arrives.24

ח

זה הכלל כל שזמנו קבוע ונדר עדיו אין אסור אלא עד שיגיע ואם נדר עד שיהיה הרי זה אסור עד שיצא וכל שאין לו זמן קבוע כגון זמן הקציר והבציר בין שנדר עדיו בין שנדר עד שיהיה אינו אסור אלא עד שיגיע:

9

When a person forbids himself [from benefiting from] a substance until the kayitz,25 he is forbidden until the people in his place begin bringing in baskets of figs. [If he vowed] until the katzir, [he is forbidden] until people will harvest wheat, but not barley.26

If he explicitly said: "...until the kayitz passes," he is forbidden until the majority of the people fold up the mats they have set aside to dry figs and grapes to produce dried figs and raisins.27 Everything depends on the local practice in the place where the person took his vow.28

ט

האוסר עצמו בדבר עד הקיץ הרי אסור עד שיתחילו אנשי המקום שנדר בו להכניס כלכלות תאנים עד הקציר עד שיתחילו העם לקצור קציר חטים אבל לא קציר שעורים פירש ואמר עד שיעבור הקיץ הרי זה אסור עד שיכפלו העם רוב המחצלאות שבמוקצה שמיבשין עליהם תאנים וענבים לעשותם גרוגרות וצמוקים הכל לפי מקום נדרו של נודר:

10

What is implied? If he took a vow in a valley and forbid himself [from benefiting] from a substance until the kayitz and then moved to a mountainous region,29 he should not pay attention to the time whether or not the fig harvest has begun in the place where he is at present. Instead, [he is concerned] with when it begins in the place where he took the vow and that is what he follows.30 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.31

י

כיצד הרי שנדר בבקעה ואסר עצמו בדבר עד הקיץ ועלה להר אינו מסתכל בקיץ של מקום שהוא בו עתה אם הגיע אם לא הגיע אלא בקיץ של מקום שנדר בו ועליו הוא סומך וכן כל כיוצא בזה:

11

When a person forbids himself [from benefiting] from a substance until "the rains," he is forbidden until the rainy season which in Eretz Yisrael [begins] on Rosh Chodesh Kislev. When the time of the rainy season arrives, he is released [from his vow] whether it rains or not. If, however, it rained from the seventeenth of MarCheshvan, he is released.32

If he said: "...Until it rains," he is forbidden until it rains, provided it rains from the second phase of the preliminary rainy season.33 In Eretz Yisrael and in the places close to it, this is from the twenty-third of MarCheshvan onward. If he explicitly said: "...until the rains cease," he is forbidden until the conclusion of Pesach in Eretz Yisrael and in the places like it.34

יא

האוסר עצמו בדבר עד הגשם הרי זה אסור עד זמן הגשמים שהוא בארץ ישראל ראש חדש כסליו הגיע זמן הגשמים הרי זה מותר בין ירדו גשמים בין לא ירדו ואם ירדו גשמים משבעה עשר במרחשון הרי זה מותר ואם אמר עד הגשמים הרי זה אסור עד שירדו הגשמים והוא שירדו מזמן רביעה שניה שהוא בארץ ישראל ומקומות הסמוכין לה מכ"ג במרחשון ואילך ואם פירש ואמר עד שיפסקו הגשמים הרי זה אסור עד שיעבור הפסח בארץ ישראל ובמקומות שהם כמותה:

12

When a person has his wife bound by a vow in MarCheshvan, telling her: "You may not benefit from me from now until Pesach if you go to your father's house from now until Sukkot," she is forbidden to benefit from him immediately. [This is] a decree for perhaps she will go.35 If she went before Pesach and derived benefit from him before Pesach, he is liable for lashes.36

If Pesach passed, even though the stipulation has expired,37 it is forbidden for him to treat the vow casually and allow her to go [to her father's home] and derive benefit from him.38 Instead, he should treat her as if it is forbidden until Sukkot as he vowed. [This applies] even though he made the vow dependent on a time that has already passed. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. If she went [to her father's home] after Pesach, she is not forbidden to benefit from him.39

יב

מי שהדיר את אשתו במרחשון ואמר לה שאין את נהנית לי מכאן ועד הפסח אם תלכי לבית אביך מהיום ועד סכות הרי זו אסורה ליהנות לו מיד גזירה שמא תלך ואם הלכה לפני הפסח והרי הוא מהנה אותה לפני הפסח הרי זה לוקה עבר הפסח אע"פ שהלך התנאי הרי זה אסור לנהוג חולין בנדרו ולהניחה שתלך ותהנה אלא נוהג בה איסור עד החג כמו שנדר ואף על פי שתלה הנדר באיסור זמן שעבר וכן כל כיוצא בזה ואם הלכה אחר הפסח אינה אסורה מליהנות לו:

13

If he told her: "You may not benefit from me from now until Sukkot if you go to your father's house from now until Pesach," she is forbidden to benefit from him immediately.40 If she went [to her father's home] before Pesach and he gave her benefit, he is subject to lashes. She remains forbidden to him until Sukkot.41 After Pesach arrives, she is permitted to go to her father's house.42

יג

אמר לה שאין את נהנית לי עד החג אם תלכי לבית אביך עד הפסח אסורה ליהנות מיד ואם הלכה לפני הפסח ונמצא מהנה אותה הרי זה לוקה ואסורה בהנייתו עד החג ומותרת לילך לבית אביה משהגיע הפסח:

Footnotes
1.

For that is the end of the day in halachic terms.

2.

Nedarim 60a discusses this issue without reaching a conclusion.

3.

I.e., for lashes are not given when there is a doubt.

4.

The Rambam uses the Hebrew term Shabbat, which literally means "Sabbath." Nevertheless, his intent (and that of his source, Nedarim 60a) is obviously a week and not the holy day itself.

When stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 220:3) uses the term shavua for "week," rather than Shabbat. The Turei Zahav 220:2 states that the Shulchan Aruch's ruling applies when the person taking the vow speaks in lashon hakodesh, "the holy tongue." If, however, he would speak in Yiddish and say di voch, "this week," the Sabbath is not included, because the term voch implies ordinary, weekdays that are different in nature than the holy Sabbath.

5.

Even if a week has not passed since the vow was taken. The Radbaz states that the vow takes effect only when it is made during the week. If, however, it is made on the Sabbath, it takes effect only on the Sabbath itself, for the week has already concluded.

6.

We are forced to say that he is referring only to one type of food. For if a person takes a vow that he will not eat at all for an entire week, the vow does not take effect, for it is impossible that he will fulfill it. See Hilchot Sh'vuot 1:7.

7.

In the first clause of this halachah.

8.

A month which is lacking is a month of 29 days [as opposed to a month of 30 days; see Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh, chs. 1-3, which discusses the principles determining when a month is given only 29 days and when it is given 30].

The commentaries question why the Rambam (based on Nedarim 60b) speaks of the month being lacking. Seemingly, it is quite obvious that if there are only 29 days in a month, one would be permitted on Rosh Chodesh in the next month. The new month has already begun. A point that has to be made is that even if there are 30 days in a month, one is permitted to partake of wine on the thirtieth day. Since it is Rosh Chodesh of the coming month, the vow has concluded even though the date is the thirtieth of the previous month.

The Radbaz explains that this in fact is the Rambam's intent, even though his wording is somewhat difficult to explain in that manner. This interpretation is reflected in the wording of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 220:4). The Or Sameach offers a different interpretation, stating that when a month has only 29 days, sometimes the conjunction of the sun and the moon does not take place until the first day of the new month. Even so, since it is already Rosh Chodesh, the vow is concluded.

9.

As explained in the previous halachah.

10.

I.e., he made the vow on the twenty-ninth of Elul.

11.

Although Rosh Chodesh Nisan is considered the beginning of the year in certain contexts, this does not apply with regard to vows.

12.

I.e., a full year on the Jewish calendar.

13.

And a month is added. See Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh, ch. 4.

14.

In Halachah 2.

15.

Like the Sabbath is the conclusion of the week, the Sabbatical year is the conclusion of the seven year cycle (Radbaz).

16.

For the Jubilee year is considered as the conclusion of the 50 year cycle.

17.

For his intent was Adar that follows Shvat.

18.

For his intent was to remain forbidden for the entire time referred to as Adar. This applies whether he knew that it was a leap year or not (Radbaz).

19.

There is a difference of opinion among the Sages (Nedarim 63a) which of the two months Adar is considered as Adar and which is the additional month. There are other authorities who follow a different version of the passage in Nedarim and maintain that he is always forbidden only until the beginning of Adar I.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 220:8) mentions the Rambam's view as a minority opinion. The commentaries note that in other places in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 43:28, Rama, Even HaEzer 126:7), the Rambam's view is not cited at all.

20.

We have translated the expression to fit the meaning given it by the Rambam.

21.

The rationale for this ruling is explained in the following halachah.

22.

Like Pesach which lasts for seven days (eight in the Diaspora) as prescribed by the Torah.

23.

There is no fixed time for the harvest's conclusion, for that depends on how plentiful it will be.

24.

For we do not assume that he took a vow of undetermined length.

25.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 8:3), the Rambam defines this as referring to the period from the end of Tammuz until the end of Elul when figs ripen and are ready for harvesting.

26.

The wheat harvest is several weeks after the barley harvest. Since wheat is the more important crop, it is given prominence (Kessef Mishneh).

27.

The figs and grapes would be laid out upon the mats to dry in the sun.

28.

As the Rambam explains in the following halachah.

29.

A mountainous region is cooler in the summer than a valley and the figs there will ripen later.

30.

For that was his intent when he took the vow. It does not matter if this leads to a more lenient ruling or a more stringent one [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 220:13).

31.

E.g., if he took a vow until the katzir in a place where the primary crop is barley, he is forbidden until the beginning of the barley harvest (ibid.:14).

32.

The seventeenth of MarCheshvan begins the first phase of the rainy season. Although it is really an extension of the summer and not the beginning of the winter (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Pe'ah 7:5), rain at that time is not considered a chance occurrence and the vow is released. See Hilchot Ta'aniot 3:1-2 and Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 1:11 which also discuss these times for rain.

33.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam interprets the term reviah as referring to the time when rain descends, explaining that it is similar to the term used for impregnating a woman, because in both cases, the potential for life is granted.

34.

For that is when the rains cease there. In the Diaspora, different laws apply with regard to all these expressions according to the local conditions.

35.

And thus retroactively, she will be forbidden to derive benefit from the time the vow was taken. Had she been allowed to derive benefit, after she broke the vow, it would be a transgression.

36.

For he allowed her to benefit from his property, thus committing a transgression. The woman is not liable for lashes (Radbaz). Others (Rashba, Rosh, Nedarim 57b) differ with the Rambam and maintain that the woman is liable for lashes.

37.

For she did not benefit from him until Pesach.

38.

The Merkevat HaMishneh explains that he should continue to withhold benefit from her, for that is the only way that he can insure that she will keep the vow. The Ra'avad and others differ with the Rambam concerning the need for this safeguard and their view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 220:22).

39.

For the time for the stipulation has passed.

40.

As above.

41.

I.e., even if he was subjected to lashes for one transgression.

42.

Because the term of the vow was completed. This applies even if she broke the vow and went before Pesach (Radbaz).

Nedarim - Chapter 11

1

[The following rules apply with regard to] a male minor who is twelve years and one day old1 and a female minor who is eleven years and one day old who took an oath or a vow, whether a vow forbidding something to them or a vow consecrating an article. We investigate them and ask them [questions]. If they know for Whose sake they took the vow2 or for Whose sake they consecrated [the article] or took the oath, their vows and their consecration are binding.3 If they do not know, their vows and their statements are of no consequence.

It is necessary to make an investigation throughout the entire twelfth year of a female minor and the entire thirteenth year of a male minor.4

א

קטן בן שתים עשרה שנה ויום אחד וקטנה בת אחת עשרה שנה ויום אחד שנשבעו או נדרו בין נדרי איסר בין נדרי הקדש בודקין אותן ושואלין אותן אם יודעין לשם מי נדרו ולשם מי הקדישו ונשבעו נדריהן קיימים והקדשן הקדש ואם לא ידעו אין בנדריהם ובדבריהם כלום וצריכין בדיקה כל השנה כולה שהוא שנת י"ב לקטנה ושנת י"ג לקטן:

2

What is implied? A minor took a vow or consecrated [property] at the beginning of the year, they were questioned, it was discovered that they knew [for Whose sake the vow was taken], and the vow was maintained. If they took another vow, even at the end of this year, they must be questioned again [for the vow] to be maintained. We do not say: "Since they were knowledgeable at the beginning of the year, they no longer have to be questioned. Instead, we question them throughout the entire year.5

ב

כיצד הרי שנדרו או הקדישו בתחלת שנה זו ושאלו אותן ונמצאו יודעין ונתקיים נדרן ונדרו נדר אחר אפילו בסוף שנה זו צריכין בדיקה ואחר כך יתקיים ואין אומרין הואיל ונמצאו יודעין בתחלת השנה אין צריכין בדיקה אלא בודקין אותן את כל השנה הזו כולה:

3

Before this time, even when they say: "We know for Whose sake we took the vow or for Whose sake we consecrated it," their vows and their consecration are of no consequence. After this time [passes] and a male is thirteen years and one day and a female is twelve years and one day,6 even though they say: "We do not know for Whose sake we took the vow or for Whose sake we consecrated it,"7their vows and their consecration are binding even if they did not manifest physical signs of maturity.8 This is the time when vows [take effect] which is mentioned in all sources.9

ג

קודם הזמן הזה אף על פי שאמרו יודעין אנו לשם מי נדרנו ולשם מי הקדשנו אין נדריהן נדר ואין הקדשן הקדש ואחר הזמן הזה שנמצא הבן בן י"ג שנה ויום אחד והבת בת י"ב שנה ויום אחד אע"פ שאמרו אין אנו יודעין לשם מי נדרנו ולשם מי הקדשנו דבריהן קיימין והקדשן הקדש ונדריהן נדרים ואף על פי שלא הביאו שתי שערות וזו היא עונת נדרים האמורה בכל מקום:

4

Since they reached the age of majority, their vows are binding even if they did not manifest physical signs of majority and [thus] are not considered as adults with regard to all matters. This concept is of Scriptural origin:10 that when a person close to the age of adulthood utters a vow, his consecration [of articles] and his vows are binding. Nevertheless, although the vows of these individuals are binding, if they desecrate their vows or take oaths and substitute for them, they are not punishable by lashes until they reach the age of majority and manifest signs of physical maturity.11

ד

הואיל והגיעו לשני הגדולים נדריהן קיימין אע"פ שלא הביאו סימנין ועדיין לא נעשו גדולים לכל דבר ודבר זה מדברי תורה שהמופלא הסמוך לאיש הקדשו ונדרו נדר אף על פי שנדריהן קיימין אם חללו נדרן או נשבעו והחליפו אינן לוקין עד שיגדילו ויביאו שתי שערות:

5

If [such a minor] consecrated an article and an adult came and benefited from the article that he consecrated, [the adult] is liable for lashes.12 For [the minor's] vows are valid according to Scriptural Law, as explained.13

ה

הקדישו ובא הגדול ונהנה מן ההקדש שהקדישו לוקה משום שנדריהם נדרים מן התורה כמו שבארנו:

6

When does the above statement - that the vows taken by a female twelve years and one day old are binding - apply? When she is neither in her father's domain14 or her husband's domain. If, however, she is in her father's domain, even if she comes of age and she is a maiden,15 her father may nullify16 all17 of the vows and oaths she takes on the day he hears of them, as [Numbers 30:6] states: "All of her vows and prohibitions18... [shall not stand...] because her father withheld her."

ו

בד"א שבת י"ב שנה ויום אחד נדריה קיימין בשלא היתה ברשות האב או ברשות הבעל אבל אם היתה ברשות האב אפילו הגדילה והרי היא נערה אביה מפר כל נדריה וכל שבועות שתשבע ביום שמעו שנאמר כל נדריה ואסריה וגו' כי הניא אביה אותה וגו':

7

Until when may her father nullify [her vows]? Until she fully comes of age.19 Once she fully comes of age, he may not nullify her [vows].20 Instead, all of her vows and oaths are like those of a widow or a divorcee, as [implied by Numbers 30:10]: "Everything that she forbade upon her soul [shall remain upon her]."

ז

ועד מתי אביה מפר עד שתבגר בגרה אינו מפר לה והרי כל נדריה ושבועותיה כנדר אלמנה וגרושה שנאמר בהן כל אשר אסרה על נפשה וגו':

8

When may a husband nullify his wife's vows and oaths? From the time she enters the chupah.21 He may continue to nullify her vows forever until he divorces her, with the bill of divorce reaching her hand.22

If there was an unresolved doubt concerning her divorce,23 he should not nullify her vows. If he gives her a bill of divorce conditionally24or one that takes effect at a later time,25 he should not nullify [her vows] in the interim.26Similarly, [when a woman] has heard that her husband died and remarried, but [in truth] her husband was alive27 or other similar situations [prevail],28neither her first husband, nor her second husband should nullify her vows.29 If she was forbidden [to her husband] by a negative commandment30 and needless to say, if she is forbidden only by a positive commandment,31 and her husband nullified her vows, her vows are nullified.32

ח

ומאימתי מפר הבעל נדרי אשתו ושבועותיה משתכנס לחופה והוא מפר לעולם עד שיגרשנה ויגיע הגט לידה היתה מגורשת מספק לא יפר לה נתן לה גט על תנאי או לאחר זמן לא יפר בימים שבינתיים וכן מי ששמעה שמת בעלה ונשאת והרי בעלה קיים וכיוצא בה אין הבעל הראשון ולא האחרון מפירין נדריה היתה מחייבי לאוין ואין צריך לומר מחייבי עשה והפר נדריה הרי אלו מופרין:

9

When a maiden33 has been consecrated, her vows may be nullified only by her father and the erus34 together.35 If one nullified [a vow] alone, it is not nullified. If her erus nullified [the vow] alone and she violated the vow before her father nullified it, she is not liable for lashes.36

ט

נערה מאורסה אין מפר נדריה אלא האב עם הבעל כאחד ואם הפר האחד לבדו אינו מופר הפר הבעל לבדו ועברה על נדרה קודם שיפר האב אינה לוקה:

10

If (the erus) dies, she returns to her father's domain. Any vow she takes37 may be nullified by her father as was her status before consecration.38 If her father died after she was consecrated and she took a vow after his death, her erus cannot nullify it. For an erus cannot nullify his wife's vows [alone] until she enters the chupah.39

י

מת הארוס חזרה לרשות אביה וכל שתדור האב מפר כשהיה קודם שתתארס מת האב אחר שנתארסה ונדרה אחר מותו אין הבעל מפר שאין הבעל מפר נדרי אשתו עד שתכנס לחופה:

11

[The following rules apply when] a consecrated maiden takes a vow, her father heard her vow, but not her erus,40 she was divorced that day and then consecrated by another person41 that day.42 Even if [she was divorced and consecrated] 100 times [that day], her father and her last erus may nullify the vows she took before her first erus. [The rationale is that] she never departed into her own domain for one moment,43 for throughout the entire time, she is in her father's domain, for she is still a maiden.

יא

נערה ארוסה שנדרה ושמע אביה ולא שמע ארוסה ונתגרשה בו ביום ונתארסה לאחר בו ביום אפילו למאה אביה ובעלה האחרון מפירין נדריה שנדרה בפני ארוס ראשון מפני שלא יצאתה לרשות עצמה שעה אחת שעדיין היא ברשות האב מפני שהיא נערה:

12

When, by contrast, a married woman took a vow and her husband did not nullify it, he divorced her that day, and remarried her that day, he cannot nullify her vows,44 for she departed into her independent domain after she took her vow.45 Although she took her vow in his domain and she is now in his domain, since she departed into her own domain in the interim, her vows are binding.

יב

אבל האשה הנשואה שנדרה ולא הפר לה בעלה וגרשה בו ביום והחזירה בו ביום אינו יכול להפר שהרי יצאתה לרשות עצמה אחר שנדרה אע"פ שנדרה ברשותו והיא עתה ברשותו הואיל ויצתה ברשות עצמה בינתיים נתקיימו נדריה:

13

[The following rule applies when] a consecrated maiden took a vow that was not heard by either her father or her erus,46 she was divorced, and then consecrated to someone else.47 Even several days after [she took the vow], when her father and her last erus hear about the vow that she took while consecrated to her first erus, they may nullify it, since her first erus did not hear it.

יג

נערה מאורסה שנדרה ולא שמע אביה ולא בעלה ונתגרשה ונתארסה לאחרים אפילו לאחר כמה ימים כשישמע האב והבעל האחרון מפירין נדריה שנדרה בפני ארוס הראשון הואיל ולא שמע אותם הארוס הראשון:

14

[The following rule applies when] a consecrated maiden took a vow, her father alone heard it and nullified it, but the man to whom she was consecrated died before hearing it. If she was consecrated to another man - or to 100 other men - that day48 her father and her last erus may nullify her vow.49

יד

נערה מאורסה שנדרה ושמע אביה לבדו והפר לה ומת הארוס קודם שישמע ונתארסה בו ביום אפילו למאה אביה וארוסה האחרון מפירין נדריה שנדרה בפני ארוס ראשון שמת קודם שישמע:

15

[The following rule applies when] the erus heard [her vow], nullified it and died and afterwards,50 her father heard and she was consecrated to another person that day.51 Her father and the second erus may nullify her vows.52

טו

שמע ארוס ראשון והפר ומת ואחר כך שמע האב ונתארסה לאחר בו ביום אביה עם הארוס האחרון מפירין נדריה:

16

If her father heard [that she took a vow], but the erus did not and the erus died that day or the erus also heard [about her vow] and nullified it or remained silent53 and then died that day, she returns to her father's domain and her father may nullify [her vows].54

If the erus heard [about her vow] and maintained it and died that day, or remained silent and died the following day,55 her father cannot nullify her vow.

טז

שמע אביה ולא שמע הארוס ומת בו ביום הארוס או ששמע גם הארוס והפר או ששתק ומת בו ביום נתרוקנה רשות לאב והאב יכול להפר שמע הארוס וקיים ומת בו ביום או ששמע ושתק ומת ביום שלאחריו אין האב יכול להפר:

17

If the erus, divorced her after hearing [of her vow], there is an unresolved question whether the divorce is considered as silence and her father may nullify her vow together with a second erus who consecrates her that day.56 Or perhaps the divorce is like her first erus maintaining her vow, in which instance, the vow is maintained.57

יז

גירשה הארוס אחר ששמע הרי זה ספק אם הגירושין כשתיקה ויפר האב עם הבעל האחרון שיארס בו ביום או הגירושין כמו שקיים ארוס ראשון שכבר נתקיימו הנדרים:

18

When the father heard the vow and nullified it and then died and then the erus heard [of the vow] or even if the erus heard of the vow before the death of the father,58 she is not transferred [entirely] to the domain of her erus. He cannot ever nullify the vow after the father's death, for an erus can nullify a vow only together [with the father].

יח

שמע האב והפר לה ומת האב ואח"כ שמע הבעל אפילו שמע הבעל קודם שימות האב לא נתרוקנה רשות לבעל ואינו יכול להפר לעולם אחר מות האב שאין הארוס מפר אלא בשותפות:

19

If the erus heard [the vow], nullified it, and died and then the father heard or the father heard and nullified it and the erus died before he heard it, the father cannot nullify these vows that were in the jurisdiction of the first erus except together with a second erus to whom she is consecrated that day,59 as we explained.60

יט

שמע ארוס והפר לה ומת ואח"כ שמע האב או ששמע האב והפר לה ומת הבעל קודם שישמע אין האב לבדו יכול להפר נדרים אלו שנראו לארוס ראשון אלא בשותפות ארוס האחרון אם נתארסה בו ביום כמו שבארנו:

20

If a woman took a vow, her father nullified it alone, and her husband did not hear [of the vow] until he brought her into his domain,61 he cannot nullify [her vow]. For a husband cannot nullify a vow taken by the woman he consecrated after he marries her.62 Instead, [this must be done] before she enters his domain, when he nullifies it together with her father. For this reason,63 it was the practice of Torah Sages to tell their daughters before they left their domain:64 "All the vows which you took while in my household are nullified."

כ

נדרה והפר לה אביה לבדו ולא שמע הארוס עד שנכנסה לרשותו אינו יכול להפר שאין הבעל מפר נדרי ארוסתו אחר שנשאת אלא קודם שתכנס לרשותו הוא שמפר בשותפות האב לפיכך היה דרך תלמידי חכמים עד שלא תצא בתו מרשותו אומר לה כל נדרים שנדרת בתוך ביתי הרי הן מופרין:

21

Similarly, the husband would tell her before she enters his domain: "All of the vows that you took from the time I consecrated you65 until you entered my home are nullified." For a husband66 can nullify the vows of his wife even though he did not hear them.67

כא

וכן הבעל עד שלא תכנס לרשותו אומר לה כל נדרים שנדרת משאירסתיך עד שלא תכנסי בתוך ביתי הרי הן מופרין שהבעל מפר נדרי אשתו אף על פי שלא שמע אותם:

22

If the father went with the agents of the husband68 or the father's agents went with the agents of the husband, her vows must still be nullified by her father and her husband jointly.69 If her father transferred her to the agents of her husband or her father's agents transferred her to her husband's agents, her father can no longer nullify her vows.70 Nor may the husband nullify them. For the husband cannot nullify vows that were taken before [he married her], as we explained.71

כב

הלך האב עם שלוחי הבעל או שהלכו שלוחי האב עם שלוחי הבעל עדיין אביה ובעלה מפירין נדריה מסר האב לשלוחי הבעל או שמסרו שלוחי האב לשלוחי הבעל אין האב יכול להפר שהרי יצאת מרשותו ולא הבעל יכול להפר שאין הבעל מפר בקודמין כמו שבארנו:

23

When a woman is waiting for yivum72 - even if the yevam already made a statement of his intent,73 and even if there is only one yevam and one yevamah74 - [the yevam] may not nullify her vows until he is intimate with her.75

כג

שומרת יבם אפילו עשה בה יבמה מאמר ואפילו יבם אחד ליבמה אחת אינו מפר נדרי יבמתו עד שיבא עליה:

24

When a yevamah who is a maiden had been [merely] consecrated to [her deceased husband] and her father is alive, the yevam and her father do not nullify her vows together. Instead, her father alone is the one who nullifies any vow that she takes.76 Even if the yevam stated his intent to marry her, she is not considered as a consecrated maiden, for a statement of intent does not [establish] a complete [marriage bond between] a yevamah [and her yevam], as we explained.77

כד

היתה יבמתו נערה מאורסה לאחיו ואביה קיים אין היבם ואביה מפירים נדריה כאחת אלא האב לבדו הוא שמפר כל שתדור ואפילו עשה בה היבם מאמר אינה כנערה מאורסה שאין המאמר קונה ביבמה קנין גמור כמו שבארנו:

25

When a maiden who was given in marriage by her father is widowed or divorced after marriage,78 she is like an orphan in her father's lifetime. Her father does not have the right to nullify her vows even if she is a maiden.79

כה

נערה שהשיאה אביה ונתאלמנה או נתגרשה מן הנשואין הרי זו כיתומה בחיי האב ואין אביה מפר נדריה ואע"פ שעדיין היא נערה:

26

When a consecrated maiden takes a vow, but neither her father or her husband heard of her vows until she came of age80 or until she became like an orphan in her father's lifetime,81 her vows are binding; they cannot be nullified by her erus.82 [The rationale is that] she departed from her father's domain and he [and her erus] must nullify her vows together and she has not entered her husband's domain.83

כו

נערה מאורסה שנדרה ולא שמעו נדריה אביה ובעלה עד שבגרה או עד שנעשית יתומה בחיי האב הרי נדריה קיימים ואין הבעל יכול להפר שהרי יצאת מרשות אביה שהוא מפר עמו בשותפות ועדיין לא נכנסה לרשות הבעל:

Footnotes
1.

As explained by the commentaries, in this context, we follow the principle: "A portion of a day is considered as an entire day." Thus, directly after his twelfth birthday, as soon as a male child enters into his thirteenth year of life, these laws apply to him. Similar concepts apply with regard to a female minor.

2.

For a vow must be taken for God's sake, as Numbers 30:3 states: "When a man will take a vow to God."

3.

This is a unique concept that Niddah 45b derives from the exegesis of Leviticus 27:2. Although throughout Jewish law, until a male attains the age of thirteen and a female, the age of twelve, their actions are of no consequence according to Scriptural Law, an exception is made in this instance because of the above verse, as stated in Halachah 4.

4.

As explained in the following halachah.

5.

The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam's ruling, noting that Niddah, loc. cit., the source for this halachah, does not lead to such a conclusion. He suggests that perhaps the Rambam had a different version of that text. Yayin Malchut states that this resolution is reflected in the revised version of the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 5:6). In his initial explanation of the mishnah, he appeared to follow the same text as the popular version of the Talmud, but later in life, he revised that interpretation, accepting a different version of the text. The Rambam's rationale is that since we are speaking about a minor, it is possible that his level of understanding will fluctuate.

6.

I.e., their thirteenth and twelfth birthdays arrive as stated in note 1.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 5:6), the Rambam writes that the Torah made the age for which women become responsible for their vows less than the age men become responsible, generally, a woman's lifetime is less than that of a man.

7.

If they manifested signs that they are mentally or emotionally incapable, this law does not apply. If, however, they are merely somewhat slow and do not understand the concept of vows, their vows are of consequence, because they have already reached the age when one becomes responsible for his or her actions.

8.

I.e., two pubic hairs as stated in Hilchot Ishut 2:1.

9.

There are others who maintain that the expression "the time when vows [take effect]" refers to a minor who understands the meaning of his vows as stated in Halachah 1. The Rambam prefers his interpretation, because it is dependent on time, the child's age, while the first interpretation is dependent on the child's knowledge (Yayim Malchut).

10.

This is the subject of debate among the Rishonim, for some do not accept the Rambam's view.

11.

For until the latter age, they are still minors, and minors are not liable for punishment for transgressions that they perform.

12.

For violating the prohibition against benefiting from consecrated property (Hilchot Meilah 1:3).

13.

In the previous halachah. Since the child's consecration is valid, the article has the status of a consecrated article according to Scriptural Law and a person who misappropriates it is liable.

14.

I.e., her father died. Alternatively, she was married as a minor and then she was divorced or widowed (see Halachah 25). Otherwise, she remains in his domain until the age of twelve and a half, as stated in the following halachah.

15.

I.e., from the age of twelve until the age of twelve and a half.

16.

See Chapter 13, Halachah 2, which describes how the father nullifies his daughter's vow.

17.

As the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:1) states, this applies even to vows taken dependent on the consent of others which cannot be repealed by a sage.

18.

The HaEmek HaShaalah interprets this term as referring to oaths.

19.

I.e., reaches the age of twelve and a half after manifesting physical signs of maturity (Hilchot Ishut 2:2).

20.

Numbers 30:17 gives him this privilege "during her maidenhood," i.e., and not beyond that time period (Kessef Mishneh).

21.

I.e, from the beginning of the second sage of the marriage relationship known as nissuin. At that time, he takes her into a private room and from that time onward, the couple live as man and wife (Hilchot Ishut 10:1). During the first stage of the marriage relationship (erusin), when the erus has merely consecrated his wife, he does not have the right to nullify her vows alone (see Halachah 9). (In the present era, it is customary to perform both these stages of marriage directly after each other.)

22.

Implied is that if he sends the bill of divorce to her via an agent, he may nullify her vows until the bill of divorce enters her possession (Siftei Cohen 234:6, Turei Zahav 234:1).

23.

I.e., he had a bill of divorce given to her and our Rabbis could not resolve if the manner in which the bill of divorce was given or written is effective. See Hilchot Gerushin 5:13 for an example.

The rationale for this law is that our Sages understood that the reason the Torah gave a husband the right to nullify his wife's vows was so that she would not become unattractive to him (Yevamot 90b). In this instance, he is not concerned that she becomes unattractive (Radbaz).

24.

See Hilchot Gerushin 8:1.

25.

He tells her: "Here is your bill of divorce, but it does not take effect for 30 days" (ibid. 9:1).

26.

I.e., in the days before the vow takes effect. The Siftei Cohen 234:8 states that even after the fact, the nullification does not take effect.

27.

See Hilchot Gerushin 10:5 which describes this situation at length.

28.

E.g., a woman who went through a divorce and then remarried, but then it was discovered that her divorce was invalid (ibid.:7). In both this and the previous instance, both husbands are required to divorce the woman.

29.

The rationale for this and the previous laws is that our Sages understood that the reason the Torah gave a husband the right to nullify his wife's vows was so that she would not become unattractive to him. In this instance, since he is obligated to divorce her, it is desirable that she become unattractive to him (Yevamot, loc. cit.).

30.

I.e., a negative commandment that is not punishable by execution, death at the hand of heaven, or karet. See Hilchot Ishut 1:7.

31.

E.g., marriages like that of a non-virgin to a High Priest, which are not prohibited by a negative commandment. Instead, the prohibition is understood, because there is a positive commandment instructing the opposite. See ibid.:8.

32.

Although these marriages are forbidden, since they are still binding, the husband has this privilege.

33.

I.e., a girl between the ages of twelve and twelve and a half.

34.

The term erus means "the man who consecrated her." The Rambam does not use this term, but instead, the term baal meaning "husband." We, however, have used the term erus, because the term baal usually implies that nisuin, the second stage of marriage, has already taken place.

35.

Numbers 30:17 states: "These are the statutes... between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter in her youth." Nedarim 68a interprets the verse as referring to one woman, implying that the nullification of her vows is performed by her father and her erus together. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 9:9), the Rambam writes that from the Biblical text, it might appear that both the father and the erus have the right to nullify her vows independently. Hence, it is necessary to clarify that this is not so.

36.

Nedarim 68a states that since one of the two has already nullified the vow, it is weak and its violation is not punishable by lashes.

37.

Even the vows she took previously while consecrated [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:11)]. This applies even if she has a yevam (Halachah 24).

38.

As stated in Halachah 6.

39.

Before nissuin, an erus can nullify his wife's vows only together with her father and that is impossible in this instance. See also Halachah 16.

40.

For if her first erus heard her vow and did not nullify it, her father can no longer nullify it together with her second erus. See Halachah 17.

41.

Or consecrated again by her first erus [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:13)].

42.

It is necessary that the divorce(s) and the consecration(s) take place on the same day the father heard of and nullified the vow. For if not, the woman's last erus will not have the right to nullify the vow, as indicated by Chapter 12, Halachah 17.

43.

In contrast to the laws applying to a married woman, as stated in the following halachah.

44.

Nor may her father nullify her vows, for once she marries, her father no longer has the right to nullify her vows.

45.

Once a woman becomes independent for even one moment, her future husband cannot nullify the vows she took previously.

46.

If, however, either her erus or her father heard her vow when it was taken, it cannot be nullified at a later date.

47.

Since she remains partially in her father's domain, the divorce does not effect the right of her father and her present erus to nullify her vows.

48.

The consecration and the nullification of the vow must take place on the day that the father heard of the vow and nullified it (Turei Zahav 234:22).

49.

Since her first erus did not hear of her vow, the fact that he died before nullifying it does not deprive her last erus of that right. The father cannot nullify her vow alone, because it was taken when she was consecrated. Since her father nullified the vow, the right of her erus to nullify the vow is weak and of little substance. Accordingly, the right to nullify it cannot be transferred to the father alone, as in Halachah 16.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:16) quotes the Rambam's view, but also that of the Tur which maintains that the second erus can never nullify a vow together with the father.

50.

I.e., after the death of her erus.

51.

But not on the following day. The Radbaz explains that this is speaking about a situation when the father heard of the vow on the same day as her first erus, for the nullification must be completed on the same day that he heard of the vow. If, however, her father does not hear about it until the following day and she was consecrated then, he and her new erus may nullify her vow then.

52.

The Turei Zahav 234:13 maintains that the Rambam would also give her father the right to nullify the vow alone, because her first erus also heard the vow and did not maintain it (see the following halachah). The Rambam mentions her being consecrated by another person only to teach that if, this is indeed the situation, the second erus must also nullify the vow.

53.

Since he did not maintain the vow and died before the day was completed, we say that there was a possibility that he would nullify it. Hence, her father is given the right to nullify it.

54.

Since her erus no longer exists and he did not maintain the vow, the right to nullify is given to her father. In his gloss to Halachah 19, the Radbaz explains the apparent contradiction between these two halachot by stating that this halachah refers to an instance where the father did not nullify the vow before the erus died. Accordingly, the right of the erus to nullify the vow is not weakened. Hence it can be transferred to the father. Halachah 19 refers to a situation where the father nullified the vow and weakens it, as explained above.

55.

Since he did not nullify it on the day that he heard it, he cannot nullify again. It is considered as if he maintained it. Once he maintained it, her father cannot nullify it.

56.

I.e., combining Halachah 15 which states that the father and the second erus can nullify the vow and Halachah 16 which states that silence is equivalent to nullification. If she does not become consecrated again, the father can nullify the vow alone (Turei Zahav, loc. cit.).

57.

And cannot be nullified afterwards.

58.

But did not nullify it then.

59.

If, however, he nullifies on a later date it is unacceptable, for the father must nullify the vow on the day he became aware of it.

60.

Halachah 15. In his gloss to this halachah, the Radbaz explains the apparent contradiction between this halachah and Halachah 16 by stating that Halachah 16 refers to an instance where the father did not nullify the vow before the erus died. Accordingly, the right of the erus to nullify the vow is not weakened. Hence it can be transferred to the father. This halachah refers to a situation where the father nullified the vow and weakens it. Hence it cannot be transferred as explained in the notes to Halachah 15. This understanding is reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:16).

61.

I.e., completed the second stage of the marriage, nissuin.

62.

See Halachah 8.

63.

I.e., to enable all the vows concerning which he did not hear to be nullified.

64.

I.e., before their marriage.

65.

An erus may also nullify the vows that a woman took before he consecrated her (together with her father). We assume, however, that her father already nullified those vows (Siftei Cohen 234:21; Turei Zahav 234:11).

66.

This also applies to her father. The husband and the father must, however, be capable of hearing. If they are deaf, they cannot nullify a vow (Chapter 12, Halachah 13).

67.

Thus if both the father and the husband made these statements, the vows are nullified. In some manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah, these two halachot are combined as one.

68.

Who were sent to bring her to her husband's home.

69.

As long as her father is accompanying her, he is not considered to have transferred her to her husband's domain and hence, still has the right to nullify her vows.

70.

I.e., even if the husband dies [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:12)].

71.

See Halachah 20.

72.

I.e., we are speaking about a widow whose husband dies childless who must be married by her deceased husband's brother. See Deuteronomy, ch. 25.

73.

Which is similar to consecration, but not entirely analogous to consecration (see Hilchot Yibbum ViChalitzah 2:1).

74.

And thus there is no question that she is designated for him.

75.

At which point their marriage is consummated and she becomes his wife. Until then, even if he has stated his intent, according to Scriptural Law, she is not his wife and he cannot nullify her vows.

76.

As stated in Halachah 10.

77.

Which is similar to consecration, but not entirely analogous to consecration (see Hilchot Yibbum ViChalitzah 2:1).

78.

I.e., she has already completed nissuin, the second stage of the marriage bond.

79.

I.e., although from the standpoint of age, her father would still have the right to nullify her vows, since she married, she is given full independence. Hence, he no longer has this right.

80.

As stated in Halachah 7, once she comes of age, her father no longer has any authority over her.

81.

I.e., she was divorced or widowed after marriage, as stated in the previous halachah.

82.

I.e., in the first situation, the man who consecrated her before she came of age. In the second situation, it refers to a second husband who consecrated her after she was divorced or widowed.

83.

This occurs only after nissuin. Moreover, even after she enters her husband's domain, he cannot nullify her vows that were taken beforehand, as stated in Halachah 20.

Nedarim - Chapter 12

1

A father [has the right to] nullify any1 vows and oaths [taken by his daughter only] on the day he hears of them,2 as [Numbers 30:6] states: "[But if her father withheld her on the day that he heard,] all of her vows and prohibitions3... [shall not stand]."

A husband,4 by contrast, may nullify only those vows and oaths that involve personal aggravation5 or they are matters that affect the marriage relationship6, e.g., she took an oath or a vow not to put on eye-paint or wear jewelry.7 [This is implied by ibid.:17]: "between a man and his wife."

א

כל הנדרים והשבועות האב מפר ביום שמעו שנאמר כל נדריה ואסריה אבל הבעל אינו יכול להפר אלא כל נדרים ושבועות שיש בהן עינוי נפש או שהן בדברים שבינו לבינה כגון שנשבעה או נדרה שלא תכחול או שלא תתקשט שנאמר בין איש לאשתו:

2

What is the difference between [the laws governing] vows that involve personal aggravation and those that affect the marriage relationship. With regard to vows that involve personal aggravation, his nullification has bearing for himself and for others.8 With regard to those involving the marriage relationship, his nullification has bearing for himself but not for others.9

ב

ומה בין נדרים שיש בהן עינוי נפש לדברים שבינו לבינה שהנדרים שיש בהן עינוי נפש מפר אל עצמו ואל אחרים ושבינו לבינה לעצמו מפר ולאחרים אינו מפר:

3

What is implied? She took a vow not to eat meat. He may nullify it and she will be permitted to eat meat if she is married to any other person forever. If she forbade marital intimacy with any man, he may nullify the vow with regard to himself10 and she may engage in intimacy with him. If, however, he dies or divorces her, she is forbidden to engage in intimacy with all other men. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

ג

כיצד נדרה שלא לאכול בשר מפר לה ותהיה מותרת לאכול עם כל אדם לעולם אסרה עליה תשמיש כל אדם שבעולם יפר חלקו ותהיה משמשתו וכשימות או יגרשנה הרי היא אסורה בתשמיש כל אדם וכן כל כיוצא בזה:

4

Whether the aggravation is of a minor nature or a major nature, for a short time or for a long time, the husband has the right to nullify all [such] vows.

ד

אחד עינוי גדול ואחד עינוי קטן ואחד עינוי שהוא לזמן מרובה או לפי שעה הכל מפר הבעל:

5

What is implied? She took a vow or an oath "not to bathe today," "not drink wine today," or "not to eat honey today,"11 he may nullify the vows. [This also applies if] she vowed "not to put on eye paint today" or "not to wear colored woven garments today."12 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. Even if she took a vow [not to partake of] an unpleasant food13 or a type of food that she had never eaten,14 [her husband] may nullify it.

ה

כיצד נדרה או נשבעה שלא תרחץ היום או שלא תשתה יין היום או שלא תאכל היום דבש וכן אם נדרה שלא תכחול היום או שלא תלבש רקמה היום מפר וכן כל כיוצא בזה אפילו נדרה ממאכל רע או ממין שלא טעמה אותו מימיה הרי זה יפר:

6

When she took a vow not to partake of two loaves of bread and not partaking of one would cause her aggravation, but not partaking of the other would not cause her aggravation,15 her husband may nullify the one that would cause her aggravation and may not nullify the one that would not cause her aggravation.16

ו

נדרה משתי ככרות באחת יש לה עינוי ובאחת אין לה עינוי מפר לזו שמתענה בה ואינו מפר לזו שאין לה עינוי:

7

When a woman takes a vow not to eat figs from her native country, [her husband] may nullify her vow, because this is a matter that affects the marriage relationship.17 For it is a major problem for him to undertake the difficulty of bringing her [figs] from another place. Therefore, if he dies, divorces her, or another person brings her figs from her native country, they are forbidden to her. For [a husband's] nullification [of a vow that] affects the marriage relationship does not have bearing for others.18

ז

נדרה שלא תאכל תאנים של מדינה זו יפר משום דברים שבינו לבינה שעסק גדול הוא לו להטפל ולהביא לה ממדינה אחרת לפיכך אם מת או גירשה או שהביא לה איש אחר מפירות אותה מדינה הרי אלו אסורין עליה שאינו מפר לאחרים בדברים שבינו לבינה:

8

Similarly, if she took an oath not to benefit from people at large, even though her husband is not included in the vow,19 he has the right to nullify it, because it affects the marriage relationship.20 Otherwise, he will have to give her food only from his own resources. Similarly, he may nullify [the vow] if she [takes a vow], forbidding her from benefiting from an entire nation,21 e.g., all the Jews or all the Ishmaelites.

ח

וכן אם נדרה שלא ליהנות לבריות אף על פי שאין הבעל בכלל יש לו להפר משום דברים שבינו לבינה שלא יהיה זקוק להאכילה משלו בלבד וכן אם אסרה הנאתה על אומה (כולה) כגון [כל] היהודים או כל הישמעאלים הרי זה יפר:

9

When a woman tells her husband: "Pleasure from intimacy with me is forbidden to you," he need not nullify the vow.22 To what can the matter be compared? To one who forbids the owner of fruit from benefiting from his own fruit.23 Similarly, if he tells her: "Pleasure from intimacy with me is forbidden to you," his statements are of no consequence, because he is obligated to provide her with her sustenance, clothing, and intimacy, as we explained in Hilchot Ishut.24

If, however, she told him: "Pleasure from intimacy with you is forbidden to me," he must nullify the vow.25 If he does not nullify it, it is forbidden for him to engage in relations with her, because we may not force a person to partake of food that is forbidden to him.

ט

האשה שאמרה לבעלה הנאת תשמישי אסורה עליך אינו צריך להפר הא למה זה דומה לאוסר פירות חבירו על בעל הפירות וכן הוא שאומר לה הנאת תשמישי אסורה עליך לא אמר כלום מפני שהוא משועבד לה בשאר כסות ועונה כמו שבארנו בהלכות אישות אבל אם אמרה לו הנאת תשמישך אסורה עלי צריך להפר ואם לא הפר הרי זה אסור לשמשה שאין מאכילין את האדם דבר האסור לו:

10

If she said: "May my hands be sanctified to the One who made them," or she took a vow that he would not benefit from the labor of her hands,26 he is not forbidden to benefit from the labor of her hands, because her hands are on lien to him.27 Although [our Sages] declared:28 "Emancipation,29[the prohibition against] chametz,30and consecration31sever a lien," our Sages reinforced a husband's lien [on his wife's work and her earnings], preventing her from severing it, because it is of Rabbinic origin.32 He must, however, nullify the vow, lest he divorce her and then he be forbidden to remarry her.33

י

אמרה יקדשו ידי לעושיהן או שנדרה שלא יהנה במעשה ידיה אינו נאסר במעשה ידיה מפני שידיה משועבדין לו שאע"פ שאמרו השחרור והחמץ וההקדש מפקיעין השעבוד חכמים עשו חזוק לשעבוד הבעל שאינה יכולה להפקיעו מפני שהוא מדבריהם אבל צריך הוא להפר שמא יגרשנה ותהיה אסורה לחזור לו:

11

If she took an oath or a vow that neither the father of her husband, his brothers, or any of his other relatives will benefit from her, he cannot nullify the vow.34 Similarly, he may not nullify her vow if she vows not to bring his animal35 water,36 straw for his cattle,37 or the like. [The rationale is that these vows] do not aggravate the soul, nor do they affect the marriage relationship, [since] they are not of the tasks that she is obligated to perform.38

יא

נשבעה או נדרה שלא יהנה בה לא אבי בעלה ולא אחיו ושאר קרוביו אינו יכול להפר וכן אם נדרה שלא אתן מים לפני בהמתך ותבן לפני בקרך וכיוצא בדברים אלו שאין בהן עינוי נפש ואינם מדברים שבינו לבינה ואינה ממלאכות שהיא חייבת בהן הרי זה אינו יכול להפר:

12

A husband and a father may nullify vows that have not taken effect and have not yet caused prohibitions for her.39 What is implied? She said, for example: "Wine will be forbidden to me if I go to this-and-this place."40 Even though she has not yet gone there and [thus the wine] is not yet forbidden, the vow may be nullified. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

יב

יש לבעל ולאב להפר נדרים שעדיין לא חלו ולא נאסרה בהן כיצד כגון שאמרה היין אסור עלי אם אלך למקום פלוני הרי זה מפר אף על פי שעדיין לא הלכה ולא נאסרה וכן כל כיוצא בזה:

13

A father or a husband who is deaf41 may not nullify vows.42 Even though a husband may nullify vows which he has not heard,43 when a person is fit to hear a vow, [the fact that he does not] hear it is not of consequence.44

יג

האב או הבעל שאין שומעין אינם מפירין אע"פ שהבעל מפר נדרים שלא שמען הראוי לשמוע אין השמועה מעכבת בו:

14

Neither a father, nor a husband who is intellectually or emotionally unstable may nullify a vow. A minor cannot establish a marriage bond;45 accordingly, he may not nullify a vow. A husband may nullify the vows of two of his wives simultaneously. Similarly, a father may nullify the vows of two of his daughters simultaneously.46

יד

השוטה אינו מפר בין אב בין בעל הקטן אין לו אישות לפיכך אינו מפר והבעל מפר נדרי שתי נשיו כאחת וכן האב מפר נדרי שתי בנותיו כאחת:

15

The nullification of vows may be carried out throughout the entire day.47 [The right does not continue] for 24 hours.

What is implied? If she took a vow at the beginning of Sunday night, the vow may be nullified throughout that night and the entire day Monday.48 When she took a vow at the conclusion of the day, directly before nightfall. If he49 nullified the vow before nightfall, it is nullified. If he did not nullify it until after nightfall, he may not nullify it any longer.50

טו

הפרת נדרים כל היום ואינה מעת לעת כיצד נדרה בתחלת ליל שני הרי מפר אותה הלילה וכל יום שני נדרה ביום שני בתחלת היום מפר כל אותו היום נדרה בסוף היום עם חשכה אם הפר לה עד שלא תחשך מופר ואם לא הפר לה עד שחשיכה אינו יכול להפר:

16

What is meant by the Torah's words [Numbers 30:15]: "from one day to the next"?51 They teach that if she takes a vow at night, he may nullify it during the night. And he may nullify it throughout the following day, as we explained.52

If she took a vow and waited several days and only then, her father or her husband heard of it, he may nullify it on the day he heard of it. It is as if she took the vow on the day that he heard of it, as [implied by ibid.:6]: "On the day he heard of it," [i.e.,] and not only the day she took the vow.

טז

ומהו זה שכתוב בתורה מיום אל יום מלמד שמפר בלילה אם נדרה בלילה וכן מפר כל היום כמו שבארנו נדרה ושהתה כמה ימים ואחר כך שמע האב או הבעל הרי זה מפר ביום שמעו וכאילו נדרה בעת ששמעה שנאמר ביום שמעו לא ביום נדרה בלבד:

17

When a consecrated maiden took a vow and her father heard of it and nullified it and after several days her erus heard of it and nullified it on the day he heard of it, it is not nullified, as [implied by ibid.:6-8]: "If her father prevented her on the day that he heard of it.... If she was married to a man with vows incumbent upon her.... If her husband heard of it. On the day, he heard of it...." From this we infer: Since her father nullified it and her erus heard of it, he must nullify it on the day the father heard of it. Similarly, if her erus heard [of the vow] and nullified it and after several days, the father heard of it and nullified it on the day he heard of it, it is not nullified.53

How do we know that the verse is speaking about a consecrated maiden? Because further on, the passage [ibid.:11-12] states: "If she vows in her husband's home...54 her husband heard her and remained silent." We can infer that the husband spoken about previously is an erus., as we explained.

יז

נערה מאורסה שנדרה ושמע אביה והפר ולאחר ימים שמע הארוס והפר ביום שמעו אין זה מופר שנאמר ואם הניא אביה אותה ביום שמעו וגו' ואם היו תהיה לאיש ונדריה עליה ושמע אישה ביום שמעו וגו' הא למדת שאחר שהפר האב ושמע הארוס הרי זה מפר ביום שמוע האב והוא הדין אם שמע ארוס והפר ואחר כמה ימים שמע האב והפר ביום שמעו שאינו מופר ומנין שבנערה מאורסה הכתוב מדבר שהרי הוא אומר למטה ואם בית אישה נדרה וגו' ושמע אישה והחריש לה וגו' מכלל שאישה האמור למעלה ארוס כמו שבארנו:

18

When a father or a husband hears of a vow and remains silent in order to cause the woman aggravation,55 if the day passes without him nullifying or revoking [her vows], they are binding even if he did not have the intent of accepting them.

If she took a vow and her father or her husband nullified it, but without knowing of the nullification, she willfully violated her vow or oath, she is not liable. Although she had the intent of transgressing, since she committed a permitted act,56 she is exempt. Concerning this, [ibid.:6] states: "God will forgive her, although her father prevented her." She is given stripes for rebellious conduct,57 because she had the intent to transgress.

יח

שמע האב או הבעל ושתק כדי לצערה אף על פי שלא היה בלבו לקיים נדרה הואיל ועבר היום ולא הפר ולא בטל נתקיימו נדריה נדרה והפר לה האב או הבעל והיא לא ידעה שהפר ועברה על נדרה או על שבועתה בזדון הרי זו פטורה ואע"פ שנתכוונה לאסור הואיל ונעשה ההיתר פטורה ועל זה נאמר וה' יסלח לה כי הניא אביה אותה ומכין אותה מכת מרדות מפני שנתכוונה לאיסור:

19

When she takes a vow and violates her vow before her father or her husband nullifies it, she is liable - either for lashes58 or a sacrifice59 - for the transgression she committed even if he heard of it that day and nullified it.60

יט

נדרה ועברה על נדרה קודם שיפר לה אביה או בעלה אף על פי ששמע בו ביום והפר לה הרי זה חייבת על דבר שעברה בו אם מלקות מלקות ואם קרבן קרבן:

20

If a father or a husband heard of [a woman's] vow, but remained silent, because he did not know that a father or a husband has a right to nullify her vows or he knew that he had a right to nullify her vow, but did not know that such a vow required nullification, when he learns of this, he may nullify [the vow]. The time when he gains this knowledge is equivalent to the time of the vow or the time he heard of it and he may nullify it for that entire day.

כ

שמע נדרה ושתק מפני שלא היה יודע שיש לאב או לבעל להפר או שידע שיש להם להפר אבל לא ידע שנדר זה צריך הפרה ולאחר זמן ידע הרי זה יפר ושעת ידיעתו כאילו היא שעת הנדר או שעת שמועתו ויפר כל היום:

21

[When a nullification is made in error,] one must return and nullify it again. [For example,] his wife took a vow and he thought that she was his daughter, and he nullified it with the intent that she was his daughter. She took a nazirite vow and he thought that she had vowed [to offer] a sacrifice and he nullified it with the intent that she had vowed [to offer] a sacrifice. She forbade herself to partake of figs and he thought she said grapes and nullified with the intent that she had forbade grapes. [In all such instances,] he must nullify the vow again when he learns of the vow and the identity of the woman taking the vow for the sake of this woman and this vow. [This can be inferred from ibid.:5]: "Her father did not prevent her"; [this indicates that he must have in mind] the woman taking the vow herself. "And her father heard her vow,"61 i.e., until he knows the vow that she took. He may nullify the vow throughout the entire day that he discovers this information.62

כא

נדרה אשתו וסבור שהיא בתו והפר לה על דעת שהיא בתו וכן אם נדרה בנזיר וסבור שנדרה בקרבן והפר לה על דעת שנדרה קרבן אסרה עצמה בתאנים וסבור [שאסרה עצמה] בענבים והפר לה על דעת שנדרה לאסור [עצמה] בענבים צריך לחזור ולהפר כשידע הנדר והנודרת לשם הנודרת הזאת ולשם הנדר הזה שנאמר לא הניא אביה אותה לנודרת עצמה ואומר ושמע אביה את נדרה עד שידע אי זה נדר נדרה ויש לו להפר אותו כל יום הידיעה:

Footnotes
1.

I.e., he may nullify all vows, not merely those that a husband may nullify.

Rabbenu Asher and other Rishonim differ and maintain that the Sifri states that the father's rights are the same as the husband's. In a response attributed to the Rambam, he explains that although this view is stated in the Sifri, it is not mentioned anywhere else in the Talmud and the simple meaning of the Biblical passage does not lead to such an inference. This leads to the conclusion that the statement of the Sifri is a minority opinion. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:58) mentions both views without stating which one should be followed.

2.

I.e., not necessarily on the day the vow was taken, but on the day he first heard of it.

3.

The Emek HaShaalah interprets this term as referring to oaths.

4.

I.e., after nissuin, the second stage of the marriage relationship.

5.

For Numbers 30:14 specifically mentions a husband's authority involving vows of this type. Vows that involve personal aggravation refer to vows that involve accepting a prohibition of a particular type of satisfaction.

6.

Literally, those "between him and her."

7.

Such conduct could arouse a husband's displeasure, for he will not be happy that his wife does not appear attractive.

The Shulchan Aruch (234:59) mentions other views which consider these vows as ones that involve personal aggravation as well as the Rambam's view that these are matters that affect the husband-wife relationship.

8.

I.e., even if he divorces her, the vow is nullified.

9.

The nullification applies only when they are married.

10.

See Halachah 9 with regard to clarification when this vow must be nullified and when it need not be nullified. The Siftei Cohen 234:83 quotes views that maintain that since the vow takes effect with regard to other men, it would also take effect with regard to him if he did not nullify it.

11.

These are considered vows that involve personal aggravation.

12.

These are considered vows affecting the marriage relationship.

13.

Our translation follows the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh. The Chatam Sofer explains that since it is forbidden to eat unpleasant foods on Yom Kippur - when fasting is described as aggravating one's soul - even unpleasant foods are included in this category.

The Turei Zahav 234:51, however, translates the term as "harmful foods," arguing that if the woman considered the food unpleasant and had no desire for it, it would not be considered as "aggravation" for her to be prevented from partaking of it.

14.

Since she never partook of this food, there is room to say that no aggravation would be caused by prohibiting it. Hence it is necessary to emphasize that it is forbidden.

15.

The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Asher's commentary to Nedarim 82b which explains that this refers to a situation where one loaf is made of fine flour and is attractive and one is made of coarse flour and is not. She will suffer aggravation from not eating the first, but not from not eating the second.

There is a slight difficulty with this explanation, because the previous halachah stated that a husband may nullify even a vow involving unpleasant food. It can be explained, however, that since her husband makes it possible for her to partake of the loaf of fine bread, she will have no aggravation over not partaking over the coarse bread. When, however, she is not able to partake of the unpleasant food, she has no similar alternative.

Alternatively, Rabbenu Asher explains that she is hungry and will be satisfied by eating one loaf. Hence, not eating that loaf will give her aggravation. Not eating the second one will not.

16.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that when a sage absolves a vow, if he nullifies a portion of the vow, the entire vow is nullified (Chapter 4, Halachah 11). This principle does not, however, hold true with regard to a vow nullified by a husband.

17.

I.e., it is not a matter of aggravation, because she may eat figs. Nevertheless, obtaining the figs places a difficulty upon her husband. Although it also mentions the Rambam's view, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:60) appears to follow the view of other Rishonim who maintain that this is also considered a vow involving aggravation.

18.

As stated in Halachah 2.

19.

I.e., this point is obvious. Even if she does not say so explicitly, she may benefit from him without him having to nullify the vow.

20.

The Mishnah (Nedarim 11:3) quotes Rabbi Yossi who rules that one may not nullify such a vow. In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that this is a minority view.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:64) quotes the Rambam's view, but also that of other Rishonim who maintain that such a vow is considered one which involves personal aggravation.

21.

Our translation is based on the Kessef Mishneh who states that the wording of the original is inexact.

22.

I.e., even if he does not nullify the vow, it does not take effect.

23.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 3. By agreeing to marriage, a woman gives her husband rights to marital intimacy that cannot be withheld.

24.

Hilchot Ishut 12:2, based on Exodus 21:10.

25.

Since the vow does not forbid anything to the man, it will take effect unless he nullifies it. See also parallels in Hilchot Ishut 14:7 and Chapter 1, Halachah 30, above.

Based on Chapter 3, Halachah 10, it must be concluded that we are referring to an instance where she said "Your body is forbidden to me," for satisfaction is not a tangible matter (Rashba, as quoted by Turei Zahav 234:57; Siftei Cohen 234:81). Tosafot maintains that even if he does not say "Your body...," we consider it as if he did. This intent is reflected in the wording chosen by the Shulchan Aruch.

26.

I.e., in both cases, she is consecrating the future products of her labor to the Temple treasury. She must, however, be careful to phrase the vow in a manner that she is not consecrating an entity that does not exist. For then the vow would not be effective [Nedarim 85a; Rama (Yoreh De'ah 234:71)]. See also Hilchot Arachin 6:28.

27.

I.e., one of the rights given to a husband is the right to benefit from his wife's labor (Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit.).

28.

Ketubot 59b; Nedarim 86b.

29.

Of a servant. If a servant was designated as security for a debt and was then freed by his master, he is a free man and is not in any way subjugated to the person who had the lien (Hilchot Malveh ULoveh 18:6).

30.

If a Jew designated leavened products (chametz) as security for a loan to a gentile, when the prohibition against benefiting from chametz takes effect, the lien is no longer effective and the chametz reverts to the ownership of the Jew and he is obligated to destroy it.

31.

If an ox was designated as security for a loan and then its owner, the borrower, consecrated it, the lien is severed and the lender must collect the debt from another source. See also Hilchot Arachin 7:5.

32.

As in several other instances, our Sages reinforced their decrees, giving them more power than Scriptural Law (see Chapter 3, Halachah 9 for another example). The rationale is that if Rabbinic Law was not given this additional measure of strength, people might treat it lightly.

33.

For her vow would take effect after the divorce and then, he would not be able to remarry her because he would then be forbidden to benefit from her work, including her performance of household tasks, thus creating an impossible situation.

See Turei Zahav 234:63 who explains why we mention this concern in this instance and not in others where it would seemingly apply.

34.

For, as reflected by Hilchot Ishut 21:3, she is not under any obligation to perform work on behalf of these people.

35.

I.e., the animal he rides upon.

36.

As Hilchot Ishut 21:5 states, she is obligated to provide straw for his riding animal. She is not, however, obligated to provide water for it, for it is necessary to draw water from a spring or river and that is compromising to a woman's modesty (Kessef Mishneh). As mentioned in the notes to Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit., the Rambam's ruling is based the version of Ketubot 61b cited by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. The standard published text of the Talmud follows a different understanding.

37.

She is obligated to provide straw for the animal he rides upon, for that is an expression of consideration for her husband's person. She has no such obligation with regard to his cattle, for those animals are necessary only for work and that is solely her husband's concern.

38.

I.e., were she obligated to perform these tasks, her vow not to perform them would not take effect.

39.

A sage, by contrast, may only absolve an oath or a vow after it takes effect (Hilchot Sh'vuot 6:14).

40.

The Rambam's ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:28). The Kessef Mishneh and the Rama quote the ruling of Rabbenu Yerucham who maintains that this principle applies only with regard to vows that have not taken effect because the time when they are due to take effect has not come. If, however, they are dependent on a deed, they cannot be nullified until they take effect. See the comments of the Siftei Cohen 234:45 which discusses this issue.

41.

This applies even if he is not both deaf and dumb [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:25)].

42.

For Numbers 30:5 speak of her father hearing. Implied is that if he cannot hear, he cannot nullify the vow (Sifri to the verse).

43.

Chapter 11, Halachah 21. This also applies with regard to her father, as indicated by Halachah 20 of that chapter.

44.

Rabbenu Asher [quoted by Rama (Yoreh De'ah 234:25)] differs and maintains that it is necessary for him to hear the vow.

45.

See Hilchot Ishut 4:7; 11:6.

46.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:29) quotes the Rambam's ruling, but mentions that there are other Rishonim who differ regarding this issue.

47.

I.e., until nightfall, as the Rambam continues to explain.

48.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:29) quotes the Rambam's ruling, but mentions that there are other Rishonim who differ regarding this issue.

49.

I.e., neither a husband, nor a father.

50.

For the day on which he heard the vow has passed.

51.

Which seemingly implies a 24 hour period.

52.

In the previous halachah.

53.

I.e., according to the Rambam, regardless of who hears about the vow and nullifies it first, the father and the husband must both nullify it on the same day. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:5) quotes the Rambam's view, but also that of the Ramban and Rabbenu Asher who maintain that the father and the husband do not have to nullify the vow on the same day. As long as each one nullifies it on the day he hears of it, it is nullified. The Siftei Cohen 234:13 quotes the opinion of the Bayit Chadash who rules that we should be stringent and follow the Rambam's decision.

54.

I.e., this obviously applies after nissuin, when the woman is living in her husband's home.

55.

I.e., he intended to nullify her vow afterwards, but desired that she think that the vow is binding so that she will take the matter more seriously.

56.

I.e., since the vow was nullified, there is no prohibition involved in the action.

57.

A punishment instituted by the Rabbis.

58.

If she transgressed willfully.

59.

If she transgressed inadvertently.

60.

In contrast to the repeal of a vow by a sage, when a father or a husband nullify a vow, they do not nullify it retroactively, only from the time of their actions onward. See the notes to Chapter 13, Halachah 2.

61.

Significantly, the Sifri derives the same concept from a different verse.

62.

For the day he discovers new information concerning the vow is equivalent to the day he hears of it.

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