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Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Ishut - Chapter Five, Ishut - Chapter Six, Ishut - Chapter Seven

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Ishut - Chapter Five

1

When a man consecrates a woman with an object from which it is forbidden to derive benefit - e.g., a mixture of milk and meat, chametz on Pesach, or other similar objects from which it is prohibited to derive benefit - she is not consecrated.1 [This ruling applies] even if the prohibition against deriving benefit from the object is merely Rabbinic in origin2 - e.g., chametz during the sixth hour on the fourteenth of Nisan.

א

המקדש בדבר שהוא אסור בהנאה כגון חמץ בפסח או בשר בחלב וכיוצא בהן משאר איסורי הנאה אינה מקודשת. ואפילו היה אסור בהנאה מדבריהם כגון חמץ בשעה ששית מיום י"ד אינה מקודשת:

2

If a man transgresses and sells an article from which it is forbidden to derive benefit, and consecrates [a woman] with the money [he receives] for it, the kiddushin are valid. [There is one] exception. If a person consecrates a woman with the money [received] for a false deity, the kiddushin are not valid. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from the money received for a false deity, just as [it is forbidden to derive benefit from] the false deity itself.3

When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the dung of cows [consecrated to] a false deity, the kiddushin are not valid. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from anything produced by entities [consecrated to] a false deity, as [Deuteronomy 13:18] states: "Let nothing that is condemned cling to your hand."

If, by contrast, [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the dung of an ox condemned to be stoned,4 the kiddushin are binding. Although it is forbidden to derive benefit from an ox condemned to be stoned, this prohibition does not apply to its dung. For the dung is considered of negligible importance when compared to the ox.

ב

עבר ומכר דבר האסור בהנאה וקידש בדמיו הרי זו מקודשת חוץ מעכו"ם שאם קידש בדמיה אינה מקודשת מפני שדמי עכו"ם אסורין בהנאה כמוה. המקדש בפרש עגלי עכו"ם אינה מקודשת שהכל מעכו"ם אסור בהנאה שנאמר ולא ידבק בידך מאומה מן החרם. אבל המקדש בפרש שור הנסקל הרי זו מקודשת אע"פ ששור הנסקל אסור בהנאה פרשו אינו אסור בהנאה שאינו דבר חשוב לגבי השור:

3

When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the produce of the Sabbatical year,5 with the ashes of the Red Heifer, or with water that was drawn for the purpose of sprinkling [the ashes of the Red Heifer],6 the kiddushin are valid.

[The following rules apply when a man] consecrates [a woman] with property dedicated to the Temple. If he was unaware [that the property had been dedicated], the kiddushin are valid. He must give the value [of the dedicated property] and an [additional fifth] to the Temple treasury and bring a guilt offering, as is required of all those who unwittingly make mundane use of property dedicated to the Temple.7 If he consecrated the woman knowing [that the property was dedicated], she is not consecrated.8

ג

המקדש בפירות שביעית או באפר פרה אדומה או במים שמילאן לעשותן מי נדה הרי זו מקודשת. המקדש בהקדש של בדק הבית בשוגג הרי זו מקודשת. והוא ישלם קרן וחומש להקדש ויביא אשמו כדין כל מועל בשגגה. ואם קידש בו אשה במזיד אינה מקודשת:

4

When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the produce of the second tithe - whether unknowingly or knowingly - the kiddushin are not valid. For unless a person redeems [this produce], it does not belong to him to use for his other purposes, since with regard to [this] tithe, [Leviticus 27:30] states: "It is God's."9

ד

קידשה במעשר שני בין בשוגג בין במזיד אינה מקודשת. לפי שאין לו לעשות בו שאר חפציו עד שיתחלל שנאמר במעשר ליי' הוא:

5

When a priest consecrates [a woman] with his share of offerings of the most sacred nature or [his share of] offerings of lesser sanctity, she is not consecrated. For one was permitted merely to eat these sacrifices.

When, by contrast, a priest consecrates [a woman] with the great terumah, the terumah taken from the tithe or with the first fruits, the kiddushin are binding. [This same ruling applies] when a Levite consecrates [a woman] with [produce from] the first tithe, or an Israelite consecrates [a woman] with [produce from] the tithe of the poor.10

ה

כהן שקידש בחלקו מקדשי קדשים או מקדשים קלים אינה מקודשת מפני שלא הותרו אלא לאכילה בלבד. אבל כהן שקידש בתרומה גדולה ובתרומת מעשר ובבכורים וכן לוי שקידש במעשר ראשון וישראל שקידש במעשר עני הרי זו מקודשת:

6

The gifts [required to be separated from produce] that have not been separated are considered as if they have already been separated. Therefore, when an Israelite inherited produce from his maternal grandfather who was a priest, and none of the required gifts had been separated from that produce, he may separate the terumah and the tithes [and keep the portions to be given to the priests as his own]. It is as if he inherited the terumah and the tithes from his maternal grandfather. Therefore, if he consecrates a woman with them, she is consecrated. Although they are not fit for [the Israelite] to eat, he has the right to sell them to someone for whom they are fit.

When, by contrast, an Israelite consecrates [a woman] with terumah that he separates from his grain heap, the kiddushin are not effective. For he does not have the right to sell this terumah; he possesses merely the privilege of giving it to the priest of his choice. This privilege is not considered to be money.

ו

מתנות שלא הורמו הרי הם כמו שהורמו. לפיכך ישראל שנפלו לו טבלים מבית אבי אמו כהן והפריש מהן תרומה ומעשרות הרי הן כתרומות ומעשרות שנפלו לו בירושה מאבי אמו. ואם קידש בהן אשה הרי זו מקודשת שאע"פ שאינן ראוין לו לאכילה יש לו למוכרן למי שהן ראוין לו. אבל ישראל שקידש בתרומה שהפריש מגרנו אינה מקודשת שהרי אין לו למוכרה ואין לו בה אלא טובת הנאה. לפי שנותנה לכל כהן שירצה וטובת הנאה אינה ממון:

7

[The following rules apply when] a person consecrates a woman [with property that] he robbed, stole or took against its owner's will. If the owner has despaired of the return of the article,11 and it is known12 that [the man] acquired it through the owner's despair, the consecration is effective. If not, it is not valid.

ז

המקדש את האשה בגזל או בגניבה או בחמס. אם נתייאשו הבעלים ונודע שקנה אותו דבר בייאוש הרי זו מקודשת ואם לאו אינה מקודשת:

8

When a person enters a colleague's home and takes an object, food or the like, and consecrates a woman, she is not consecrated. [This ruling applies] even when the owner comes and says, "Why did you not give her a more valuable article than the one you gave her?" He is making this statement only to prevent the person from being shamed [and it does not reflect his true intent]. Since the man consecrated [a woman] with property belonging to a colleague without the colleague's knowledge, this is robbery, and the woman is not consecrated.

If [the man] consecrated [the woman] with an article that the owner would not object [to its being taken] - e.g., a date or a nut - the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.13

ח

הנכנס לבית חבירו ולקח לו כלי או אוכל וכיוצא בהן וקידש בו אשה ובא בעל הבית אע"פ שאמר לו למה לא נתת לה דבר זה שהוא טוב ממה שנתת לה אינה מקודשת. שלא אמר לו דבר זה אלא כדי שלא להתבייש עמו. והואיל וקידש בממון חבירו שלא מדעת חבירו הרי זה גזל ואינה מקודשת. ואם קידשה בדבר שאין בעל הבית מקפיד עליו כגון תמרה או אגוז הרי זו מקודשת מספק:

9

When a person owns merchandise in partnership with a colleague and divides the merchandise without his colleague's knowledge, using it to consecrate [a woman], the kiddushin are not valid. [The rationale is that for the division of a partnership's assets to be effective,] an evaluation by the court is necessary. One [partner] may not take what he wants as his own and leave [the remainder for his colleague].

ט

היתה סחורה בינו ובין חבירו וחלקה שלא מדעת חבירו וקידש בחלקו הואיל וצריכה שומת ב"ד אינה מקודשת שאין זה נוטל לעצמו מה שירצה ויניח מה שירצה:

10

[The following rules apply when] a person robbed or stole an article from a woman or took it without her consent, and afterwards consecrated her with the article that he took from her, saying: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this." If the two were already engaged, and she took the article in silence, she is consecrated.14If, however, there was never an engagement between them, she is not consecrated, even if she remained silent when he gave her [the stolen articles] as kiddushin.15 If, however, she explicitly agreed [to the kiddushin], she is consecrated.

י

גזל את האשה או גנב ממנה או חמסה וחזר וקידשה בגזל ובגניבה ובחמס שלה ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת בו. אם קדם ביניהן שידוכין ונטלה ושתקה הרי זו מקודשת. ואם לא שידך אותה מעולם אף ע"פ ששתקה כשנתן לה דברים אלו בתורת קידושין אינה מקודשת. ואם אמרה הן הרי זו מקודשת:

11

Similar [concepts apply when a man] entrusts an article to [a woman] for safekeeping and tells her: "Take care of this article," and afterwards tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated with it." If he told her this before she took [possession of] the article, and she took it in silence, she is consecrated. If, however, he made his second statement after she had accepted the article for the purpose of safekeeping, and she remained silent, [the kiddushin] are not valid. For whenever [a woman] remains silent after money has been given, [the kiddushin] are not valid. If, however, she explicitly agreed, she is consecrated, even though she made the statement after accepting the article.16

יא

וכן אם נתן לה פקדון ואמר לה כנסי פקדון זה וחזר ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בו. אם אמר לה קודם שנטלתו ונטלתו ושתקה הרי זו מקודשת. ואם אחר שנטלתו בתורת פקדון אמר לה הרי את מקודשת בו ושתקה אין זה כלום שכל שתיקה שלאחר מתן מעות אינה מועלת. אבל אם אמרה הן אחר שנטלה הרי זו מקודשת:

12

[The following rules apply when a man] pays a debt that he owed [a woman] and [upon paying it,] says: "You are consecrated with it." If the two were engaged, [the man made the statement] before she accepted the money, and she accepted it in silence, she is consecrated. If they were not engaged, she is not consecrated unless she explicitly agrees.

If he states [his desire to consecrate her] after she accepted payment of the debt, she is not consecrated, even if she explicitly agrees. For nothing has been given her; she merely took what was rightfully hers. The debt he owed was repaid when she took the money, and she cannot demand repayment again.

יב

החזיר לה חוב שהיה לה אצלו ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת בו קודם שתטלנו ונטלתו ושתקה. אם היה ביניהן שידוכין הרי זו מקודשת. ואם לא שידך אינה מקודשת עד שתאמר הן. ואם אמר לה אחר שנטלה החוב שלה הרי את מקודשת בו אפילו אמרה הן אינה מקודשת. שהרי לא הגיע לידה ממנו כלום אלא שלה נטלה וכבר נפרע חובו משעה שנטלה ואינה יכולה לחזור ולתובעו בחוב פעם אחרת:

13

When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with a debt, even with [a debt that is recorded] in a promissory note,17 she is not consecrated.

What is implied? [The woman] owed [the man] a dinar; if he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with the dinar that you owe me," she is not consecrated. [The rationale is that] a loan is given to be spent, and there is nothing that presently exists for her to derive benefit from [and to accept as kiddushin]. For she has [- or it is as if she has - ]18 already spent that dinar and has derived benefit from it already.

יג

המקדש במלוה אפילו היתה בשטר אינה מקודשת. כיצד כגון שהיה לו אצלה חוב דינר ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר שיש לי בידך אינה מקודשת. מפני שהמלוה להוצאה ניתנה ואין כאן שום דבר קיים ליהנות בו מעתה שכבר הוציאה אותו דינר ועברה הנאתו:

14

[A different rule applies when] he has given her a loan [and received] collateral for it. If he consecrates her with the loan and returns the collateral,19 she is consecrated. For she derives benefit from the collateral from that time onward, and thus, [as a result of the kiddushin,] she has derived benefit.

יד

היה לו אצלה מלוה על המשכון וקידשה באותה המלוה והחזיר לה המשכון הרי זו מקודשת שהרי היא נהנית במשכון מעתה והרי הגיע הנאה לידה:

15

When [a man] consecrates [a woman] with the benefit [derived from] a loan, the consecration is valid.

What is implied? The consecration is binding if he lends her 200 zuz [at the time of the kiddushin] and tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me through the benefit [you receive] by my extending the length of this loan for you. It may be in your possession for so many days, and I will not demand payment until this date." For she is receiving benefit now [from the opportunity] to use the loan until the end of the time period fixed.

It is forbidden to make [such a condition], because it is like taking interest.20 My teachers interpreted the expression "the benefit [derived from] a loan," in a way that is not worthy of mention.21

טו

המקדש בהנאת מלוה הרי זו מקודשת. כיצד כגון שהלוה אותה עתה מאתים זוז ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בהנאת זמן שארויח לך במלוה זו שתהיה בידך כך וכך יום ואיני תובעה ממך עד זמן פלוני הרי זו מקודשת. שהרי יש לה הנאה מעתה להשתמש במלוה זו עד סוף זמן שקבע. ואסור לעשות כן מפני שהיא כרבית. ופירשו רבותי בהנאת מלוה דברים שאין ראוי לשומען:

16

If [the man] tells [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this p'rutah and with the debt that you owe me," she is consecrated. Similarly, if he tells her, "[Behold, you are consecrated...] with the debt that you owe me and with this p'rutah, the consecration is binding.22

טז

אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בפרוטה זו ובחוב שיש לי אצלך הרי זו מקודשת. וכן אם אמר לה במלוה שיש לי אצלך ובפרוטה זו הרי זו מקודשת:

17

When [a man] is owed a debt by a third party, and he tells [a woman] in the presence of the third party: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the debt that I am owed by this person," the consecration is binding.23

יז

היה לו חוב ביד אחרים ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בחוב שיש לי ביד זה במעמד שלשתן הרי זו מקודשת:

18

[The following rule applies when a man] consecrates [a woman] with an object that he has entrusted to her for safekeeping or with an article that he has lent her: If the entrusted object or borrowed article is worth a p'rutah24 and it exists within her property, she is consecrated.25

יח

קידשה בפקדון שיש לו בידה או בשאלה שהשאילה. אם היה הפקדון והשאלה פרוטה או שוה פרוטה באחד מהן קיים ברשותה הרי זו מקודשת:

19

[The following rule applies when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me in consideration of my speaking to the ruling authorities on your behalf." Although [the man] indeed spoke to the ruling authorities on her behalf - [and his words had an effect,] causing them to refrain from prosecuting her, she is not consecrated unless he gives her a p'rutah of his own.

[The rationale is that] the benefit that she received from his speaking [on her behalf] is regarded as a loan,26 and when one consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not binding.

יט

אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בשכר שאדבר עליך לשלטון ודיבר עליה לשלטון והניח השלטון ולא תבעה אינה מקודשת אלא אם נתן לה פרוטה משלו שההנאה שבאה לה מדבריו הרי היא כמלוה והמקדש במלוה אינה מקודשת:

20

[The following rule applies when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me [in return] for the work that I will perform on your behalf." Although [the man] indeed performs [the work he promised], she is not consecrated unless he gives her a p'rutah of his own.

[The rationale is that] a worker earns his wages [continuously] from [the time he] begins [working] until the end. As he performs a portion of the work, he earns an [equivalent] portion of his wages. Thus, [in the above situation, the man's] wages are considered to be a debt that she [owes him].27 And when one consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not binding.

כ

הרי את מקודשת לי במלאכה זו שאעשה עמך ועשה אינה מקודשת אלא אם כן נתן לה פרוטה משלו. לפי שהשכירות יזכה בה הפועל מתחלה ועד סוף כל זמן שיעשה מקצת מן המלאכה זוכה במקצת מן השכר ונמצא השכר כולו מלוה אצלה והמקדש במלוה אינה מקודשת:

21

[The following rule applies when a woman] tells [a man]: "Give so and so a present, and I will be consecrated to you." If he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me for the sake of the present I gave upon your request," the kiddushin are binding.28 Although she [personally] did not receive anything, she derived benefit from the fact that her will was carried out, and the other derived benefit because of her.

Similarly, if she told him, "Give a dinar to so and so as a present, and I will be consecrated to him," the kiddushin are binding29 provided the person who receives the present tells [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the pleasure [you derived] from the present that I received at your request."

כא

האשה שאמרה תן דינר לפלוני מתנה ואתקדש אני לך ונתן ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בהנאת מתנה זו שנתתי על פיך הרי זו מקודשת. אע"פ שלא הגיע לה כלום הרי נהנית ברצונה שנעשה ונהנה פלוני בגללה. וכן אם אמרה לו תן דינר לפלוני מתנה ואתקדש לו ונתן לו וקידשה אותו פלוני ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בהנאת מתנה זו שקבלתי ברצונך הרי זו מקודשת:

22

[To cite a similar instance: A man] tells [a woman]: "Take this dinar as a present and become consecrated to so and so"; the kiddushin are binding provided that the other person tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the benefit you received on my behalf," despite the fact that he himself did not give her anything.30

[The following rule applies when a woman] tells [a man]: "Take this dinar as a present and I will become consecrated to you"; he receives the present and tells her "Behold, you are consecrated to me by virtue of the pleasure [you received] in my accepting a present from you." If he is an important person, she is consecrated.31 For she derives satisfaction from the fact that he has benefited from her, and for the sake of this satisfaction, she consecrates herself to him.

כב

אמר לה הילך דינר זה במתנה והתקדשי לפלוני וקידשה אותו פלוני ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בהנאה זו הבאה ליך בגללי הרי זו מקודשת אע"פ שלא נתן לה המקדש כלום. אמרה לו הילך דינר זה מתנה ואתקדש לך ולקחו ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בהנאה זו שקבלתי ממך מתנה אם אדם חשוב הוא הרי זו מקודשת שהנאה יש לה בהיותו נהנה ממנה ובהנאה זו הקנת עצמה לו:

23

When [a man] tells a woman: "Become consecrated to me with a dinar. [Take this article] as security until I give you the dinar," she is not consecrated to him. For she did not receive the dinar, and the security was not given to her for it to be her own.32

If the man has in his possession security that he was given for a debt that a third party owes him, and he gives a woman the security as kiddushin, the consecration is binding although [the security] does not belong to him. For a creditor has certain rights with regard to the ownership of security.33

כג

האומר לאשה התקדשי לי בדינר והרי זה המשכון בידך עד שאתן הדינר אינה מקודשת לו. לפי שלא הגיע הדינר לידה ולא המשכון נתן להיותו שלה. היה בידו משכון על חוב שיש לו אצל אחרים וקידש בו אשה אע"פ שאינו שלו הרי זו מקודשת. לפי שבעל חוב יש לו מקצת קנין בגופו של משכון:

24

When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar on condition that you return it to me," she is not consecrated, regardless of whether or not she returns it. For if she does not return it, his condition will not be met. And if she returns it, she will not have derived any benefit, for she will not have received anything.34

כד

האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה על מנת שתחזירהו לי אינה מקודשת בין החזירה בין לא החזירה. שאם לא החזירתו לא נתקיים התנאי. ואם החזירתו הרי לא נהנית ולא הגיע לידה כלום:

25

[These rulings were issued with regard to the following instances:] [A man] gave [a woman] a wreath of myrtle or the like and told her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this." She accepted it, but [protested,] saying: "But it is not worth a p'rutah." He responded, "Become consecrated with the four zuz that are hidden in the wreath."

If she said yes, she is consecrated. If she remained silent, she is not consecrated with this money, for remaining silent after money has been given is of no consequence.35 There is nonetheless a doubt: perhaps the kiddushin are valid, lest the wreath be worth a p'rutah in another place.36

כה

נתן לה אגודה של הדס וכיוצא בה ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בזו וקבלה אותו אמרו לו והלא אין בה שוה פרוטה ואמר תתקדש בד' זוזים המוחבאים בתוך האגודה אם אמרה הן הרי זו מקודשת. ואם שתקה אינה מקודשת במעות אלו שהשתיקה שלאחר מתן מעות אינה מועלת כלום ותהיה מקודשת בספק מפני האגודה שמא שוה פרוטה במקום אחר:

26

[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Become consecrated to me with this date. Become consecrated to me with this one. Become consecrated to me with this one." If one of them is worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the kiddushin are merely of doubtful status,37 [their viability stemming only from] the possibility that one of the dates would be considered to be worth a p'rutah in another place.

כו

האומר לאשה התקדשי לי בתמרה זו התקדשי לי בזו התקדשי לי בזו אם יש באחת מהן שוה פרוטה הרי זו מקודשת ואם לאו אינה מקודשת אלא מספק שמא תשוה תמרה אחת פרוטה במקום אחר:

27

[Different rules apply if] he told her: "Become consecrated to me with this one, with this one and with this one." If together, they are all worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful.

[Different rules apply if] she eats [the dates] one after another as he gives them to her: If the last date is worth a p'rutah, she is consecrated. If not, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. For the dates that she ate are considered to be a loan, and when [a man] consecrates [a woman] with a loan, the kiddushin are not valid. Thus, the status of the kiddushin [depends] solely on [the worth of] the final date.

כז

אמר לה התקדשי לי בזו ובזו ובזו אם יש בכולם שוה פרוטה מקודשת ואם לאו אינה מקודשת אלא מספק. היתה אוכלת ראשונה ראשונה אם יש באחרונה שוה פרוטה מקודשת ואם לאו אינה מקודשת אלא מספק. שאותן תמרים שאכלה הרי הן כמלוה והמקדש במלוה אינה מקודשת ונמצא שאין הקידושין אלא בתמרה אחרונה:

28

If he tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated with these," the kiddushin are binding if all the dates together are worth a p'rutah. [This applies] even when she eats [the dates] one after another as he gives them to her. She is consecrated, for she is eating her own property.

כח

אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי באלו אם יש בכולן שוה פרוטה מקודשת אף ע"פ שהיא אוכלת ראשונה ראשונה שלה היא אוכלת ומקודשת:

29

[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this cup." If it is filled with water, the consecration [depends on the combined value of] the cup itself and its contents. If it is filled with wine, the consecration [depends on the value of] the cup itself, but not its contents. If it is filled with oil, the consecration [depends on the value of] the contents, but not of the cup itself.38

Therefore, if the oil was not worth a p'rutah, the status of the kiddushin is doubtful. If the oil is worth a p'rutah, she is definitely consecrated; no attention is paid to [the value of] the cup.

כט

האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי בכוס זה אם היה מלא מים הרי זו מקודשת בו ובמה שבתוכו. ואם היה מלא יין הרי זו מקודשת בו ולא במה שבתוכו. ואם היה מלא שמן הרי זו מקודשת במה שבתוכו ולא בו. לפיכך אם לא היה בשמן שוה פרוטה הרי זו מקודשת בספק. ואם היה בשמן שוה פרוטה הרי זו מקודשת ודאי ואין משגיחין על הכוס:

Footnotes
1.

Since it is forbidden to derive benefit from the article, according to the Torah, it has no value whatsoever. For a woman to be consecrated, she must receive an article worth a p'rutah.

2.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Tur (Even HaEzer 28) understand the Rambam as saying that all articles that are forbidden to be used by Rabbinic decree cannot establish a bond of kiddushin. Rav Yosef Karo (in the Kessef Mishneh) differs and explains that the example given by the Rambam specifies the scope of the ruling. Only when a Rabbinic commandment has its source in a prohibition from the Torah are the kiddushin of no effect.

From the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 2:1), his view is clearly that even if the prohibition is entirely Rabbinic in origin, the kiddushin are not binding.

In the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:21), Rav Yosef Karo follows the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that if the article is forbidden by force of Rabbinic decree, and that prohibition has no source in the Torah, the kiddushin are binding. If the prohibition has its source in the Torah, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.

(The rationale for this ruling is that since, according to Scriptural law, the article is worth money, and the woman accepts it as kiddushin, the criteria for kiddushin have been met.)

The Beit Shmuel 28:52 justifies the Maggid Mishneh's interpretation of the Rambam's view, explaining that since in practice the article is worthless because of the Rabbinic decree, the woman has not been given an article of value, and the kiddushin are not binding. In support, he cites another example: The man must own the article he gives as kiddushin. If he acquired that article through a kinyan (contractual act) that is Rabbinic in origin and is not accepted by Scriptural law, the kiddushin are binding.

Kin'at Eliyahu explains that the difference between these two views can be explained using the concepts of cheftza (the article) and gavra (the person). The Rambam's perspective puts the emphasis on the person, the woman receiving the kiddushin. She must receive an object from which she can derive benefit. Hence, since the Rabbis forbade deriving benefit from such an object, the kiddushin are not binding.

Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, puts the emphasis on the article given as kiddushin. For kiddushin to be effective, an article that is worth a p'rutah must be given. Since according to Scriptural law the article has intrinsic worth, the fact that our Sages forbade using it is not relevant in this context.

3.

See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:9.

4.

For goring a person. (See Exodus 21:28.)

5.

Although the produce of the Sabbatical year is ownerless, once a person takes possession of it, it becomes his private property and has value. Hence, it can be used to consecrate a woman.

6.

As the Rambam states in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 2:10, based on Kiddushin 58a), it is forbidden to receive money for consecrating or sprinkling the water of the ashes of the Red Heifer. One may, however, take payment for drawing the water and transporting it. Thus, the woman can derive this benefit from the water and/or ashes she is given.

7.

See Hilchot Me'ilah 1:3.

8.

For dedicated property that was consciously used for a person's private purposes retains its sacred nature and does not enter the possession of the person to whom it was given. (See Hilchot Me'ilah 6:3.)

9.

We are required to eat the produce of the second tithe in Jerusalem or redeem it and use the money to buy food to be eaten in Jerusalem. Although one derives personal benefit from eating this produce, it is not considered to be one's own property.

10.

In all the latter instances, although the person receives the produce in question because of the Torah's decree - and with regard to terumah, it still possesses a dimension of ritual sanctity - once he has received it, it is regarded as his personal property entirely, and he may use it as he pleases. Hence, it is fit to be used to consecrate a woman.

11.

A thief or robber cannot normally become the legal owner of an article through the owner's despair alone. The article must be given to a third party or undergo a change before it is considered to have left its original owner's property. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the woman receiving can legally acquire the article - for she is a third party - the kiddushin are effective (Maggid Mishneh).

12.

The Rambam's intent is that if the witnesses to the consecration know that the article was stolen, they must know that the owner of the article has despaired of its return. If they do not have such knowledge, they cannot serve as witnesses. Hence, the kiddushin are invalid, for it is as if they were performed without being observed by witnesses (Noda Biy'hudah, Even HaEzer, Volume II, Responsum 77).

13.

The commentaries have questioned this ruling, for it appears to be the Rambam's own addition. The Noda Biy'hudah (Even HaEzer, Volume I, Responsum 59) states that it would appear that this refers to a situation in which the owner is present and does not object. Nevertheless, since none of the sages of the earlier generations offered this interpretation, he is not willing to do so.

The Edut BiY'hosef (Volume II, Responsum 77) states that this ruling depends on those in the previous halachah. Since kiddushin are valid after the owner relinquishes his ownership of stolen property by despairing of its return, they are valid in the present instance. Since the owner does not object to the person's taking the object, he is considered to have relinquished his ownership. A similar interpretation is found in the Chatam Sofer, Even HaEzer, Responsum 85.

The Beit Shmuel 28:45 states that the doubt is that perhaps the owner indeed objects. The Chatam Sofer explains that the doubt concerns the object's worth. Although it is not of significant value in the place of the kiddushin, maybe it is valuable in another locale, as stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 19.

14.

We interpret her silence as implying that she granted him the stolen object as a present and accepted it as kiddushin (Rashi, Kiddushin 52b). There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether or not he is obligated to return the value of the stolen property to her. The Rashba maintains that he is not required, while Rabbenu Nissim states that he is. (See the Ramah and commentaries, Even HaEzer 28:2.)

15.

For she merely accepted her own property.

16.

Since she acknowledged the kiddushin, the situation becomes parallel to that mentioned in Halachah 18.

17.

The Ramah (Even HaEzer 28:7) notes that if the promissory note is worth a p'rutah and he returns it, there are opinions that maintain that the consecration is binding.

18.

I.e., even if she has not actually spent the money, from the time she received the loan, the money is hers and not the lender's, and he cannot consecrate her with it (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 28). See also Beit Shmuel 28:19.

19.

Tosafot, Kiddushin 19a, states that the kiddushin are effective even if the collateral is not returned. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:11) appears to favor the Rambam's view, it also quotes the other opinion.

20.

Since in addition to the eventual repayment of the debt, the person also receives the benefit of consecrating the woman, it is regarded like interest. The Rabbis (Meiri, Ma'aseh Rokeach) explain that the Rambam's wording is precise. The expression "like interest" implies that it is not actually considered to be taking interest, as forbidden by Scriptural law.

21.

The Rambam is referring to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who interprets the passage from Kiddushin 6b as referring to a person who extends the length of a loan at the time that payment is due. The Rambam does not accept that interpretation, because it is not logical that extending the length of the loan would be more effective than forfeiting the debt entirely (Maggid Mishneh).

Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's view is also followed by Rashi and the Ra'avad. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:9) quotes the Rambam's interpretation (for even the opinions that differ agree that such kiddushin are binding). In the law that follows, it also quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. Although the opinion of the Rambam is mentioned, the other view is favored. The Ramah, however, considers the status of the kiddushin to be doubtful because of the Rambam's view.

22.

Although the man mentions the debt, since he also gives her a p'rutah, we assume that she considers the money that she actually receives together with the loan. Therefore, the kiddushin are binding (Kiddushin 46a).

23.

As stated in Hilchot Mechirah 6:8, when such a statement is made in the presence of all the concerned parties, our Sages accepted it as a formal means of transferring the debt. This law shows that even when money is transferred through means ordained by Rabbinic and not Scriptural law, the kiddushin are binding according to Scriptural law.

There are opinions that maintain that the woman is not consecrated. These opinions maintain that even after such a transfer has been made, the original creditor can nullify a debt that has been transferred through such a process. Since there is a possibility that the debt will be nullified, they maintain that the woman will not make the commitment required by kiddushin. (See Rabbenu Nissim and the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 28:13 and commentaries.)

24.

Our translation is based on the Yemenite manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The wording of the standard printed text is somewhat confusing. It could be rendered: "If a p'rutah's worth of the article remains..." - i.e., even if the article is lost or stolen, if a p'rutah's worth remains - the consecration is binding. See the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:6) and commentaries.

25.

If, however, the entrusted object or borrowed article has been lost, stolen or destroyed, even if the woman is obligated to reimburse the man for its value, that obligation is considered similar to other debts, and the woman cannot be consecrated through it.

Although the entrusted object or borrowed article was located in the woman's property at the time of the kiddushin, since she was not the legal owner, she is considered to have received sufficient benefit to make the kiddushin effective.

26.

Speaking on her behalf is considered equivalent to working for her. Hence, an equation is established between this law and the following halachah.

27.

I.e., it is not as if the man's entire wage becomes due at the time he completes his work. Instead, for each moment of work, he earns a corresponding amount of his wages. This money is considered as a loan which is not due until the end of his employment. Thus he is in fact consecrating the women with a loan.

28.

Kiddushin 7a compares this situation to that of a guarantor who becomes liable to pay a loan if the borrower cannot. In both instances, the benefit received by another person causes the person who made the commitment (the guarantor or the woman) to incur an obligation.

The Maggid Mishneh (4:4) and others compare this law to Chapter 4, Halachah 4, but explain that there is a difference between the two cases. In Chapter 4, the man does not respond to the woman's suggestion, while in this halachah, he makes a clear statement acknowledging the woman's offer of kiddushin. The Ramah (Even HaEzer 29:2) puts the emphasis on the fact that in this halachah, the woman initially made this suggestion, even before the man proposed the kiddushin. In the previous law, by contrast, her statement was made in response to his proposal, and her facetious intent becomes clear.

29.

Kiddushin 7a derives this law by making a twofold comparison: to a guarantor (as in the law explained in the first portion of the halachah) and to a Canaanite servant. To explain: The servant becomes free when other people give his master money for that purpose, even though he himself gives nothing at all. Similarly, the person receiving the present acquires the woman as a wife even though he did not give anything for that purpose himself. Although there is a difference between the two - because the servant's owner receives money for the sake of freeing him and the woman does not receive any money herself - the comparison to a guarantor resolves that difficulty, as explained above.

30.

Kiddushin, ibid., derives this law from a comparison to a Canaanite servant, as explained above.

31.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 27:9) states that clarification is necessary to determine what is meant by "an important person." Because of the doubt involved, it is proper to require a divorce if the woman desires to become consecrated to another man (Chelkat Mechokek 27:21).

32.

Thus, it is as if she has received nothing. Therefore, she is not consecrated.

33.

The Ramah (Even HaEzer 28:12) quotes the Tur as stating that this law applies only when the security was taken at the time the loan was given. Otherwise, the kiddushin are not binding.

34.

From the Rambam's wording, it appears that there is no reason to say that the woman has been consecrated. Rabbenu Asher and others maintain that according to Scriptural law, the consecration is valid, for a present of this nature is considered to be a valid transaction. It is merely that the Rabbis nullified these kiddushin lest they resemble chalifin (barter).

The difference between these two approaches is that the Rambam puts the emphasis on the benefit the woman receives (or does not receive). Hence in this situation, since the woman did not receive any benefit, the kiddushin are not binding. Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, puts the emphasis on whether or not the man performed a valid act of transfer. Since he did, the kiddushin would be binding, were it not for our Sages' decree (Or Sameach).

35.

I.e., at the time the money was given, she was not aware of it, and afterwards to be consecrated she must explicitly express her consent. Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi differs and maintains that in such an instance there is a doubt whether or not the kiddushin are binding, and the more stringent ruling must be followed in every instance. His view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 28:5).

36.

As stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 19 above.

37.

In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo raises a question on this ruling, noting that Kiddushin 46a interprets this law as following the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon. In similar instances (see Hilchot Sh'vuot 7:10 and Hilchot Nedarim 4:11), the Rambam rejects Rabbi Shimon's reasoning.

In his gloss on Hilchot Nedarim, the Kessef Mishneh resolves that issue, explaining that we find that there is a mishnah in the tractate of Kiddushin (stated without mentioning the name of the author) that follows Rabbi Shimon's view, and a mishnah in the tractate of Nedarim that follows the opposing view. One of the principles of Talmudic law is that a mishnah is taught without mentioning its author to show that it is accepted by the majority of the Sages. Accordingly, one may presume that since the Rambam saw that the redactor of the Mishnah chose to follow Rabbi Shimon's reasoning in one instance and to differ with it in another, the Rambam followed suit.

38.

Since the water is of little value, it is considered to have no independent importance. Hence, its value is considered together with that of the cup. The wine is not of negligible value, but - in the Talmudic era - it was worth less than the cup containing it. Hence, the wine is given independent importance and is not considered together with the cup. The oil - in the Talmudic era - was considered to be very valuable, more valuable than the cup containing it. Moreover, oil is not necessarily all used at one time. Therefore, it is apparent that the cup is subservient to the oil, and it is the value of the oil that is the determining factor.

Ishut - Chapter Six

1

[The following rules apply when a man] consecrates [a woman] based on a conditional agreement: If the condition is met, the kiddushin are binding. If not, they are of no consequence. This applies regardless of whether the condition was stipulated by the man or by the woman.

Every [valid] conditional agreement whatsoever - whether with regard to kiddushin, divorce, commercial transactions or other questions of business law - must conform to the following four rules.1

א

המקדש על תנאי אם נתקיים התנאי מקודשת ואם לאו אינה מקודשת בין שיהיה התנאי מן האיש בין שיהיה מן האשה. וכל תנאי שבעולם בין בקידושין בין בגירושין בין במקח בין בממכר בין בשאר דיני ממון צריך להיות בתנאי ארבעה דברים:

2

These are the four rules governing all conditional agreements:2

a) the stipulation must be twofold [with both a positive and negative statement];

b) the positive aspect must be stated before the negative aspect;

c) the stipulation should be mentioned before the completion of the deed that one desires to make conditional;3

d) the stipulation must be something that is possible to comply with.

If one of these rules was not kept when a conditional agreement was made, the stipulation is nullified; it is as if there is no condition at all. Thus, [the woman] is either consecrated or divorced immediately, and the commercial agreement is completed as if no condition had ever been made, for one of the four rules of conditional agreements was not met.

ב

ואלו הן הד' דברים של כל תנאי. שיהיה כפול. ושיהיה הן שלו קודם ללאו. ושיהיה התנאי קודם למעשה. ושיהיה התנאי דבר שאפשר לקיימו. ואם חסר התנאי אחד מהן הרי התנאי בטל וכאילו אין שם תנאי כלל אלא תהיה זו מקודשת או מגורשת מיד ויתקיים המקח או המתנה מיד וכאילו לא התנה כלל הואיל וחסר התנאי אחד מן הד':

3

What is implied? [When a man] tells a woman: "If you give me 200 zuz, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. And if you do not give me [that sum], you are not consecrated," and after making this stipulation gives her the dinar, the condition is valid, and the kiddushin are subject to its terms. If she gives him 200 zuz, she is consecrated. If she does not give him, she is not consecrated.

ג

כיצד האומר לאשה אם תתני לי מאתים זוז הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה ואם לא תתני לי לא תהיה מקודשת ואחר שהתנה תנאי זה נתן לה הדינר. הרי התנאי קיים והרי זו מקודשת על תנאי. ואם נתנה לו מאתים זוז תהיה מקודשת ואם לא נתנה לו אינה מקודשת:

4

If, however, [the man] told [the woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar," gave her the dinar in her hand and then made a stipulation, saying: "If you give me 200 zuz you are consecrated," and if you do not give me [that sum] you are not consecrated," the stipulation is of no consequence, because he performed the deed first by giving it to her, and then making the stipulation.

[The above applies] even if everything occurred within a brief span of time;4 she is consecrated immediately and does not have to give [her husband] anything at all.

ד

אבל אם אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה ונתן הדינר בידה והשלים התנאי ואמר אם תתני לי מאתים זוז תהיי מקודשת ואם לא תתני לי לא תהיי מקודשת הרי התנאי בטל מפני שהקדים המעשה ונתן בידה ואח"כ התנה. ואע"פ שהכל בתוך כדי דיבור הרי זו מקודשת מיד ואינה צריכה ליתן לו כלום:

5

Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you give me 200 zuz you are consecrated to me with this dinar," and then places the dinar in her hand, the stipulation is of no consequence, because the condition was not stated in a twofold manner. He did not tell her: "If you do not give me, you will not be consecrated." [Therefore] she is consecrated immediately without having to give him anything.

ה

וכן אם אמר לה אם תתני לי מאתים זוז הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה ואח"כ נתן הדינר בידה הרי התנאי בטל מפני שלא כפל תנאו. שהרי לא אמר לה ואם לא תתני לא תהיי מקודשת והרי זו מקודשת מיד ואינה צריכה ליתן לו כלום:

6

Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you do not give me 200 zuz, you will not be consecrated to me. But if you give me 200 zuz, you are consecrated to me with this dinar," and then places the dinar in her hand, the stipulation is of no consequence, because the negative dimension of the stipulation was stated before the positive one. [Therefore,] she is consecrated immediately without having to give him anything.

ו

וכן אם אמר לה אם לא תתני לי מאתים זוז לא תהיי מקודשת לי ואם תתני לי מאתים זוז הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה ואח"כ נתן הדינר בידה הרי התנאי בטל לפי שהקדים לאו להן והרי זו מקודשת מיד ואינה צריכה ליתן לו כלום:

7

Similarly, when [a man] tells [a woman]: "If you ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. But if you do not ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, you are not consecrated." If he places the dinar in her hand afterwards, the stipulation is of no consequence, and the kiddushin are effective immediately. For it is well known that she cannot keep this stipulation; he is merely speaking facetiously in a jesting and teasing manner.

ז

וכן אם אמר לה אם תעלי לרקיע או תרדי לתהום הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה ואם לא תעלי לרקיע ולא תרדי לתהום לא תהיי מקודשת ואח"כ נתן הדינר בידה הרי התנאי בטל והרי היא מקודשת מיד שהדבר ידוע שא"א לה לקיים תנאי זה ואין זה אלא כמפליגה בדברים דרך שחוק והיתול:

8

[The following rules apply when a man] makes a condition with regard to a deed that is possible to be performed, but that is forbidden by the Torah - e.g., he told a woman: "If you eat fat or blood, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. But if you do not eat fat or blood, you are not consecrated," or [a man tells his wife]: "If you eat the meat of pigs, this is your get. But if you do not eat it, the get is not effective." If, after making this stipulation, he placed the dinar or the get in her hand, the stipulation is valid. If the woman transgresses and eats [the forbidden article as stipulated], she will be either consecrated or divorced [accordingly]. It is not with regard to such a situation that it is said, "the person made a stipulation that contradicts what is written in the Torah." For the woman has the option not to eat and not to be consecrated or divorced.

ח

הרי שהתנה בדבר שאפשר לעשותו אלא שהתורה אסרה אותו כגון שאמר לאשה אם תאכלי חלב ודם הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה ואם לא תאכלי לא תהיי מקודשת. אם תאכלי בשר חזיר הרי זה גיטיך ואם לא תאכלי לא יהא גט. ואחר שהתנה נתן הדינר או הגט בידה הרי התנאי קיים. ואם עברה ואכלה תהיה מקודשת או מגורשת. ואם לא אכלה אינה מקודשת ואינה מגורשת. ואין אומרים בזה הרי התנה על מה שכתוב בתורה שהרי בידה שלא תאכל ושלא תתקדש ולא תתגרש:

9

With regard [to which situations] did in fact our Sages say:5 "Whenever a person makes a stipulation that contradicts what is written in the Torah, his stipulation is nullified, except with regard to financial matters, in which instances his stipulation is binding"?6

When a person consecrates, divorces, gives or sells, dependent on a stipulation through which he wants to acquire a right that the Torah did not grant him, but rather prevented him from obtaining, or to use this stipulation to free himself from an obligation for which the Torah made him liable. In such an instance, he is told, "Your stipulation is of no consequence. The deed you have performed is binding. You are not freed from any responsibility for which the Torah obligates you, nor can you acquire any privilege that the Torah does not grant you."

ט

ובמה אמרו חכמים כל המתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה תנאו בטל חוץ מדבר שבממון שתנאו קיים. כגון שקידש או גירש או נתן או מכר על תנאי שהוא רוצה בתנאו שיזכה עצמו בדבר שלא זיכתה לו תורה ומנעה ממנו או יפטור עצמו בתנאו מדבר שחייבה אותו בו התורה שאומרין לו תנאך בטל וכבר נתקיימו מעשיך ואין אתה נפטר מדבר שחייבה אותך בו התורה ולא תזכה בדבר שמנעה אותך ממנו:

10

What is implied? For example, when a man consecrates a woman on condition that he is not obligated to provide her with her provisions or garments, nor grant her conjugal rights, he is told: "With regard to provisions and garments, your stipulation is binding, for these are financial obligations. With regard to conjugal rights, however, your condition is not binding,7 for the Torah has obligated you to grant these [to a woman]. Therefore, she is consecrated and you are obligated to grant her conjugal rights. You do not have the potential to free yourself of this responsibility with this stipulation." The same applies in all similar situations.

Similarly, if a man consecrates a woman whom he took as a captive for sexual relations on condition that he may have her perform servile tasks,8 she is consecrated and he is forbidden to have her perform these tasks, for after he had relations with her this was prohibited by the Torah. His stipulation does not empower him to a privilege that the Torah held back from him. The same applies in all similar situations.

י

כיצד כגון שקידש אשה על תנאי שאין לה עליו שאר כסות ועונה. שאומרין לו בכסות ושאר שהוא תנאי שבממון תנאך קיים אבל בעונה תנאך בטל שהתורה חייבה אותך בעונה והרי זו מקודשת ואתה חייב בעונתה ואין בידך לפטור עצמך בתנאך וכן כל כיוצא בזה. וכן המקדש יפת תואר על תנאי שיתעמר בה הרי זו מקודשת ואין לו להתעמר בה שהרי התורה מנעה אותו מלהשתעבד בה אחר שנבעלה. ולא מפני תנאו יזכה בדבר שמנעה אותו תורה אלא תנאו בטל וכן כל כיוצא בזה:

11

If a man established a condition with a woman at the time of kiddushin or divorce requiring her to engage in sexual relations with her father, her brother, her son or the like, it is as if he made a stipulation that she ascend to the heavens or descend to the depths, and his condition is of no consequence. For it is not within the woman's capacity to cause others to transgress and to engage in a forbidden sexual relationship. Thus, he has made a stipulation that she is incapable of fulfilling. The same applies with regard to all similar instances.

יא

התנה על האשה בשעת קידושין או בשעת גירושין שתבעל לאביה ולאחיה או לבנה וכיוצא בזה הרי זה כמי שהתנה עליה שתעלה לרקיע או שתרד לתהום ותנאו בטל שאין בידה שיעברו אחרים ויבאו על הערוה ונמצא שהתנה עמה בדבר שאינו בידה לקיימו וכן כל כיוצא בזה:

12

If, however, the man made a stipulation that she [influence] so and so to "give me his courtyard or to have his daughter marry my son," the stipulation is binding. For it is in her capacity to fulfill it, she can give so and so a large amount of money so that he will [consent to] give the man [making the condition] his courtyard or have his daughter marry that man's son. For in this instance, there is no sin involved. The same applies with regard to all similar instances.

יב

אבל אם התנה עליה שיתן לי פלוני חצירו או שישיא בתו לבני וכיוצא בזה תנאו קיים שהרי אפשר בידה לקיימו ותתן לפלוני ממון רב עד שיתן לו חצירו ועד שישיא בתו לבנו שהרי אין כאן עבירה וכן כל כיוצא בזה:

13

Have in mind at all times all these guidelines that have been mentioned with regard to conditional agreements. Whenever you hear the expression "A man consecrated [a woman] on the basis of these and these conditions," "gave a divorce on the basis of these and these conditions," or made a sale or gave a present conditionally, you will know that the condition must fit the four rules mentioned. Thus, it will not be necessary to repeat them on every occasion. If one of these rules is not kept, the stipulation is of no consequence.

יג

שים כל אלו הדברים של תנאים לנגד עיניך תמיד. וכל מקום שאתה שומע המקדש על תנאי כך וכך או הנותן גט על תנאי כך וכך או המוכר או הנותן על תנאי תדע שהתנאי יש בו ד' דברים אלו שביארנו כדי שלא נהיה צריכין לפרש אותן בכל מקום. ואם חסר אחד מהן אין כאן תנאי:

14

Some of the later geonim9 maintain that a person is required to make a conditional statement twofold only with regard to kiddushin and divorce. With regard to financial matters, by contrast, a twofold statement need not be made.

It is not proper to rely on this ruling, for our Sages derived the need to make a twofold statement of the condition, and the other four rules, from the condition made [with] the members [of the tribes] of Gad and Reuven, as [Numbers 38:29-30] states: "If the members [of the tribes] of Gad... cross over. But if they do not cross over...." And this condition involved neither kiddushin nor divorce. [My ruling echoes] the decisions of the great geonim of the previous eras, and it is fitting to follow it.10

יד

יש מקצת גאונים אחרונים שאמרו שאין צריך אדם לכפול תנאו אלא בגיטין וקידושין בלבד אבל בדיני ממון אינו צריך לכפול. ואין ראוי לסמוך על דבר זה שכפילת התנאי עם שאר הארבעה דברים מתנאי בני גד ובני ראובן למדו אותן חכמים אם יעברו בני גד וגו' ואם לא יעברו ותנאי זה לא היה לא בגיטין ולא בקידושין. וכזה הורו גדולי הגאונים הראשונים וכן ראוי לעשות:

15

When a man consecrates a woman conditionally, the kiddushin become effective at the time the stipulation is fulfilled, and not at the time of the [original] kiddushin.

What is implied? [For example, a man] tells a woman: "If I give you 200 zuz this year, you are consecrated to me with this dinar. But if I do not give you, you are not consecrated." If he [made these statements and] gave her the dinar in Nisan, but gave her the 200 zuz that he stipulated only in Elul, it is in Elul that the consecration takes effect. Therefore, if another person consecrates her before the first completes carrying out his stipulation, she is consecrated to the second.

Similar laws apply with regard to divorce and monetary law. When the stipulation is fulfilled, the divorce is effective or the sale or gift is completed.11

טו

המקדש על תנאי כשיתקיים התנאי תהיה מקודשת משעה שנתקיים התנאי לא משעה שנתקדשה. כיצד האומר לאשה אם אתן ליך מאתים זוז בשנה זו הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה ואם לא אתן ליך לא תהיי מקודשת ונתן הדינר לידה בניסן ונתן לה המאתים זוז שהתנה עמה באלול הרי זו מקודשת מאלול. לפיכך אם קדשה אחר קודם שיתקיים התנאי של ראשון הרי זו מקודשת לשני. וכן הדין בגיטין ובממונות בשעה שיתקיים התנאי הוא שיהיה גט או יתקיים המקח או המתנה:

16

When does the above apply? When a stipulation was made, and [the person making it did not state that the agreement took effect] from this time onward. If, however, [a man] told [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward with this dinar if I give you 200 zuz,"12 when at a later date he gives her the 200 zuz she is consecrated. Retroactively, the kiddushin are considered to have taken effect at the time they were given, despite the fact that the stipulation was not fulfilled until after much time had passed. Therefore, if a second person consecrates her before the stipulation has been fulfilled, she is not consecrated to that [second] person. Similar laws apply with regard to divorce and monetary law.

טז

בד"א בשהיה שם תנאי ולא אמר מעכשיו. אבל אם אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי מעכשיו בדינר זה אם אתן ליך מאתים זוז ולאחר זמן נתן לה מאתים זוז הרי זו מקודשת למפרע משעת הקידושין אע"פ שלא נעשה תנאו אלא לאחר זמן מרובה. לפיכך אם קידשה השני קודם שיעשה התנאי אינה מקודשת. וכן הדין בגיטין ובממון:

17

Whenever a person makes a stipulation and states [that it is effective] "from this time onward," it is not necessary for him to make a twofold statement of the stipulation,13 nor is it necessary to state the stipulation before performing the deed involved.14 Even when he performs the deed first, his stipulation is effective. He must, however, make a stipulation that is possible to fulfill. A person who makes a stipulation that is impossible to fulfill is merely speaking facetiously; there is no [intent to make] a [binding] stipulation.

When a person appends a stipulation to an agreement using the wording al menat ("on condition that"), the rules that apply when the person states "from this time onward" also apply.15 It is not necessary for him to make a twofold statement of the stipulation, nor is it necessary to state the stipulation before performing the deed involved.

יז

כל האומר מעכשיו לא יצטרך לכפול תנאו ולא להקדים התנאי על המעשה אלא אף על פי שהקדים המעשה תנאו קיים. אבל צריך להתנות בדבר שאפשר לקיימו. ואם התנה בדבר שא"א לקיימו הרי זה כמפליג בדברים ואין שם תנאי. וכל האומר על מנת כאומר מעכשיו ואינו צריך לכפול התנאי ולא להקדימו למעשה:

18

What is implied? When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that you give me 200 zuz," "here is your get on condition that you give me 200 zuz," or "this courtyard is given to you as a present on condition that you give me 200 zuz," the stipulation is binding. She is consecrated or divorced, or she acquires the field, but she must give the 200 zuz. If she does not give [the money], she will not be consecrated or divorced, nor will she acquire the field.

[The above applies] even when the man did not make a twofold condition, and even though he performed the deed before stating the condition - i.e., he placed the kiddushin or the get in her hand or let her take possession of the courtyard, and then completed [the statement of] his stipulation. [The rationale for these leniencies is that] when the stipulation is fulfilled, she retroactively either acquires the field or is consecrated or divorced from the time the deed was performed, as if a stipulation had never been made at all.16

יח

כיצד האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי על מנת שתתני לי מאתים זוז. הרי זה גיטיך על מנת שתתני לי מאתים זוז. הרי חצר זו נתונה ליך במתנה על מנת שתתני לי מאתים זוז הרי תנאו קיים ונתקדשה או נתגרשה וזכתה זו בחצר והם יתנו המאתים זוז. ואם לא נתנו לא תהיה זו מקודשת ולא מגורשת ולא תזכה זו בחצר. ואע"פ שלא כפל תנאו ואע"פ שהקדים המעשה לתנאי ונתן הקידושין או הגט בידה והחזיקה זו בחצר ואח"כ השלים תנאו. שהרי כשיתקיים התנאי תזכה זו בחצר ותתקדש זו ותתגרש משעה ראשונה שבה נעשה המעשה כאילו לא היה שם תנאי כלל:

Footnotes
1.

See Halachah 14 and notes.

2.

We find a conditional agreement in the Torah: Moses' granting the lands of Transjordan to the tribes of Reuven and Gad (Numbers 32:29-30). All these four rules were evident in Moses' phrasing of the stipulation. Accordingly, our Sages (Kiddushin 61a) consider this a prototype for all future conditional agreements.

3.

This is the Rambam's interpretation of the requirement that in its Hebrew original states: שיהיה התנאי קודם למעשה. The Ra'avad (in his gloss on Halachah 4) interprets the phrase differently. He states that in the wording of the person making the stipulation, the stipulation must be stated before the result of its completion: e.g., "If you give me 200 zuz, you will be consecrated..., and if you do not give me that sum, you will not be consecrated." The Beit Shmuel 38:2 accepts the Ra'avad's interpretation and not that of the Rambam.

4.

We have chosen a very loose translation. The Hebrew toch kedei dibbur has a precise connotation, meaning the amount of time it takes to say the words Shalom alecha rabbi umori.

5.

Kiddushin 19b.

6.

An exception is made with regard to financial matters, because with regard to these matters the Torah grants the person the right to waive monetary privileges that are due him. Privileges that are not monetary in nature may not be waived.

7.

Based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Bava Metzia, the conclusion of Chapter 7), the Ritba (Kiddushin 19a) and the Mordechai (gloss on Bava Metzia 93a) maintain that even conjugal rights can be considered to be a financial consideration, for it is a matter of physical pleasure. Nevertheless, this opinion is not accepted as halachah. Instead, withholding conjugal relations is considered a matter of physical anguish. Hence a woman does not have the prerogative of waiving this right.

8.

Deuteronomy 21:11-14 describes the right of a soldier to have relations with a female captive of war whom he desires. Once he has relations with her, he may no longer treat her as a servant.

9.

The commentaries have pointed to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Shmuel ben Chofni HaCohen.

10.

The Ra'avad, the Ramban and the Rashba differ with the Rambam's reasoning. According to the position of these authorities, it is only one Sage, Rabbi Meir, who maintains that the rules regarding conditional agreements were derived from the agreement made between Moses and the tribes of Reuven and Gad. They maintain that the need to repeat the condition applies only with regard to kiddushin, and was instituted only because of the severity of the establishment and annulment of the marriage relationship. With regard to other matters, however, there is no such requirement. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 241:9) follow the Rambam's view.

11.

The above applies when the agreement is made verbally. If, however, a conditional sale or a present is recorded in a legal document, it is considered to be effective retroactively from the date stated in the document, although the stipulation is not carried out until much later.

Others maintain that the same principle applies with regard to a get, and if a date is included in a conditional bill of divorce, the divorce is retroactively effective from the date of the get, even though the stipulation is carried out much later. As stated in Hilchot Gerushin 8:1, the Rambam does not follow this approach. (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 143:2.)

12.

In such an instance, the stipulation need not be restated, as mentioned in the following halachah.

13.

Since the condition does not have to be restated, there is also no need for the positive statement to precede the negative.

14.

This follows the Rambam's interpretation of the Talmud's wording שיהיה התנאי קודם למעשה, as explained in Halachah 2.

15.

Tosafot and many subsequent Ashkenazic authorities do not accept this ruling. The difference of opinion is noted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 144:4).

16.

Among the other rationales offered are that the rules for a conditional agreement are derived from the agreement between Moses and the tribes of Gad and Reuven, and in that instance that condition was phrased using the term "if," rather than "from this time onward" or "on condition that" (Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi). The Ra'avad explains that stating a stipulation using the wording "if" nullifies the act the person performs. For a stipulation to have this power, it must be worded precisely. If, however, the wording "on condition that" or "from now onward" is used, the implication is that the act is not nullified, but is merely dependent on the fulfillment of the condition. Since the stipulation is not that powerful, its wording need not be as precise.

Ishut - Chapter Seven

1

[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that my father will consent." If his father consents, she is consecrated.1 If he does not consent, if he remained silent, or if he died before he heard of the matter, she is not consecrated.2

[If the man tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me] on condition that my father does not object." If he hears and objects, she is not consecrated. If he does not object or he dies, she is consecrated. If the son dies, and the father hears afterwards, we instruct the father to say: "I do not consent," so the kiddushin will not be effective, and the woman will not be obligated to undergo the rites of yibbum.3

א

האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי ע"מ שירצה אבי רצה האב מקודשת לא רצה או ששתק או שמת קודם שישמע הדבר אינה מקודשת. על מנת שלא ימחה אבי שמע ומיחה אינה מקודשת. לא מיחה או שמת הרי זו מקודשת. מת הבן ואחר כך שמע האב מלמדין האב שיאמר איני רוצה כדי שלא יהו קידושין ולא תפול לפני יבם:

2

[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I possess 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain."4 If there are witnesses who say that he possesses these entities, the kiddushin are binding. If there are no witnesses, [the kiddushin are not nullified entirely; instead,] their status is doubtful. Perhaps he possesses these entities and says he does not own them in order to cause the woman difficulties.5

ב

האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי בזה על מנת שיש לי מאתים זוז או בית כור עפר אם יש שם עדים שיש לו הרי זו מקודשת. ואם אין לו הרי זו מקודשת מספק שמא יש לו והוא אומר אין לי כדי לקלקלה:

3

[The following rules apply when he tells her:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I possess 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain in a particular place." If he possesses these entities in that place, the kiddushin are binding. If he does not possess these entities in the place he specified, [the kiddushin are not nullified entirely; instead,] their status is doubtful. Perhaps he possesses these entities in that place [and says he does not own them] in order to cause the woman difficulties.6

ג

הרי את מקודשת לי בזה על מנת שיש לי מאתים זוז או בית כור עפר במקום פלוני. אם יש לו באותו מקום הרי זו מקודשת. ואם אין לו באותו מקום שאומר הרי זו מקודשת מספק שמא יש לו שם והוא מתכוין לקלקלה:

4

[The following rules apply when he tells her:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I show you 200 zuz or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain." When he shows her these entities, she is consecrated. If he shows her money that is possessed by someone else or land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain in a field belonging to someone else, she is not consecrated; he [must] show her what belongs to him.

If he borrowed the money, rented a field or took it on a sharecropping arrangement and showed it to her, she is not consecrated; he [must] show her what belongs to him. For when he says "I will show you," that implies that "I will show you the entity I mentioned that belongs to me and is in my possession."

ד

הרי את מקודשת לי בזה על מנת שאראך מאתים זוז או בית כור עפר הרי זו מקודשת ויראנה. הראה הזוזים ביד אחרים או שהראה בית כור עפר בשדה אחרים אינה מקודשת עד שיראנה משלו. לקח המעות בהלואה או בשותפות או ששכר השדה או לקחה באריסות והראה אינה מקודשת עד שיראנה משלו. שמשמע שאראך שאראך משל עצמי דבר זה שאמרתי לך:

5

[The following rules apply when] the man owns land on which it is fit to grow a kor of grain, but it contains clefts ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high. If the clefts are filled with water, they are considered to be rocks and are not included in the total measure, because they are not fit to be sown.7 If they are not filled with water, they are included in the total measure, because they are fit to be sown.

ה

היה לו בית כור עפר והיה בו נקעים עמוקים עשרה טפחים או סלעים גבוהים עשרה טפחים. אם היו הנקעים מלאים מים הרי הן כסלעים ואין נמדדין עמו מפני שאינן ראויין לזריעה ואם אינן מלאין מים נמדדין עמו מפני שהן ראויין לזריעה:

6

[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that you are not bound by vows." The kiddushin are not binding if she is bound by any of the following three vows: that she may not eat meat, that she may not drink wine, or that she may not wear colored ornaments.8 If she is bound by any vow other than these, she is consecrated, even when [the husband] states: "I object even with regard to these."

If he told her, "[Behold, you are consecrated...] on condition that you are not bound by any vow," even if she has made a vow [as insignificant as] not to eat carobs, she is not consecrated.

ו

האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי בזה על מנת שאין עליך נדרים ונמצא עליה אחד משלשה נדרים אלו שלא תאכל בשר או שלא תשתה יין או שלא תתקשט במיני צבעונין אינה מקודשת. נמצא עליה נדר חוץ מאלו אף ע"פ שהוא אומר מקפיד אני אפילו על זה הרי זו מקודשת. ואם אמר לה על מנת שאין עליך כל נדר אפילו נמצאת שנדרה שלא תאכל חרובין אינה מקודשת:

7

[The following rules apply when a man tells a woman:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that you do not have any physical blemishes." If she has one of the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit [as a wife], she is not consecrated. If she has a physical blemish other than these, she is consecrated, even though he states, "I object even with regard to these."

What are the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit [as a wife]: All the physical blemishes that cause a priest to be deemed unfit [for service in the Temple] cause a woman to be deemed unfit. In Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash, all the blemishes affecting the priests are explained.9 In addition, [there are other blemishes that cause] women [to be deemed unfit]. They include: foul body odor, [excessive] sweating, foul breath, deep voice, breasts of abnormal size, being more than a handbreadth larger than those of other women,10 a distance of more than a handbreadth between one breast and the other, a scar in the place where she was bit by a dog, and a birthmark on her forehead.

This includes even a birthmark that is very small, even if it is close to her hairline, and even if there are no hairs growing from it. This is the birthmark that is mentioned as a disqualifying factor for a woman and not for a priest. If, however, a birthmark has facial hair growing from it, or if it is as large as an isar11 even when no hair grows from it, it is a disqualifying blemish, both for priests and for women.

ז

הרי את מקודשת לי בזה על מנת שאין בך מומין ונמצא בה אחד מן המומין הפוסלין בנשים אינה מקודשת. נמצא בה מום אחר חוץ מאותן המומין אף ע"פ שאמר מקפיד אני אפילו על זה הרי זו מקודשת. ומה הן המומין הפוסלין בנשים כל המומין הפוסלין בכהנים פוסלין בנשים. ובהלכות ביאת מקדש יתבארו כל מומין של כהנים. ויותר עליהן בנשים. ריח רע. וזיעה. וריח הפה. וקול עבה. ודדין גסין מחברותיה טפח. וטפח בין דד לדד. ונשיכת כלב ונעשה המקום צלקת. ושומא שעל הפדחת. אפילו היתה קטנה ביותר ואפילו קרובה לשער ראשה ואף ע"פ שאין בה שיער. וזו היא השומא שיתרה אשה על הכהנים. אבל אם היתה שומא שיש בה שיער בשאר הפנים או שומא גדולה כאיסר אעפ"י שאין בה שיער הרי זה מום בין בכהנים בין בנשים:

8

When a man consecrates a woman without making any specific stipulations, and it is discovered that she has one of the physical blemishes that cause a woman to be deemed unfit, or [it is discovered that] she is bound by one of the three vows mentioned above, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.12

If [a man] consecrates [a woman] on condition that she is not bound by vows, and she was bound by vows, but [afterwards,] she went to a wise man who nullified them for her,13 she is consecrated.

ח

המקדש אשה סתם ונמצא עליה אחד מן המומין הפוסלין בנשים או נמצא עליה אחד משלשה נדרים הרי זו מקודשת מספק. קידשה על מנת שאין עליה נדרים והיו עליה נדרים והלכה אצל חכם והתיר לה הרי זו מקודשת:

9

If [a man] consecrates [a woman] on condition that she does not have physical blemishes, and she does have blemishes, she is not consecrated, even if [afterwards,] she goes to a physician who heals these blemishes.14

When, by contrast, a man enters into a marriage contract on condition that he is not bound by any vows, and that he does not have any physical blemishes, although he is indeed bound by vows and has physical blemishes, if he goes to a wise man who nullifies the vows, and if he goes to a physician who heals the blemishes, the marriage is valid. [The rationale is that] there is no shame for a man to have had physical blemishes once they have been healed. A woman will not object because of such a thing.15

ט

קידשה על מנת שאין בה מומין והיו בה מומין והלכה אצל רופא וריפא אותה אינה מקודשת. אבל אם התנה האיש שאין עליו נדרים ושאין בו מומין והיו עליו נדרים והיו בו מומין והלך אצל חכם והתירו אצל רופא וריפאו הרי זו מקודשת שאין גנאי לאיש במומין שכבר נרפאו והאשה אינה מקפדת על זאת:

10

[The following rules apply when a man tells a woman:] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] on condition that I give you 200 zuz within 30 days." If he gives her [the money] within 30 days, she is consecrated. If 30 days pass without him giving it to her, she is not consecrated.

[If a man tells a woman,] "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these zuz after 30 days," she is consecrated after 30 days, even though she used the money within the 30 days. If either he or she change their minds [and decide to nullify the marriage] within these 30 days, she is not consecrated.

י

האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי בזה על מנת שאתן ליך מאתים זוז מיכן ועד שלשים יום אם נתן לה בתוך שלשים יום מקודשת ואם עברו שלשים יום ולא נתן לה אינה מקודשת. הרי את מקודשת לי בזוזים אלו לאחר שלשים יום. אע"פ שנתאכלו המעות בתוך שלשים יום הרי זו מקודשת לאחר שלשים יום. ואם חזר בו בתוך השלשים או חזרה היא אינה מקודשת:

11

If another man comes and consecrates her within these 30 days, she is consecrated to the second man forever. [The rationale is] that at the time the second man consecrated her, she was not consecrated. Therefore, the second man's kiddushin are binding and make her a married woman. Thus, after the 30 days pass and the first man's kiddushin are fit to take effect, she is already a married woman. It is thus as if the first man consecrated a married woman, in which case the kiddushin are not binding.16

יא

בא שני וקידשה בתוך שלשים יום הרי זו מקודשת לשני לעולם. לפי שבשעה שקידשה השני לא היתה מקודשת ותפסו בה קידושי שני ונעשת אשת איש ולאחר השלשים יום כשיבואו קידושי ראשון ימצאו אותה אשת איש ונמצא הראשון כמי שקידש אשת איש שאין הקידושין תופסין בה:

12

[The following rules apply when a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar from this time onward, and after 30 days," and another person consecrates her within the 30 days. [There is doubt regarding the matter,17 and] both [men] are considered as having established kiddushin that may possibly be binding. Therefore, both are required to divorce her.18 The divorce may be given within the [original] 30 days19 or afterwards.

[Should one man tell a woman,] "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 30 days"; and another man comes and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 20 days," and another man comes and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me from this time onward, and after 10 days," [there is doubt regarding the matter, and] all [the men] are considered as having established kiddushin [that may possibly] be binding, and every one must divorce her. [Indeed, these rules apply] even when a hundred men consecrate her in this manner.

יב

האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי מעכשיו ולאחר שלשים יום בדינר זה ובא אחר וקידשה בתוך השלשים יום הרי זו מקודשת מספק לשניהם. לפיכך שניהם נותנין גט בין בתוך השלשים יום בין לאחר השלשים יום. הרי את מקודשת לי מעכשיו ולאחר שלשים יום. ובא אחר ואמר הרי את מקודשת לי מעכשיו ולאחר עשרים יום. ובא אחר ואמר הרי את מקודשת לי מעכשיו ולאחר עשרה ימים. אפילו הן מאה על הסדר הזה קידושי כולן תופסין בה וצריכה גט מכל אחד ואחד מפני שהיא ספק מקודשת לכולן:

13

When [a man] tells a woman, "Behold, you are consecrated to me [and these kiddushin apply to everyone] with the exception of so and so" - i.e., that she should not be forbidden to have relations with him - with regard to everyone else she should be considered a married woman, but with regard to him she should be considered to be single - there is doubt regarding the status of the kiddushin.20

If, however, he tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me on condition that you are permitted to so and so," she is consecrated, and she is forbidden to that person as she is forbidden to all others. [The rationale is that] he has made a condition that is impossible to fulfill.21

יג

האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי חוץ מפלוני כלומר שלא תיאסר עליו אלא תהיה אשת איש על כל העולם ולפלוני כפנויה הרי זו מקודשת מספק. אבל אם אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי על מנת שתהיי מותרת לפלוני הרי זו מקודשת ותהיה אסורה עליו כשאר העם מפני שהתנה בדבר שא"א לקיימו:

14

When [a man] gives two p'rutot to a woman and tells her: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with one today, and with the other after I divorce you," she is consecrated. When he divorces her, she becomes consecrated to him again22 until he divorces her a second time, because of the kiddushin established by the second p'rutah.

If, however, [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] after I convert," "...after you convert," "...after I become freed [from servitude],"23 "...after you become freed [from servitude]," "...after your husband dies," or "...after your sister dies,"24 she is not consecrated. [The rationale is] that he cannot consecrate her now.25

יד

הנותן שתי פרוטות לאשה ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי היום באחת ובאחת לאחר שאגרשך הרי זו מקודשת. וכשיגרש אותה תהיה תקודשת עד שיגרש אותה פעם שנייה מן קידושי פרוטה שנייה. אבל אם אמר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי בזה לאחר שאתגייר. לאחר שתתגיירי. לאחר שאשתחרר. לאחר שתשתחררי לאחר שימות בעליך. לאחר שתמות אחותיך אינה מקודשת לפי שאינו יכול עתה לקדשה:

15

When [a man] tells a yevamah: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this [item] after your yavam performs chalitzah for you,"26 she is consecrated. [The rationale is] that even if he consecrated her at present, the kiddushin would be [at least] of a doubtful status.27

טו

האומר ליבמה הרי את מקודשת לי בזה לאחר שיחלוץ ליך יבמיך הרי זו מקודשת הואיל ואילו קידשה עתה היו קידושין תופסין בה מספק:

16

When a man tells a friend, "If your wife gives birth to a girl, [the girl] is consecrated to me with this [item]," his statements are of no consequence.28 If the friend's wife is pregnant, and the existence of a fetus has been recognized, [the girl] is consecrated.29 [Nevertheless,] it appears to me that [the man] must consecrate [his bride] again via her father after she is born, so that she will enter a marriage bond about which there are no questions.

טז

האומר לחבירו אם ילדה אשתך נקבה הרי היא מקודשת לי בזה לא אמר כלום. ואם היתה אשת חבירו מעוברת והוכר העובר הרי זו מקודשת. ויראה לי שצריך לחזור ולקדש אותה אחר שתלד ע"י אביה כדי שיכניס אותה בקידושין שאין בהן דופי:

17

When [a man] tells a woman: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with 100 dinarim," and gives her at least one dinar, she is consecrated, provided he gives her the entire sum. It is as if he told her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this dinar on condition that I give you 100 dinarim." [In such an instance,] the kiddushin take effect from [the time he gave her the first dinar].

When does the above apply? When he told her "with 100 dinarim" without specifying [any particular dinarim]. If, however, he is more explicit and tells her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these 100 dinarim," and begins counting them out into her hand, she is not consecrated until he gives her [all 100].30 Either of them may retract their consent until the very last dinar is given.

Similarly, if one of the dinarim was found lacking the standard weight, or one was a dinar of brass, she is not consecrated.31 [The following rules apply when] one of the dinarim was inferior: If it would be accepted with difficulty, [the kiddushin are valid, provided]32 he exchanges it. If it would not [be accepted], the kiddushin are of no consequence.

יז

האומר לאשה הרי את מקודשת לי במאה דינרין ונתן לה אפילו דינר אחד הרי זו מקודשת משלקחה הדינר והוא שישלים לה השאר. שזה כמי שאמר הרי את מקודשת לי בדינר זה על מנת שאשלים ליך מאה דינרים שהיא מקודשת לו מעכשיו. בד"א כשאמר לה במאה דינרים סתם אבל אם פירש ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי במאה דינרין אלו והתחיל למנות לתוך ידה אינה מקודשת עד שישלים [לה מאה] ואפילו בדינר האחרון שניהם יכולים לחזור זה בזה. וכן אם נמצא מנה חסר דינר או נמצא מהן דינר נחשת אינה מקודשת. נמצא בהם דינר רע אם יכולה להוציאו על ידי הדחק יחליפנו ואם לאו אינה מקודשת:

18

[The following rules apply when a man] tells [a woman]: "Behold, you are consecrated to me with these clothes that are worth 50 dinarim." When they are silk or of similar fabrics that a woman would desire,33 and they are worth 50 [dinarim], the woman is consecrated from the time she took them onward. There is no need that they be evaluated in the market, and only afterwards, when the woman is assured [of their value], will she be consecrated. Instead, since they are worth the amount he states, she is consecrated from the time of the initial [exchange]. If they are not worth [that amount], she is not consecrated.

יח

אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בבגדים אלו שהן שוין חמשים דינרים והיו של משי וכיוצא בהן שהאשה מתאווה להן אם היו שוין חמשים הרי זו מקודשת משעת לקיחה. ואינן צריכין שומא בשוק ואחר כך תהיה מקודשת כדי שתסמוך דעתה אלא הואיל והן שוין כמו שאמר לה הרי זו מקודשת משעה ראשונה. ואם אינן שוין אינה מקודשת:

19

A man and a woman were discussing the subject of their consecration, he saying: "I will consecrate you with 100 dinarim," and she saying: "I will not be consecrated for less than 200 [dinarim]." [Since they did not agree,] they both went home.

[The following rules apply when] afterwards, [either the man or the woman requested the other [to reconsider], and the man consecrated her without specifying a sum. If the man made the request of the woman, the sum [originally] quoted by the woman is accepted. If the woman made the request of the man, the sum [originally] quoted by the man is accepted.

יט

איש ואשה שהיו עסוקין בדברי אירוסין הוא אומר במאה דינרים אקדש אותך והיא אומרת איני מתקדשת לך אלא במאתים והלך זה לביתו וזו לביתה ואחר כך תבעו זה את זה וקדשו סתם. אם האיש תבע את האשה יעשו דברי האשה ואם האשה תבעה את האיש יעשו דברי האיש:

20

When a man appoints an agent to consecrate a woman, and the agent consecrates her on the basis of a conditional agreement, the kiddushin are not valid.34 Similarly, if [the principal] instructed the agent to consecrate the woman on the basis of a conditional agreement, and he consecrated her without making any stipulation whatsoever, or made another stipulation or changed the stipulation stated by the principal, the kiddushin are not valid.

כ

העושה שליח לקדש לו אשה והלך השליח וקדשה על תנאי אינה מקודשת. וכן אם אמר לו לקדשה על תנאי והלך וקדשה סתם או על תנאי אחר או ששינה את התנאי אינה מקודשת:

21

When [the principal] tells the agent: "Consecrate her in this and this place," and the agent consecrated her in another place, the kiddushin are not valid.35 [If the principal tells the agent:] "Consecrate her for me. She is in this and this place," and the agent goes and consecrates her in another place, she is consecrated; he is merely suggesting to him the place [where she might be found].

Similarly, if [the woman] tells her agent, "Receive kiddushin for me in this and this place," and the agent received them for her in another place, the kiddushin are not valid. [If she told her agent: "Receive kiddushin for me. My prospective] husband is in this and this place," and [the agent] receives the kiddushin in another place, she is consecrated; she is merely suggesting to him the place [where he might be found].

כא

אמר לו קדשה לי במקום פלוני והלך וקידשה במקום אחר אינה מקודשת. קדשה לי והרי היא במקום פלוני והלך וקידשה במקום אחר הרי זו מקודשת מפני שמראה מקום הוא לו. וכן היא שאמרה לשלוחה קבל לי קידושי במקום פלוני וקבלם לה במקום אחר אינה מקודשת. הרי הבעל במקום פלוני וקבל לה במקום אחר הרי זו מקודשת מפני שמראה מקום היא לו:

22

When [a man] consecrates a woman, but he or she desires to retract immediately - even if the retraction is made within a very short amount of time36 - the retraction is of no consequence and the woman is consecrated.37

כב

המקדש את האשה וחזרו בו מיד הוא או היא אף ע"פ שחזרו בתוך כדי דיבור אין חזרתה כלום והרי היא מקודשת:

23

When [a man] consecrates [a woman] and attaches a condition [to the kiddushin], and after several days changes his mind and nullifies the condition, the condition is of no consequence and it is as if the woman had been consecrated without any condition ever having been made. [This law applies] even when he nullifies the condition in the presence of his intended bride alone, without this being observed by witnesses. Similarly, if the woman was the one who attached a condition to the kiddushin, and afterwards nullified it in the presence of her prospective husband alone, the condition is of no consequence.38

Therefore, if [a man] consecrated [a woman] and attached a condition [to the kiddushin], and afterwards, brought her [to the chuppah] without mentioning the condition, or engaged in sexual relations with her without mentioning the condition, she must receive a divorce [before she marries another man]39 even though the condition was never fulfilled. [The rationale is that] perhaps [the man] nullified the condition when he brought her [to the chuppah] or when he engaged in sexual relations with her.

Similarly, when [a man] consecrates a woman with [an article] worth less than a p'rutah or with a loan, and then engages in sexual relations [with this woman] in the presence of witnesses, without making a statement of intent, the woman must receive a divorce [before she marries another man]. [The rationale is that] perhaps [the man intended to consecrate her through these relations] and relied on them, rather than on the kiddushin that are inadequate.

[The principle on which these rulings depend is:] It is an accepted presumption that no virtuous Jewish man will enter into sexual relations that are wanton when he has the potential to engage in these relations in a way that is a mitzvah.40

כג

המקדש על תנאי וחזר אחר כמה ימים וביטל התנאי אף ע"פ שבטלו בינו לבינה שלא בפני עדים בטל התנאי והרי היא מקודשת סתם. וכן אם היה התנאי מן האשה ובטלה אותו (אח"כ) בינה ובינו בטל התנאי. לפיכך המקדש על תנאי וכנס סתם או בעל סתם הרי זו צריכה גט אע"פ שלא נתקיים התנאי שמא ביטל התנאי כשבעל או כשכנס. וכן המקדש בפחות משוה פרוטה או במלוה וחזר ובעל סתם בפני עדים צריכה גט שעל בעילה זו סמך ולא על אותן הקידושין הפסולין חזקה היא שאין אדם מישראל הכשרים עושה בעילתו בעילת זנות והרי בידו עתה לעשותה בעילת מצוה:

Footnotes
1.

It appears that, according to the Rambam, what is significant is the father's consent (or his objection) the first time he hears of the matter. The Ra'avad and others do not share this view and maintain that the father has the option of consenting (or objecting) at all times. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:8) quotes the Rambam's wording.

2.

There are two opinions in Kiddushin 63a, the source for this halachah, regarding the meaning of "consent": a) to say "yes," b) not to object. The Rambam takes the first view, while the Ra'avad and other authorities favor the second. Both views are mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:9). Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam mentions the second view.

3.

Since the kiddushin are not effective, the woman will not be under any obligation to marry the brother of her intended husband. Were the father to indeed consent, she would be under obligation either to marry the deceased's brother, or have the obligation removed through chalitzah.

4.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 3:2-3), the Rambam writes that it is necessary to mention both land and money, because it is difficult to hide the ownership of land. Were land to be mentioned in the stipulation, one might think that if it were not known that the person did not own land, we would assume that the kiddushin would be void.

5.

I.e., his desire is that she marry another man. He will then show how her original kiddushin were valid, causing her to be considered an adulteress and to be forbidden to her second husband.

6.

Rav Moshe HaCohen and others object to the Rambam's ruling, explaining that in such an instance, it is highly unlikely for a man to possess a field in a particular place without people's knowing about it. Hence, if there are no witnesses, the kiddushin are not valid at all; there is no doubt about the matter. The Radbaz (Volume III, Responsum 39) justifies the Rambam's decision, explaining that it is possible that the person temporarily gave the land as a present, or had a deed written in the name of another person to conceal the matter. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:20) quotes the Rambam's decision.

7.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:22) differentiate between a cleft filled with water that is not fit to use for irrigation, and a cistern of water that is. The latter is included in the measure of the field, even when it is filled with water, because it enhances the value of the field.

8.

The same law applies regarding a vow not to wear any other jewelry, clothing or cosmetics that women will frequently wear to adorn themselves. (See Chapter 25, Halachah 1.)

Ketubot 72b describes these vows as involving ענוי נפש, "the oppression of the soul" (cf. Numbers 30:14). Simply put, a woman who must live under such restrictions will not be happy, and it will therefore not be pleasant for her husband to live with her.

In the Beit Yosef and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 39:1), Rav Yosef Karo mentions that the vows that nullify a relationship have a larger scope than those involving ענוי נפש; it also includes those בינו לבינה, affecting the relationship between the husband and wife (cf. Numbers 30:17). (For a more detailed explanation of these types of vows, see Hilchot Nedarim, Chapter 12, and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, Chapter 234.)

9.

Leviticus, Chapter 21, states that a priest who possesses certain physical blemishes may not serve in the Temple. In Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash, Chapters 6-8, these blemishes are listed.

10.

Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Ketubot 7:5).

11.

An Italian coin equivalent in weight to four barley corns, with a diameter of 2.7 cm (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Kiddushin 1:1).

12.

She cannot marry another man until she receives a divorce, nor may she consummate this marriage unless the husband consecrates her again, stating that he has no objections to her condition.

This ruling is given because we are unsure whether these vows or physical blemishes are disturbing enough to cause a person who did not express concern about the matter to consider himself as having been deceived about the nature of his marriage partner.

13.

A wise man has the authority to release people from vows they have taken if they regret having taken them. (See Hilchot Nedarim, Chapter 4.)

The kiddushin are binding only when the wise man nullifies the vows before the woman's intended husband discovers their existence. Once he discovers that she is bound by vows, the kiddushin are nullified even when she has the vows nullified afterwards (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 39:2).

14.

The wording used by the man is significant. If he states: "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you will not have blemishes," the kiddushin are binding if a physician is able to heal her (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 39:7).

15.

The Rambam appears to be sharing the interpretation of Tosafot, Ketubot 74b, that the reason the kiddushin are nullified if a woman has blemishes that a physician heals is that even after she is healed, the husband will still be repelled by the fact that at one time she possessed physical blemishes.

Rashi, by contrast, explains the difference between a wise man's nullification and a physician's healing as follows: The wise man nullifies the vow at its source, causing it to be considered as never having been taken. Thus, retroactively it is as if the woman had not been bound by a vow at the time of the kiddushin. A physician, by contrast, can heal a blemish only within the existence of a continuum of time. Thus, at the time of the kiddushin, the woman had physical blemishes. Therefore, the kiddushin are not binding.

16.

From the Rambam's wording, it would appear that if her second husband died or divorced her within the thirty days, the first man's kiddushin are binding. The Rashba (in his gloss on Kiddushin 59b) does not accept this premise and states that the woman's acceptance of the second kiddushin clearly shows a change in her mind with regard to the first kiddushin. For this reason, they are nullified and can never be binding again (Maggid Mishneh). (See Ramah and Tur, Even HaEzer 40:2.)

17.

Rashi, Kiddushin 59b, explains that the doubt is whether his statement is a conditional statement, and thus, after 30 days pass the original kiddushin will retroactively take effect, thus nullifying the kiddushin given her by the second man. Or perhaps by saying "after 30 days," the first man withdrew his initial statement, and his intent was that his kiddushin would not be effective until after 30 days. If this were so, the second man's kiddushin would be binding.

Significantly, if a person made a similar statement with regard to a sale, the Rambam rules (Hilchot Mechirah 2:9) that this is a conditional statement. Thus, it appears that his ruling here is a stringency, accepted because of the severity of the laws of marriage and divorce.

18.

The Tur (Even HaEzer 40) states that this is necessary only when the woman wants to marry a third person. If she wants to marry either of the individuals who consecrated her, she may do so, provided the other divorces her. Although the Shulchan Aruch does not quote this ruling, many later authorities do.

19.

Although the kiddushin given by the first man do not take effect fully until after 30 days, it is possible for him to divorce her before that date. For when the kiddushin take effect, she will be consecrated retroactively from the time of the original kiddushin, and then these kiddushin will be nullified by the divorce.

20.

The doubt centers on whether it is possible to establish a bond of kiddushin that is incomplete. This is an unresolved issue. The latter clause states that if a person desires to establish a bond of kiddushin, but with a proviso, this is definitely unacceptable. As mentioned by the Beit Shmuel 38:68, there are authorities who maintain that the kiddushin are not binding at all.

21.

For the very nature of the marriage bond forbids relations with another man.

22.

In the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 40:7), Rav Yosef Karo rules that the status of these kiddushin is doubtful: the woman cannot marry another person until she is divorced, but she must be consecrated again before the marriage can be consummated.

23.

This refers to a Canaanite servant, who cannot marry a Jewish woman. Similarly, a male Jew cannot marry a female Canaanite servant.

24.

I.e., the man proposing is married to the woman's sister. While his wife (her sister) is alive, he may not marry the woman. Afterwards, he may.

25.

Kiddushin 62a explains that at the time the kiddushin were given, the possibility of marriage is "something that has not come into the world," for it is impossible for them to take effect. Therefore, even when the situation changes afterwards, they are not effective retroactively.

26.

I.e., when a woman's husband dies childless, she is obligated to marry his brother (referred to as a yavam) through the rite of yibbum, or be freed of her obligation to him through the rite of chalitzah. The Rambam is describing a situation in which another man gives her kiddushin with the expectation that chalitzah will be performed.

27.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 14. Since the kiddushin a person gave her now would have some effect, kiddushin given with a conditional statement are binding totally.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 40:6) rules that even when a conditional statement is made, the status of the kiddushin is in doubt. There are some manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah that indicate that the Rambam also shared that view.

28.

For the object of the kiddushin does not yet exist.

29.

The Ra'avad, the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh interpret the Rambam as stating that the kiddushin given for the fetus are definitely binding. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 3:5), however, the Rambam explicitly states that this is a Rabbinic stringency, enforced because of the severity of the laws of marriage.

30.

Since he began counting them out for her, she is under the impression that she will receive the entire sum, and will not accept less (Kiddushin 8a).

31.

For she accepted the kiddushin under the impression that all 100 dinarim were of full value. Nor can he give her a different dinar, because he specified that the kiddushin would be with the coins he was giving her. Even if neither the man nor the woman retracts, the kiddushin are not binding (Maggid Mishneh). (See Ramah, Even HaEzer 29:7.)

32.

The Ra'avad objects to this ruling, explaining that even though the man is obligated to exchange the dinar, the kiddushin are binding whether or not he does so. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 29:7) quotes the Ra'avad's ruling.

33.

The Rambam's wording appears to indicate that the reason no evaluation is necessary is that women usually desire silk, and because of this desire waive the need for evaluation. Implied is that other items that are not that desirable must be evaluated before the kiddushin are binding. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 31:1) does not follow this approach. (See Beit Shmuel 31:1.)

Tosafot, Kiddushin 7b, offer a different rationale for the mention of silk: Most people can make at least a rough evaluation of the value of silk. When, however, an object cannot be evaluated easily - e.g., a precious stone - a woman is not consecrated, because she is unsure of the value of the gem until she receives an expert's appraisal. This is one of the sources for the custom of consecrating a woman with a wedding ring that does not contain a stone.

34.

For by entering into a conditional agreement when he was not instructed to do so by the principal, the agent deviated from the instructions he was given. As such he is acting on his own initiative, and not as the agent of the principal.

35.

Here also, the reason is that the agent deviated from the instructions he was given.

36.

Here the intent is a specific measure of time, the amount of time it takes to say: Shalom alecha, rabbi umori.

37.

Nedarim 87a states that with the exception of idol worship, marriage and divorce, a retraction made within the abovementioned span of time is reckoned with. Why are these three instances different? In general, a person is not precise with regard to what he says and may make statements, relying on the possibility of retracting them later. In these three instances, however, the severity of the matter is obvious, and a person would not make such statements unless he made them with full presence of mind (Rabbenu Nissim). (See also the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Temurah 5:3, which mentions several other instances in which a person's retraction is of no consequence.)

38.

The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, maintaining that the nullification of the condition must also be made in the presence of witnesses. (He does, however, accept the Rambam's decision that if a man brings the woman to the chuppah, without a condition, in the presence of witnesses, the condition is considered to be nullified. For his act is considered equivalent to nullifying the condition.)

The Rashba accepts the Rambam's ruling with regard to conditions involving money - e.g., "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you give me 200 zuz." For a person may waive a debt owed him, and consider it as received. With regard to other conditions - e.g., "Behold, you are consecrated on condition that you are not bound by vows" - he does not accept the Rambam's position. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 38:35) quotes the Rambam's ruling.

39.

I.e., the status of the kiddushin originally given is doubtful. If the couple want to continue living together, they must establish kiddushin that are unquestionably binding. And if a second man consecrates her, she must receive a divorce from both men before marrying a third (Ramah, Even HaEzer 38:35).

40.

In one of his responsa, the Rambam states that this principle cannot be extended without limit. When a man and a woman engage in sexual relations with a promiscuous intent, we do not say that he intends to consecrate her with these relations. The principle stated above is applied only when there is reason to presume that the man desired to establish a marriage relationship. (See also Hilchot Gerushin 10:19.)

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