Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

For he has not fulfilled his vow.

For it is as if the promise to bring the smaller animal included the possibility of bringing the larger one.

An animal in the first year of its life (Chapter 1, Halachah 14).

One that is more than one year and one month old (ibid.).

An animal in the second year of its life (ibid.).

The laws to follow also apply with regard to a peace-offering. They do not apply with regard to a guilt-offering or a sin-offering, for those sacrifices may not be brought voluntarily.

A sheep that is between the age of one year and one year and one month. Thus it is no longer a lamb, but it is not yet considered as a ram (ibid.).

There is an unresolved doubt regarding the status of a pi/gas. Hence, the person cannot be considered as having fulfilled his obligation. Nevertheless, since its status is unresolved, we are not definitely certain that he did not fulfill his obligation.
The Kessef Mishneh questions why is he not considered to have fulfilled his obligation if he vowed to bring a lamb. As stated in the previous halachah, if one vows to bring a small animal and instead, brings a large animal, he is considered to have fulfilled his obligation. Thus in the case at hand, if a pilgas is considered a lamb, he will have fulfilled his obligation and if it is considered as a ram, he would have fulfilled his obligation, based on the principle stated in Halachah 1. The Kessef Mishneh answers that the animal’s status is considered one of doubt, an intermediate state between the two. Hence it is not considered as acceptable as either type.

This law applies only with regard to burnt-offerings, for peace-offerings may not be brought from fowl.

Turtle doves may only be brought as sacrifices when they are small and under-developed. Ordinary doves, by contrast, may be brought as sacrifices only when they have developed and reached a mature state (Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:2).

An intermediate stage in which the fowl is unacceptable, because it is too mature for a turtle-dove and not mature enough for an ordinary dove (Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:2).

Since there is an unresolved doubt concerning a fowl that reached this state of development, a person who brings one such dove would certainly not fulfill his obligation. In this instance, however, since he brought one for each species, one might think that it is considered as if he fulfilled his vow. For if this is considered as a stage of development, he will have fulfilled the vow, because he brought an acceptable ordinary dove. And if it is not considered acceptable, he would have fulfilled the vow, because he brought an acceptable turtle dove. Nevertheless, since a priest is not permitted to offer such a fowl as an initial preference, he is not considered to have fulfilled his vow.

For he did not bring the animal that he vowed to bring as a sacrifice.

This follows a general principle stated by the Rambam, that with regard to the interpretation of the wording used in vows, everything is determined by local custom.

I.e., and not a calf.

As Malachi 1:14 asks rhetorically: “You bring the stolen and the lame and the sick and offer it as a sacrifice. Shall I accept it from you?” See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 7:1.

Although ibid.:11 states: “One who desires to gain merit for himself, subjugate his evil inclination, and amplify his generosity should bring his sacrifice from the most desirable and superior type of the item he is bringing,” this is a desirable ethical standard, but not a halachic imperative.

Menachot 13:8 mentions prices to be paid for animals offered as sacrifices. In the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, he explains that the prices mentioned were the average prices for animals at that time.

As long as the animal is unblemished.

100 silver pieces.

The wine, meal, and oil brought together with the offering, as stated in Chapter 2.

In this instance, since the ox was consecrated as a burnt-offering and was no longer fit to be offered as such, the proceeds of its sale must be used for that purpose. It does not matter, however, which animal(s) is purchased for that purpose.
In the previous halachah, it was not acceptable for him to bring two oxen that have a combined worth of 100, for he made an explicit vow to bring one ox worth 100 and until he does so, he does not fulfill his obligation. In this halachah, once the consecrated animal is disqualified, there are no qualifications regarding which animals may be brought as burnt-offerings. See Menachot 108a.

I.e., the sacrifice he brings need not even be of the same species as the animal he originally designated for sacrifice.

The new point this clause is teaching is that even if two animals were originally consecrated, one may be brought with the proceeds of their sale.

For when taking the vow, he did not specify what animal he would bring. This applies provided people of this locale also refer to a sheep as a burnt-offering (see Halachah 3). Moreover, if he had pledged to bring that particular ox as a burnt-offering, he is not obligated to bring any sacrifice at all (Radbaz).

Even if the animal is disqualified, he is obligated to bring another one like it as a sacrifice.

For we assume that anyone who consecrates his property does so generously (Menachot 108b).

For it is also possible that this was his intent, since consecrating the middle one is still acting generously, because there is a smaller one.

The Kessef Mishneh interprets the Rambam’s words as implying that once the second one becomes blemished, the holiness automatically falls on the third. This runs contrary to Rashi’s approach (Menachot, loc. cit.) which requires the person to make a stipulation conditionally transferring the holiness that might have fallen on the middle ox.

For by saying “An ox,” we assume he meant the choicest one (Menachot, loc. cit.). The commentaries note that the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Meilah 7:7 appears to run contrary to this explanation.

And then his father died without informing him which one was consecrated (Rashi, Menachot, loc. cit.).

For we assume that he intended to offer the most choice one as a sacrifice. The Radbaz explains that this case is different from the one in the previous halachah where concern is also given to the middle one. The rationale is that since he already designated the animal, we assume that he chose the best one.

For even if he originally designated a small animal as a sacrifice, we follow the principle stated in Halachah 1 that a person who vows to bring a small animal, but instead brings a large one fulfills his obligation [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 13:6); see also Ra’avad].

Whether a ram or a lamb.

Whether a grown goat or a kid.

I.e., he must allow for the possibility that he designated any of the three types of animals that could be offered as burnt-offerings and he must offer a large animal from each species for the reason mentioned above.

He must bring both, because they are considered as two separate species and not as developed and underdeveloped specimens of the same species.

As stated above with regard to burnt-offerings, he is obligated to bring a developed specimen. Unlike a burnt-offering, these sacrifices may be brought from females as well as males. Hence, although bringing a large animal fulfills his obligation even if he originally vowed to bring a small one, he is still required to bring both a male or a female, for he is unsure of the gender of the animal he originally designated.

Peace-offerings may not be brought from fowl, so there is no need to bring doves.

Bringing either will enable him to fulfill his vow.

As stated in Halachah 13, when one brings frankincense, he must bring at least a handful.

Since he said: “For the altar,” we assume he meant something that is only for the altar. As mentioned below, there are other entities which are also offered on the altar, but unlike frankincense, they are not offered on the altar in their entirety. (The hide of an animal offered as a burnt-offering and the feathers of a fowl offered as a burnt-offering are withheld. With regard to the wine, it is not consumed by the altar’s pyre, but poured upon it. And with regard to an offering of flour, since there are types of meal-offerings which are given to the priests to eat, we assume that his intent was not to bring such an offering.)

Since the primary elements of the burnt-offering are burnt on the altar and the wine is poured over the altar, it is possible that this was his intent.

I.e., aside from the wine brought as part of the accompanying offering of flour (Kessef Mishneh).

A large silver coin used in the Talmudic era.

As a burnt-offering. The Radbaz states that this word should be included in the statement of the person’s promise.

In addition to the burnt-offering, this could include wine, frankincense, and flour.

Menachot 106b derives this concept from a comparison to · the flour offered from a meal offering, just as there a handful is offered, so too, a handful of frankincense should be offered.

The Hebrew term is written in the plural. Hence at least two logs are required.

See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 7:3.

He would place the money in a container designated for that purpose and the priests would take the money and purchase the wood (Tosefta, Shekalim 3:3).

Kin‘at Eliyahu questions how one takes a handful of oil.

As required of all the sacrifices (Hilchot lssurei Mlzbeiach 5:11).

See Chapter 12, Halachah 9.

Although Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach, loc. cit., states that salt is not required for wine that is offered on the altar, that refers to wine offered as a libation accompanying other sacrifices. When, however, wine is offered alone, salt is required (Kessef Mishneh).

None is given to the priests to partake of.

See Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 2:11 which states: “There were two cavities in the southwest corner [of the Altar], resembling two thin nostrils.... The blood [which was poured onto the Altar] would run off through them and... [ultimately,] go out to the Kidron River.”

It is not poured over the fire, because it would - at least partially quench the fire and that is forbidden (Kessef Mishneh).

As mentioned in Hilchot Ma‘asaer Sheni, ch. 4, when a person lives far from Jerusalem and cannot easily take produce from the second tithe to the holy city, he should redeem it for money. That money must be used to purchase food which must be eaten in Jerusalem according to the strictures that apply to the second tithe.

Because of his vow.

And the second tithe is considered as holy, “consecrated unto God.” This is a general principle. The rationale is that since the person is obligated to bring the offering, it must be brought from resources that belong to him entirely (see the conclusion of Halachah 17).

I.e., the bread is considered as an integral part of that offering and not an additional element. Thus when he vows to bring a thanksgiving-offering, that vow also requires him to bring bread. Hence the bread must come from ordinary property (Radbaz).

As stated below, if he specifies, he is allowed to bring a thanksgiving-offering using the money from the second tithes, for he will partake of the meat of that sacrifice in Jerusalem. What is unique here is the fact that the sacrifice will be from the second tithes and the bread from ordinary funds. Even so, the sacrifice is acceptable.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 7:5; based on Menachot 81b), the Rambam writes that it is indeed more desirable for him to bring the sacrifice from ordinary funds.

In this instance as well, in his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam states that it is desirable for him to bring everything from ordinary property.

Chapter 3, Halachah 13.

This refers not only to the wine libations, but to all vows for sacrifices.

A range with an opening for one pot [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 5:9)].

I.e., one of the common ways to bake in the Talmudic period was to heat rafters and stones until they were glowing hot and place dough upon them. Afterwards, the stones and rafters were covered and thus the dough would bake (ibid.).

A pit covered with mud into which wood was placed and kindled. The dough was placed within and it was covered so that it would bake like an oven (ibid.). These are not acceptable, because the person took a vow that he would bring a meal offering cooked in an oven and these devices do not fit that description.

See Chapter 13, Halachah 6, with regard to the difference between the two.

Because he did not bring the sacrifice he vowed to bring.

Pointing to cakes that he prepared to bake.

For he specified that the cakes be prepared in one way and they were not.

For all the above.

Implying that the vow must be fulfilled in all its particulars.

If he can take a handful from each one separately, they are acceptable, as indicated by the conclusion of Halachah 4.

Because he did not fulfill his vow. It is, however, necessary to ask him and have him respond as the Rambam states. Otherwise, we assume that he is not bringing this offering in fulfillment of his vow, but rather as a separate sacrifice. In that instance, although he would not have fulfilled his vow, the sacrifice would be acceptable.

Since he offered them as he vowed, the fact that he originally brought them in two vessels is not significant.

In that instance, as stated in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 11:29, the law is that if one can take handfuls of each individually, they are acceptable. If not, they are not.

See Chapter 12, Halachah 4, for a description of these meal-offerings.

Since he used the plural, at least two offerings are required.

The Kessef Mishneh suggests that the word “types” is a printing error, because even if he brought two of the same type of meal-offering, he fulfilled his obligation. The Radbaz, however, initially explains that the Rambam’s wording could be interpreted as being precise. Since the person said two meal-offerings, we can assume that he meant of two different types. Otherwise, he would have just vowed to bring one large meal-offering. Nevertheless, ultimately, the Radbaz rejects this interpretation and states that the Rambam’s intent is “even of two types,” i.e., he may bring two offerings either of one type or of two types.

Here also, since he spoke of “meal-offerings,” using the plural, he is required to bring two.

For he said “a type,” limiting him to only one type.

Since he used the plural for both offerings and types, he should bring two offerings and they should be of two different types.

One offering from each type, as in the previous clause. Hebrew grammar occasionally allows for a singular term to be used in a plural sense. The Kessef Mishneh notes that this matter is debated by Menachot 105a and a ruling is not reached. Hence he questions how the Rambam can require him to bring a second offering: If it is not required, he will be bringing ordinary flour into the Temple Courtyard (which is forbidden). Hence he maintains that the person must make a stipulation when bringing this offering: “If I am obligated to bring it, this is to fulfill my vow. And if I am not obligated, it is a freewill offering.”

For in this way, he will certainly fulfill his vow.

I.e., in contrast to the community at large. For there is no concept of a voluntary communal meal-offering and all the required communal meal-offerings have specific measures.

As indicated by the following halachah, it appears to be preferable that he bring sixty in one vessel and the remainder in the other, rather than dividing the sum evenly between the two.

Even though oil is always mixed with the flour at a ratio of one log to every isaron (Chapter 12, Halachah 7), nevertheless, if there is a very large quantity of flour, it will be difficult to get a proper mixture.

Chapter 13, Halachah 11.

Menachot 18b; 103b.

Because there is too large a quantity of flour.

As long as the meal and the oil could be mixed together, the fact that they were not mixed together is not significant, because there is nothing inherently lacking in the mixture. If, however, they could not be mixed together, there is an inherent difficulty with the mixture, therefore it is disqualified.

I.e., he does not divide them into three equal portions.

For an individual meal-offering is never more than 60 esronim and if he had promised a lesser amount, bringing more will not disqualify his offering (Radbaz).

This is necessary, because, as stated in Halachah 3, if a person vowed to bring two esronim in two vessels and he brought them in one, the offering is unacceptable. By bringing the full range of vessels from one to sixty, the person will certainly have included the entire number he vowed to bring. Any extra are considered as voluntary offerings.
The Radbaz notes that there is a difference of opinion concerning this matter in Menachot 13:2 and the opinion the Rambam quotes here is that of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi. The Sages, however, differ and maintain that it is sufficient to bring one meal offering of 60 esronim. The Radbaz questions why the Rambam chooses to follow Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi’s view, for it is a minority opinion. Moreover, he notes that in the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, he explicitly states that the halachah does not follow this view. The Radbaz explains that since the Talmud (Menachot 106a) tries to justify other teachings according to Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi’s view, we can assume that it is accepted as halachah.

Which is unacceptable, because, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 2, all the meal-offerings are brought from wheat except the meal-offering of a Sotah and the omer offering. Those are obligatory offerings and cannot be vowed by a person.

Which is also unacceptable, because a meal-offering may not be less than an isaron (Chapter 12, Halachah 5).

Such an offering is also unacceptable, for oil and frankincense are absolute requirements (Chapter 12, Halachah 7).

The difference between this and the previous clause depends on the precise Hebrew term used. If he said minchat (“meal-offering of”), as in the first clause he is not obligated at all, for the grammatical structure of the term is that of an adjective and the emphasis is on the words that follow. If, however, he used the term minchah (“meal-offering”), we assume that the fundamental intent of his vow was to bring a meal-offering. Since the specifics he mentioned were unacceptable, we ask him to clarify his intent. The Ra’avad does not accept this distinction, but the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain the Rambam’s position.

Which is also unacceptable. Although Menachot 103a debates whether a person could possibly err and think that a meal-offering from lentils is acceptable, from the resolution of that passage, it appears that such an error is plausible.

Based on the conclusion of the clause and the explanations in the previous halachah, the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh maintain that this law applies only when the person said: “a meal-offering (minchah) of an isaron and a half.”

For he obviously desired to bring more than one isaron.

As stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 2, all of the meal-offerings are brought from solet, “fine flour,” and not kemach, “coarse flour.” This he is vowing to bring an entity that is never offered.

The Ra’avad differs concerning this point and states that in this instance as well, he should be asked to clarify his intent, as mentioned in the previous halachah.

See Chapter 9, Halachah 5, which includes the bread as an integral part of the thanksgiving-offering.

See Chapter 2 which explains that every sacrifice is offered together with wine, meal, and oil.

I.e., as in the previous halachah, he is asked about his intent (Kessef Mishneh).

We assume that this was his intent when making the vow. The Radbaz explains that it is not even necessary to ask him to clarify his intent, since he mentioned the thanksgiving-offering when making his vow, we take for granted that this was what he meant to say.

See Chapter 14, Halachah 1; Chapter 16, Halachah 14.

See Halachah 14.

As mentioned in Chapter 2.

For no two offerings will reach a total of five. See also Halachah 14.

For any number over six will be able to be broken up into multiples of 3,4, or 5, as stated in the following halachah [see the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Menachot 12:4)).

The libations for a sheep are three lugim and those for a ram are four. We assume that the person that the person desired to bring them both.

Six lugim.

Which are the libations for an ox.

Since libations of three and four lugim are brought, we assume that he did not want to make an empty statement. Hence, we ask him to increase the amount so that he will also be able to bring a valid offering. We do not reduce the amount, because there is an unresolved discussion in Menachot 104a if that is acceptable.

Based on the ruling in Halachah 9 with regard to a meal-offering of a half an isaron, the Radbaz states that if one says: “a wine libation of one log,” he should be asked to clarify his intent.

See Chapter 12, Halachot 5 and 7.

See Halachah 12.

See the previous halachah.

See Chapter 10, Halachot 3, 14, for the details of the number and types of animals sacrificed on that day. The wine and oil brought as accompanying offerings for these sacrifices totaled 140 lugim. We assume that a person would not vow or pledge a larger amount. The Radbaz clarifies that this ruling applies to a very wealthy person who can be assumed to have made a generous vow. A person of ordinary means, by contrast, should be required to pay the largest amount he could conceive of having pledged (see Hilchot Arachin 2:8-10).

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 84) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 440) include this commandment as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that this excludes sacrifices from fowl, but this understanding is not accepted by all authorities.

Temurah 21a states that the firstborn offering is not included in this commandment.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 85) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 453) include this commandment as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. The Ramban differs and maintains that this should not be considered as an independent mitzvah.

The one stated in the previous halachah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 90) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 186) include this prohibition as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. There are several historical dimensions to this prohibition. First of all, in the era between the destruction of the Sanctuary of Shiloh and the construction of the Temple, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on bamot (literally, “high-places”), i.e., individual altars. See the notes to Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 1:3 which explain the transition between these periods. It is also relevant with regard to the sanctuary constructed by Chonio, the son of Shimon the Just described in the notes to Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 9:14.

Literally, the soul’s being cut off. This involves premature death in this world (before the age of 50, Mo’ed Kattan 28a) and the soul not meriting a portion in the world to come (Hilchot Teshuvah 8:1).

This term is used to distinguish this sacrifice from the adjustable guilt offering. See Hilchot Shegagot 1:4.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 89) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 439) include this prohibition as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

This applies even if he performed both transgressions without realizing the prohibitions involved in the interim, for they are two separate transgressions that are not dependent on each other (Radbaz).

I.e., the animals mentioned in Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:1 for a definition of this term.

It is, however, forbidden to do so.

The source for this prohibition, as stated in Halachah 3.

See the following halachah.

See Halachah 9.

The prohibition involves slaughtering sacrificial animals. Since these animals are not fit to be sacrificed or their owners are not fit to sacrifice them, they are not considered sacrificial animals in the full sense.

See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:8 which states that it is a positive commandment to offer sacrificial animals after eight days of life, but not before.

See ibid.:2 which states that “Turtledoves are acceptable when [their feathers all] are of a golden hue.” Before this stage, they are not acceptable (ibid.:9).

See Hilchot Shechitah 12:1-2 which states that it is forbidden to sacrifice an animal and its offspring on the same day. No matter which is slaughtered first, one must wait until the following day to sacrifice the other.

A person with a physical affliction somewhat similar to gonorrhea that renders one ritually impure and obligates him to bring a set of sacrifices (see Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 1:1, 3-4; 2:1).

A woman who bleeds for three consecutive days after the seven days associated with her menstrual period. This renders her ritually impure and obligates her to bring a set of sacrifices (see ibid. 1:1, 3-4, 6).

Who is ritually impure after giving birth and must bring a set of sacrifices (see ibid. 1:1, 3, 5).

As explained in the above sources, a zav and a zavah must wait seven “spotless days” after their condition ceases before bringing their sacrifices. A woman must wait 40 days after giving birth to a male and 80 days after giving birth to a female before bringing her sacrifices.

A skin affliction similar to, but not identical with leprosy that is a spiritual manifestation of the impurity resulting from improper speech (the conclusion of Hilchot Tuma’at Tzara’at). Such a person must bring a set of sacrifices when emerging from ritual impurity (see Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 1:1, 3-4).

Such a person must also wait seven days after his condition ceases before bringing his sacrifices.

The sacrifices of all of these individuals include a burnt-offering and a sin-offering and the sacrifice of a person emerging from Tzara‘at also includes a guilt-offering.

To appease God and restore His favor.

See Hilchot Nizirut, ch. 8, for the details regarding the sacrifices a nazirite must bring upon completion of his nazirite vow. He may not bring these sacrifices beforehand.

See Hilchot Shegagot, Chapter 8, for a description of the situations which warrant bringing these sacrifices.

See Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 1:7, which describes the situations under which such sacrifices should be brought.

With regard to these sacrifices, it is possible that it will be discovered that the person definitely did sin. In such an instance, the sacrifice is not offered. If the sacrificial animal has not been slaughtered, it is left to pasture until it contracts a blemish. If it was slaughtered, its blood is poured down the drainage channel. Since there is a possibility of this taking place, the animal is not deemed a sacrificial animal in the full sense and one is not liable for slaughtering it or offering it.
The Ra’avad accepts the Rambam’s ruling with regard to a sin-offering of fowl brought because of a doubt, since only its blood is offered on the altar, but not its body. Hence, there is room to free one from the obligations involved with a sacrificial animal. Nevertheless, he argues, a conditional guilt-offering is offered on the altar. Hence one should be liable for slaughtering and offering it outside the Temple. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh question the Ra’avad’s objection, noting that the Rambam’s ruling has its basis in Keritot 18a.

As stated in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 15:1, with the exception of a sin-offering or a Paschal sacrifice, whenever a sacrificial animal was slaughtered for the sake of an offering other than the one for which it was intended, it is acceptable, but it does not fulfill the obligation of the owner (see also ibid.:20). Since the sacrifice would be acceptable if it was offered in the Temple, the person is liable for slaughtering it outside.

The goat sent to Azazel and its pair whose blood is taken into the Holy of Holies. See Hilchot Avodat Yom HaKippurim 1:1.

More precisely, the confession is recited only over the one sent to Azazel (ibid. 4:2). The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that the matter is dependent not only the confession, but on the lottery in which the goats are designated for their respective purposes. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that the Rambam’s ruling is based on Zevachim 113a. Although there are other interpretations of that passage, the Rambam has a foundation for his decision.

Or for either of them, were he to slaughter only one.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 5, which states that the gates to the Temple building must be open for the slaughter of peace offerings to be acceptable.

The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that this applies only during the remainder of the year. The rationale is that, as explained below, during the remainder of the year, an animal designated as a Paschal sacrifice is considered as a peace-offering and a peace-offering is not disqualified if it is not offered with the desired intent. On the day preceding Pesach, when the Paschal sacrifice is offered, it is unacceptable if it is not offered with the desired intent. Hence on that date, were someone to slaughter an animal designated for this purpose for the sake of another sacrifice outside the Temple Courtyard, he would not be liable.

See Hilchot Korban Pesach 4:7. Since it is considered as a peace-offering, just as one is liable for slaughtering an animal designated as a peace-offering outside the Temple Courtyard, so too, he is liable for slaughtering such an animal.

Since the fetus it is carrying will later be offered as a sacrifice, it is forbidden to cause that sacrifice to be disqualified.

Neither the mother nor the fetus.

Even though the animal did not belong to him and hence, he had no right to consecrate it, our Sages considered it as his own so that he would be liable for karet.

For then it is still considered as belonging to the owner. Hence, the thiefs consecration is not effective. See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 5:7 which speaks of the disqualification of a thiefs offering. From Hilchot Geneivah 2:6, it appears that the thief must have also consecrated the animal after the owner’s despair and not before. Otherwise, the consecration would not be effective.

Karet or lashes for slaughtering the animal outside the Temple Courtyard.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that Zevachim 107b uses this prooftext to teach the following concept: that one who slaughters on the roof of the Temple Building is exempt. Hence he suggests that a printing error crept into the Mishneh Torah and that the text should be amended to fit the Talmud’s teaching. This conception is not, however, shared by all authorities.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 4.

For he did not slaughter the animal outside the Temple Courtyard.

Note the contrast to Chapter 19, Halachah 12, with regard to offering an animal as a sacrifice.

The verses use a singular form.

The commentaries note that although the Rambam’s ruling has a source in Zevachim 108a and in the Sifri, his process of exegesis is different than that used in those sources.

But instead was slaughtering it for mundane purposes.

In this as well, there is a contrast to offering an animal as a sacrifice, as stated in Chapter 19, Halachah 1.

Here also, the Rambam’s method of exegesis is different from that of his apparent source, Zevachim 108b. Significantly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 13:3), he cites the method of exegesis used by the Talmud.

Literally, “poured out.”

I.e., an ordinary animal, not one designated as a sacrifice.

The Ra’avad maintains that the person is exempt in such a situation. The Radbaz justifies the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that there is a fundamental difference between slaughtering an animal inside the Temple Courtyard and slaughtering it outside. When it is slaughtered inside the Temple Courtyard at night, it is disqualified as a sacrifice, because of it having been slaughtered at night and hence, it is not acceptable wherever it was offered. If, by contrast, it was slaughtered outside the Temple Courtyard, it becomes placed in the category of animals slaughtered in such a place. Hence the time when it is offered is not significant. The Kessef Mishneh also justifies the Rambam’s approach.

Even during the following day (Kessef Mishneh).

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 3:6.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 1.

This disqualifies the sacrifice, for as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 1, the blood of a sacrificial animal must be received in a sacred vessel.

For the animal was no longer acceptable as a sacrifice.

For the prooftext defining the prohibition (Leviticus 17:3) mentions slaughter, but not melikah (Zevachim 107a).

This is equivalent to slaughtering an animal inside the Temple Courtyard and offering it outside.

Thus disqualifying it, for in the Temple Courtyard, a fowl should be killed through melikah not ritual slaughter.

Both for slaughtering and for offering.