Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Using the singular form of the words.

The Kessef Mishneh states that a partner has a share in the entire animal. Hence, even if the gentile’s partnership is minimal, it cannot be said that this animal belongs to a Jew entirely. This approach, however, does not seem to be accepted by all authorities. The Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De’ah 320:4, explains that the rationale for the halachah is that it is possible that the gentile’s share encompasses an organ that is of vital importance like the heart or the brain.

The mother or the fetus.

Since the gentile does not own or have a share in the animal as a whole different laws apply.

There is a difference of opinion concerning the matter in Bechorot 3a. There are Rabbis who follow the more stringent view that maintains that this leniency applies only when gentile’s share encompasses an organ whose absence would render the animal treifah. The Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 320:4 quotes the Rambam’s ruling, but the Siftei Cohen advises following the stringency required by the other opinions as an initial preference.

The Kessef Mishneh asks: “What limb could be cut off without causing the animal to be considered unblemished?” and explains that it refers to an extra toe on the animal’s hooves.

Which would be a firstborn.

He buys - or in the following instance - he sells the fetus, but not the cow.

It is forbidden to sell a large animal to a gentile, as stated in Hilchot Shabbat 20:3.

For, as indicated by the following halachah, both the mother and the offspring must be owned by a Jew.

As stated in Hilchot Shabbat, loc. cit., a person who sells a large animal to a gentile is penalized and required to buy it back, even at a loss. This penalty is not exacted for selling a fetus. Tosafot, Bechorot 13a, places the emphasis on the fact that the person prevented the mitzvah of the firstborn from being carried out. Even though one might think a person should be penalized for such a deed, leniency is granted.

This was one of the common arrangements made for caring for sheep and cattle in the Talmudic era. Instead of paying the cowherd or shepherd in cash, he would be paid by receiving a share of the animal’s offspring.

Because of the gentile’s ownership.

The mother and the offspring.

This also was an arrangement to enable a shepherd to earn a livelihood without the owner of the sheep paying his wages in cash. This arrangement is called tzon barzel and is described by the Rambam in Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 8:12: [A person] owned 100 sheep. [A shepherd] accepted the responsibility of caring for them on the condition that the shearing, offspring, and milk would be split between them... [Included in the agreement is the condition that] if the sheep die, the shepherd must make restitution for them.

I.e., since the gentile has a claim on the offspring, there is no obligation to separate the firstborn from the third generation.

I.e., the fourth generation.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 320:6, adds that if the Jew extends the gentile’s lien to the later generations, their offspring are also free from the requirements of firstborn animals.

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Mechirah, ch. 3, according to Scriptural Law, a transaction (kinyan) is completed through the exchange of money. Nevertheless, our Sages ordained that transactions between Jews should be completed through meshichah, i.e., drawing it after one for a short distance.
This institution, however, was not necessarily accepted by the secular laws by which most gentiles abide. Hence if a gentile desired and a Jew agreed that the transaction between them be completed through the payment of money, that agreement is binding (see Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 1:14).

I.e., if the animal gives birth to its firstborn after the payment of the money, the laws of the firstborn apply even though the Jew had not taken possession of it through meshichah.

The laws stated in the following halachah apply to it.

The owner is required to set the animal aside as a firstborn, because of the doubt. Nevertheless, he may not have it offered in the Temple as a sacrifice, for perhaps it is an ordinary animal and one would transgress by slaughtering an ordinary animal in the Temple Courtyard. Hence it is allowed to pasture until it contracts a blemish. Once it is blemished, it need not be given to the priest for the reason the Rambam proceeds to explain. It may be eaten by its owners, because there is no sacred quality connected with it. See Chapter 5, Halachah 3.

In this instance, the priest.

The firstborn.

The owner.

Since the priest cannot prove that the animal is a firstborn, the owner is allowed to retain possession. This is a general principle applicable in many contexts of Jewish Law; see Hilchot Terumot 10:14, Hilchot Mechirah 20:5, et al.
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 316:1, states that both the stringencies and leniencies stated above apply whether the animal is within its first year of life (and thus is less likely to have given birth previously), as stated in Halachah 10, or after its first year of life (when it is more likely to have given birth). Similarly, they apply even if the gentile mentions in the course of conversation that the animal has already given birth previously.

Bechorot 24a explains that this ruling is based on the assumption that an animal will not have mercy on a young animal unless it gave birth previously.

See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 1:4 which states that, because of the doubt, it is forbidden to partake of such an animal. Thus it is clear that we are not certain that it is the offspring of the mother. Nevertheless, the probability is significant enough to free the offspring from the requirements of a firstborn animal.

The Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:3, quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Tur and the Rama differ and maintain that we do not rely on the assumption mentioned by the Rambam. They do, however, mention that if, in the course of conversation, the gentile states that the animal has given birth, his word may be accepted if it is providing milk. This, however, applies only when speaking of a cow for which the above assumption is more applicable. Goats, by contrast, often provide milk before giving birth.

The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, loc. eit.:6. The Tur and the Rama differ and maintain that the animal should be considered as a firstborn of doubtful status and the laws mentioned in Halachah 7 apply.

I.e., people at large will not be able to discern the nature of the discharge, but an experienced shepherd could.

For we accept their word and consider it as if the animal has given birth already.

In which instance, it is likely that the animal did not give birth previously.

And thus is governed by the laws mentioned in Halachah 7.

This principle is also applied in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 10:14 and Hilchot Temurah 4:10.

Chapter 2, Halachah 6.

Because of the combination of these factors, the likelihood is that the offspring carried in the placenta was not a male obligated in the requirements of the firstborn. Hence, the placenta is not considered as consecrated.

As a portion of a consecrated animal.

For even if we assume that a fetus was also discharged, as mentioned in the previous halachah, the majority of firstborn fetuses are not bound by the requirements of a firstborn animal.

Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 10:1-2.

Thus the laws of impurity associated with childbirth do not apply to her and, if this was her first pregnancy, a male born afterwards is considered as the firstborn.

See Halachah 10 for the definition of this term.

The commentaries have questioned - without resolving - the apparent redundancy in the Rambam’s words. Rashi (Bechorot 22a) interprets the source for the Rambam’s statements differently.

According to Rav Yosef Corcus, the Rambam is saying that it is possible to classify an animal as a firstborn in the following situation. Its mother had not given birth previously. The mother discharged a tinuf, afterwards engaged in relations with a male, and then was kept alone. If it gave birth within six months of the discharge of the tinuf, we assume that the discharge was not a miscarriage and was merely blood and not a fetus.

I.e., it went out to the field in the morning looking pregnant and returned in the evening looking like an ordinary animal.

See Halachah 7.
Bechorot 29a states that, generally, an animal which miscarries discharges an entity that causes her offspring to be exempted from the requirements of the firstborn. However, in such an instance, it discharges a tinuf first and this animal did not discharge a tinuf Rav Yosef Corcus questions whether that is the Rambam’s intent as well. When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 315:4, quotes the wording used by the Rambam without emendation.

And thus does not exempt an offspring born afterwards from the requirements of the firstborn.

i.e., a weaving needle. The needle used for the woof is, however, larger than that used for the warp (Bechorot 22a).

Compare to the final clause of the halachah. Since the limbs are being cut up within the animal, extracted individually, and fed to the dogs immediately, it never existed as a complete entity outside its mother’s womb. Consequently, such a fetus is not considered to have been “born,” nor to have “opened its mother’s womb.” Its meat is not considered consecrated and hence may be fed to the dogs.

The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 319:1. The Tur and the Rama, by contrast, follow the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that the second animal should not be considered a firstborn.
Rav Yosef Corcus asks: Why is such a situation considered more lenient than that of a tinuf or a flow of blood mentioned above? He answers that in those situations, we assume that the fetus emerged whole, while here, we know that it did not.

It is considered to have been “born.” Hence it is consecrated and must be buried; see Chapter 3, Halachah 4; Hichot Pesulei HaMukdashim 19:11.

The rationale is that since the greater portion of the animal emerged, it is considered as "born" and thus the offspring is considered as the firstborn.

Here, also, the Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, foe. cit., while the Tur and the Rama follow the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that the offspring’s limbs are not consecrated retroactively. Since they were not consecrated at the time they emerged, their status remains the same afterwards.

Rav Yosef Corcus explains that this is speaking about a situation where the third of the animal that emerges first is cut off from the remainder of the animal.

And thus the greater portion of the animal did emerge.

When the second third of the offspring emerges, the greater part of the animal is present before us. Hence it is considered as if it emerged at one time and hence, becomes consecrated. Accordingly, the sale of the first third to the gentile is nullified, because retroactively, it is considered as if the owner never possessed the third he sold, because it was consecrated property.

Since the first animal is consecrated, the offspring that follow are not considered as firstborn. The Or Sameach and others maintain that this point is obvious and suggest that there is a printing error in the Mishneh Torah and this clause was moved from its proper place.
The Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:2, quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Tur and the Rama follow the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that the offspring is not consecrated retroactively and the sale to the gentile is binding.

As stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 4, if an offspring is removed by Caesarian section, neither it, nor the offspring that follows it is bound by the laws applying to a firstborn.

I.e., of the first 51 percent of the animal to emerge, the larger portion did not emerge from the womb.

I.e., when the second third emerged, it would have been joined with the first third to make up the larger portion of the offspring. Since the larger portion of the first half of the offspring is not fit to be considered a firstborn, the animal is not granted that distinction.
The Or Sameach maintains that the phrase “[the future offspring of the mother] is exempted from [the requirements of] the firstborn” should be placed here. Even though this offspring is not consecrated, the one which follows is exempt.
In this instance as well, the Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:3, quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Tur and the Rama again follow the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that the offspring is consecrated (because its larger portion emerged through the womb).

Chulin 70a discusses this instance, explaining that we are speaking about a situation where 47% of the offspring emerged from the womb together with this portion of the limb which constituted a third of the limb, but 5% of the offspring. Hence if the portion is added together with the 47%, the greater portion of the offspring will have emerged from the womb. Hence the animal is considered as a firstborn that died, as in the final clause of Halachah 14. Even though the limb from which this smaller portion is separated remains within the mother animal and emerges afterwards, the smaller portion of the limb is counted as part of the portion that emerged and not as part of the limb that remains.

For it is consecrated as a firstborn. It may not be sold to a gentile or fed to the dogs (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:4).

The unresolved doubt is whether the portion of the limb that remains within the mother animal is considered as part of the limb that emerged (and thus it would be considered as if the greater portion of the offspring emerged) or whether it is considered as part of the animal that remained inside the womb.

And is governed by the laws stated in Halachah 7.

All these questions revolve around the same issue: Must the firstborn touch the mother’s womb as it emerges or is it sufficient for it to emerge from the womb to receive that status? Each of the successive instances brought up by the Rambam represents a further question: the fiber mentioned in the first clause is not flesh, while the placenta is. Hence one could apply the principle (Bechorot 9a, et al): “One entity is not considered as an intervening substance for another entity of that type.” And if one would say that it is inappropriate to apply that principle with regard to the placenta, seemingly, it would be appropriate to do so with regard to the sister, for it is certainly “of the same kind” as the firstborn.
The mother animal’s next offspring is certainly not a firstborn, because this offspring is certainly no worse than an offspring born through Caesarian section.

To enable the firstborn to enter.

And in this instance, it didn’t.

In which instance, it would be consecrated.

In this instance, Chulin 70a does not mention any doubt regarding the matter. Since the walls of the womb are no longer supportive, it is as if the offspring emerged through Caesarian section.

Rashi explains that the question is: Since the portion of the womb that remains is greater than the portion stripped away, is it considered as if the offspring emerged through the womb even though it emerged through the portion that was open?

Here the question is the reverse: Since the portion of the womb that is stripped a way is greater than the portion that remains perhaps it is not considered as if the offspring emerged through the womb even though it emerged through the portion that remains (ibid.)?