Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The commentaries raise a question concerning this ruling, because seemingly, the baker should separate challah himself. Moreover, because of the severity of the prohibition of challah, the common people were not considered suspect to refrain from making this separation.

The Radbaz explains that we are speaking about an instance where the baker told the purchaser to separate challah, alternatively, an instance where the baker is suspect not to separate challah. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the responsibility for the baker to separate challah applies only when the challah is ritually pure. Since it will be eaten by the priest, it is appropriate that the baker separate it. When, by contrast, it is impure and must be burnt, it should be separated by the purchaser.

Difusim, translated as "trays," literally means "molds." In the Talmudic era, bread was baked in various molds so that the loaves would be shaped differently. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Demai 1:3), the Rambam explains that there was an opinion which forbade separating challah from one tray for another lest the flour used to bake the different breads was from different years.

I.e., whether the dough is made from each of the species individually or a combination of any of the five, as stated in Halachah 15.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Challah 1:1) derives this concept because there is an association between challah and matzah. Matzah may only be made from these five species, for they are the only species that can become leaven. Hence, it is these five to which the mitzvah of challah applies. See Halachah 11 which discusses the laws that apply when a dough is made using one of these grains and other species.

These mitzvot refer to grain left for the poor.

When the grain was left by its owner, it was ownerless and hence, there were no agricultural obligations incumbent upon it. Now, however, that someone took possession of it, those obligations do apply.

Because at this point it is not considered as grain yet. See Hilchot Ma'aser 2:3-5. Nevertheless, since a dough made from such grain will become leaven, there is an obligation to separate challah [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Bikkurim 1:4)].

Before it was threshed; see Hilchot Terumah3:13, Hilchot Ma'aser 3:19.

For as stated in Hilchot Terumah, op. cit., there is no obligation to separate terumah from such grain. And since there is no obligation to separate terumah, one might think that one is also exempt from the obligation to separate challah

As explained in Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 7:11-12, three se'ah of barley would be harvested for the omer offering. That barley was then made into flour, sifted and refined until only an isaron (a far smaller measure) was selected for the omer offering. The remainder of the barley was redeemed and could be used for mundane purposes.

This refers to the extra flour which had been set aside for the two loaves or the showbread, like the remainder of the barley mentioned in the previous note, it could be redeemed and then used for mundane purposes.

In all these instances, since the dough was prepared after it was redeemed, it is considered as bread belonging to an ordinary person. Hence, the obligation to tithe it applies (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).

Although produce of the second tithe is "the property of the Most High," in Jerusalem, it is permitted to be eaten by ordinary people. Hence, challah must be separated from the dough (Radbaz).

Like the ownerless produce mentioned in the previous halachah, at present, it is the property of the person who took it as his own. Hence, there is an obligation to separate challah.

Although there is a possibility that the produce is a mixture of terumah and ordinary produce which is exempt as stated in the following clause, there is also a possibility that this is only ordinary produce in which instance, an obligation does apply.

The Radbaz states that this law applies only in the present era when the obligation to separate challah is of Rabbinic origin. In that instance, the prohibition of a mixture of terumah offsets the obligation to separate challah, for they are both Rabbinic safeguards. If, however, the obligation to separate challah is Scriptural in origin, it would take precedence.

Together with the thanksgiving offering, 40 loaves (10 each of four types) were offered.

Together with the ram, a nazirite offered 30 loaves (10 each of three types). See Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 9:12-24 for a description of these loaves.

To bring as part of his offering, rather than to sell to someone else.

And challah need only be separated from a person's private property, not from consecrated property (Menachot 67a).

This applies even if the dough is not large enough that each of the partners will receive a portion the size of an olive (Radbaz). Even though they intend to separate the bread after it is baked, as long as they do not intend to separate the dough, they are obligated to separate challah (Siftei Cohen 326:1).

We are speaking about a situation where a person bakes bread in order to give it to many people. He does not, however, declare the bread ownerless. Were he to do so, there would be no obligation to separate challah, as stated in Chapter 8, Halachah 6.

I.e., even though he should have separated the terumah before the dough was made, after the fact, his separation is effective

The Radbaz questions why the Rambam does not mention the second tithe, for in the years that there is an obligation to separate it, one may not partake of the produce until it is separated.

The Radbaz states that the law depends on the intent of the person making the dough and not what it is eventually used for.

For the mitzvah applies only to dough prepared for human consumption.

A dough made without bran being separated from the flour which is thus usually not intended for human consumption [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Challah 1:8)].

Since the shepherds also intend to partake of it, it is considered as intended for human consumption and challah must be separated from the entire dough, even from the portion intended for the dogs.

Menachot 67a derives this from the fact that Numbers 15:20, the prooftext for the obligation of challah, speaks of "the first of your dough," i.e., the dough of a Jew and not of a gentile.

The Radbaz maintains that the Jew may separate challah from the entire dough, even from the gentile's portion.

Because there is no holiness associated with it.

I.e., the Jew thought that if he gave the dough to a gentile to prepare, it would be exempt and the gentile desired to separate challah from it. The Radbaz states that although generally we do not suspect that a prohibition is being violated, there is room to do so in this instance, because otherwise, why would the gentile think of separating challah.

As stated in Halachah 15.

Or any other of the five species of grain mentioned in Halachah 2.

The Turei Zahav 324:9 states this law applies to rice and not to other species, because rice takes on the flavor of wheat.

This applies even if quantitatively, there is more rice than wheat. For the wheat is considered as dominant.

The Ra'avad states that this ruling applies only when there is enough wheat in the dough to establish an obligation. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that the Rambam does not make such a distinction. The difference of opinion between them centers on the interpretation of the Jerusalem Talmud (Challah 3:5). The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 324:9) quotes the Rambam's wording without any further qualification. There is a similar disagreement between the Rambam and the Ra'avad with regard to matzah made from wheat and rice. See Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 6:5.

Yeast is singled out, because a small amount of yeast can affect an entire dough.

The Ra'avad states that this applies when the yeast is taken from a dough from which challah had not been separated. The Radbaz, however, states that it is possible that the Rambam does not accept that conclusion. In this instance as well, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 324:10) quotes the Rambam's ruling without further qualification.

All of the instances mentioned in the first clause of the halachah are not bread in the simple sense. Nevertheless, they are all considered as dough within the context of this mitzvah.

Even though no water was mixed into it [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 329:9)].

Since ultimately the dough was baked, the fact that the flour was boiled first is not significant (Siftei Cohen 329:8).

Similarly, dough boiled in water is not considered as bread, but as cooked food.

As long as there was an intent to use the dough for bread at one stage in its preparation, challah must be separated.

A mixture of whey and bread crumbs used as a dip.

This shape indicates that he may change his mind and serve the cakes as bread.

This indicates that he is not intending to serve the strips as bread, but will indeed crumble them and use them for kutach.

Our Sages derived this measure as follows: Numbers 15:19 states: "You shall separate the first of your dough as challah." As Exodus 16:16 relates the amount of manna allotted to each individual in the desert was an omer. Hence we use that as the size of the required measure of dough (Eruvin 83b).

A revi'it is approximately 86cc according to Shiurei Torah and approximately 150 cc according to Chazon Ish. Thus a log is 344 or 600 cc, a kab 1376 or 2400 cc, and the measure of the dough from which challah must be separated is 2500 (because the above figures are approximations) or 4320 cc.

Shiurei Torah writes that a blessing should be recited when separating challah from a dough made from 3 pounds and 10 ¾ ounces of flour and one should be stringent and separate challah from a dough made from 2 pounds and 10.1 ounces of flour.

I.e., less than the measure described in the previous halachah.

This applies even though he is ritually impure and he knows that he will be separating the dough to have it burnt (Challah 2:3). The Turei Zahav 324:17 and the Siftei Cohen 324:25 emphasize that this applies only when the person's intent in making the loaf small is that he will not have to separate challah. If he has another intent, his actions are not sanctioned.

Which was also less than the prescribed measure.

This applies even though the loaves themselves are not joined together. One of the examples of the separation of challah with which many are familiar - the separation of challah from matzah - employs this principle.

I.e., if small loaves are baked together in an oven, but taken out separately, there is no obligation to separate challah.

Even though at the time the dough was made, there was not a sufficient quantity to require the separation of challah.

The fact that they are joined is sufficient for them to be considered as a singled entity.

In contrast to the basket mentioned in the previous halachah.

Pesachim 48b mentions an unresolved difference of opinion concerning this question among the Sages.

Like the challah separated in the present era, as stated Chapter 5, Halachah 5.

For we follow the principle: When there is a doubt regarding a Rabbinic obligation, we rule leniently (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 325:1) writes that if one places the bread on a board and then covers it with a cloth, there is an authority who requires the separation of challah. The Siftei Cohen 325:5 questions why the Shulchan Aruch uses the expression "there is an authority...," in as much as this principle is universally accepted.

I.e., the flour together with the bran, even though the flour alone is not of sufficient quantity to require challah to be separated.

For a poor person will eat bread made from coarse flour containing bran (Shabbat 76b).

The Jerusalem Talmud (Challah 2:6) explains that this is derived from Numbers 15:21 that speaks of "your dough," i.e., the way dough is ordinarily made.

According to the Rambam, this halachah pertains to a baker and not to ordinary individuals. The laws pertaining to them are mentioned in the following halachah.

To sell to others to use the yeast to leaven other doughs without this dough being baked.

So that he will be baking smaller portions and not be obligated to separate challah.

I.e., private individuals who will use the yeast for themselves and not for commercial purposes.

Because the dough is not being made to be baked as bread, but to be divided as dough. Since it is being made for private individuals, the Rambam maintains that there is little likelihood that they will change their minds and have it baked. Even though the women did not give their flour to the baker together, the fact that he made a dough from them would have caused an obligation for challah had the intent been to bake the dough. Moreover, the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 326:3) rules that if the women consent to having their flour mixed in a larger dough, an obligation to separate challah is created.

The Ra'avad maintains that if one woman makes dough to use as yeast, the law mentioned with regard to a baker in the previous halachah applies to her and she is required to separate challah. Here the leniency is granted because several women are involved. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh argue against the Ra'avad's conclusion and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 326:2) states that the stringency applies to a baker and not to an ordinary person.

The Radbaz emphasizes that touching each other is not sufficient; the two doughs must become attached. See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 325:1).

Who are not partners (Siftei Cohen 326:1).

See the following halachah which distinguishes between doughs made from one type and those made from two. See also Chapter 6, Halachot 16-17, which deal with the issues mentioned in this and the following halachot.

Thus even if they were kneaded together, since they were intended to be separated, they are considered as distinct entities.

Since they both belong to him and are of the same type of grain, why would he object to their combination?

This, however, applies only when the two doughs are types that would normally be mixed together. If they would not be normally mixed, even if they are owned by one person, this principle does not apply [Shulchan Aruch and Rama (Yoreh De'ah 326:1)].

And becomes attached. This applies to all the other instances when touching doughs are mentioned in this chapter.

Although they are from different species, since they are of the same general type (for the doughs made from the two are similar, see Chapter 8, Halachah 4), they are combined.

I.e., barley, oats, or rye.

Despite the fact that if the different species of grain are mixed in the same dough, they are combined, as stated in the following halachah.

Although spelt is often associated with wheat (ibid.), its dough can be combined with that of rye.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 324:2) mentions the Rambam's perspective as a minority ruling, favoring the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that rye can be combined with barley and with spelt, but not with oats or wheat. And oats can be combined with barley and spelt, but not with rye or wheat.

See Hilchot Terumah 10:18.

I.e., taking a portion of both of the two doughs. This advice was given by Rabbi Yishmael (Challah 4:4).

I.e., placing the doughs of new grain on either side of the dough of old grain or the doughs of old grain on either side of the dough from new grain. Since the person will see that he is adding an extra dough, he will not err and think that one may separate terumah from new grain for old grain [Kessef Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 324:8); see Halachah 6]. The Radbaz offers a different explanation.

Chapter 6, Halachah 15.

The two doughs on the sides are of the same type of grain and together, they comprise the required measure.

See Chapter 6, Halachot 2-4, 9-10, which mention the exemption of these doughs.

I.e., the two external doughs touch the middle dough. If, however, the two external doughs are touching, challah must be separated from them.

In all the instances mentioned in this halachah, the governing principle is that even if the dough in the center cannot be combined with those on the side (as explained in Halachot 1-4), since it is fit to require the separation of challah, it does not prevent the doughs on the side from being combined.

This is speaking about a dough that was not consecrated until after it was made. If it was consecrated before it was rolled together, it is not fit to be redeemed. See Chapter 8, Halachot 6-7.

As stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 16.

In contrast to two Jews or a Jew and a gentile, as explained in the following halachot.

Since they were gentiles (see Chapter 6, Halachah 8) at the time the obligation to separate challah could have taken effect, the mitzvah of challah is not relevant to them at all . Hence, the exemption because the dough was made with the intent that it be divided into small portions (see ibid. 19) is not significant.

If, however, they divided the dough after they converted, there is no obligation to separate challah even if they added to the dough. For in such an instance, they would be comparable to the two Jews mentioned in the following halachah (Rambam LeAm).

Hence we do not say - as is said with regard to the following halachah - since the dough was exempt at the time when it could have been obligated, it cannot become obligated again.

The Siftei Cohen 326:8 emphasizes that for this law to apply the addition must be less than the size that obligates the separation of challah.

Had it belonged to one person.

And since the obligation was not incurred at the time it could have been incurred originally, it cannot be incurred afterwards.

The Ra'avad objects to this ruling. He admits that it appears to have a source in the Jerusalem Talmud (Challah 3:4), but argues that logically, it is hard to distinguish this from a situation where a person made a dough smaller than the required size and then attached it to a dough of the required size (see Chapter 6, Halachah 16). Hence, he rules that both Jews should separate challah from the dough after they increased its size.

The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh support the Rambam's ruling, differentiating between the two instances by explaining that when a dough is smaller than the required size, it has never reached a state where the obligation to separate challah relates to it. In contrast, in the instance described here, the dough was of the size that obligates the separation of challah and it was exempted. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 326:4) quotes the Rambam's view.

The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that this is speaking about a situation where the two had not originally intended to divide their dough and then decided to divide it. Had they originally intended to divide it, it would be necessary to separate challah from the portion belonging to the convert as well.

In contrast to the situation mentioned in the previous halachah, the dough was not originally intended to be divided. Hence, since the gentile has a portion in it, while it is whole, it is not considered as if the mitzvah of challah relates to it. Thus the Jew's portion of the dough was never of the size that requires the separation of challah and when he increases its size, an obligation is created (Radbaz).

I.e., the convert.

Since originally, the gentile's involvement in the dough caused his portion to be exempted, when he adds to it, it is not liable, based on the principle explained above. The Ra'avad differs and maintains that there is an obligation to separate challah from both doughs. For just as the mitzvah of challah is not considered as relating to the Jew's dough, it also does not relate to the gentile's dough. Hence, when he adds to it after his conversion, the obligation takes effect. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh favor the Rambam's understanding and it is quoted as halachah by Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 330:6).

This is preferable to separating challah from the dough with which the yeast was mixed, because a) it will represent a saving for the person separating the challah, since he will not be separating challah a second time; b) it is not desirable to separate challah from the first dough, because the obligation to separate challah from it is Rabbinic, not Scriptural, as will be explained.

As is required (Chapter 5, Halachah 14). That is why the second dough must be combined with the first dough into which the yeast was placed.

The combination of the yeast and the dough.

The yeast.

And yeast and dough are considered of the same type.

This is a Rabbinic decree, according to Scriptural Law, the presence of tevel is also nullified when there is a majority of permitted substances. Our Sages considered tevel as a devar sheyeish lo matirin, a prohibition that could be released, since once the necessary separations are made, the prohibition no longer exists. See Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 15:6. Hence, he is not considered to be separating challah from dough that is obligated for that which is exempt (Siftei Cohen 324:20).

Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTuma'ah 11:2, 15.

It does, however, have such an effect with regard to terumah and challah.

See Hilchot Tuma'at Ochalin 16:9. There the Rambam differentiates between produce from which the appropriate agricultural separations have been made and produce from which they have not been made (as in the present instance). If the separations have already been made, one may bring it into direct contact with ritual impurity. If they have not been made, one may only "cause it to contract ritual impurity," i.e., indirectly.

Which is ritually pure.

Challah 2:8 gives this suggestion, but speaks of taking less than the size of an egg of the impure dough, for in that manner, the other dough will not become impure.

Causing it to touch it. This will cause the pure dough to become ritually impure (see Hilchot Tuma'at Ochalin 6:18). Nevertheless, this is not significant, because - as the Rambam stated - there is no prohibition against causing food to become ritually impure.

The dough set aside to be separated as challah does not become ritually impure, because until it becomes consecrated as challah, it does not become impure because it was touched by dough that was impure to the second degree. And before it is consecrated as challah, it is lifted up and no longer in contact with the source of ritual impurity. To clarify this, the Rambam began this halachah: "A dough from which challah has not been separated is like ordinary produce and... impurity of the second degree does not bring about impurity of the third degree with regard to ordinary produce" (Radbaz).

Ordinarily to separate challah for two doughs in the same place, it is not necessary for them to touch. Nevertheless, since one should not separate challah from dough that is ritually pure for dough that is ritually impure (Chapter 5, Halachah 14), in this instance, they must be touching.

The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, based on Challah 2:8, but the Radbaz explains the Rambam's position as above.

I.e., the person would consider an appropriate portion of the dough set aside as challah for a given dough and would continue doing this for future doughs until the entire dough that was set aside became challah [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Challah 4:6)].

E.g., two witnesses stated that challah had been separated from the dough and two other witnesses state that it was not separated.

Here the demai is being used differently than its ordinary meaning. For unlike the tithes, it is taken for granted that the common people separate challah just as they separate terumah (Radbaz; see Chapter 8, Halachah 14).

Generally, the initial preference is not to separate challah from dough that is ritually pure for dough that is ritually impure (Chapter 5, Halachah 14).

And generally, they must (ibid.).

It is permitted to be eaten by a non-priest. Rashi (Kiddushin 46b) explains that the rationale for this law is that the prooftext requiring the separation of challah mentions "your dough," i.e., the obligation is incurred only when dough is made.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 327:1) clarify that this law applies when the person desires that the flour be considered as challah while it is still flour. If, however, he stipulates: "May it be considered challah when a dough is made from it," when it is made into a dough, his statement takes effect.

The priest is obligated to return it to the person who gave it to him. This applies even if the one who gave it is a Torah scholar who knows that flour cannot be separated as challah. Although one could assume that he was giving the flour to the priest as a gift, it must be returned lest the priest think that it was challah and not separate challah from the dough he makes from it (Kiddushin 46b; Turei Zahav 327:1).

Since the first separation is of no consequence.

I.e., it was of the measure from which we are required to separate challah.

The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, stating that it is undesirable to separate challah in this manner, for as indicated by Halachah 4, the obligation to separate challah has not taken effect yet. Based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Pesachim 3:3), the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that the statements in this halachah are a safeguard against the dough becoming ritually impure. From the time the water is mixed with the flour, it is permitted to separate the challah and one may do so if he is worried that the dough will become ritually impure. It is, however, preferable to wait until the dough is thoroughly mixed as stated in Halachah 4. Certainly, this applies in the present era when there is no need to take safeguards against ritual impurity [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 327:3)]

I.e., it was of the measure from which we are required to separate challah.

For then the dough made from that flour would have a separate obligation. When, by contrast, there is less than that measure, it is considered as ancillary to the initial dough.

This applies even if an omer of flour remains. Since he can easily mix the dough, he can make a stipulation that will take effect when he actually mixes it together. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 327:2) states that it is desirable to teach women who separate challah to make this stipulation.

Chapter 6, Halachah 16.

After the obligation to separate challah takes effect, however, it is forbidden to snack from the dough. It is considered as tevel and one is liable as stated in the following halachah.

For spelt flour has characteristics similar to wheat flour, and rye and oats to barley.

See Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 10:19; Hilchot Ma'aser 1:5; 9:2.

Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:1. This applies when he is given a warning before transgressing.

And thus challah need not be separated from it.

As stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 4. This applies only in the present era when the obligation to separate challah is Rabbinic in origin (Radbaz).

Because the obligation to separate challah from the dough had already taken effect.

There is no obligation to separate challah from dough that is consecrated. Once, however, the consecrated dough is redeemed, challah must be separated. When a person makes dough from flour that was ownerless which he acquired, he must separate challah from it. See Chapter 6, Halachot 3 and 5.

In which instance, the obligation to separate challah had already taken effect before it was consecrated or declared ownerless.

Because it was consecrated.

Because the obligation to separate challah took effect when the dough belonged to the Jew.

For at the time the obligation to separate challah was to take effect, the dough belonged to the gentile and was exempt.

Because at the time the obligation to separate challah was to take effect, the convert had not converted and was not obligated to separate challah.

The Rambam adds this explanation (based on Chullin 134a), because generally, we would follow the principle: "When one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him" (see Chapter 9, Halachah 13). Nevertheless, in this instance, because of the severity of the transgression, challah should be separated. The Turei Zahav 330:3 and the Siftei Cohen 330:8 note that in the present age, when there is a question whether of not challah has been separated, one is exempt, for at present the observance of the mitzvah of challah is Rabbinic in origin. On this basis, the Sifei Cohen questions why this law is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 330:5),

Since there is a doubt concerning the matter, the person must make restitution for the challah, because whenever there is a question with regard to Scriptural Law, we rule stringency and require him to make restitution so that he can gain atonement. There is, however, no such obligation with regard to the additional fifth, because it was never definitely established that he was liable.

And thus, the obligation to separate challah has not been established. Hence, the principle that we are allowed to cause ordinary produce to become impure is applied.

For in this way, he will have defined the ritual state of the challah.

As stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 4.

We are forbidden to cause challah mandated by Scriptural Law to contract ritual impurity (Hilchot Terumah 12:1). In this instance, since the challah has not been separated, that prohibition would not be violated. Nevertheless, since the obligation to separate challah has been established, it is preferable to be stringent.

Lest it be impure. Thus a priest who partakes of it would be transgressing, as stated in Hilchot Terumah 7:3.

Lest it be pure. In which case, it would be forbidden to destroy it unnecessarily. See Hilchot Terumah 12:3.

This refers to dough prepared in Eretz Yisrael when the obligation to separate challah was of Scriptural origin. See Hilchot Terumah 12:1. See also Radbaz.

A Talmudic measure roughly equivalent to a kilometer.

I.e., a mikveh or stream in which he can purge himself from impurity. Compare to Hilchot Tefilah 4:2-3 which makes a distinction whether the water is before him or behind him. See Kessef Mishneh.

I.e., a loaf to be set aside and used as challah for loaves to be baked in the future.

Lest over time he cause it to become impure. The person making the loaf is thus enabling the common person to transgress the prohibition against making challah impure.

By making the dough pure, the doughmaker is required to separate challah in a state of ritual impurity. That is problematic, because the common person may cause it to become ritually impure. Nevertheless, as will be explained, certain provisions are enacted to allow such a dough to be made.

A person who is careful in his observance of the laws of ritual impurity.

See Hilchot Tuma'at Meit 6:2, Hilchot Keilim 1:6, et al. Thus even if the common person would touch the utensil, it would not become impure.

This warning is not true, for once challah is separated, a dough never becomes tevel again. Nevertheless, we assume that the common person will not know the law and will be careful not to touch the dough, because of this warning. We are not concerned about the dough itself, because one is permitted to cause ordinary produce to contract ritual impurity, as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 12.

I.e., it is not desirable, because ultimately, there is the possibility that the challah will become impure.

Although the common person's wife is presumed to be ritually impure, nevertheless, since the flour is dry, it is not susceptible to ritual impurity. Hence even if she would touch it, it would not present a difficulty [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 5:9)]. This leniency is allowed only as an expression of "the ways of piece" (Sh'vi'it, loc. cit.).

I.e., needless to say, the wife of the chaver should not let the wife of the common person help her, for her dough would become ritually impure. She should not even help the wife of the common person for the reason stated by the Rambam.

And preparing dough in a state of ritual impurity was considered a transgression in the Talmudic era when the laws of ritual impurity were observed.

For then the baking process has already been completed.

Which is considered an intermediate level between Eretz Yisrael and the Diaspora with regard to many of the agricultural laws. With regard to its status for challah, see Chapter 5, Halachah 8.

Certainly, this law applies in Eretz Yisrael where eating bread from which challah was not separated is punishable by death at the hand of heaven. We do not suspect a baker of being willing to cause a fellow Jew to violate such a transgression. Nevertheless, the above applies only when the baker says that he has separated the challah. If he does not make such a statement and he is a common person, even in Eretz Yisrael, the purchaser must separate challah as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 1 (Radbaz).

I.e., he can rely on the baker.

Even the common people.

We are speaking about a baker who is a common person. Even if he says that he separated challah, his word is not accepted (Radbaz).

Even if he is a common person.

We assume that a common person is careful about what he eats himself - and what he serves from his kitchen. It is only when selling retail that his integrity is suspect.