Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Our Sages penalized robbers and gave the person whose property was taken the prerogative of taking an oath to support his claim regarding the value of the goods taken. He may then collect that money from the robber, provided that there are two witnesses who testify that this person robbed him.

What is implied? A person came into a colleague's home to collect collateral. He was observed by two witnesses. When he entered he was not carrying anything under his cloak, and when he departed he was carrying utensils under his cloak, but the witnesses were not able to discern what the utensils were, and the owner of the home states: "He robbed me of this and this."

Regardless of whether the robber claimed: "I never entered his home and I did not take anything," "I entered his home as the witnesses observed, but I did not take anything. The utensils under my cloak were mine," or he said: "I took this utensil," and the owner claims that he took another utensil besides the one he admits - in all instances the owner of the home must take an oath while holding a sacred article to affirm his claim. He may then collect everything that he claims.

When does the above apply? When the owner claims that the robber took articles that one might assume that he owned or that it was possible that such goods would be entrusted to him for safekeeping, and it was possible for those articles to be taken out by the robber under his cloak, as the witnesses testify.

Different rules apply, however, when witnesses observe a person enter a colleague's home to take collateral, but do not see him depart, or they see him depart without appearing to be carrying any utensil under his cloak. Although the owner claims that the defendant took such and such, the defendant is not held liable. This applies even if the defendant denies entering the home and thus contradicts the testimony of the witnesses.

The rationale is that if he claimed: "I entered his home but I did not take anything," he would be required to support his claim with a Rabbinic oath, and then he would be exonerated. For it is possible that he entered with the intent of committing robbery, but did not.

Different rules apply when one witness testifies that a person entered a colleague's home and removed utensils under his cloak, but the witness was unable to recognize which utensils were taken, and the person who entered states: "I did not take anything," or he says, "I took goods that you gave to me because of a debt." The person who entered must take an oath while holding a sacred article that he did not commit robbery. He is given this prerogative because he is not considered to be a robber unless two witnesses testify against him.

Just as the owner of a home is entitled to take an oath and collect his due from the robber in the instances mentioned in Halachot 1-3, so too, a watchman appointed by the home owner, or even the wife of a watchman, may take such an oath, stating that the person took goods. This obligates the robber to pay.

If, however, the robber was observed by merely a worker or a harvester of the homeowner, they are not given the prerogative of taking an oath to allow the homeowner to collect against his claim. The person whose property was taken is not given the prerogative of taking the oath, because he was not at home at the time of the robbery. The witnesses are not able to identify the articles that the robber took under his cloak, so their testimony does not obligate him to make restitution. Nor is the robber given the opportunity to clear himself by taking an oath, for we suspect that he might take a false oath.

How is this matter resolved? The home owner has a ban of ostracism issued against any person who took goods from his home and does not admit the matter to a court.

Even if the robber admits to having taken certain articles, he is required to return only what he admits, for the owner cannot lodge a definite claim against him.

The following rules apply when a person robs one of five people, but does not know whom he robbed, and each of the five claims that it was he whom he robbed. Although there are no witnesses that this person robbed, each of the plaintiffs may take an oath, and then the robber is obligated to pay each the amount he admits.

This is also a penalty enforced by the Sages because he transgressed and robbed. According to Scriptural Law, however, he has no obligation to pay, because the identity of the person whom he robbed is a matter of doubt.

The following laws apply when a person tells two colleagues, "I robbed one of you" - or "...one of your fathers..." - "of a maneh, but I don't know whom." If he desires to fulfill his moral and spiritual obligation, he must pay the full amount of the robbery to each of the persons. The law, however, requires only that he give the value of the robbery, and they divide it among themselves.

The rationale is that neither of them knows that he has been robbed; it is the robber himself who is notifying them. Our Sages did not impose a penalty in this instance, because no one is lodging a claim against the robber.

The following laws apply when a person lodges a claim against a colleague, saying: "You robbed me of a maneh." If the defendant replies: "I did not rob from you," he is required to take a sh'vuat hesset, as is the case with regard to any defendant.

If he admits that he robbed him of 50 zuz, he must pay the fifty he admits owing and take an oath required by Scriptural Law with regard to the remainder, as is the case with regard to any person who admits a portion of a claim. He is allowed to take this oath because witnesses did not establish that he was a robber.

Similarly because it was not established that a person was a robber, he is given the benefit of the doubt in the following situation: a person claimed that a colleague entered his home and stole utensils from him. The colleague replied that he took the utensils as collateral for a debt that that person owed him. The owner of the home denied the debt. Although the colleague admitted that he took the collateral without permission, since there are no witnesses who testify that he committed robbery, he is permitted to take an oath and collect the debt he claims from the collateral. For the very mouth that created the problem, rationalized it. Since he is taking an oath and collecting money, he must take an oath while holding a sacred article, as will be explained in Hilchot To'en.

The following laws apply when witnesses observe a person enter a colleague's home when the owner is not home, and take utensils. These laws apply even when he does not conceal the utensils, and even when the owner of the home frequently sells his household articles.

If the owner claims: "He robbed them from me," and the defendant claims: "I entered with your permission, and you sold them to me," "...you gave them to me," or "I took them as payment for a debt you owe me," the defendant's claim is not accepted. The rationale is that whenever a person enters a colleague's home when he is not present and takes utensils and removes them in the presence of witnesses, we presume that he is a robber.

Therefore, he must return the utensils to the homeowner. The homeowner is not even required to take an oath, for the witnesses saw that the intruder committed robbery. After the defendant returns the utensils, he may lodge a suit against the homeowner according to his claims, and the judgment will be rendered according to law.

Similarly, if only one witness observed the intruder taking the article, and the homeowner claims that the intruder robbed him of the article, while the defendant claims that he purchased it, he took it as payment for a debt, or it was his and was entrusted to the homeowner for safekeeping, the intruder is obligated to return the article to the homeowner, and the homeowner is not even required to take an oath.

The rationale is that if two witnesses had observed the matter, the defendant would have been obligated to pay. Since there is only one witness, the defendant is required to take an oath. And in this instance he cannot take the oath, because he does not deny the statement of the witness. Therefore, we follow the principle: Whenever a person is obligated to take an oath and cannot take that oath, he must pay.

Accordingly, different rules apply if the defendant denied the matter, saying: "I never entered his house, nor did I take anything." Since there is only one witness, and the defendant denies his testimony, he is obligated to take an oath mandated by Scriptural Law, stating that he did not take anything from the home. With this, he is exonerated.

The following incident occurred. A person took a slab of silver from a colleague in the presence of one witness. The person who took the silver said: "Yes, I took it; and it was mine." Our Sages obligated him to return the silver, because the testimony of the witness obligates him to take an oath. He cannot take the oath, because he admits to what the witness says.

Had there not been a witness involved, he would have been able to take a Rabbinic oath that the silver he seized belonged to him. If he denied the statements of the witness and said, "I never took the silver," he would be required to take an oath required by Scriptural Law that he did not take it. This judgment should be followed universally in all analogous cases.

The following rules apply if a person seizes gold coins from a colleague and the act was observed by one witness. The defendant says: "I seized my own money. There were twenty gold coins." Although the witness does not know how many coins there were, the defendant must pay twenty coins, for the witness knows that he took gold coins. If two witnesses had observed him, he would have been obligated to pay the full amount. Thus, when there is one witness, he is obligated to take an oath, but cannot, as explained above.

There are opinions that maintain that the following rule applies when, in the above situation, the person who took the coins said: "I seized twenty gold coins; they were mine," while the person who was robbed says, "He took 100." The defendant must pay the twenty he admitted to having taken, and take an oath required by Scriptural Law with regard to the remainder, for he was obligated for a portion of the plaintiff's claim. My opinion is that he is required merely to take a Rabbinic oath, for he did not admit any liability. Instead, he said that he took what belonged to him.

The following rules apply when a person enters a colleague's home when he is not present and takes utensils, while observed by one witness. The witness does not know how many utensils were taken. The owner claims that he had twenty utensils in his home, while the person who took them states: "I took only ten, and they were my own."

The defendant is required to return the ten, for he is obligated to take an oath, but cannot. He is not required to take even a Rabbinic oath concerning the remainder, because the owner cannot issue a definite claim against the robber.

It is forbidden to purchase an object obtained by robbery from the robber. Similarly, it is forbidden to assist him in changing its nature, so that the robber will acquire it.

Whoever acts in this manner or the like assists transgressors and violates the prohibition Leviticus 19:14: "Do not place a stumbling block before the blind."

It is forbidden for anyone to benefit from an article obtained by robbery even after its rightful owner has despaired of its return, if one knows for certain that this object was obtained through robbery.

What is implied? If one knows for certain that a particular animal was obtained by robbery, it is forbidden to ride on it or plow with it.

When a person obtains a house or a field by robbery, it is forbidden to pass through it or enter it. This applies even merely to seek shade or shelter from the rain. If he lives in another person's home, he must pay rent to the legal owners, as mentioned above with regard to a person who lives in a colleague's courtyard without the owner's knowledge.

If a person cuts down palm trees and constructs a bridge from them, it is forbidden for anyone to pass over it. The same applies with regard to other similar situations.

If a person transgressed and ate an object obtained by robbery after the owners despaired of its return, he is not liable to compensate the owners.

If he ate the article before the owners despaired of its return, the owners must be compensated. They may collect from the person who ate the article, for it is still in their possession. Or if they desire, they may collect from the robber.

The following rules apply when a person commits robbery and dies. There is no difference if he fed the object he obtained by robbery to his sons after the owner despaired of its return, or rather than feed it to them he sold it or it was lost.

If the robber left landed property, his heirs must reimburse the original owner. According to Talmudic law, they need not, by contrast, reimburse him if he left only movable property. For the value of the object obtained by robbery is considered to be a debt owed by the robber, and movable property is not placed on lien to a creditor after the principal's death.

The Geonim have already ordained that a debt owed a creditor can be expropriated from the movable property in the estate. This applies even to a loan supported by a verbal commitment alone. Therefore, in the above instance, the heirs are liable to reimburse the owners from either the landed property or the movable property in the robber's estate, regardless of whether or not the heirs ate the article obtained by robbery, and whether or not the owners despaired of its return.

The laws applying to a person who purchases movable property from a robber are the same as those applying to one who purchases from a thief. If the reputation of the robber was a matter of public knowledge, our Sages did not grant any leniency. If the robber's reputation was not public knowledge, our Sages ordained leniency to enable uninhibited trade in the marketplace, and required the original owner to pay a purchaser the price he paid for the article taken by robbery. He may then take the article and sue the robber for the price of the article.

If the owner already despaired of the article's return, the purchaser is considered to have acquired the article itself and is not required to return it.

It is forbidden to benefit from a robber's property. If even a minor portion of his property was legitimately his, one is allowed to benefit from his property, unless one is certain that the article from which one is benefiting was obtained by robbery.

It is forbidden to benefit from the property of people whom we can assume to be robbers, when all of their property can be assumed to have come from robbery, for their profession is based on robbery - e.g., customs-collectors and highwaymen.

We may not change money from their cash-box, for all their money can be assumed to have come from robbery.

If a customs-collector takes a person's garment and then returns another one to him, or he takes a person's donkey and returns another one to him, the person may keep the one returned. This is considered to be a transaction, and we can assume that the original owner despaired of its return. Moreover, we do not know for certain that this object was obtained by robbery. If the recipient is diligent and is wont to be stringent concerning his personal gain, he should return the object to its original owner.

When does the statement that a customs-collector is considered to be a highwayman apply? When the customs-collector is a gentile, is self-appointed, or was appointed by the king but is given unlimited jurisdiction and takes whatever he wants and leaves whatever he wants.

If, however, the customs-collector was appointed by the king to take a third, a fourth or any fixed amount of the subjects' goods or their value, the customs-collector appoints a Jew to collect this sum for the king, and it is known that this person is faithful and does not add anything beyond what the king decreed, this person is not considered a robber. For the law established by the king is binding law. Indeed, anyone who does not pay this tax transgresses, for he is taking what is due the king. This applies whether the king is Jewish or gentile.

Similarly, if a king imposes a tax on all the inhabitants of a city, a fixed annual head tax or a fixed annual property tax, or decrees that anyone who violates a particular law will have all his property confiscated by the king, or decrees that anyone who is found in a field at the harvest time must pay the tax on it whether or not he is the owner of the field, or any similar decree, it is not considered to be robbery.

A Jew who collects these duties on behalf of the king is not considered to be a robber. On the contrary, he is considered of upright character, provided he does not add to or change the king's levy in any way, nor take any for himself.

Similarly, if a king becomes angered with a servant or an attendant who is one of his subjects and confiscates his field or his courtyard, it is not considered to be robbery, and one is permitted to benefit from it. If a person purchases it from the king, it becomes his and the original owners cannot expropriate it from him. For this is the law exercised by all kings: to confiscate all the property of their attendants if they become angered by them.

Thus, it is the king who annulled the ownership over this courtyard or field, making it ownerless. Therefore, the person buying it from the king legally acquires it.

If, however, a king confiscates a courtyard or a field from one of the subjects of his country in a manner that is not in accordance with the laws that he enacted, he is considered to be a robber, and the owners may expropriate the property from the person who purchased it from the king.

The general principle is: Any law that a king decrees to be universally applicable, and not merely applying to one person, is not considered robbery. But whenever he takes from one person alone in a manner that does not conform to a known law, but rather seizes the property from the person arbitrarily, it is considered to be robbery.

Therefore, when the king's tax collectors and enforcement officers sell fields because the owner did not pay the fixed tax for the field, the sale is binding. A head tax, however, is the personal responsibility of each person and it may not be collected from his property. Thus, if a field was sold because an individual was delinquent in paying the head tax, the sale is not binding, unless this is the law enacted by this particular king.

The following rules apply when the law of a king is that whoever pays the tax for a particular field acquires ownership of that field. If the owner of a field flees to avoid paying the property tax, and another person pays this tax to the king and derives benefit from that field, it is not considered to be robbery.

The one who paid the taxes may reap the benefit of the field provided he continues to pay the taxes until the owners return and pay this duty. For the law of a king is binding, as stated above.

Similarly, if a king decrees that whoever pays a head tax for a person who has not paid acquires the delinquent person as a servant the decree is binding. If one Jew comes and pays a head tax for another indigent, he may compel him to work beyond ordinary limits, for the laws of a king are binding. He may not, however, have him toil as a slave.

When a king cuts down trees belonging to private people and uses them for a bridge, one is permitted to cross over it. Similarly, if he destroys homes in order to construct a road or a wall, it is permitted to benefit from it. The same principle applies in all analogous situations, because the laws of a king are binding.

When does the above apply? When the coins issued by a king are the tender of the land. This indicates that the inhabitants of that land have accepted him and consider him to be their leader and themselves to be his subjects.

If, however, the coins he issues are not the tender of the land, he is considered to be a robber who takes by the force of arms. He and his servants are like a band of armed thieves, whose laws are not binding. Such a king and his servants are considered to be robbers in all respects.

The following rules apply when a river washes away beams, stones, wood and the like. If the owners despaired of their return, it is permitted for the finder to keep them, and they become his property. If, however, the finder does not know whether or not the owners have despaired, he is obligated to return the objects. Needless to say, this applies if the owners are pursuing the article.

Therefore, the same principle is applied when a person saves an article from the bed of a sea, from a flooding river, from gentiles, from a fire, from a lion, from a bear, from a tiger or from a leopard. If one knows that the owners have despaired of the article's return, it may be kept by the finder. If one does not know, one must return it.

When a person saves an article from a Jewish robber, he may keep it, for we assume that the owners despaired of its return. If, however, he knows that they did not despair of its return, he is obligated to return it.

When, by contrast, a person saves an article from a gentile robber, he is obligated to return it, for we do not assume that the owners despaired of its return. If, however, he knows that they did despair of its return, he may keep it.

Why do we say with regard to Jewish robbers that we can assume that the owners despair, while with regard to gentile robbers we do not assume that they despair? Because the owners know that the gentile authorities will require a robber to return an article obtained by robbery, although there are no witnesses that he committed robbery. Circumstantial evidence and probability are sufficient.

It is not considered robbery to take fresh cress that grows among flax, because it harms the flax belonging to the owner of the field. If the cress has become dry, taking it is considered robbery, because it has already caused whatever damage it might cause.

If it grows on the border of the rows of flax, it is forbidden to be taken even if it is fresh.

We have stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon that taking straw and hay that a person has placed in the public domain is not considered robbery. If, however, a piece of feces is placed in the public domain, whether during the time when taking out wastes is permitted or at other times, taking it is considered to be robbery.

When a person's clothes were exchanged for those belonging to another person at a house of mourning or a place of celebration, he should not use the article in his possession unless the owner comes and returns the original article and takes his own.

Slightly different rules apply if a person's articles become exchanged for another's in the home of a craftsman. If the craftsman's wife or children gave him the articles, or the craftsman gave him the articles and told him: "Take your articles," the person should not use the articles in his possession unless the owner comes and returns the original articles and takes his own.

If, however, the craftsman tells him: "Take this article," he may use it until the owner comes and returns the original articles and takes his own. For it is possible that the article belongs to the craftsman, or that the owner of the article told the craftsman to sell it for him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

Our Sages forbade many acts, classifying them as robbery - e.g., one who sets doves into flight or plays dice. If a person transgresses these prohibitions, he is considered a robber by Rabbinic decree.

What is meant by setting doves into flight? A person should not set doves into flight in a settled area, because he will take property belonging to others unjustly. For he will send out a male and it will bring a female from another dovecote; he will send out a female and it will bring a male.

This does not apply to doves alone. Instead, anyone who performs a like act with regard to other fowl, beasts or domesticated animals is considered to be a robber by Rabbinic decree.

Similarly, our Sages forbade snaring doves within a settled area, for we can assume that the doves belong to others. One may not set a snare for doves unless one places a distance of four mil between the snare and the settled area. Moreover, if the settled area is composed of vineyards, one should not set a snare even within 100 mil, for the doves belong to the owners of the vineyards.

Similarly, a person should not set a snare among dovecotes even if he owns those dovecotes, or they belong to a gentile or are ownerless, even if the dovecotes are more than 100 mil from the settled area, for the doves from the settled area will come to the area of the dovecotes.

When constructing a dovecote, a person should position it at least 50 cubits from the village. Similarly, a person should not construct a dovecote in his field unless he owns the property in a radius of 50 cubits on all sides, so the doves will not be drawn forth and damage the fields of others by eating their produce.

If a person purchased a dovecote from another person, he may continue using it even if there is only a distance in which a quarter of a kav of grain can be sown between the dovecote and the beginning of his colleague's field. We do not require him to move it further away.

What is meant by dice players? People who play with pieces of wood, pebbles, bones or the like and establish a condition that whoever will better a colleague in this sport is entitled to take a certain amount of money from him. This is robbery according to Rabbinic decree. Although the person himself consents to the other person's taking his money, since he is taking it for nothing, as part of the frivolous sport, it is considered to be robbery.

Similarly, those who gamble with regard to domesticated animals, beasts or fowl, making a condition that whosoever's animal will vanquish or outrace the other one's is entitled to take a certain amount of money from him - this and all forms of gambling are forbidden and considered to be robbery by Rabbinic decree.

When a person plays dice with gentiles, he does not violate the prohibition against robbery. He does, however, violate the prohibition against occupying oneself with empty matters. It is not fitting for a person to spend any of his days occupied in anything other than words of wisdom or pursuits that lead to a stable world.

The following principle applies with regard to snares for beasts, fowl and fish: If an animal falls into such a snare and another person takes it, this is considered robbery by Rabbinic law. It is not considered to be robbery by Scriptural law because they have not as yet entered the possession of the person who acquires them.

A river and a stream that flow belong to all people.

When a poor person climbs to the top of an olive tree and beats the branches so that olives that have been forgotten by their owner will fall, he is entitled to them. If another poor person takes them, it is considered robbery by Rabbinic decree.

If the poor person collects them in his hand and then throws them to the earth, taking them is full-fledged robbery, for they have entered the possession of the person who acquires them.

Unlike chickens and ducks, bees are not considered the private property of a person according to Scriptural law. Nevertheless, it is possible to acquire them according to Rabbinic law.

A person who steals a swarm of bees or prevents their owner from taking them if the swarm comes into his domain is considered a robber by Rabbinic decree. Thus, if a swarm of bees leaves a person's property and comes to rest in a colleague's property, the owner of the bees has the right to enter his colleague's field and proceed until he takes his bees. If in his progress he damages his colleague's field, he must reimburse him for the damages. He may not, however, cut down a branch with the intent that later he will reimburse the owner for the damages.

We accept the statements of a woman or a minor who says, "this swarm of bees left this property," provided that the statements are made in the course of conversation and the owners are pursuing the swarm and asking "Where did it come to rest?"

Although a woman or a minor is not generally accepted as a witness, since the ownership of bees is a matter of Rabbinic law, their testimony is accepted in this case.

Whenever a person is in possession of property that is considered to be robbed according to Rabbinic law, it cannot be expropriated by judges.

Similarly, if the person denied possession of it and took a false oath to that effect, he is not required to add a fifth, as he is with regard to property acquired by full-fledged robbery.