Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

A firstborn does not receive a double portion of property that will later accrue to his father's estate, only of that property that was in his father's possession and had already entered his domain at the time of his death. This is derived from Deuteronomy 21:17 which states: "of everything that he possesses."

What is implied? If one of the people whose estate the father would inherit dies after he did, the firstborn and an ordinary son receive equal shares. Similarly, if the father was owed a debt or he owned a ship at sea, all sons share the inheritance equally.

If the father left his sons a cow that was rented out, hired out, or that was pasturing in open territory and it gave birth, the firstborn receives a double share of it and its offspring.

If one of the colleagues of a person's father slaughtered an animal and then the father died, the son is entitled to a double portion of the presents from that animal.

A firstborn does not receive a double portion of an increase to the value of the estate that accrued after his father's death. Instead, he should have the value of that increase assessed, and he should give the financial equivalent of the difference to the ordinary sons.

The above applies provided the property undergoes a change, e.g., budding grain became ears, or budding dates became dates. If, however, the value of the land improved as a matter of course, without undergoing a change - e.g., a small tree grew taller and thicker, or sediment was washed up onto land, the firstborn receives a double portion of the increase in value. If the property increased in value because of investment, he does not receive a double portion.

A firstborn does not receive a double share of a debt owed to his father. This applies even though the debt was supported by a promissory note and land was expropriated to pay the debt.

If the father was owed a debt by the firstborn, there is an unresolved doubt concerning the matter. It might be said that he should receive a double portion, because the money was in his possession. It could, however, be argued that he should not receive the extra amount, since he is inheriting it because of his father, and it did not enter his father's possession before his death. Therefore, he should take half of the firstborn's portion from it.

When a firstborn sells his extra share of the inheritance before the estate is divided, the sale is binding. For the firstborn's extra share is distinct, even before the estate is divided. Therefore, if initially, the firstborn divides a portion of the estate, either landed property or movable property, and accepts the same portion as an ordinary son, he is considered to have waived his right to an extra portion with regard to the entire estate. He receives only an ordinary son's share of the remainder.

When does the above apply? When he did not protest. If, however, he protested against his brothers and said in the presence of two witnesses: "Although I am dividing these grapes equally with my brothers, I have not waived my right to the firstborn's share," his protest is significant and he is not considered to have waived his right to the other property.

Even if he protested with regard to the division of grapes while they were still attached to the earth, and yet agreed to divide them equally after the harvest, he is not considered to have waived his right to the other property. If, however, the grapes were pressed, and he divided the wine equally with them and did not issue a protest when the wine was made, he is considered to have waived his right to the other property. To what can the matter be compared? To a person who issued a protest when grapes were divided but then divided olives equally, in which instance he is considered to have waived his rights to an extra portion of the entire estate.

The brother who performs the rite of yibbum, marrying his brother's childless widow, inherits all of the property in his estate at the time of his brother's death. With regard to any property that is fit to enter the deceased's estate afterwards, he receives the same share as the others. This concept is derived from the fact that the verse refers to him as a "firstborn," as Deuteronomy 25:6 states: "And the firstborn that she will bear will take the place of the brother who died, and thus his name will not be wiped out among Israel."

Just as the brother who performs the rite of yibbum does not acquire property that is fit to be acquired by the estate, in contrast to property that is within the estate; so, too, he does not acquire the increase in the estate's value.

To what does the latter phrase refer? To the increase in his deceased brother's share in his father's estate, which increased in value in the time between his father's death and the division of that estate among his brothers. Even if the property increased in value after he married his brother's widow, but before it was divided, he receives the same share of the increase as the other brothers. This applies despite the fact that he receives two shares of this property, his own share and the share of his brother whose widow he married. For the father died while they were all alive.

We already explained in Hilchot Shechenim that the firstborn is given his two portions of a field together. This does not apply with regard to a person who marries his brother's childless widow. He receives his portion and his brother's portion by lot. If it happens that he is allotted portions in two different places, these are the portions he receives.

The following laws apply when a childless widow who was waiting to be married by her deceased husband's brother dies. They apply even when one of the brothers designated her for marriage. Her family from her father's household inherit her nichsei m'log and half of her nichsei tzon barzel, and her husband's heirs inherit the money due her by virtue of her ketubah and the other half of her nichsei tzon barzel.

Since they inherit the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, her husband's heirs are obligated to bury her, as we have explained in the appropriate place.

When a person says: "This is my son," "This is my brother," "This is my uncle," or identifies a person as any of his other heirs, his word is accepted and that person inherits his estate. This applies even when he makes this acknowledgment concerning people who are not recognized to be his relatives. And it applies whether he made such a statement when he was healthy or when he is on his deathbed. Even if he lost his power of speech and identified a person as his heir in writing, his word is accepted, provided we test his powers of understanding as we test a man with regard to divorce.

When one person is recognized to be another person's brother or cousin, and the latter says: "He is not my brother," or "He is not my cousin," his word is not accepted. His word is accepted, however, with regard to a person who is recognized to be his son. If he says he is not his son, he does not inherit his estate.

It appears to me that even if the son already fathered children - although at that point, the father's word is no longer acceptable with regard to the determination of his lineage, and we do not consider him a mamzer because of his father's statement - his father's word is, nevertheless, accepted with regard to the concept of inheritance. He should not inherit his father's estate.

When a person states: "This is my son," and afterwards, says: "He is my servant," his latter statement is not accepted.

If he states: "He is my servant," and afterwards, says: "He is my son," his latter statement is accepted. This applies even though the "son" serves him like a servant. We interpret his statement that he is his servant to mean that he relies on him like a servant. Nevertheless, if people would call this individual "A slave worth 100 zuz" or the like - i.e., expressions that are appropriate only for servants - the deceased's retraction is not accepted.

If a person had to pass through customs and identified an individual as his son, but afterwards identified him as a servant, his later statement is accepted. We assume that he identified him as his son only to avoid paying customs duty. If, however, in customs, he identified a person as his servant, and afterwards identified him as his son, his word is not accepted.

A person should not call a servant Papa Joe or a maidservant Mama Sarah lest this lead to an undesirable outcome and a blemish be placed on his lineage. Therefore, if there were servants or maidservants who were very distinguished personages, their reputations are well known, and everyone in the community recognizes them and the children and servants of their master - e.g., the servants of the nasi - it is permitted for the children of that household to refer to the servants in the above manner.

The following rules apply when a person had a maidservant and fathered a son with her, and he would treat the son as one treats a son or said: "He is my son and his mother was freed." If the person involved is a Torah scholar or an honorable person whose conduct has been scrutinized and he is found to be precise in the observance of the details of the mitzvot, the "son" may share in the inheritance of his estate. Nevertheless, this "son" may not marry a Jewish woman until he brings proof that his mother was freed before she gave birth. The rationale for this stringency is that it has been established for us that the woman is a maidservant. If the person is one of the ordinary people - and needless to say, if he is one of those who act loosely in this manner - the "son" is presumed to be a servant with regard to all matters. His paternal brothers may sell him. If his father does not have any children other than him, the father's wife must undergo the rite of yibbum.

This is the law as it appears to me, for it follows the fundamental principles of the received tradition. There are, however, authorities who do not make a distinction between honorable people and people at large, except with regard to the ruling that his brothers may not sell him. And there are others who rule that this "son" may even inherit his father's estate, so that a distinction is not made with regard to Jews. It is not appropriate to rely on this ruling.

All the heirs may inherit on the basis of the prevailing presumption that they are the deceased relatives. What is implied? When witnesses testify that the prevailing presumption is that a person is an individual's son or his brother, the former may inherit the latter's estate on the basis of this testimony, even though the witnesses do not testify concerning the person's lineage, nor do they possess indubitable knowledge concerning his lineage.

A person's statements regarding his relatives affect his share of an inheritance, but not that of his brothers. To illustrate by example: Jacob died and left two sons: Reuven and Shimon. The prevailing presumption was that he did not have any sons other than these two.

Reuven took Levi from among people at large and said: "He is also our brother." Shimon replied: "I don't know." Shimon is granted half the estate. Reuven is given a third, for he acknowledged that they are three brothers, and Levi is given a sixth.

If Levi dies, that sixth is returned to Reuven. If other property had been acquired by Levi, it should be divided between Reuven and Shimon, for Reuven acknowledges Shimon's claim to a portion of the estate, because Levi is their brother.

Different rules apply if the sixth that Levi was given increased in value on its own accord and then Levi died. If the increase were crops that were almost ready to be reaped - e.g., grapes that are ready to be harvested - they are considered to be property acquired from others and should be divided among the two brothers. If they are not ready to be reaped, they belong to Reuven alone.

If Shimon said explicitly: "Levi is not my brother," and Levi received part of Reuven's share, as explained above, and then died, Shimon should not inherit any part of his estate. Instead, Reuven should inherit both the sixth from his share and any other property that Levi left. These principles apply with regard to any other heirs when a portion of them acknowledge the existence of other heirs that the remaining portion do not acknowledge.

The following principles apply with regard to questions concerning the right of inheritance: Whenever there are two prospective heirs, one who is definitely an heir and one whose right to inherit is a matter of question, the person whose right is in doubt does not receive anything. If there are two claimants whose rights are a matter of question, perhaps this one is an heir or perhaps the other is an heir, they divide the estate equally.

Accordingly, if a person died and left a son and a tumtum or an androgynous, the son inherits the entire estate. For the status of the tumtum or the androgynous is a matter of question. If he left daughters and a tumtum or an androgynous, they share equally in the inheritance. The tumtum or androgynous is considered as one of the daughters.

In Hilchot Ishut, we explained the laws pertaining to the portions of an estate given to daughters from the sons' share to provide for the daughters' sustenance, and for their livelihood. There we explained that the sustenance of the daughters is one of the provisions of the ketubah.

When the estate is ample, the daughters receive only their sustenance. The sons inherit everything, and they should give dowries to the daughters of a tenth of the estate each so that men will desire to marry them as husbands. When the estate is limited, the sons do not receive anything. Instead, everything is set aside for the daughters' sustenance.

Accordingly, the following rules apply when a person died and left sons, daughters and a tumtum or an androgynous. If the estate is ample, the sons inherit the estate and compel the tumtum to be treated as one of the daughters. He is given only his sustenance as they are. If the estate is limited, the daughters compel the tumtum to be treated as one of the sons. They tell him: "You are a male and hence you are not entitled to receive your sustenance as we are."

The following rules apply when a woman did not wait three months after parting from her husband, but instead, married within that time and gave birth to a son. We do not know if the son was born after nine months and is her first husband's child or was born after seven months and was her second husband's son.

This son does not inherit the estate of either father, because his claim is doubtful. If this son dies, both of them inherit his estate, sharing it equally, because both of their claims are doubtful. Maybe this one is his father, Or maybe the other one.

The following laws apply when a childless widow did not wait three months after her first husband's death, married her husband's brother and bore a son. We do not know if the son was born after nine months and is her first husband's child, or was born after seven months and was her second husband's son.

With regard to the inheritance of the estate of the woman's first husband, the son whose parentage is doubtful says: "Perhaps I am the son of the deceased, in which instance I would inherit my father's entire estate. You would not be fit to marry my mother, for she would not be required to perform the rite of yibbum."

The brother who married her says: "Perhaps you are my son and thus your mother was required to perform the rite of yibbum. You have no right to my brother's estate."

Since not only the status of the "son," but also that of the brother who married the widow is doubtful, they share the estate equally. The same laws apply when this "son" whose status is doubtful and the other sons of the brother who married the widow come to divide the estate of the brother whose widow was married. They divide the estate equally. The "son" whose status is doubtful receives half, and the other sons of the brother who married the widow receive half.

If the brother who married the widow died after dividing the estate of his deceased brother with the "son" whose status is doubtful, the sons of that brother who are fit to inherit his estate are granted it. The "son" whose status is doubtful may feel entitled to claim: "If I am your brother, give me a share in this estate. And if I am not your brother, return to me the half of my father's estate that your father took." This claim is not accepted. Instead, the "son" whose status is doubtful is not given any share in the estate of the brother who married the widow; he does not expropriate property from them.

The following rules apply when the "son" whose status is doubtful and the brother who married the widow come to divide the estate of the father of the family. The brother who married the widow is definitely an heir. In this instance as well, there is a question concerning the rights of the "son" whose status is doubtful. If he is the son of the deceased brother, he receives half; if he is the son of the brother who married the widow, he does not receive anything. Therefore, the estate should be given to the brother and the "son" whose status is doubtful should be overlooked.

The following principles apply with regard to the inheritance of the grandfather's estate if the brother who married the widow left two sons whose lineage is definite and died. The "son" whose status is doubtful claims: "I am the son of the deceased brother. Hence, I should receive half and you two should receive half."

The two sons say: "You are our brother and the son of the brother who married the widow. Hence, you deserve only one third of the estate of our grandfather."

The two sons receive the half that the "son" whose status is doubtful acknowledges as belonging to them. The third that they acknowledge as belonging to him is given to him, and the remaining sixth is divided equally: he receives half of it and they receive half of it.

If the "son" whose status is doubtful dies, the brother who married the widow may claim: "Perhaps he is my son and I have the right to inherit his estate." His father may say: "Perhaps he is the son of my deceased son and I have the right to inherit his estate." In such a situation, they should divide the estate equally.

(If the son who married the widow died, the "son" whose status is doubtful may claim: "He is my father and I have the right to inherit his estate." His father may say: "Perhaps you are the son of my other son and this is your father's brother. Thus, I have the right to inherit his estate." In such a situation, they should divide the estate equally.)

The following rules apply when a house fell on a person and his wife and they both died. It is not known if the woman died first, in which instance the heirs of her husband inherit her entire estate, or the husband died first, and the woman's heirs inherit her estate.

How is the issue resolved? We consider the nichsei m'log to be in the possession of the woman's heirs. The money due her by virtue of her ketubah - both the essential obligation and the additional amount - are considered to be in the possession of her husband's heirs. Her nichsei tzon barzel are divided, half are given to the woman's heirs and half to the husband's heirs.

If a house fell on a person and his mother, the estate of the mother may be retained by her heirs from her father's household, for they are definitely heirs. The status of the heirs of the son, by contrast, is doubtful. For if the son died first, his paternal brothers do not have a share in the inheritance of his mother, as we have explained.

The following rules apply if a house fell on a person and his daughter's son. If the father died first, his daughter's son would inherit his estate, and thus the estate would be given to the son's heirs. If his daughter's son died first, the son does not inherit his mother's estate after his death as we have explained. Thus, the estate would be given to the father's heirs. Since we do not know who died first, the father's heirs should divide his estate with the heirs of his daughter's son.

Similar rules apply if the father was taken captive and died while in captivity, and his daughter's son died in his city, or conversely, the son was taken captive and died while in captivity and his mother's father died in his city. Since we do not know who died first, the father's heirs should divide his estate with the heirs of his daughter's son.

The following rules apply if a house fell on a person and his father or on another person whose estates he would acquire, and the son was responsible for the money due his wife by virtue of her ketubah and other debts. The father's heirs claim that the son died first without leaving an estate. Hence, the debts will remain unpaid. The creditors maintain that the father died first, and thus the son acquired the inheritance. Hence, they have a source from which they can collect the debts owed them. The estate is considered to be in the possession of the heirs. The son's wife or the creditors must prove that the father died first, or they must depart without receiving anything.

The same laws apply to people who die in a landslide, were drowned at sea, fell into a fire, or died on the same day in different countries. For in all these and other analogous situations, we do not know who died first.