Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

I.e., so that the fowl will be offered either as burnt-offerings or as sin-offerings.

The rationale for the difference is that, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachot 1-2, the prohibition against me’ilah applies to sacrifices of the most sacred order from the time they were consecrated, but does not apply to sacrifices of a lesser degree of sanctity until their blood is cast on the altar. As reflected by Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 5:1, money set aside for a sacrifice is bound by the same laws as an animal set aside for that sacrifice.

Based on Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 15:2, we are forced to say that this refers to a limb or organ on which the life of the animal depends.

The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that this is the proper version of the text. There are versions which substitute tikaver (“it should be buried”) for tfkrav (“it should be offered”). See Hilchot Arachin 5:14.

The rationale is that one may not redeem a consecrated animal that is unblemished. Hence if the holiness did spread through the entire animal, it would be forbidden to redeem it.

Since it is possible that the holiness did not spread throughout the entire animal, only th’e money paid for that particular limb is consecrated. The remainder is not (Kessef Mishneh). Alternatively, since it is possible that the holiness spread throughout the entire animal and thus it is not fit to be redeemed, the redemption is not effective and the money has not become consecrated (Rav Yosef Corcus).

Even though the funds are sufficient to purchase the burnt-offering and sin-offering that he is also required to bring, since a specific designation was not made, it can be said that they were all intended for the peace-offering.

As stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

Before purchasing animals for his sacrifices or explicitly designating the funds for each one.

Even though one of the offerings is a sin-offering and the money for a sin-offering for a person who died should be cast away and never used, as stated below, an exception is made in this case, for there was an explicit teaching received by Moses at Sinai to that effect (Nazir 25a).

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 5:1.

As stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 4.

The funds set aside for the peace offering should be used for a peace offering (Hilchot Nizirut 9:3). The Rambam does not mention that point here because the prohibition of me’ilah does not apply.

For the burnt-offering and peace-offering that he must bring.

For he certainly benefited from the money set aside for the burnt-offering.

For it is possible to say that he benefited only from the money set aside for the peace-offering.

For the sin-offering and peace-offering that he must bring.

For he certainly benefited from the money set aside for the sin-offering.
The Kessef Mishneh questions this ruling, asking why is this instance different from the first clause where we said that it is possible to say that he would use the entire sum to purchase peace-offerings? The Kessef Mishneh gives two answers: a) since the donor has died, there is no way that he can change his mind and use the money only for a peace-offering; b) since he stated: “The remainder is for my nazirite offering,” it would appear that he desired to bring all of his nazirite offering from those funds.

Setting aside specific coins for each sacrifice.

When he used only some of the money, to be liable, he must use more than the value of a peace-offering. Otherwise, it is not certain that coins that had been designated for the sin-offering and the burnt-offering were used and it is possible that he is not liable. Hence were he to bring a guilt-offering to atone for the transgression of me’ilah, he would be transgressing (Rav Yosef Corcus).

A zav, a zavah, a woman after childbirth, and a convert. The first three are required to bring one dove as a burnt-offering and one as a sin-offering. A convert brings two doves as burnt-offerings (Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah, ch. 1).

For the prohibition against me’ilah applies to both these types of offerings. There is no peace-offering among them (Kessef Mishneh).

The teaching transmitted to Moses mentioned above includes this instance as well.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 15:6; Hilchot Shegagot 3:3.

Rav Yosef Corcus comments that the Rambam does not state “the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply,” for certainly, if one benefits from the sacrifice, the prohibition against me’ilah applies. His intent is that the act of transferring the sacrifice from one sin to another is not considered an act of me’ilah, because it is not effective.
He also notes that Keritot 27b, the source for this ruling, considers atonement dependent on me’ilah and not the converse, as the Rambam states here. Nevertheless, the difference is that here the Rambam is putting the emphasis on me’ilah, while the Talmud is putting the emphasis on whether the sacrifice brings about atonement.

As Rav Yosef Corcus explains, he is considered to have taken the money for his own personal use and then used it to purchase an animal for a sin-offering.

The mandatory minimum value of a guilt-offering (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:22). See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Keritot 6:6) for an explanation of these rulings.

For each sela is worth four dinarim.

As part of his atonement for the transgression of me’ilah.

Even though he paid only a sela for it, he fulfills his obligation, for the profit on the exchange is his.

He is still obligated to bring two guilt-offerings (one for which he was originally liable and one for purchasing one of the rams as an ordinary animal with money set aside to purchase a guilt-offering). And he must make restitution for the sela that he used for the ordinary animal and add an additional fifth.

The four dinarim that he misappropriated plus an additional fifth. This money should come from his own funds.

For one must add a fifth in atonement for me’ilah.

I.e., he should purchase a more valuable animal as a sin-offering.

I.e., he purchased an animal of lesser value for a sin-offering.

Since the money should have been used for the sin-offering and the sin-offering has already been purchased, there is nothing to do with the money, but have it destroyed.
Rav Yosef Corcus comments that this ruling appears to follow the opinion of Rabbi Shimon (Me’ilah 10a) who maintains that any animal designated as a sin-offering should be consigned to death if its owners received atonement through the offering of another sacrifice. Nevertheless, in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:8, the Rambam follows the differing view, which maintains that this stringency is applied only when the first animal was lost and it was discovered after the person found atonement. The Sages who follow that view maintain that, in this instance, the money should be used for a freewill offering. Rav Yosef Corcus explains that since he knew that he misappropriated the money for the sacrifice and yet, did not use it to purchase another more expensive offering, it is as if he purposely diverted it from its intended use. Hence the money is consigned to destruction.

I.e., he should have used the money that he misappropriated and the additional fifth to purchase a more expensive offering. Since he failed to do so, one might think that the money should be destroyed as in the previous instance, Nevertheless, that stringency is not followed for the reason stated by the Rambam.

This applies in all instances, because the stringencies mentioned above apply only to a sin-offering and not a guilt-offering.

The animal should be offered as designated for the sake of its original owner (Rashi, Pesachim 89b).

I.e., given back to the purchaser.

For he purchased a consecrated animal.

We do not say that the additional zuz is a present to the owner (ibid.).

And must make restitution of the value of the article and an additional fifth to the Temple treasury (Nedarim 35a).

For he consecrated it only with regard to himself. It is not considered as the property of the Temple treasury.

For it is not really consecrated property and does not belong to the Temple treasury.

For the article itself has been consecrated and is the property of the Temple treasury.

This is speaking about an instance where the loaf is within a radius of four cubits of a person. A person has the right to acquire any property within four cubits of him (Bava Metzia 10a). Since he has the right to acquire it for himself, he also has the right to consecrate it.

I.e., we evaluate how much it would be worth for a person to be able to endow his heirs with such a gift.

I.e., we do not say that once the loaf leaves the property of the person who consecrated it, its consecrated dimension is released.

Hence giving it to another person is not considered a violation of this prohibition. Had he consecrated the article in a universally applicable manner, the giver would have transgressed when he transferred ownership of the object.

The term konem is one of the terms for vows used in the vernacular of the Talmudic era.

I.e., the Rambam is speaking about situation in which a given article is not worth a p’rutah, but all of the articles together are worth a p’rutah.

I.e., his original vow takes effect repeatedly.

For they were consecrated only until they were cut down. Since the plantings themselves were never consecrated, only their value, the person’s stipulation limits the extent to which the consecration applies. Hence, redemption is not required.
This ruling represents a change of opinion for the Rambam. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 3:4), he rules that after they are cut down, they must be redeemed.

They become his property.

For the vow of the person who consecrated them does not affect them since they now belong to someone else.